Search Results For: Pramod Kumar (AM)


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DATE: August 31, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 11, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 10(10D): Keyman Insurance: Even a "United Linked Endowment Assurance Plan" with the main object of guaranteed returns rather than life insurance is a "keyman insurance" as defined in s. 10(10D). The fact that policy was not termed as a "keyman insurance" and the fact that the IRDA Guidelines disapproved the issue of such policies is irrelevant

All that is required for an insurance policy to meet the requirements of Section 10(10D), therefore, has to be – (a) it should be a life insurance policy; (b) it should be taken by the assesse on the life of another person who is, or was, an employee of the assesse or is related to the business of the assesse is any manner. As long as a policy is an insurance policy, whether it involves a capital appreciation or is under any other investment scheme, it meets the tests laid down under section 10(10D). Even if such an inference is desirable, as long as it does not emerge from the plain words of the statute, it cannot be open to supply the same. The concepts of term policy, pure life policy and the IRDA guidelines find no mention in the statutory provisions. But even if these concepts ought to be incorporated in this statutory provision of the Income Tax Act to make it more meaningful and workable, it cannot be open to any judicial forum to supply these omissions. The IRDA guidelines, no matter how relevant as these guidelines may be, have no role to play in the interpretation of the statutory provisions. The fact that the insurance policies in question were not termed as keyman insurance policies is irrelevant. The keyman insurance policy is a defined concept and as long as it meets the requirements of this definition, the terminology given by the insurers have no relevance for the purposes of the Income Tax Act.

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DATE: July 7, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Transfer Pricing: Even if the loan to the 100% subsidiary is intended to be a long term investment in the subsidiary and it has a crucial role to play in the assessee's business plans, it cannot be treated as "quasi capital". The ALP of the loan has to be determined on the basis of LIBOR interest

The expression ‘quasi capital’ is relevant from the point of view of highlighting that a quasi-capital loan or advance is not a routine loan transaction simplictor. The substantive reward for such a loan transaction is not interest but opportunity to own capital. As a corollary to this position, in the cases of quasi capital loans or advances, the comparison of the quasi capital loans is not with the commercial borrowings but with the loans or advances which are given in the same or similar situations

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DATE: June 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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Development Agreement: Tax implications of entering into a development agreement in respect of land held as stock-in-trade explained

What the assessee has got today is only a right to sell the 1,28,940.26 fts of constructed area in the Alexandria project and the profits, howsoever certain they may appear to be, will only fructify and be realized, and can even be quantified, only when this right is exercised- in part or in full. That stage has not yet come, and until that stage comes, such profit cannot be taxed

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DATE: July 7, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 80-IB(10): To be the "developer" of a housing project, the assessee has to undertake the entrepreneurship risk in execution of the project. He need not be the owner of the land. S. 40(a)(ia): The amendment is clarificatory and retrospective w.e.f. 01.04.2005

In order to answer the question as to whether the condition precedent for deduction under section 80IB has been satisfied inasmuch as whether or not the assessee is engaged in “developing and building housing projects”, all that is material is whether assessee is taking the entrepreneurship risk in execution of such project. When profits or losses, as a result of execution of project as such, belong predominantly to the assessee, the assessee is obviously taking the entrepreneurship risk qua the project and is, accordingly, eligible for deduction under section 80IB(10) in respect of the same. The assumption of such an entrepreneurship risk is not dependent on ownership of the land

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DATE: June 9, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 234E: Prior to the amendment to s. 200A w.e.f. 01.06.2015, the fee for default in filing TDS statements cannot be recovered from the assessee-deductor

Section 200A was amended by the Finance Act 2015 with effect from 1st June 2015 to provide that in the course of processing of a TDS statement and issuance of intimation under section 200A in respect thereof, an adjustment could also be made in respect of the fee computed in accordance with the provisions of section 234E. As the law stood prior to 1st June 2015, there was no enabling provision therein for raising a demand in respect of levy of fees under section 234E

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DATE: June 11, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 11/ 12AA(3): The Proviso to s. 2(15) has no bearing on the grant or denial of registration. The applicability of the proviso has to be evaluated on a year to year basis and it only affects the grant of exemption u/s 11

The impact of the proviso to Section 2(15) being hit by the assessee will be that, to that extent, the assessee will not be eligible for exemption under section 11 of the Act. The mere fact that the assessee is granted registration under section 12 A or 12AA as a charitable institution will have no bearing on this denial of registration. As a corollary to this legal position, the fact that the objects of the assessee may be hit by the proviso to section 2(15) cannot have any bearing on the grant, denial or withdrawal of the registration under section 12AA

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DATE: June 10, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2010-11
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S. 194C: Only payments "in pursuance of a contract" are subject to TDS. Payments made under a legal obligation are not covered

It is only when payments are made “in pursuance of a contract” that the provisions of section 194C come into play. The contract may be oral or written, express or implied but there must be a contract nevertheless. In the present case, the payment is on account of legal obligation under section 24(1) of the Punjab Water Supply and Sewerage Board Act 1976. Accordingly, the provisions of section 194C did not come into play

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DATE: April 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 25, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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S. 255(4): Even if Third Member's verdict is shown to be “unsustainable in law and in complete disregard to binding judicial precedents”, Division Bench has no choice but to give effect to it

At the time of giving effect to the majority view under section 255(4), it cannot normally be open to the Tribunal to go beyond the exercise of giving effect to the majority views, howsoever mechanical it may seem. In the case of dissenting situations on the division bench, the process of judicial adjudication is complete when the third member, nominated by Hon’ble President, resolves the impasse by expressing his views and thus enabling a majority view on the point or points of difference. What then remains for the division bench is simply identifying the majority view and dispose of the appeal on the basis of the majority views. In the course of this exercise, it is not open to the division bench to revisit the adjudication process and start examining the legal issues

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DATE: April 27, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 275(1)(a): For penalty proceedings initiated on issues unrelated to assessment of income (such as for s. 269SS/ 269T & TDS defaults), time limit runs from date of initiation of penalty proceedings and not from date of CIT(A)'s order

Since penalty proceedings for default in not having transactions through the bank as required under sections 269SS and 269T are not related to the assessment proceeding but are independent of it, therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising out of the assessment proceedings or the other proceedings during which the penalty proceedings under sections 271D and 271E may have been initiated has no relevance for sustaining or not sustaining the penalty proceedings and, therefore, clause (a) of sub-section (1) of section 275 cannot be attracted to such proceedings

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DATE: January 20, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 26, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 147: Reopening an assessment on the ground that there is need of an inquiry which may result in detection of an income escaping assessment is not valid

The important point is that even though reasons, as recorded, may not necessarily prove escapement of income at the stage of recording the reasons, such reasons must point out to an income escaping assessment and not merely need of an inquiry which may result in detection of an income escaping assessment