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COURT:
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DATE: October 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 18, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
Article 7: There is a difference between "effectively connected" with the permanent establishment and "legally connected" with it. Only those activities necessary for the functioning of the PE are "effectively connected" with the PE. Article 13: Concept of "make available" technical knowledge etc explained

In the present case certain activities are carried out by the appellant which are not even concerned with the functioning of the permanent establishment therefore in our view only the activities which are performed by the permanent establishment are effectively connected with the permanent establishment and activities which are not carried on by the permanent establishment but are carried out by the head office of the appellant are not “effectively connected” with the permanent establishment. We are also of the view that the term “effectively connected” should not be understood to mean the opposite of “legally connected” but rather something in the sense of “really connected”. Therefore the activities mentioned in the contract should be connected to the permanent establishment not only in the form but also in substance. It is also interesting to note that the permanent establishment of the assessee has been admitted by the appellant only because of the reason that some of the employees of the appellant came to India from time to time for short visit and further certain freelancers were appointed for undertaking the own ground implementation related supervision activities in India. Therefore according to us there are minimum activities performed by the PE of appellant in India. Hence just performing such minimum activities it cannot be said that whole of the revenue of Rs. 33 crores involved in the contract is “effectively connected” with the activities of the permanent establishment in India. Hence we reject the contention of the assessee that the whole of the revenue involved in the contract should be considered as effectively connected with the permanent establishment of the appellant.

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COURT:
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DATE: September 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 18, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BE(1)(b): A panchnama for purposes of opening a locker and vacating s. 132(3) prohibitory orders does not amount to conclusion of the search for purposes of extending limitation for passing the block assessment order

Now the legal issue qua the search is whether the block assessment as made by the AO was barred by limitation u/s 158BE(1)(b) of the Act. According to the provisions of section 158BE (1)(b) of the Act order in the block assessment has to be passed by the AO within two years from the end of the month in which the search was conducted and concluded. Now the issue to be adjudicated is whether the search concluded in 17.12.1999/23.12.1999 or 14.02.2000

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COURT:
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DATE: September 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BC: Action of the Revenue in issuing s. 158BC notice despite the appraisal report clearly stating that no incriminating material was found is highly deplorable as it amounts to harassment of the taxpayer. The Officers cannot act on their whim and fancy. The Dept should adopt a SOP to provide adequate safeguards before issuing notices under Ch. XVIB. Chief CIT directed to pay costs to the assessee

We note that this action on the part of the revenue to issue the impugned notice ignoring the appraisal report is highly deplorable. We live in a Country governed by laws. The Officers of the Income Tax Department are obliged to proceed in accordance with the statutory provisions and not on their whim and fancy. The Officers hold power in trust and must ensure that no citizen is harassed by sending him notices, when on the basis on its own record, such notices are not sustainable. We trust that the Income Tax Department would adopt a standard operating procedure which would provide for appropriate safeguards before issuing notices under Chapter XIVB of the Act. This alone would ensure that Officers of the Revenue act in terms of the mandate provided in the Act. In fact, at the very outset, after a preliminary hearing, we had asked the learned Counsel for the Revenue whether the Revenue would still want to persist with the impugned notice under Section 158BC of the Act. On instructions, Mr. Suresh Kumar, learned Counsel for the revenue informed us that the revenue seeks to press the impugned notice and seek dismissal of the present Petition. In the above view, this is the fit case where costs should be awarded to the Petitioner

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DATE: September 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)(v): Entire law on whether entering into a "joint development agreement" with the builder and handing over possession/ power of attorney amounts to a "transfer" and gives rise to capital gains explained. Chaturbuj Dwarkadas Kapadia 260 ITR 491(Bom) explained/ distinguished

It is generally seen that there may be several stages or events arising in a joint development arrangement made between owner of the land and the developer. For the purpose of determining the actual date of transfer of the land by the land owner, all these stages / events needs to be collectively analsysed and after evaluating overall effect of the same we can determine the actual date of transfer. These stages / events may be described as date of entering into JDA, date of executing power of attorney authorising the developer for taking various approvals / permissions etc., handing over the possession of the land to the developer for various purposes, receipt of part / full sale consideration from the developer, date of execution of power of attorney in favour of developer authorising him for the sale of developed units to the customers at his absolute discretion; and transfer of developed units to the customers etc. There may be few more stages / events to complete the transaction. Though, one single event may trigger the process of transfer but may not necessarily complete it also. Whether the transfer has, in substance, taken place, can be determined by analysing the inter-play and effect of all these stages / events combined and put together. For example, possession may be given for various purposes, viz. possession given to a contractor, or to a tenant also, but such an event in itself cannot be regarded as “transfer” of land. Possession of land may also be handed over as licensee only for the purpose of development of real estate on land. Here again, it shall not give rise to “transfer”. Thus, when the possession is given along with other legal rights to the developer resulting into entitlement of the developer for full use and enjoyment of the property as well as its further sale after converting it into developed units at its full, own and sole discretion, then it may result into ‘transfer’ provided other conditions also suggest so. Thus, handing over of the possession has to be necessarily coupled with the intention of transferring the rights of ownership and enjoyment of the property to the developer. Handing over of the possession for the limited purpose of developing the land while still retaining the ownership and control of various legal rights upon the property by the land owner would not fall in clause (v) of section 2(47)

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DATE: September 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12, 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 69C Bogus purchases: The AO cannot treat purchases as bogus (accommodation entries) merely on the basis of information received from the sales-tax department and without conducting independent inquires especially when the assessee has discharged its primary onus of showing books of account, payment by way of account payee cheque and producing bills for purchase of goods

The AO has not conducted any independent enquires for making the addition especially since the assessee has discharged its primary onus of showing books of account, payment by way of account payee cheque and producing bills for purchase of goods. (i) By relying on the official website of the Sales Tax Department, Government of Maharashtra regarding suspicion parties providing accommodation entries, the AO has made an addition. In response to the show cause notice issued by the AO, the assessee has supplied copy of bills, cop of the bank statement to prove that payment made for purchases, and copy of ledger accounts of all eight parties. The assessee is an individual carrying on a proprietary business in the name of M/s Noble Construction Company, undertaking construction work of dams and canals on behalf of Government of Maharashtra in the interior part of the State. In the interior parts the goods are not available easily. The Government contracts are time barring contract and the work is required to be completed on time. Accordingly, when the material is required in emergency the telephonic orders are placed upon the parties who supply the materials at site. The corresponding consumption of materials in respect of which the purchases were affected by the assessee firm have not been doubted by ld. AO. Neither any document information has been provided by the AO nor he has given any opportunity to the assessee to cross examine the said party and AO has concluded that the purchases by assessee company from the said party is bogus merely on the basis of information from Sales Tax Department.

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DATE: October 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
37(1)/43(5): Loss suffered in foreign exchange transactions entered into for hedging business transactions cannot be disallowed as being “notional” or “speculative” in nature. S. Vinodkumar Diamonds is not good law as it lost sight of Badridas Gauridas 261 ITR 256 (Bom)

It appears that in S. Vinodkumar, the Tribunal held the forward contract on facts before it to be speculative in nature in view of Section 43(5) of the Act. However, it appears that the decision of this court in CIT vs. Badridas Gauridas (P) Ltd. (134) Taxman Pg. 376 was not brought to the notice of the Tribunal when it rendered its decision in S. Vinodkumar (supra). In the above case, this court has held that forward contract in foreign exchange when incidental to carrying on business of cotton exporter and done to cover up losses on account of differences in foreign exchange valuations, would not be speculative activity but a business activity

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DATE: September 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1993-94
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CITATION:
S. 147: Non-supply by the AO of reasons recorded for reopening the assessment (even where the reopening is prior to GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC)) renders the reassessment order bad as being without jurisdiction

An alternative submission is made on behalf of the Revenue that the obligation to supply reasons on the Assessing Officer was consequent to the decision of the Apex Court that GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. vs. Income-tax Officer (2003) 259 ITR 19 (SC) rendered in 2003 while, in the present case, the reopening notice is dated 9 December 1996. Thus it submitted at the time when the notice under Section 148 of the Act was issued and the time when assessment was completed, there was no such requirement to furnish to the assessee a copy of the reasons recorded. This submission is not correct. We find that the impugned order relies upon the decision of this Court in Seista Steel Construction (P.) Ltd. [1984] 17 Taxman 122(Bom.) when it is held that in the absence of supply of reasons recorded for issue of reopening notice the assessment order would be without jurisdiction and needs to be quashed. The above view as taken by the Tribunal has also been taken by this Court in CIT vs. Videsh Sanchar Nigam Ltd. [2012] 21 Taxmann 53 (Bombay) viz. non-supply of reasons recorded to issue a reopening notice would make the order of Assessment passed thereon bad as being without jurisdiction

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COURT:
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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 10, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 200A/234E: As the amendment to s. 200A has come into effect on 1.6.2015 and has prospective effect, no computation of fee for the demand or the intimation for the fee u/s 234E can be made for TDS deducted prior to 1.6.2015. Hence, the demand notices u/s 200A for payment of fee u/s 234E is without authority of law

It is hardly required to be stated that, as per the well established principles of interpretation of statute, unless it is expressly provided or impliedly demonstrated, any provision of statute is to be read as having prospective effect and not retrospective effect. Under the circumstances, we find that substitution made by clause (c) to (f) of sub-section (1) of Section 200A can be read as having prospective effect and not having retroactive character or effect. Resultantly, the demand under Section 200A for computation and intimation for the payment of fee under Section 234E could not be made in purported exercise of power under Section 200A by the respondent for the period of the respective assessment year prior to 1.6.2015. However, we make it clear that, if any deductor has already paid the fee after intimation received under Section 200A, the aforesaid view will not permit the deductor to reopen the said question unless he has made payment under protest.

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COURT:
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SECTION(S):
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COUNSEL:
DATE: September 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 50C: The proviso to s. 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.04.2017 to provide that the stamp duty valuation of property on the date of execution of the agreement to sell should be adopted instead of the valuation on the date of execution of the sale deed is curative and intended to remove an undue hardship to the assessee and an apparent incongruity. It should accordingly be given retrospective effect from 1st April 2003, i.e. the date effective from which s. 50C was introduced

The Proviso to Section 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, on the recommendation of the Income Tax Simplification Committee (Easwar Committee) recognizes the genuine and intended hardship in the cases in which the date of agreement to sell is prior to the date of sale and introduces welcome amendments to the statue to take the remedial measures. However, this brings no relief to the assessee as the amendment is introduced only with prospective effect from 1st April 2017. There cannot be any dispute that this amendment in the scheme of Section 50C has been made to remove an incongruity, resulting in undue hardship to the assessee, as is evident from the observation in Easwar Committee report to the effect that “The (then prevailing) provisions of section 50C do not provide any relief where the seller has entered into an agreement to sell the asset much before the actual date of transfer of the immovable property and the sale consideration has been fixed in such agreement” recognizing the incongruity that the date agreement of sell has been ignored in the statute even though it was crucial as it was at this point of time that the sale consideration is finalized. The incongruity in the statute was glaring and undue hardship not in dispute

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COURT:
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SECTION(S):
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COUNSEL:
DATE: September 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Penalty cannot be imposed if the AO does not specify whether the penalty is for "concealment of income" or for "furnishing inaccurate particulars". Penalty cannot be imposed in respect of income surrendered by the assessee if the AO does not link the income to incriminating documents

The income is offered by appellant on ad hoc basis without co-relating the amount of year wise disclosure without any corroborating evidence. The above disclosure has been accepted by assessing officer without referring to any incriminating material pertaining to respective years. The assessing officer as well as the 1st appellate authority has also not referred to any material based on which disclosure is made and assessed by the assessing officer. In view of this it is apparent that disclosure is without any material but merely on the statement of appellant. In our view, there may be several reasons for making surrender by an assessee and merely on this basis an inference beyond doubt cannot be drawn that there was concealment of particulars of income or furnishing inaccurate particulars thereof on the part of the assessee towards the surrendered income to attract penal provisions under sec. 271(1)(c) of the Act

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