Category: Supreme Court

Archive for the ‘Supreme Court’ Category


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DATE: February 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2019 (Date of publication)
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S. 80-IC: An assessee availing exemption of 100% tax on setting up of a new industry, which is admissible for 5 years, and either on the expiry of 5 years or thereafter (but within 10 years) from the date when these assessees started availing exemption, they carried out substantial expansion of its industry, from that year the assessees become entitled to claim exemption @ 100% again (Classic Binding Industries 407 ITR 429 held not good law and reversed)

We have no hesitation to accept this mistake which occurred in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Classic Binding Industries 407 ITR 429. The Court specifically dealt with ‘initial assessment year’ and came into conclusion that there cannot be two initial assessment years within a span of 10 years which is the maximum period for allowing deduction as per sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC. As the issue directly concerned with initial assessment year, its definition contained in that very Section was missed out. To that extent, there is an error in the judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case

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DATE: February 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 14, 2019 (Date of publication)
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An adjournment cannot be sought on the ground that Counsel is out of station. The appeal has to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Under no circumstances, application for restoration shall be entertained

The appeals are dismissed for non-prosecution in terms of the signed order. We make it clear that since we have not found it to be a good ground for adjournment, under no circumstances, application for restoration shall be entertained

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DATE: December 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 20, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 260A Condonation of delay of 1662 days: The High Court should not take a technical approach and refuse to condone the delay when appeals for earlier years with identical issues are already pending before it

It is a matter of record that on the identical issue raised by the appellant in respect of earlier assessment, the appeal is pending before the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court should not have taken such a technical view of dismissing the appeal in the instant case on the ground of delay, when it has to decide the question of law between the parties in any case in respect of earlier assessment year

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DATE: November 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 24, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Professional Misconduct of CAs: A Chartered Accountant can be held guilty of professional misconduct even when he is acting as an individual in commercial dealings and is not acting as a CA nor discharging any function in relation to his practice as a Chartered Accountant. Under the CA Act, any action which brings disrepute to the profession or the Institute is misconduct whether or not related to professional work

The Disciplinary Committee has, on facts, found the Chartered Accountant guilty of a practice which was not in the Chartered Accountant’s professional capacity. This, it was entitled to do under Schedule I Part-IV subclause (2) if, in the opinion of the Council, such act brings disrepute to the profession whether or not related to his professional work

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DATE: October 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 6, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Interpretation of statutes: Effect of repeal of a statute u/s 6 of the General Clauses Act on pending proceedings explained in the context of the Gold Control Act and in view of law laid down in State of Punjab vs. Mohar Singh [1955] 1 SCR 893, New India Assurance Co. Ltd. vs. C. Padma (2003) 7 SCC 713 etc

The statement of objects and reasons makes it clear that over 22 years, the results achieved under the Act have not been encouraging and the desired objectives for which the Act has been introduced have failed. Following the advice of experts, who have examined issues related to the Act, the objects and reasons goes on further to state that this Act has proved to be a regressive measure which has caused considerable dissatisfaction in the minds of the public and hardship and harassment to artisans and small self-employed goldsmiths. This being the case, we are of the opinion that the repeal simpliciter, in the present case, does not attract the provisions of Section 6 of the General Clauses Act as a contrary intention is very clearly expressed in the statement of objects and reasons to the 1990 repeal Act

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DATE: October 26, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Condonation of abnormal delay of 1371 days in removing office objections: High Court refused to condone delay and held that Dept must "set its own house in order by sacking and removing the delinquent and negligent officials or penalising them otherwise so as to subserve larger public interest". The Supreme Court reversed this holding High Court ought to have condoned the delay and not dismissed the appeal. Dept to pay costs of Rs. 1 lakh (from taxpayers' funds) for condonation of delay

No doubt, there is a long delay in removing the objections, we are of the opinion that in a case like this the High Court should have condoned the delay in removing the office objections and heard the2matter on merits

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DATE: October 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 10(20) Interpretation of statutes: Law on whether "functional test" as laid down in UOI vs. R.C. Jain, (1981) 2 SCC 308 is still good law explained in the context of whether the statutory functions conducted by a municipal committee enables it to qualify as a 'local authority'

The High Court based its decision on the fact that functions carried out by the assessee are statutory functions and it is carrying on the functions for the benefit of the State Government for urban development. The said reasoning cannot lead to the conclusion that it is a Municipal Committee within the meaning of Section 10(20) Explanation Clause (iii). The High Court has not adverted to the relevant facts and circumstances and without considering the relevant aspects has arrived at erroneous conclusions. Judgments of the High Court are unsustainable

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DATE: August 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
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We are shocked that the UOI through the CIT has taken the matter so casually. The petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10 lacs to be paid (by the exchequer)

First of all this petition has been filed after a delay of 596 days. There is an inadequate and unconvincing explanation given for the delay in filing the petition. Secondly, it is mentioned in the proforma for first listing that a similar matter being C.A. No. 7096/2012 is pending in this Court. However, the office has given a report stating that C.A. No. 7096/2012 was decided by this Court as far back as on 27.09.2012. In other words, the petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. We are shocked that the Union of India through the Commissioner of Income Tax has taken the matter so casually

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DATE: August 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 80-IC: An assessee who avails of deduction for a period of 5 years @ 100% of profits and gains is entitled to deduction on 'substantial expansion' for remaining 5 Assessment Years @ 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) and not @ 100% (Mahabir Industries v. PCIT 256 TM 201 (SC) distinguished)

As pointed out above, once the assessees had started claiming deduction under Section 80-IC and the initial Assessment Year has commenced within the aforesaid period of 10 years, there cannot be another initial Assessment Year thereby allowing 100% deduction for the next 5 years also when sub-section (3), in no uncertain terms, provides for deduction @ 25% only for the next 5 years. It may be asserted again that the assessees accept the legal position that they cannot claim deduction of more than 10 years in all under Section 80-IC

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DATE: August 10, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Income-tax dues, being in the nature of Crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons. Given s. 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-tax Act

Given Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, it is obvious that the Code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-Tax Act. We may also refer in this Connection to Dena Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co. & Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 694 and its progeny, making it clear that income-tax dues, being in the nature of Crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons