Search Results For: S. Abdul Nazeer J


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DATE: August 11, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 12, 2020 (Date of publication)
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(i) S. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 confers status of coparcener on daughters born before or after amendment in the same manner as son with the same rights and liabilities, (ii) The rights can be claimed by the daughter born earlier with effect from 9.9.2005 with savings as provided in Section 6(1) as to the disposition or alienation, partition or testamentary disposition which had taken place before 20th day of December, 2004, (iii) Since the right in coparcenary is by birth, it is not necessary that father coparcener should be living as on 9.9.2005 (Entire law on family settlements under Hindu Law (HUFs) explained)

The object of preventing, setting up of false or frivolous defence to set at naught the benefit emanating from amended provisions, has to be given full effect. Otherwise, it would become very easy to deprive the daughter of her rights as a coparcener. When such a defence is taken, the Court has to be very extremely careful in accepting the same, and only if very cogent, impeccable, and contemporaneous documentary evidence in shape of public documents in support are available, such a plea may be entertained, not otherwise. We reiterate that the plea of an oral partition or memorandum of partition, unregistered one can be manufactured at any point in time, without any contemporaneous public document needs rejection at all costs. We say so for exceptionally good cases where partition is proved conclusively and we caution the courts that the finding is not to be based on the preponderance of probabilities in view of provisions of gender justice and the rigor of very heavy burden of proof which meet intendment of Explanation to Section 6(5). It has to be remembered that courts cannot defeat the object of the beneficial provisions made by the Amendment Act

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
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Articles 136, 141: Entire law on legal effect of dismissal of a Special Leave Petition (SLP) by a speaking/ non-speaking order explained. If the dismissal is by a speaking order & reasons are given, the same is a declaration of law which is binding under Article 141. The findings are also binding by way of judicial discipline. However, this does not mean that the order of the lower court has merged in the dismissal order of the Supreme Court

If the order refusing leave to appeal is a speaking order, i.e., gives reasons for refusing the grant of leave, then the order has two implications. Firstly, the statement of law contained in the order is a declaration of law by the Supreme Court within the meaning of Article 141 of the Constitution. Secondly, other than the declaration of law, whatever is stated in the order are the findings recorded by the Supreme Court which would bind the parties thereto and also the court, tribunal or authority in any proceedings subsequent thereto by way of judicial discipline, the Supreme Court being the Apex Court of the country. But, this does not amount to saying that the order of the court, tribunal or authority below has stood merged in the order of the Supreme Court rejecting the special leave petition or that the order of the Supreme Court is the only order binding as res judicata in subsequent proceedings between the parties

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DATE: March 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 37(1)/40A(2) Business expenditure vs. sharing of profit: The AO has to take into account the manner in which the business works, the modalities and manner in which SAP/additional purchase price/final price are decided and determine what amount forms part of the profit. Whatever is the profit component is sharing of profit/distribution of profit and the rest is deductible as expenditure

Merely because the higher price is paid to both, members and non-members, qua the members, still the question would remain with respect to the distribution of profit/sharing of the profit. So far as the non-members are concerned, the same can be dealt with and/or considered applying Section 40A (2) of the Act, i.e., the assessing officer on the material on record has to determine whether the amount paid is excessive or unreasonable or not

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DATE: March 1, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 1979-80, 1980-81
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CITATION:
S. 80-HH/ 80-I/ 80-AB: There is a difference between 'income' referred to in s. 80-AB and 'profits & gains' referred in s. 80-HH/80-I. Deduction u/s 80-HH/ 80-I has to be computed on the ‘profits and gains’, without deducting therefrom ‘depreciation’ and ‘investment allowance’ & not from ‘income’ as computed under the Act. S. 80AB is prospective. Motilal Pesticides 243 ITR 26 (SC) reversed

Reading of Section 80HH along with Section 80A would clearly signify that such a deduction has to be of gross profits and gains, i.e., before computing the income as specified in Sections 30 to 43D of the Act. It is correctly pointed out by Division Bench in the reference order that in Motilal Pesticides case, the Court followed the judgment rendered in the M/s. Cloth Traders (P) Ltd. which was a case under Section 80M of the Act, on the premise that language of Section 80HH and Section 80M is the same. This basis is clearly incorrect as the language of two provisions is materially different. We are, therefore, of the considered opinion that judgment of Motilal Pesticides is erroneous. We, therefore, overrule this judgment.

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DATE: February 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 80-IC: An assessee availing exemption of 100% tax on setting up of a new industry, which is admissible for 5 years, and either on the expiry of 5 years or thereafter (but within 10 years) from the date when these assessees started availing exemption, they carried out substantial expansion of its industry, from that year the assessees become entitled to claim exemption @ 100% again (Classic Binding Industries 407 ITR 429 held not good law and reversed)

We have no hesitation to accept this mistake which occurred in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. M/s. Classic Binding Industries 407 ITR 429. The Court specifically dealt with ‘initial assessment year’ and came into conclusion that there cannot be two initial assessment years within a span of 10 years which is the maximum period for allowing deduction as per sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC. As the issue directly concerned with initial assessment year, its definition contained in that very Section was missed out. To that extent, there is an error in the judgment dated 20th August, 2018 in Classic Binding Industries case

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DATE: February 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 14, 2019 (Date of publication)
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An adjournment cannot be sought on the ground that Counsel is out of station. The appeal has to be dismissed for non-prosecution. Under no circumstances, application for restoration shall be entertained

The appeals are dismissed for non-prosecution in terms of the signed order. We make it clear that since we have not found it to be a good ground for adjournment, under no circumstances, application for restoration shall be entertained

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DATE: December 3, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 20, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 260A Condonation of delay of 1662 days: The High Court should not take a technical approach and refuse to condone the delay when appeals for earlier years with identical issues are already pending before it

It is a matter of record that on the identical issue raised by the appellant in respect of earlier assessment, the appeal is pending before the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court should not have taken such a technical view of dismissing the appeal in the instant case on the ground of delay, when it has to decide the question of law between the parties in any case in respect of earlier assessment year

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DATE: August 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
We are shocked that the UOI through the CIT has taken the matter so casually. The petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10 lacs to be paid (by the exchequer)

First of all this petition has been filed after a delay of 596 days. There is an inadequate and unconvincing explanation given for the delay in filing the petition. Secondly, it is mentioned in the proforma for first listing that a similar matter being C.A. No. 7096/2012 is pending in this Court. However, the office has given a report stating that C.A. No. 7096/2012 was decided by this Court as far back as on 27.09.2012. In other words, the petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. We are shocked that the Union of India through the Commissioner of Income Tax has taken the matter so casually

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DATE: July 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Entire law on interpretation of statues relating to 'purposive interpretation', 'strict interpretation', 'literal interpretation', etc explained. Difference in interpretation of statutes vs. exemption notifications explained. Q whether there is doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of a statute or notification benefit of doubt should go to the taxpayer or to the revenue explained. Law on Doctrine of substantial compliance and “intended use” also explained

Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally, it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for limited period or with the specific objective etc. That is why its construction, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In fact, an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principles requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject, but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction