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DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 45: Entire law on whether a joint development agreement entered into by an owner of land with a developer constitutes a "transfer" u/s 2(47) and whether the same gives rise to capital gains chargeable to tax u/s 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act explained in the context of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and real income theory

If an agreement, like the JDA in the present case, is not registered, then it shall have no effect in law for the purposes of Section 53A. In short, there is no agreement in the eyes of law which can be enforced under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This being the case, we are of the view that the High Court was right in stating that in order to qualify as a “transfer” of a capital asset under Section 2(47)(v) of the Act, there must be a “contract” which can be enforced in law under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. A reading of Section 17(1A) and Section 49 of the Registration Act shows that in the eyes of law, there is no contract which can be taken cognizance of, for the purpose specified in Section 53A. The ITAT was not correct in referring to the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” in Section 2(47)(v) in order to arrive at the opposite conclusion. This expression was used by the legislature ever since sub-section (v) was inserted by the Finance Act of 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. All that is meant by this expression is to refer to the ingredients of applicability of Section 53A to the contracts mentioned therein. It is only where the contract contains all the six features mentioned in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (supra), that the Section applies, and this is what is meant by the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A”. This expression cannot be stretched to refer to an amendment that was made years later in 2001, so as to then say that though registration of a contract is required by the Amendment Act of 2001, yet the aforesaid expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” would somehow refer only to the nature of contract mentioned in Section 53A, which would then in turn not require registration. As has been stated above, there is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. This being the case, and it being clear that the said JDA was never registered, since the JDA has no efficacy in the eye of law, obviously no “transfer” can be said to have taken place under the aforesaid document

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DATE: June 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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CITATION:
Capital Gains: While a family arrangement/settlement does not amount to a "transfer" u/s 2(47) as it only recognizes "pre-existing rights" between the parties, the same applies only to members of the families and not to transfers made by corporate entities. The corporate veil can never be lifted at the instance of the company itself because that would amount to its denying its own corporate existence. The fact that the Company is wholly owned by the members of the family is irrelevant

There is no dispute before us that a family arrangement/settlement would not amount to a transfer. So far as the members of Mohota family are concerned, who are parties to the family settlement, any transfer inter se between them on account of family settlement would not result in a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Capital gain tax under the Act. However, in the present case, we are not concerned with the members of Mohota family who were parties to the family settlement, but with transfer of share done by the Company incorporated under the Companies Act having separate/independent corporate existence, perpetual succession and common seal. This Company is independent and distinct from it’s members

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DATE: February 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
Capital gains: While s. 2(42A) uses the term "held", the other provisions use the terms "acquired", "purchased" and "owner". Accordingly, for considering whether an asset is a "long-term capital asset", the period of holding must be computed on a de facto basis. The letter of allottment, even though not "ownership", must be taken as the date of holding the asset

Perusal of the definition of the term “short-term capital asset” in section 2(42A) shows that the legislature has used the expression ‘held’. It is further noted by us that in various other allied or similar sections, the legislature has preferred to use the expression ‘acquired’ or ‘purchased’ e.g. in section 54 / 54F. Thus, it shows that the legislature was conscious while making use of this expression. The expressions like ‘owned’ has not been used for the purpose of determining the nature of asset as short term capital asset or long term capital asset. Thus, the intention of the legislature is clear that for the purpose of determining the nature of capital gain, the legislature was concerned with the period during which the asset was held by the assessee for all practical purposes on de facto basis. The legislature was apparently not concerned with absolute legal ownership of the asset for determining the holding period. Thus, we have to ascertain the point of time from which it can be said that assessee started holding the asset on de facto basis

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DATE: December 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 54EC/54F: U/s 108 of the Companies Act read with CBDT Circular No. 704 dated 28.04.1995, a mere agreement for transfer of shares does not cause effective transfer of shares unless it is accompanied with delivery of share certificate and duly signed and stamped share transfer form. An agreement to transfer share merely gives an enforceable right to the parties

The word transfer of shares is an act of the parties, i.e. transferor and transferee by which title to share is transferred from one person to another for a consideration or otherwise. Share transfer is governed by section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956. As per section 108 of the Companies Act, 1956 registration of transfer of shares is possible only if a proper transfer deed in form no. 7B duly stamped and signed by or on behalf of the transferor and by or on behalf of the transferee and specifying the name, address and occupation, if any of the transferee and has been delivered to the company along with share certificates and endorsed by the Company by changing such details in the share holder register maintained under the Companies Act. In the case of shares of listed companies, effective transfer would take place when title to share is transferred from one person to another through demat account in recognized stock exchange. In the case of shares of unlisted companies, transfer would take place, only when valid share transfer form in form no. 7B is delivered to the company and endorsed by the Company. Therefore, for effective transfer of shares a mere agreement for transfer of shares is not sufficient, unless it is physically transfer shares by delivery of share certificate along with duly signed and stamped share transfer form

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DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 54F: The demolition of a structure does not amount to a "transfer". It is not correct to contend that Vania Silk Mills 191 ITR 647 (SC) is overruled by Grace Collis 248 ITR 323 (SC). Lower authorities cannot refuse to apply binding High Court judgements on the basis that the High Court has not considered a Supreme Court judgement

The demolition of the structure would not constitute a transfer of the assets in terms of Section 54(3) of the Act in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT, reported in 191 ITR 647. In the above case, the Apex Court has held that when an asset is destroyed, there is no question of transfer taking place under the Act. The Apex court held that in terms of the Act that the words ‘Extinguishment of any right’ in Section 2(47) of the Act, does not include an extinguishment of right on account of destruction. It has to be an extinguishment of right on account of transfer. Thus, a destruction of assets when not on account of any transfer would not be hit by Section 54F(3) of the Act. Counsel for the revenue seeks to distinguish the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. (Supra) that the destruction in that case took place because of fire and hence it was involuntary. This distinction is of no consequence. In our view of the decision of the Apex Court in Vania Silk Mills (Supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Entire law on difference between premium (salami) paid to acquire a lease and rent paid to use a lease explained in the context of whether a lease results in a transfer u.s 2(47)

By its nature the salami being a non-recurring payment -made by a tenant to the landlord at the inception of the grant of the lease has a/ways been regarded as a receipt of a capital nature in the hands of the landlord. The finding that had been recorded by the Tribunal was that this payment was made to the assessee by the tenants for getting them accepted as tenants. In other words, it was by way of a premium or salami that these payments were received by the assessee as a consideration for granting monthly tenancies to the tenants. Obviously, it was a non-recurring payment made by the tenants to the assessee for the purpose of getting the monthly tenancy. Every payment by way of a salami or a premium need not necessarily be held to be of a capital nature or on capital account, but since prima facie that is the nature of such payment it is for the department to establish facts which would go to show that such payment was in the – nature of income and not on capital account

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DATE: September 24, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether leasehold rights constitute a "capital asset" u/s 2(14), whether there is a "transfer" u/s 2(47) of such rights and whether "capital gains" u/s 45 can arise explained in detail

The Court is unable to agree with the above approach of the ITAT to interpreting what appear to be plain and unambiguous provisions of the Act. It is useful to recall that this entire discussion is in the backdrop of what constitutes “transfer” in relation to a capital asset. Further, the entire exercise is for ultimately determining if there has been any capital gains arising from the transaction. Under Section 45(1) ‘capital gains’ are any profits or gains arising from the transfer of a capital asset effected in the previous year. When the word “transfer” itself has been defined under Section 2(47) (vi) and by virtue of Explanation 1 “shall” have the same meaning as Section 269UA(d) then it is not possible to ‘restrict’ Explanation 1 to only those transactions described in Chapter XXC. Explanation 1 is a deeming fiction and incorporates by way of reference the provisions of Section 269 UA (d) in order to understand the meaning of the word ‘transfer’ for the purposes of Section 2 (47) (vi). Therefore, that entire scheme has to be given effect to. In other words, it is not possible to omit the reference to Section 269UA(d) (i) which in turn brings in Section 269UA(f) (i). The ITAT has therefore erred in conveniently choosing to not apply the Explanation 1 to Section 2 (47) in order to arrive at the conclusion there was indeed a ‘transfer’ of a capital asset brought about by the lease agreement in question

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DATE: November 26, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 1, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 53A: Mere handing over possession pursuant to development agreement does not result in transfer if developer has not taken steps for development of property

The AO has assessed capital gain in the assessment year for the reason that assessee as per the terms of the development agreement entered with the developer has handed over possession of the property. However, as can be seen from …

ACIT vs. B. Rajamallu (ITAT Hyderabad) Read More »

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DATE: December 26, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 1, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
For constituting a long-term capital asset, date of allotment of property and not date of registration to be considered. Benevolent approach should be adopted and not a hyper-technical or legalistic one

(i) All the aforesaid judgments relied on by the Revenue are cases arising prior to the amendment to Section 2(47) of the Act. The very same judgments show, in particular the judgment of the Full Bench of the Gujarat High …

Andhra Networks Limited vs. DCIT (ITAT Hyderabad) Read More »

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DATE: January 1, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 14, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)(v): Execution of a Power of Attorney in favour of the builder constitutes part performance u/s 53A of TOP Act and a "transfer" for capital gains

(i) On a reading of the above provision itself, it is clear that possession of the property has been handed over to the builder immediately on receipt of the first installment of the payment from the builder. As per clause …

Cochin Stock Exchanges Limited vs. CIT (Kerala High Court) Read More »