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DATE: September 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 50C: The proviso to s. 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.04.2017 to provide that the stamp duty valuation of property on the date of execution of the agreement to sell should be adopted instead of the valuation on the date of execution of the sale deed is curative and intended to remove an undue hardship to the assessee and an apparent incongruity. It should accordingly be given retrospective effect from 1st April 2003, i.e. the date effective from which s. 50C was introduced

The Proviso to Section 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, on the recommendation of the Income Tax Simplification Committee (Easwar Committee) recognizes the genuine and intended hardship in the cases in which the date of agreement to sell is prior to the date of sale and introduces welcome amendments to the statue to take the remedial measures. However, this brings no relief to the assessee as the amendment is introduced only with prospective effect from 1st April 2017. There cannot be any dispute that this amendment in the scheme of Section 50C has been made to remove an incongruity, resulting in undue hardship to the assessee, as is evident from the observation in Easwar Committee report to the effect that “The (then prevailing) provisions of section 50C do not provide any relief where the seller has entered into an agreement to sell the asset much before the actual date of transfer of the immovable property and the sale consideration has been fixed in such agreement” recognizing the incongruity that the date agreement of sell has been ignored in the statute even though it was crucial as it was at this point of time that the sale consideration is finalized. The incongruity in the statute was glaring and undue hardship not in dispute

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DATE: June 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): Expenditure on Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), though voluntary, is allowable as business expenditure. Explanation 2 to s. 37(1) inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2015 is not retrospective. It applies only to CSR expenditure referred to in s. 135 of the Companies Act and not to voluntary CSR expenditure

The amendment in the scheme of Section 37(1), which has been introduced with effect from 1st April 2015, cannot be construed as to disadvantage to the assessee in the period prior to this amendment. This disabling provision, as set out in Explanation 2 to Section 37(1), refers only to such corporate social responsibility expenses as under Section 135 of the Companies Act, 2013, and, as such, it cannot have any application for the period not covered by this statutory provision which itself came into existence in 2013. Explanation 2 to Section 37(1) is, therefore, inherently incapable of retrospective application any further. In any event, as held by Hon’ble Supreme Court’s five judge constitutional bench’s landmark judgment, in the case of CIT Vs Vatika Townships Pvt Ltd [(2014) 367 ITR 466 (SC)], the legal position in this regard has been very succinctly summed up by observing that “Of the various rules guiding how legislation has to be interpreted, one established rule is that unless a contrary intention appears, legislation is presumed not to be intended to have a retrospective operation

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DATE: June 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): When there are conflicting judgements of non-jurisdiction High Courts, the Tribunal is not permitted to choose based on its perception of what the correct law is because it will amount to sitting in judgement over the High Courts’ views. Instead, it has to follow the view which is in favour of the assessee even if it believes that this view is not the correct law. Second proviso to s. 40(a)(ia) inserted by FA 2013 should be treated as retrospectively applicable from 1st April 2005

It will be wholly inappropriate for us to choose views of one of the High Courts based on our perceptions about reasonableness of the respective viewpoints, as such an exercise will de facto amount to sitting in judgment over the views of the High Courts something diametrically opposed to the very basic principles of hierarchical judicial system. We have to, with our highest respect of both the Hon’ble High Courts, adopt an objective criterion for deciding as to which of the Hon’ble High Court should be followed by us. We find guidance from the judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the matter of CIT vs. Vegetable Products Ltd. [(1972) 88 ITR 192 (SC)]. Hon’ble Supreme Court has laid down a principle that “if two reasonable constructions of a taxing provisions are possible, that construction which favours the assessee must be adopted”. This principle has been consistently followed by the various authorities as also by the Hon’ble Supreme Court itself

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DATE: May 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 56(2)(vii)/ 145A: Interest awarded on compensation for personal disability does not have the character of "income" and cannot be taxed. CBDT requested to issue instructions to mitigate hardship of accident victims

Clearly, unless a receipt is not an income, there is no occasion for the provisions of Section 56(1) or 56(2) coming into play. Section 56 does not decide what is an income. What it holds is that if there is an income, which is not taxable under any of the heads under Section 14, i.e item A to E, it is taxable under the head ‘income from other sources’. The receipt being in the nature of income is a condition precedent for Section 56 coming into play, and not vice versa. To suggest that since an item is listed under section 56(2), even without there being anything to show that it is of income nature, it can be brought to tax is like putting the cart before the horse. The very approach of the authorities below is devoid of legally sustainable merits. The authorities below were thus completely in error in bringing the interest awarded by Hon’ble Supreme Court to tax

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DATE: March 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing Of Corporate Guarantees: Explanation i(c) to S. 92 B, though stated to be clarificatory and stated to be effective from 01.04.2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best AY 2013-14 as it is an "anti abuse" provision. Dept’s submission that Bharti Airtel 161 TTJ 428 is “per incuriam” is not acceptable. Law laid down in Micro Ink 176 TTJ 8 (Ahd) on transfer pricing implications of corporate guarantees reiterated

It is very important to bear in mind the fact that right now we are dealing with amendment of a transfer pricing related provision which is in the nature of a SAAR (specific anti abuse rule), and that every anti abuse legislation, whether SAAR (specific anti abuse rule) or GAAR (general anti abuse rule), is a legislation seeking the taxpayers to organize their affairs in a manner compliant with the norms set out in such anti abuse legislation. An anti-abuse legislation does not trigger the levy of taxes; it only tells you what behavior is acceptable or what is not acceptable. What triggers levy of taxes is non-compliance with the manner in which the anti-abuse regulations require the taxpayers to conduct their affairs. In that sense, all anti abuse legislations seek a certain degree of compliance with the norms set out therein. It is, therefore, only elementary that amendments in the anti-abuse legislations can only be prospective. It does not make sense that someone tells you today as to how you should have behaved yesterday, and then goes on to levy a tax because you did not behave in that manner yesterday. It is for this reason that the Explanation to Section 92 B, though stated to be clarificatory and stated to be effective from 1st April 2002, has to be necessarily treated as effective from at best the assessment year 2013-14

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DATE: January 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 23, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 154: Pedantic stand of AO in refusing to rectify a mistake on the ground that the assessee is responsible for it is appalling and makes a mockery of the assessment proceedings. A sense of fair play by the field officers towards the taxpayers is not an act of benevolence by the field officers but it is call of duty in a socially accountable governance

A lot of emphasis is placed on the fact that the mistake was committed by the assessee himself which has resulted in the error creeping in the assessment order as well. Instead of being apologetic about the complete non application of mind to the facts and making a mockery of the scrutiny assessment proceeding itself, the Assessing Officer has justified the mistake on record on the ground that it is attributed to the assessee. The income tax proceedings are not adversarial proceedings. As to who is responsible for the mistake is not material for the purpose of proceedings under section 154; what is material is that there is a mistake- a mistake which is clear, glaring and which is incapable of two views being taken. The fact that mistake has occurred is beyond doubt. The fact that it is attributed to the error of the assessee does not obliterate the fact of mistake or legal remedies for a mistake having crept in. It is only elementary that the income liable to be taxed has to be worked out in accordance with the law as in force. In this process, it is not open to the Revenue authorities to take advantage of mistakes committed by the assessee. Tax cannot be levied on an assessee at a higher amount or at a higher rate merely because the assessee, under a mistaken belief or due to an error, offered the income for taxation at that amount or that rate. It can only be levied when it is authorised by the law, as is the mandate of Art. 265 of the Constitution of India. A sense of fairplay by the field officers towards the taxpayers is not an act of benevolence by the field officers but it is call of duty in a socially accountable governance

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DATE: December 15, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 16, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 268A: In view of CBDT's Circular no. 21/ 2015 dated 10.12.2015 appeals of the department where the monetary limit does not exceed Rs. 10 lakh have to be dismissed as a legal nullity. CBDT's decision termed as "paradigm shift", "unprecedented" and "possibly a game changing initiative heralding a new era in thoughtful litigation management"

We need to take note of a very pragmatic initiative, taken by the Central Board of Direct Taxes last week, for reducing litigation in direct taxes. Vide circular no. 21/ 2015 dated 10th December 2015, the Central Board of Direct Taxes has, inter alia, announced that, subject to certain exceptions- which are not relevant in the present context, henceforth, no departmental appeals will be filed against relief given by the CIT(A), before this Tribunal, unless the tax effect, excluding interest, exceeds Rs 10,00,000. What is even more important is that not only that such a taxpayer friendly measure will be implemented in all future tax litigation, even the pending appeals, wherever the tax involved in the appeals does not exceed Rs 10,00,000, shall not be pressed or withdrawn. In effect thus, irrespective of the year to which the departmental appeal before the Tribunal pertains, as long as such an appeal is pending before the Tribunal, this will be a legal nullity

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DATE: November 27, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 3, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Entire law on transfer pricing implications of (i) allowing excess credit to AE's on account of sale of goods and (ii) issue of corporate guarantee to AEs (after insertion of Explanation i(c) to s. 92B by FA 2012) explained

If the international transaction of exports of goods which has been benchmarked on TNMM basis is duly accepted by the TPO, making an adjustment for interest on excess credit allowed on sales to AEs will vitiate the picture, inasmuch as what has already been factored in the TNMM analysis, by taking operating profit figure which incorporate financial impact of the excess credit period allowed, will be adjusted again separately as well because the interest levy for late realization of debtors is inextricably connected with the sales and is also part of operating income. When such an interest is includible in operating income and the operating income itself has been accepted as reasonable under the TNMM, there cannot be an occasion to make adjustment for notional interest on delayed realization of debtors

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DATE: October 9, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
Law on applicability of Article 24 of the India-Singapore DTAA (Limitation of Benefits) to a case where the income is not remitted to, or received in Singapore, explained

The benefit of treaty protection is restricted to the amount of income which is eventually subject matter of taxation in the source country. This is all the more relevant for the reason that in a situation in which territorial method of taxation is followed by a tax jurisdiction and the taxability for income from activities carried out outside the home jurisdiction is restricted to the income repatriated to such tax jurisdiction, as in the case of Singapore, the treaty protection must remain confined to the amount which is actually subjected to tax. Any other approach could result in a situation in which an income, which is not subject matter of taxation in the residence jurisdiction, will anyway be available for treaty protection in the source country

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DATE: September 10, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 12, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2011-12
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CITATION:
Even post insertion of proviso to s. 2 (15) but before 01.04.2016, s. 11 benefit cannot be denied to business activities carried by the trust in the course of actual carrying out of such advancement of any other object of general public utility. Trusts are entitled to carry out activities in the nature of trade, commerce or business etc as long as these activities are carried out in the course of actual carrying out of advancement of any other object of general public utility. On facts, activity of auctioning commercial plots for maximum revenue cannot be regarded as a profit-making exercise

This substitution of proviso to Section 2(15) may be viewed as representing a paradigm shift in the scope of the exclusion clause. The paradigm shift is this. So far as the scope of earlier provisos is concerned, the CBDT itself has, dealing with an assessee pursing “the advancement of any object of general pubic utility”, observed that “If such assessee is engaged in any activity in the nature of trade, commerce or business or renders any service in connection to trade, commerce or business, it would not be entitled to claim that its object is for charitable purposes” because “In such a case, the object of ‘general public utility’ will only be a mask or a device to hide the true purpose which is trade, commerce, or business or rendering of any service in relation to trade, commerce or business.” The advancement of any objects of general public utility and engagement in trade, commerce and business etc. were thus seen as mutually exclusive in the sense that either the assessee was pursuing the objects of general public utility or pursuing trade, commerce or business etc. in the garb of pursing the objects of general public utility

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