Search Results For: Aarti Sathe


COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: June 12, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 13, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 260A/ 271(1)(c): (i) An appeal u/s 260-A can be entertained by the High Court on the issue of jurisdiction even if the same was not raised before the Tribunal (ii) the question relating to non-striking off of the inapplicable portion in the s. 271(1)(c) show-cause notice goes to the root of the lis & is a jurisdictional issue (iii) it would be too technical and pedantic to take the view that because in the printed notice the inapplicable portion was not struck off, the order of penalty should be set aside even though in the assessment order it was clearly mentioned that penalty proceedings u/s 271(1)(c) had been initiated separately for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income, (iv) Penalty cannot be imposed for alleged breach of one limb of s. 271(1)(c) of the Act while proceedings were initiated for breach of the other limb of s. 271(1)(c). This vitiates the order of penalty, (v) Threat of penalty cannot become a gag and / or haunt an assessee for making a claim which may be erroneous or wrong (All judgements referred)

Concealment of particulars of income was not the charge against the appellant, the charge being furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. As discussed above, it is trite that penalty cannot be imposed for alleged breach of one limb of Section 271(1)(c) of the Act while penalty proceedings were initiated for breach of the other limb of Section 271(1)(c). This has certainly vitiated the order of penalty.

COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , , , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: September 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 5, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 48 Capital Gains: The payment towards discharge of outstanding loan liability out of the sale proceeds of mortgaged property is a mere application of income and not a diversion of sale proceeds by overriding title. The assessee cannot claim such application as deduction for the purpose of computing Capital Gain in terms of s. 48 of the Act. The legal position prevailing prior to SARFAESI Act is also germane even after the enactment of SARFAESI Act

I thus agree with the view taken by the learned Judicial Member that the consideration from sale of property to the extent of principal component of loan adjusted by the bank cannot be treated as ‘diversion of income by overriding title’ and was thus not deductible from the total consideration accrued to the assessee from sale of property. In my considered opinion, so far as the instant dispute is concerned, the legal position prevailing prior to SARFAESI Act is also germane even after the enactment of SARFAESI Act

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: April 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 30, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 1986-87
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 35AB: Question whether the term "acquiring know-how" means acquiring on ownership basis or on lease and whether deduction can be allowed u/s 37(1) for revenue expenditure explained. Judgements in Anil Starch Products 232 TM 129 and Diffusion Engineers 376 ITR 487 (Kar) (based on Swaraj Engines 301 ITR 284 (SC)) dissented from

Therefore, the reliance by the Gujarat High Court in Anil Starch Products Ltd. (supra) and Sayaji Industries Ltd.(supra) and Karnataka High Court in Diffusion Engineers Ltd. (supra) on the basis of the Apex Court decision in Swaraj Industries Ltd. (supra) to hold that all expenditure which is revenue in nature would not fall under section 35AB of the Act and would have necessarily to fall under Section 37 of the Act to our mind is not warranted by the decision of the Apex Court in Swaraj Engines Ltd. (SC)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 9(1)(i): The capital gains arising on transfer by a foreign company of shares in another foreign company holding assets in India is liable to tax in India. The argument that the transfer is a mere re-organisation of assets within the group and that there is no “real income” is not acceptable. The argument that the India-UK DTAA should be given a “static” interpretation and that the retrospective amendment to s. 9 by the Finance Act 2012 should be ignored is also not acceptable. Where the DTAA provides that the income shall be chargeable to tax in accordance with the provision of the domestic law, the said domestic law has to be the amended law

Coming to the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of DIT Vs. New Skies Satellite BV wherein the Hon’ble High court has held that in relation to applicability of Article 3(2) of the relevant DTAAs, that it can apply only to terms not defined in the DTAA. Since the relevant DTAAs in the case before them defined ‘royalty’, Article 3(2) could not be applied. For terms which are defined under the DTAA, there is no need to refer to the laws in force in the Contracting States, especially to deduce the meaning of the definition under the DTAA. Further, the court has held that neither act of parliament supply or alter the boundaries of DTAA or supply redundancy to any part of its. Similarly, according to us, the provisions of DTAA where it simply provides that particular income would be chargeable to tax in accordance with the provisions of domestic laws, such article in DTAA also cannot the limit the boundaries of domestic tax laws. In view of this, we do not find any force in the argument of the assessee and dismiss ground No. 3.12 of the appeal

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2): Plea that the appeal was mistakenly withdrawn on the advice of Counsel and that the same should be restored should be backed by evidence. If the assessee voluntarily withdraws the appeal, he cannot seek restoration on the ground that the withdrawal was an apparent mistake

At the very outset we must point out that it is the petitioner’s case that he acted on the advise of the Counsel in withdrawing the appeal. However, this submission of the petitioner is without there being anything on record from the Advocate concerned that he advised the petitioner to withdraw his appeal. Further the communication dated 23rd April, 2010 addressed to the Tribunal for withdrawal of the appeal was by the petitioner himself and in that communication he does not mention that the appeal is being withdrawn on account of legal advise. In fact it is an unconditional withdrawal of the appeal

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 50C: Land purchased by a builder with the knowledge that there are encumbrances on it and development is not feasible is a “capital asset” and not “stock-in-trade”. The gains on transfer of such land is assessable as capital gains and not as business profits. S. 50C applies to development agreements if the effect of the development agreement read with the conveyance deed is that the entire land with ownership rights are transferred

Section 50C of the Act is clearly applicable even to the sale of development rights in the land as was held in the decisions relied upon by the learned DR as detailed above , more-so we have already held that in-fact the assessee has not only sold development rights in the land but the assessee sold the entire land with ownership rights in the land if the development agreement are read in conjunction with deed of confirmation / conveyance executed by the assessee which are placed in paper book filed with the Tribunal. Thus, the land which was sold during the previous year by the assessee, thus keeping in view our above discussions in the light of facts and circumstances of the case, was a capital asset within the provisions of Section 2(14) of the Act and the valuation of the land as per stamp duty valuation authorities as per section 50C of the Act was rightly adopted by the AO as full value of consideration

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 2(22)(d)/ 46A: A buyback of shares u/s 77A of the Companies Act is not a reduction of capital u/s 100 - 104 of that Act. A buyback cannot be regarded as a "colourable transaction" and cannot be assessed as "deemed dividend" u/s 2(22)(d). The capital gains on buy-back are exempt under the India-Mauritius DTAA

Section 100-105 r.w.s. 391of the CA deal with reduction of capital and obtaining permission of the Court. Clearly, both deal with different situations. The Hon’ble Jurisdictional High Court has dealt with the schemes of buyback of shares and reduction of capital in the case of Capgemini India Private Limited (Company Scheme Petition No.434 of 2014 dated 28.04.2015) where it was held that it is open to a company to buy back its own shares by following the procedure prescribed under section 77A/Section 68 or by following the procedure prescribed under section 391 read with Sections 100 to 104 of the 1956, Act. The observations of the Hon’ble Court does not leave any doubt that buyback of shares cannot be equated with reduction of capital

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: September 12, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 4, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Creation of a reserve was sufficient to entitle the assessee to claim the benefit u/s 36(1)(viii) and the assessee was not obliged to maintain the said reserve

This court held in the matter of Grasim Industries Ltd. (supra) that the condition precedent to the exercise of jurisdiction under section 263 was that the order sought to be revised must be erroneous insofar as it was prejudicial to …

CIT vs. LIC Housing Finance Ltd (Bombay High Court) Read More »