COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: September 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Entire law on whether leasehold rights constitute a "capital asset" u/s 2(14), whether there is a "transfer" u/s 2(47) of such rights and whether "capital gains" u/s 45 can arise explained in detail

The Court is unable to agree with the above approach of the ITAT to interpreting what appear to be plain and unambiguous provisions of the Act. It is useful to recall that this entire discussion is in the backdrop of what constitutes “transfer” in relation to a capital asset. Further, the entire exercise is for ultimately determining if there has been any capital gains arising from the transaction. Under Section 45(1) ‘capital gains’ are any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year. When the word “transfer” itself has been defined under Section 2(47) (vi) and by virtue of Explanation 1 “shall” have the same meaning as Section 269UA(d) then it is not possible to ‘restrict’ Explanation 1 to only those transactions described in Chapter XXC. Explanation 1 is a deeming fiction and incorporates by way of reference the provisions of Section 269 UA (d) in order to understand the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ for the purposes of Section 2 (47) (vi). Therefore, that entire scheme has to be given effect to. In other words, it is not possible to omit the reference to Section 269UA(d) (i) which in turn brings in Section 269UA(f) (i). The ITAT has therefore erred in conveniently choosing to not apply the Explanation 1 to Section 2 (47) in order to arrive at the conclusion there was indeed a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset brought about by the lease agreement in question

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Strictures passed against CBDT for causing ‘very unfair discrimination' between taxpayers by extending due date for filing ROI only for taxpayers in P&H and Gujarat and not for those in other States

Taking into account the fact that the decision of the Gujarat High Court and Punjab and Haryana High Court have been accepted by the CBDT issuing orders under Section 119 of the Act but very unfairly in case of an all India Statute restricting its benefit to only two States and one Union Territory. This itself warrants an extension of due date to the same date as is available for the assessees in Gujarat, Punjab and Haryana to avoid any discrimination to the assessees else where

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
CBDT directed to forthwith issue an order u/s 119 to extend the due date for filing ROI to 31.10.2015

The Respondent No.2 i.e. CBDT is directed to forthwith issue the order/ notification under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act and extend the due date for Efiling of the Income Tax Returns in respect of the assessee who are required to file return of income by 30th September, 2015 to 31st October, 2015

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: September 29, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 30, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Strictures passed against CBDT for being lax and delaying issuing of the Forms and then taking adamant stand by not extending due date for filing ROI. CBDT directed to issue order u/s 119 to extend due date for filing ROI to 31.10.2015

The Board while not extending the due date for filing return was also of the view that due date should not be extended just for the benefit of those who have remained lax till now for no valid reason in discharging their legal obligations. It may be noted that despite the fact that ordinarily the ITR Forms which should be prescribed and made available before the 1st of April of the assessment year, have in fact, been made available only on 7th August, 2015 and the assessees are given only seven weeks to file their tax returns. Therefore, laxity, if any, evidently is on the part of the authority which is responsible for the delay in making the utility for E-Filing the return being made available to the assessees. When the default lies at the end of the respondents, some grace could have been shown by the Board instead of taking a stand that such a trend may not be encouraged. Had it not been for the laxity on the part of the respondents in providing the utilities, there would not have been any cause for the petitioners to seek extension of the due date for filing tax returns

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 29, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 29, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
As the CBDT delayed issued the Income-tax Return Forms, the due date for filing the returns is extended to 31.10.2015. CBDT directed to issue an appropriate order u/s 119

In view of the above, taking the totality of facts and circumstances of the case, it is considered appropriate to extend the due date for e-filing of returns upto 31st October 2015 for which the CBDT shall issue appropriate notification/instructions under Section 119 of the Act. Direction is also issued to the respondents to ensure that the forms etc. which are to be prescribed for the audit report and for e-filing the returns should ordinarily be made available on the first day of April of the assessment year

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 29, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 28, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Entire law on the taxation of deceased persons and their estate explained in the context of the Income-tax Act and the Central Excise Act

The individual assessee has ordinarily to be a living person and there can be no assessment on a dead person and the assessment is a charge in respect of the income of the previous year and not a charge in respect of the income of the year of assessment as measured by the income of the previous year. Wallace Brothers & Co. Ltd. v Commissioner of Income-tax. By section 24B of the Income-tax Act the legal representatives have, by fiction of law, become assessees as provided in that section but that fiction cannot be extended beyond the object for which it was enacted

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 21, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 28, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1977-78 to 1986-87
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Important principles relating to valuation of property subject to the Land Ceiling Act explained in the context of the Wealth-tax Act

One has to assume that the property in question is saleable in the open market and estimate the price which the assumed willing purchaser would pay for such a property. When the asset is under the clutches of the Ceiling Act and in respect of the said asset/vacant land, the Competent Authority under the Ceiling Act had already determined the maximum compensation of Rs.2 lakhs, how much price such a property would fetch if sold in the open market? We have to keep in mind what a reasonably assumed buyer would pay for such a property if he were to buy the same. Such a property which is going to be taken over by the Government and is awaiting notification under Section 10 of the Act for this purpose, would not fetch more than Rs.2 lakhs as the assumed buyer knows that the moment this property is taken over by the Government, he will receive the compensation of Rs.2 lakhs only. We are not oblivious of those categories of buyers who may buy “disputed properties” by taking risks with the hope that legal proceedings may ultimately be decided in favour of the assessee and in such a eventuality they are going to get much higher value. However, as stated above, hypothetical presumptions of such sales are to be discarded as we have to keep in mind the conduct of a reasonable person and “ordinary way” of the presumptuous sale. When such a presumed buyer is not going to offer more than Rs.2 lakhs, obvious answer is that the estimated price which such asset would fetch if sold in the open market on the valuation date(s) would not be more than Rs.2 lakhs

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 14, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 28, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 2(14)(iii)(b): To determine whether the “agricultural land” is situated within 8 km of the municipal limits so as to constitute a “capital asset”, the distance has to be measured in terms of the approach road and not by the straight line distance on horizontal plane or as per crow's flight

The Court is of the view that for the purposes of Section 2 (14) (iii) (b) of the Income-tax Act, the distance had to be measured from the agricultural land in question to the outer limit of the municipality by road and not by the straight line or the aerial route. The distance has to be measured from the land in question itself and not from the village in which the land is situated

COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 14, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 17, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Acche Din For Corrupt Babus: Mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused is not sufficient to establish an offense under the Prevention of Corruption Act. Proof of demand of illegal gratification is essential. Its absence is fatal to the complaint

Mere possession and recovery of currency notes from an accused without proof of demand would not establish an offence under Sections 7 as well as 13(1)(d)(i)&(ii) of the Act. In the absence of any proof of demand for illegal gratification, the use of corrupt or illegal means or abuse of position as a public servant to obtain any valuable thing or pecuniary advantage cannot be held to be proved. The proof of demand is an indispensable essentiality and of permeating mandate for an offence under Sections 7 and 13 of the Act. Qua Section 20 of the Act, which permits a presumption as envisaged therein, it has been held that while it is extendable only to an offence under Section 7 and not to those under Section 13(1)(d) (i)&(ii) of the Act, it is contingent as well on the proof of acceptance of illegal gratification for doing or forbearing to do any official act. Such proof of acceptance of illegal gratification, it was emphasized, could follow only if there was proof of demand. Axiomatically, in absence of proof of demand, such legal presumption under Section 20 of the Act would also not arise. As a corollary, failure of the prosecution to prove the demand for illegal gratification would be fatal and mere recovery of the amount from the person accused of the offence under Sections 7 or 13 of the Act would not entail his conviction thereunder

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: September 4, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 16, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 32: The "functional" test has to be applied to determine whether an asset is "plant". Even a pond designed for rearing prawns can be "plant"

In Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Anand Theatres 224 ITR 192 it was held that except in exceptional cases, the building in which the plant is situated must be distinguished from the plant and that, therefore, the assessee’s generating station building was not to be treated as a plant for the purposes of investment allowance. It is difficult to read the judgment in the case of Anand Theatres so broadly. The question before the court was whether a building that was used as a hotel or a cinema theatre could be given depreciation on the basis that it was a “plant” and it was in relation to that question that the court considered a host of authorities of this country and England and came to the conclusion that a building which was used as a hotel or cinema theatre could not be given depreciation on the basis that it was a plant