Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category


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DATE: March 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 115JB: As the loss suffered on transfer of business was rightly debited to the P&L A/c as per AS 13, it cannot be added back to the Book Profits

The accounting standards laid down by the institute however provide for recognition of the profit or loss arising out of investment in the profit and loss account. Reference in this regard may be made to Clauses 21 and 25 of Accounting Standard 13. The disclosure made in the financial statements is in pursuance of the requirement of Clause- 25 quoted above and is also in pursuance of Clause 2(b) of Part II of Schedule VI to the Companies Act, 1956 which is not to be construed as any qualification indicating any inaccuracy in the accounts. There was, thus no mistake on the part of the assessee in debiting the loss to the profit and loss account. Once it is realized that the assessee had correctly debited the profit and loss account for the loss arising out of the transfer of investment division, there remains no difficulty in realizing that the CIT proceeded on a wrong premise which was responsible for exercise of jurisdiction under Section 263 which he would not have done if he had realized the correct position

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DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 80-IA: As CBDT's Circular No.1/ 2016 dated 15.2.2016 is in line with Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills 340 ITR 477 (Mad) the Dept should not agitate the controversy whether deduction u/s 80IA is allowable without setting off losses/unabsorbed depreciation which were set off in earlier years against other business income

On the basis of the decision in Velayudhaswamy Spinning Mills (340 ITR 477), the Central Board of Direct Taxes has issued Circular No.1/ 2016 dated 15.2.2016. The CBDT has clarified that an assessee who is eligible to claim deduction u/s 80IA has the option to choose the initial/first year from which it may desire the claim of deduction for ten consecutive years, out of a slab of fifteen (or twenty) years, as prescribed under that Sub-Section. It is clarified that once such initial assessment year has been opted for by the assessee, he shall be entitled to claim deduction u/s 801A for ten consecutive years beginning from the year in respect of which he has exercised such option subject to the fulfillment of conditions prescribed in the section. Hence, the term ‘initial assessment year’ would mean the first year opted for by the assessee for claiming deduction u/s 801A. However, the total number of years for claiming deduction should not transgress the prescribed slab of fifteen or twenty years, as the case may be and the period of claim should be availed in continuity

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DATE: February 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Severe strictures passed against the ITAT for taking the view that the presumption laid down in HDFC Bank 366 ITR 505 (Bom) and Reliance Utilities 313 ITR 340 (Bom) that investments in tax-free securities must be deemed to have come out of own funds and (ii) Law laid down in India Advantage (Bom) that s. 14A and Rule 8D does not apply to securities held as stock-in-trade cannot be applied as both propositions are contrary to Godrej & Boyce 328 ITR 81 (Bom). ITAT's order reversed on the ground that it is "Judicial Indiscipline" leading to complete chaos and anarchy in the administration of law

The impugned order of the Tribunal seems to question the decision of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. (supra) to the extent it relied upon the decision of this Court in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra). This is by observing that the decision in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.(supra) it must be appreciated was rendered in the context of Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and its parameters are different from that of Section 14A of the Act. This Court in its order in HDFC Bank Ltd.(supra) consciously applied the principle of presumption as laid down in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra) and in fact quoted the relevant paragraph to emphasize that the same principle / test of presumption would apply to decide whether or not interest expenditure could be disallowed under Section 14A of the Act in respect of the income arising out of tax free securities. It is not the office of Tribunal to disregard a binding decision of this court. This is particularly so when the decision in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra) has been consciously applied by this Court while rendering a decision in the context of Section 14A of the Act

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DATE: January 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 147/ 148: Providing the assessee with the recorded reasons towards the end of the limitation period and passing a reassessment order without dealing with the objections results in gross harassment to the assessee which the Pr. CIT should note & remedy

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax would take serious note of the above and after examining the facts, if necessary, take appropriate remedial action to ensure that an assessee is not made to suffer for no fault on its part. This is particularly so as almost the entire period of two years from the end of the financial year in which the notice is issued was consumed by the Assessing Officer in failing to give reasons recorded in support of the impugned notice. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer proceeds to pass a draft Assessment order without dealing with the objections filed by the Petitioner. We could have on that date or even earlier passed an order setting aside the draft assessment order dated 30th March 2015 as it was passed without disposing of the objections. Thus, clearly without jurisdiction. However, we were of the view that although this appears to be a gross case of harassing an Assessee, the Principal Commissioner would take note and adopt remedial action / proceedings

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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Transfer Pricing: Even if TNMM is found acceptable as regards all other transactions, it is open to the TPO to segregate a portion and subject it to an entirely different method i.e. CUP if the assessee does not provide satisfactory replies to his queries

The narrow controversy which this Court is called upon to decide is as to whether the adoption of the CUP method by the revenue authorities was justified. What the assessee urges essentially is that whereas the TP report furnished by it applied the TNMM method which was found acceptable as regards all other transactions/business activities, it was not open to the revenue to segregate a portion and subject it to an entirely different method, i.e. CUP. The assessee relies upon paras 3.6, 3.9 and 3.10 of the OECD guidelines in support of its contentions. It also relies upon certain rulings of different Benches of the ITAT to urge that such sequential segregation and setting portion of the TP exercise – so to say, to break with the integrity is unjustified and unsupported by the text of the law, i.e. Section 92C of the Income Tax Act. The assessee also relies upon Rule 10E of the Income Tax Rules, which guide the proper approach of the TPO in such matters

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DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
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S. 40(a)(iii): Salaries paid to expatriate employees overseas on which tax was paid in accordance with CBDT Circular dated 685 dated 17/20.06.1994 and Circular 686 dated 12.8.94 is permissible as a deduction even though the tax is not paid within the time limit but is paid subsequently

An absence of a provision similar to the proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act cannot be read as to disentitle an Assessee to claim a deduction even though it has complied with the condition under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act. A plain reading of proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act indicates that where an Assessee has not deducted or paid the tax at source in terms of Chapter XVII B in respect of any sum as specified under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act, the Assessee can, nonetheless, claim a deduction in the year in which the assessee deposits the tax. This benefit is not available to an assessee in respect of payments chargeable under the head “Salaries” which fall within sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 40 and not sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act. Thus, an assessee would not be entitled to claim deduction on account of salaries if it fails to deduct or pay the amount under Chapter XVII B of the Act. In cases where such assessee deposits the amount in a subsequent year, the Assessee would still not be able to claim the deduction in the year in which such tax is deposited; his claim for deduction can be considered only in respect of the year to which such expense relates. Therefore, in cases where the assessments stand concluded, the Assessee would lose the benefit of deduction for the expenses incurred on account of its failure to have deposited the tax at source. Thus, concededly, in the present case the Assessee has lost its right to claim a deduction for a period of six years – AY 1985-86 to AY 1990-91- even though the Assessee has paid the TDS on the expenses pertaining to said period

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DATE: February 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 44AB/ 271B: Belief that a mutual association like a club is not liable for tax audit is a bona fide one and constitutes reasonable cause u/s 273B

Under the general law relating to mutual concerns, the surplus accruing to a mutual concern cannot be regarded as income, profits or gains for the purpose of the Act (s.4), and where the contributors are to receive back a part of their own contributions, the complete identity between the contributors and recipients negatives the idea of any profit, for no man can make profit out of himself. Therefore, a mutual concern can carry on an activity with its members, though the surplus arising from such activity is not taxable income or profit. The principle of mutuality has also been accepted in the case of a voluntary organization, which receives contributions from its members. The assessee’s contention that Section 44AB of the Act is not applicable to a club being a mutual concern is supported by several judgements

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DATE: February 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
No s. 40(a)(ia) disallowance for short-deduction TDS default (i.e. deduction u/s 194H instead of u/s 194H)

An identical question regarding Section 40(a)(ia) of the Act was considered by the Calcutta High Court in S. K. Tekriwal [2014] 361ITR 432 (Cal) and the findings given by the Calcutta High Court has been followed by the Tribunal. Similarly, as regards the binding nature of the CBDT, the Tribunal has followed the Judgment of the Apex Court in HAL (supra). In view of both the decisions cited supra, no substantial questions of law arises for our determination in this appeal

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DATE: February 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 2(15): In order to constitute a “charitable purpose”, the object need not be to benefit of the whole of mankind or of persons in a Country or State. Even benefit to only a section of the public is sufficient. To ascertain the true nature/purpose of the Trust, the objectives have to be considered as a whole and not in isolation

Section 2[15] of the Act contemplates ‘charitable purpose’. ‘Charitable purpose’ includes relief of the poor, education, medical relief and the advancement of any other object of general public utility. The phrase ‘any other object of general public utility’ if, examined in the light of the Judgment in the case of AHMEDABAD RANA CASTE ASSOCIATION [supra], it is not necessary that the object should be to benefit of the whole of mankind or of persons in a Country or State. If it is distinguished from a specified individual and if it is to the benefit of section of the public, it has to be construed as charitable purpose

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DATE: January 12, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: The disallowance of expenditure cannot exceed the amount of tax-free dividend

The income from dividend had been shown at Rs. 1,11,564/- whereas disallowance under Section 14A read with Rule 8D of the Rules worked out by the Assessing Officer came to Rs. 4,09,675/-. Thus, the Assessing Officer disallowed the entire tax exempt income which is not permissible as per settled position of law. The window for disallowance is indicated in section 14A, and is only to the extent of disallowing expenditure “incurred by the assessee in relation to the tax exempt income”. The disallowance under section 14A read with Rule 8D as worked out by the Assessing officer is not in accordance with law and as such working is not sustainable