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DATE: January 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi): While consideration paid to acquire the right to use software is assessable as "royalty", payments made for purchase of software as a product is not for use or the right to use the software and is not assessable as "royalty"

In the cases where an Assessee acquires the right to use a software the payment so made would amount to royalty. However in cases where the payments are made for purchase of software as a product, the consideration paid cannot be considered to be for use or the right to use the software. It is well settled that where software is sold as a product it would amount to sale of goods. In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 (SC), the Supreme Court examined the transactions relating to the purchase and sale of software recorded on a CD in the context of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The court held the same to be goods within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act and consequently exigible to sales tax under the said Act. Clearly, the consideration paid for purchase of goods cannot be considered as ‘royalty’. Thus, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where consideration is paid to acquire the right to use a patent or a copyright and cases where payment is made to acquire patented or a copyrighted product/ material. In cases where payments are made to acquire products which are patented or copyrighted, the consideration paid would have to be treated as a payment for purchase of the product rather than consideration for use of the patent or copyright

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 50B/43(6)(c): In computing the net worth for computing capital gains from a slump sale, depreciation on assets have to be deducted even if not claimed by the assessee

Plainly, the purpose of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act is to provide a methodology to compute the written down value of the block of assets transferred by an Assessee as a part of the undertaking or division sold by way of a slump sale. The reference to Clause C is clearly not for the purposes of computing the block of assets remaining with the Assessee after the slump sale. It is apparent from the above that the intended object and scope of Clause C as used in Section 50B of the Act is totally different than the purpose of the said provision when read as a part of Section 43 of the Act. In the circumstances, clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act must be read in a manner to expressly include the computation provisions of Clause C without reference to other the import of the said provisions of Section 43 of the Act. In our view, the ITAT fell into error in importing the interpretation of Clause C read as a part of Section 43 of the Act, to interpret the scope of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act

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DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 79: The transfer of shares of an Indian company by a holding Co (Yum Asia) to another holding Co (Yum Singapore) results in change of “beneficial ownership” of shares and results in disallowance of b/fd losses even though the ultimate beneficial owner remains Yum USA. The corporate veil cannot be pierced to regard the ultimate holding Co as the beneficial owner

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT, the Court finds that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be AEs of Yum USA, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India does not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of Section 79 of the Act, Yum India cannot be permitted to set off the carry forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years

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DATE: December 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10 to 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): As the Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” has been struck down in Pepsi Foods 376 ITR 87 (Del) as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, the law laid down in Narang Overseas 295 ITR 22 (Bom) & Ronuk Industries 333 ITR 99 (Bom) that the ITAT has power to grant stay beyond 365 days has to be followed

The ratio of the decision of this Court in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even to the substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act. The basis of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) was that the power to grant stay or interim relief has to be read as coextensive with the power to grant final relief. The object being that in the absence of the power to grant interim relief the final relief itself may be defeated. This Court thereafter followed the decision of the Apex Court in “CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills(P) Ltd., (2005(180) ELT 434 (SC)) and held that notwithstanding the pre-substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act the Tribunal continues to have powers to grant interim relief. In the above view, therefore, the ratio of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even in case of substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act

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DATE: January 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 268A: Though the low tax effect circular No. 21/2015 dated 10.12.2015 does not refer to references filed u/s 256(1), it has to be held to apply to references as well in view of the objective of the CBDT to focus only on large tax effect matters

One feature in support of the submission that the Circular be not applied to References could be that the References are opinions sought by the Tribunal on questions of law from this Court unlike statutory appeals filed by the parties, seeking the view of the Courts. However though these References are undoubtedly made by the Tribunal, they emanate from an application by one of the parties before it leading to the order giving rise to the question of law requiring the opinion of the Court. This in practice is similar to the statutory appeal under Section 260A of the Act being filed by a party to the High Court for the reason that, this appeal is not considered as a matter of right of the party but only if the court to which the appeal is preferred is satisfied that a substantial question of law arises and admits the appeal for further consideration. Therefore a pending appeal under Section 260A of the Act is no different from a pending Reference in as much as in the case of a Reference the Tribunal is of the view that a substantial question of law arises either on its own (Section 256(1) of the Act) or as directed by Court (Section 256(2) of the Act) which requires the opinion of the Court, while in a pending appeal under Section 260A of the Act which has been admitted, the Court is of the view that a substantial question of law arises which requires due consideration by the Court. Therefore we construe the Circular dated 10th December 2015 as applicable even to pending References in the same manner they apply to pending appeals

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DATE: November 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Entire law on accountability of public officials for acts of omission and commission explained. Customs officials directed to pay costs of Rs. 14 lakh + interest @ 9% p.a. from personal account & to face disciplinary action for “high-handedness”, arbitrariness” and seeking to “hoodwink” Court

Today the issue thus is not only of award of compensation but who should bear the brunt. The concept of authority and power exercised by public functionaries has many dimensions. It has undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change in socioeconomic outlook. The authority empowered to function under a statute while exercising power discharges public duty. It has to act to subserve general welfare and common good. In discharging this duty honestly and bona fide, loss may accrue to any person. And he may claim compensation which may in circumstances be payable. But where the duty is performed capriciously or the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the responsibility to pay the loss determined should be whose? In a modem society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. Public administration, no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields the action of administrative authority. But where it is found that exercise of discretion was mala fide and the complainant is entitled to compensation for mental and physical harassment then the officer can no more claim to be under protective cover. When a citizen seeks to recover compensation from a public authority in respect of injuries suffered by him for capricious exercise of power and the National Commission finds it duly proved then it has a statutory obligation to award the same. It was never more necessary than today when even social obligations are regulated by grant of statutory powers. The test of permissive form of grant is over. It is now imperative and implicit in the exercise of power that it should be for the sake of society. When the court directs payment of damages or compensation against the State the ultimate sufferer is the common man. It is the tax payers’ money which is paid for inaction of those who are entrusted under the Act to discharge their duties in accordance with law. It is, therefore, necessary that the Commission when it is satisfied that a complainant is entitled to compensation for harassment or mental agony or oppression, which finding of course should be recorded carefully on material and convincing circumstances and not lightly, then it should further direct the department concerned to pay the amount to the complainant from the public fund immediately but to recover the same from those who are found responsible for such unpardonable behaviour by dividing it proportionately where there are more than one functionaries

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DATE: January 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Bogus Sales/ Purchases: Addition solely on the basis of information received from the sales-tax department is not sustainable. Suspicion of the highest degree cannot take the place of evidence

AO had made the addition as one of the supplier was declared a hawala dealer by the VAT Department. We agree that it was a good starting point for making further investigation and take it to logical end. But, he left the job at initial point itself. Suspicion of highest degree cannot take place of evidence. He could have called for the details of the bank accounts of the suppliers to find out as whether there was any immediate cash withdrawal from their account. We find that no such exercise was done

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DATE: November 27, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 50C: The stamp duty value on the date of agreement & not date of sale deed has to be taken. The nature of the property on the date of agreement has to be considered. Q whether proviso to s. 56(2)(vii)(b) is curative and retrospective left open

The issue is as to whether the date of agreement or the date of execution of sale deed has to be considered for the purpose of adopting the SRO value under S.50C of the Act. We find that this issue is now settled in favour of the assessee by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Lal and Smt. Shantilal Motilal V/s. CIT(365 ITR 389) as well as decisions of the coordinate bench of this Tribunal at Visakhapatnam in the cases of M/s. Lahiri Promoters Visakhapatnam V/s. ACIT, Circle 1(1), Visakhapatnam (ITA No.12/Vizag/2009 dated 22.6.2010) and Moole Rami Reddy V/s. ITO (ITA No.311/Vizag/2010 dated 10.12.2010). It is therefore, now settled that the SRO value as on the date of agreement of sale has to be considered for the purpose of computation of capital gains

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DATE: December 10, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
CUP method can be applied by a comparing a pricing formulae, rather than the pricing quantification in amount. Rule 10AB inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2012 is beneficial in nature and so retrospective w.e.f. 01.04.2002

Rule 10B(1)(f) inserted vide notification dated 23rd May 2012 is not a residual method in the sense that it is not a condition precedent for the application of this method that all other methods set out in s. 92C (1)(a) to 92C(1)(e) and as elaborated under rule 10B(1)(a) to (e), must fail and only then this method can be applied. This method is at par with all other methods of determining the arm’s length price as set out in sections 92C(1)(a) to (f), and, in terms of Section 92C(2), the most appropriate method, referred to in Section 92C(1), “shall be applied, for determination of arm’s length price, in the manner prescribed”. Therefore, as long as the method covered by rule 10AB, which is duly covered by Section 92C(1) satisfies the test of being the ‘most appropriate method’, it can be applied to a fact situation. The expression ‘ price which….would have been charged on paid” is used in rule 10BA, dealing with this method, in this method the place of “price charged or paid”, as is used in rule 10B(1)(a), dealing with CUP method, such an expression not only covers the actual price but also the price as would have been, hypothetically speaking, paid if the same transaction was entered into with an independent enterprise. This hypothetical price may not only cover bonafide quotations, but it also takes it beyond any doubt or controversy that where pricing mechanism for associated enterprise and independent enterprise is the same, the price charged to the associated enterprises will be treated as an arm’s length price. In this view of the matter, the business model said to have been adopted by the assessee, in principle, meets the test of arm’s length price determination under rule 10BA as well

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DATE: December 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Transfer pricing of AMP Expenditure: the onus is on the Revenue to demonstrate by tangible material that there is an international transaction involving AMP expenses between the Indian Co and the AE. In the absence of that first step, the question of determining the ALP of such a transaction does not arise. In the absence of a machinery provision it is hazardous for any TPO to proceed to determine the ALP of such a transaction since Bright Line Test has been negatived as a valid method of determining the existence of an international transaction and thereafter its ALP

The provisions under Chapter X do envisage a ‘separate entity concept’. In other words, there cannot be a presumption that in the present case since WOIL is a subsidiary of Whirlpool USA, all the activities of WOIL are in fact dictated by Whirlpool USA. Merely because Whirlpool USA has a financial interest, it cannot be presumed that AMP expense incurred by the WOIL are at the instance or on behalf of Whirlpool USA. There is merit in the contention of the Assessee that the initial onus is on the Revenue to demonstrate through some tangible material that the two parties acted in concert and further that there was an agreement to enter into an international transaction concerning AMP expenses

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