Home › Archive for High Court › Page 35
Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category

This section is now closed. Click here for new judgements


Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 2, 2011 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Bogus purchases: A statement by the alleged vendor that the transactions with the assessee are only accommodation entries and that there are no sales or purchases cannot be relied upon by the AO unless the assessee is given the opportunity to cross-examine the vendor

The question raised in this appeal is, whether the Tribunal was justified in deleting the addition on account of bogus purchases allegedly made by the assessee from M/s. Thakkar Agro Industrial Chem Supplies P. Ltd. According to the revenue, the Director of M/s. Thakkar Agro Industrial Chem Supplies P. Ltd. in his statement had stated that there were no sales / purchases but the transactions were only accommodation bills not involving any transactions. The Tribunal has recorded a finding of fact that the assessee had disputed the correctness of the above statement and admittedly the assessee was not given any opportunity to cross examine the concerned Director of M/s. Thakkar Agro Industrial Chem Supplies P. Ltd. who had made the above statement. The appellate authority had sought remand report and even at that stage the genuineness of the statement has not been established by allowing cross examination of the person whose statement was relied upon by the revenue

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 68: Even if the premium at which the shares are issued defies commercial prudence, the receipt cannot be assessed as "unexplained credit" if the identity of the payer, genuineness of the transaction and capacity of the subscriber are not disputed. Interest earned on short-term fixed deposits is assessable as "profits and gains of business" and not as "income from other sources"

Mr.Chhotaray the learned counsel for the Revenue states that the impugned order itself holds that share premium of Rs.490/per share defies all commercial prudence. Therefore it has to be considered to be cash credit. We find that the Tribunal has examined the case of the Revenue on the parameters of Section 68 of the Act and found on facts that it is not so hit. Therefore, Section 68 of the Act cannot be invoked. The Revenue has not been able to show in any manner the factual finding recorded by the Tribunal is perverse in any manner

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Failure by the AO to specify in the s. 274 notice whether the penalty is being initiated for 'furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income' or for 'concealment of income' is fatal. It reflects non-application of mind and renders the levy of penalty invalid (Manjunatha Cotton 359 ITR 565 (Kar) followed)

The above submission on the part of the Revenue is in the face of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Pai v/s. CIT 292 ITR 11 [relied upon in Manjunath Cotton & Ginning Factory (supra)] – wherein it is observed that concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income in Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, carry different meanings/ connotations. Therefore, the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer with regard to only one of the two breaches mentioned under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, for initiation of penalty proceedings will not warrant/ permit penalty being imposed for the other breach. This is more so, as an Assessee would respond to the ground on which the penalty has been initiated/notice issued. It must, therefore, follow that the order imposing penalty has to be made only on the ground of which the penalty proceedings has been initiated, and it cannot be on a fresh ground of which the Assessee has no notice

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 28/29: There is a distiction between "setting up of business" and "commencement of business". All expenditure after "setting up" is deductible business expenditure even if the business has not commenced. A business is "set up" when steps are taken to recruit employees and take premises etc

A similar issue viz. distinction between setting up of business and commencement of business had come up for consideration before this Court in Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 1954 Vol. 26 ITR Page 151. This Court had held that business is said to have been set up when it is established and ready to be commence. However, there may be an interval between a business which is set up and a business which is commenced. However, all expenses incurred during the interregnum between setting up of business and commencement of business would be permissible deductions

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 31, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus capital gains: A transaction cannot be treated as fraudulent if the assessee has furnished documentary proof and proved the identity of the purchasers and no discrepancy is found. The AO has to exercise his powers u/s 131 & 133(6) to verify the genuineness of the claim and cannot proceed on surmises

The assessee has adduced the documentary evidences in support of the transaction in question. The identity of the purchasers of the shares was established as it was borne on the record of the Income Tax Department. The purchasers have PAN card as well. Turning to the shares which were sold by the appellant as per its version, there is no evidence or material to even suggest, as pointed out as on behalf of the assessee, that the cheques directly or indirectly emanated from the assessee so that it could be said that the assessee’s own money was brought back in the guise of sale proceeds of the shares. Though, the purchasers of the shares could not be examined by the AO, since they were existing on the file of the Income Tax Department and their Income Tax details were made available to the AO, it was equally the duty of the AO to have taken steps to verify their assessment records and if necessary to also have them examined by the respective AOs having jurisdiction over them which has not been done by him

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): The Tribunal is mandated to pass orders within 90 days of the hearing. Delay is not justified on the ground that 'administrative clearance' was obtained. The aggrieved party is entitled to seek recall of such an order

The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a loss to understand what is meant by ‘administrative clearance’ and the basis for the same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was received, are all questions still at large

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 45/48: The AO is not bound to accept the consideration stated in the sale deed. In a case where property is sold between arm’s length parties at a gross undervaluation, the onus is on the assessee to explain and if there is no explanation, the AO is entitled to draw an inference. The presumption against the value being understated (not undervalued) is greater where parties are connected or related. However, if the AO does not allege that the assessee received more consideration than is stated in the sale deed, he cannot made an addition to the stated consideration (George Henderson 66 ITR 622 (SC) & Gillanders Arbuthnot 87 ITR 407 (SC) explained)

The judgments in CIT v. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. (1967)66 ITR 622, Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. (1973) 87 ITR 407 undoubtedly hold that the expression “full value of the consideration” cannot be construed as the market value but as the price bargained for by the parties to the sale. It is necessary for the Assessing Officer to ascertain as to what was the price bargained for by the parties to the sale. The judgment, however, does not support the further submission of the assessee that the price stated in the sale-deed must irrespective of anything also be considered to be the sale price for the purpose of computing the capital gain. In our view this absolute proposition is not well founded. The Assessing Officer must determine whether the price stated in the agreement for sale is in fact the price bargained for by the parties thereto. In other words, the full value of the consideration is neither the market value nor necessarily the price stated in the document for sale but the price actually arrived at between the parties to the transaction. If therefore it is found that the price actually arrived upon between the parties is not the price reflected in the document, it is the price bargained for by the parties to sale that must be considered for determining the capital gain under section 48. The Supreme Court did not hold that inferences cannot be drawn by the Assessing Officer from the facts established. In fact in paragraph-5 the Supreme Court observed that there was no inferential finding that the shares were sold at the market price of ` 620/- per share. This read with the operative part of the order in paragraph-6 remanding the matter to record a finding as to the actual price received makes it clear that the finding can be based on inferences as well. In paragraph-6 the assessee is given an opportunity to explain the unusual nature of the transaction. It cannot be suggested that even if there was no explanation by the assessee, the Assessing Officer was bound not to draw an adverse inference

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty' on transfer of software rights: There is a difference between sale of a 'copyrighted article' and the 'copyright' itself. S. 9(1)(vi) applies only to the latter and not the former. Explanation 4 inserted by FA 2012 w.r.e.f. 01.06.1976 has to be read and understood only in that context and cannot be expanded to bring within its fold transactions beyond the realm of the provision

The provisions of section 9(1)(vi) as a whole, would stand attracted in the case of the latter and not the former. Explanations 4 and 7 relied by the authorities would thus have to be read and understood only in that context and cannot be expanded to bring within its fold transaction beyond the realm of the provision. The Tribunal has relied on the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax V. M.Tech India Pvt Ltd, which supports our view as above. It is brought to our notice that the decision of the Delhi High Court has not been accepted by the Department and an SLP is pending. Be that as it may, in view of the facts and circumstances as observed above, we have no hesitation in dismissing the Departmental Appeal answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 147/ 151: The mere appending of the word "approved" by the CIT while granting approval u/s 151 to the reopening u/s 147 is not enough. While the CIT is not required to record elaborate reasons, he has to record satisfaction after application of mind. The approval is a safeguard and has to be meaningful and not merely ritualistic or formal

Section 151 of the Act clearly stipulates that the CIT (A), who is the competent authority to authorize the reassessment notice, has to apply his mind and form an opinion. The mere appending of the expression ‘approved’ says nothing. It is not as if the CIT (A) has to record elaborate reasons for agreeing with the noting put up. At the same time, satisfaction has to be recorded of the given case which can be reflected in the briefest possible manner. In the present case, the exercise appears to have been ritualistic and formal rather than meaningful, which is the rationale for the safeguard of an approval by a higher ranking officer

Read more ›

Posted on by editor
COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 254(2): Facts recorded by the ITAT have to be accepted as correct and conclusive and cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise. The mere placing of a case law in the paper book does not mean that it was cited before the ITAT and non-consideration thereof is not a mistake apparent from the record. A MA to rectify such alleged mistake of non-consideration of a judgement must be filed as quickly as possible

It is settled position in law that statement of fact recorded in the order of the Court/Tribunal has to be accepted as correct and conclusive. It cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas S. Nayak 1982 (2) SCC 463, Central Bank of India vs. Vrajlal K. Gandhi 2003(6) SCC 573 and Jagvir Singh & Others vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 2007 (5) SCC 359. Thus, mere filing of the paperbook is no indication of the fact that the case law referred to in paperbook was relied upon and submissions made on it during course of hearing of the appeal. Moreover, in cases such as this where it is contended by a party that particular case was not considered by the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority was cited during the course of hearing and is relevant to the issue, then a party would be expected to move the Tribunal as quickly as possible. This for the reason that the issues would be fresh in the mind of the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority

Read more ›