Search Results For: Domestic Tax


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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to curtail the period available to file rectification applications from four years to six months cannot apply to appellate orders passed prior to that date because that would take away a vested right

The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision

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DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 153A search assessment: Supreme Court stays operation of the judgement of the Delhi High Court in Dayawanti Gupta vs. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del). The High Court dealt with the issue whether an assessment u/s 153A can be made even if no incriminating material has been found during s. 132 search proceedings

In Dayawanti Gupta vs. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del), the assessee argued before the Delhi High Court that since no incriminating material was found during or pursuant to the search, additions, made on the basis of block assessment, were unsustainable inasmuch as they revisited finally settled assessments. It was submitted that for completing a block assessment, founded on search proceedings and notice under Section 153A, the assessing officer has to base the order on fresh materials found during the search, in the form of books of accounts, articles seized, or other similar materials. In this case, the revenue could not substantiate its plea that the assesses had concealed their income, because nothing suspect which could result in an addition to the income assessed during the previous years was in fact seized or taken into custody. Therefore, the four assessments for the block period in question had to be set aside

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DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 45: Entire law on whether a joint development agreement entered into by an owner of land with a developer constitutes a "transfer" u/s 2(47) and whether the same gives rise to capital gains chargeable to tax u/s 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act explained in the context of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and real income theory

If an agreement, like the JDA in the present case, is not registered, then it shall have no effect in law for the purposes of Section 53A. In short, there is no agreement in the eyes of law which can be enforced under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This being the case, we are of the view that the High Court was right in stating that in order to qualify as a “transfer” of a capital asset under Section 2(47)(v) of the Act, there must be a “contract” which can be enforced in law under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. A reading of Section 17(1A) and Section 49 of the Registration Act shows that in the eyes of law, there is no contract which can be taken cognizance of, for the purpose specified in Section 53A. The ITAT was not correct in referring to the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” in Section 2(47)(v) in order to arrive at the opposite conclusion. This expression was used by the legislature ever since sub-section (v) was inserted by the Finance Act of 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. All that is meant by this expression is to refer to the ingredients of applicability of Section 53A to the contracts mentioned therein. It is only where the contract contains all the six features mentioned in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (supra), that the Section applies, and this is what is meant by the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A”. This expression cannot be stretched to refer to an amendment that was made years later in 2001, so as to then say that though registration of a contract is required by the Amendment Act of 2001, yet the aforesaid expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” would somehow refer only to the nature of contract mentioned in Section 53A, which would then in turn not require registration. As has been stated above, there is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. This being the case, and it being clear that the said JDA was never registered, since the JDA has no efficacy in the eye of law, obviously no “transfer” can be said to have taken place under the aforesaid document

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DATE: September 19, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Strictures by ITAT against ICAI deprecated: It is very unfortunate that the Tribunal, out of sheer desperation and frustration and agitated by the fact that the Revenue is not opposing the request for condonation of delay blamed the assessee's Chartered Accountant and the ICAI on how they should conduct themselves. The Tribunal completely misdirected itself by taking irrelevant factors into account. Delay of 2984 days in filing the appeal caused by wrong advice of a professional is capable of condonation. However, even if the assessee has acted bona fide, he can be held liable for payment of costs to balance rights and equities

Thus, we find that the Tribunal, out of sheer desperation and frustration and agitated by the fact that the Revenue is not opposing the request for condonation of delay, turned its attention towards the assessee’s Chartered Accountant. It is unfortunate that thereafter paragraphs after paragraphs are devoted to how a Chartered Accountant ought to conduct himself and while advising litigants in tax matters. How a Chartered Accountant, as a professional, should be aware that legal proceedings should be filed in time and if there are adverse orders, how proper advice should be given. It is very unfortunate that the Tribunal has, apart from seeking to advice professionals, blamed not only individual Chartered Accountants but equally the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. It is unfortunate that Courts of law or Tribunals, which are the last fact finding authorities in this case, adopted this course

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DATE: September 26, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 140A/ 221(1): Law explained on whether an assessee who defaults on paying self assessment tax u/s 140A while filing the return of income is liable for penalty u/s 221(1) if he files a revised return of income and pays the tax thereon at the time of filing the revised return of income

As a plain reading of the above statutory provisions would show, the lapse, referred to in section 140A(1), is the failure “to pay such (admitted) tax together with interest payable under any provision of this Act for any delay in furnishing the return or any default or delay in payment of advance tax, before furnishing the return” and the lapses punishable under section 221(1) are the lapses in respect of “default in making a payment of tax”. The default triggering the penal liability under section 221(1) is the default in making payment of tax, and that the default in payment is tax is with reference to the filing of the income tax return. Viewed thus, default is committed at the point of time when a return of income is filed without making payment of the admitted tax liability. Clearly, therefore, the assessee committed a default in not paying the admitted tax liability when it filed the original income tax return, without payment of admitted tax liability, on 30th September 2008. To this extent, there is no dispute or ambiguity at all.The question then arises as to what is the impact of filing a revised income tax return

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DATE: September 19, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: The AO is not entitled to make any disallowance under Rule 8D if he does not specifically record that he is not satisfied with the correctness of the assessee's claim. The fact that the CIT(A) and ITAT were not satisfied with the assessee's disallowance and enhanced it does not mean that Rule 8D becomes applicable and the disallowance should be computed as per the prescribed formula

The Assessing Officer did not specifically record that he is not satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee in respect of the expenditure in relation to the income which does not form part of the total income under the Act. However, he felt obliged and going by the presence of Rule 8D that once Section 14A is attracted, the disallowance is to be made as per Rule 8D only which has been prescribed by the Legislature. The Assessing Officer has not adverted to the plain language of subsection (2) of Section 14A

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DATE: September 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: Despite numerous judgements on the reopening of assessments, the Revenue authorities are repeating the same errors. Accordingly, Guidelines are laid down and the Revenue is directed to adhere to them

Before parting with the case, the Court would like to observe that on a routine basis, a large number of writ petitions are filed challenging the reopening of assessments by the Revenue under Sections 147 and 148 of the Act and despite numerous judgments on this issue, the same errors are repeated by the concerned Revenue authorities. In this background, the Court would like the Revenue to adhere to the following guidelines in matters of reopening of assessments

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DATE: September 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 29, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) penalty: The quantum of returned income (Rs. 34.94 crore) and tax paid (Rs.10.85 crore) vis-a-vis the addition/ disallowance (Rs. 13 lakh) indicates whether there was a mala fide intention to conceal. Deferral of depreciation allowance does not result in concealment of income or furnishing of furnishing of any inaccurate particulars. No penalty can be levied for a sheer accounting error of debiting loss incurred on sale of a fixed asset to the P&L A/c instead of reducing the sale consideration from the WDV of the block

The claim for depreciation only gets deferred to subsequent Years by claiming it for half year. In our view the deferral of depreciation allowance does not result into any concealment of income or furnishing of furnishing of any inaccurate particulars. However, it was a sheer accounting error in debiting loss incurred on sale of a fixed asset to profit and loss account instead of reducing the sale consideration from wdv of the block under block concept of depreciation. There was a sheer accounting error in debiting loss incurred on sale of a fixed asset to profit & loss account instead of reducing the sale consideration from wdv of the block under block concept of depreciation. There was a separate line item indicated loss on fixed asset of RS.1,69,429/- in the Income & Expenditure Account which was omitted to be added back in the computation. The error went un-noticed by the tax auditor as well as the same was overlooked while certifying the Income & Expenditure Account 12 and by the tax consultant while preparing the computation of income. Hence, there was no intention to avoid payment of taxes

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DATE: September 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 45(5): Enhanced compensation and interest thereon under an interim order passed by the High Court in pending appeals relating to land acquisition matter are liable to be assessed for income tax in the year in which it has been received

Section 45(5) read as a whole [including 3 clause (c)] not only deals with reworking as urged on behalf of the asseess but also with the change in the full value of the consideration (computation) and since the enhanced compensation/consideration (including interest under Section 28 of the 1894 Act) becomes payable/paid under the 1894 Act at different stages, the receipt of such enhanced compensation/consideration is to be taxed in the year of receipt subject to adjustment, if any, under Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act, later on. Hence, the year in which enhanced compensation is received is the year of taxability. Consequently, even in cases where pending appeal, the Court/tribunal/authority before which appeal is pending, permits the claimant to withdraw against security or otherwise the enhanced compensation (which is in dispute) the same is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act. This is the scheme of Section 45(5) and Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act. We may clarify that even before the insertion of Section 45(5)(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f. 1-4-2004, the receipt of enhanced compensation under Section 45(5)(b) was taxable in the year of receipt which is only reinforced by insertion of clause (c) because the right to receive payment under the 1894 Act is not in doubt

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DATE: September 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 132: The plea that the search proceedings initiated u/s 132 are invalid and that the block assessment proceedings are without jurisdiction cannot be entertained because s. 132A provides that the 'reason to believe' or 'reason to suspect', as the case may be, shall not be disclosed to any person or any authority or the Appellate Tribunal as recorded by Income Tax Authority u/s 132 or 132A

In view of the amendment made in Section 132A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by Finance Act of 2017, the ‘reason to believe’ or ‘reason to suspect’, as the case may be, shall not be disclosed to any person or any authority or the Appellate Tribunal as recorded by Income Tax Authority under Section 132 or Section 132A. We, therefore, cannot go into that question at all. Even otherwise, we find that the explanation given by the appellant regarding the amount of cash of Rs.30 lacs found by the GRP and seized by the authorities has been disbelieved and has been treated as income not recorded in the Books of Account maintained by it