Month: May 2016

Archive for May, 2016


Rajmandir Estates Private Limited vs. Pr. CIT (Calcutta High Court)

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 263: Even if the AO has conducted an inquiry into the taxability of share capital receipts u/s 68, the CIT is entitled to revise u/s 263 if the AO has not applied his mind to important aspects. Law in Lovely Exports 299 ITR 268, Sophia Finance 205 ITR 98 etc does not apply as they are prior to the Money Laundering Act 2002. Qs whether receipt towards share capital is taxable pre s. 56(2)(viib) & whether proviso to s. 68 is retrospective are left open

Whether receipt of share capital was a taxable event prior to 1st April, 2013 before introduction of Clause (VII b) to the Sub-section 2 of Section 56 of the Income Tax Act; whether the concept of arms length pricing in a domestic transaction before introduction of Section 92A and 92BA of the Income Tax Act was there at the relevant point of time are not questions which arise for determination in this case. The assessee with an authorised share capital of Rs.1.36 crores raised nearly a sum of Rs.32 crores on account of premium and chose not to go in for increase of authorised share capital merely to avoid payment of statutory fees is an important pointer necessitating investigation. Money allegedly received on account of share application can be roped in under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act if the source of the receipt is not satisfactorily established by the assessee. Reference in this regard may be made to the judgement in the case of Sumati Dayal –Vs- CIT (supra) wherein Their Lordships held that any sum “found credited in the books of the assessee for any previous year, the same may be charged to income tax….”. We are unable to accept the submission that any further investigation is futile because the money was received on capital account. The Special Bench in the case of Sophia Finance Ltd. (supra) opined that “the use of the words “any sum found credited in the books” in Section 68 indicates that the said section is very widely worded and an Income-tax Officer is not precluded from making an enquiry as to the true nature and source thereof even if the same is credited as receipt of share application money. Mere fact that the payment was received by cheque or that the applicants were companies, borne on the file of Registrar of Companies were held to be neutral facts and did not prove that the transaction was genuine as was held in the case of CIT –Vs- Nova Promoters and Finlease (P) Ltd. (supra). Similar views were expressed by this Court in the case of CIT –Vs- Precision Finance Pvt. Ltd. (supra). We need not decide in this case as to whether the proviso to Section 68 of the Income Tax Act is retrospective in nature. To that extent the question is kept open. We may however point out that the Special Bench of Delhi High Court in the case of Sophia Finance Ltd. (supra) held that “the ITO may even be justified in trying to ascertain the source of depositor”. Therefore, the submission that the source of source is not a relevant enquiry does not appear to be correct. We find no substance in the submission that the exercise of power under Section 263 by the Commissioner was an act of reactivating stale issues. In the case of Gabriel India Ltd. (supra) the CIT was unable to point out any error in the explanation furnished by the assessee. Whereas in the present case we have tabulated the evidence which was before the assessing officer which should have provoked him to make further investigation. The assessing officer did not attach any importance to that aspect of the matter as discussed above by us

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

VLS Finance Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BC: A stay on the conduct of a "special audit" u/s 142(2A) amounts to a "stay of the assessment proceedings" and extends limitation u/s 158BE. One warrant of authorisation can be used for multiple visits and searches and limitation commences only after the panchnama records the conclusion of the search

As a general rule, therefore, when there is no stay of the assessment proceedings passed by the Court, Explanation 1 to Section 158BE of the Act may not be attracted. However, this general statement of legal principle has to be read subject to an exception in order to interpret it rationally and practically. In those cases where stay of some other nature is granted than the stay of the assessment proceedings but the effect of such stay is to prevent the assessing officer from effectively passing assessment order, even that kind of stay order may be treated as stay of the assessment proceedings because of the reason that such stay order becomes an obstacle for the assessing officer to pass an assessment order thereby preventing the assessing officer to proceed with the assessment proceedings and carry out appropriate assessment

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Saurashtra Cement & Chemical Industries Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: May 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1981-82
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CITATION:
S. 153: In a case of conferment of “concurrent” jurisdiction upon the ITO & IAC, the ITO does not stand denuded of powers to make an assessment. It is open to the ITO to assume jurisdiction and pass the assessment order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers. S. 144B applies only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO

It is not the IAC who exercises the powers or performs the functions of the ITO, even when such a power was conferred upon him, concurrently with the ITO. The significant feature of Section 125A of the Act is that even when the IAC is given the same powers and functions which are to be performed by the ITO in relation to any area or classes or person or income or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, on the conferment of such powers, the ITO does not stand denuded of those powers. With conferment of such powers on the IAC gives him “concurrent” jurisdiction which means that both, ITO as well as the IAC, are empowered to exercise those functions including passing assessment order. It is still open to the ITO to assume the jurisdiction and pass the order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers in respect of the assessment year. Provisions of Section 144B would not apply only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers that are borne out from the bare reading of sub-Section (4) of Section 125B

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Indu Lata Rangwala vs. DCIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-2000
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CITATION:
S. 143(1)/ 147: Entire law on the reopening of s. 143(1) assessments in the light of Zuari Estate Development 373 ITR 661 (SC) explained

Whereas in a case where the initial assessment order is under Section 143 (3), and it is sought to be reopened within four years from the expiry of the relevant assessment year, the AO has to base his ‘reasons to believe’ that income has escaped assessment on some fresh tangible material that provides the nexus or link to the formation of such belief. In a case where the initial return is processed under Section 143 (1) of the Act and intimation is sent to the Assessee, the reopening of such assessment no doubt requires the AO to form reasons to believe that income has escaped assessment, but such reasons do not require any fresh tangible material

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Arvind Asmal Mehta vs. ITO (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Bogus purchase and sale of shares: Law explained as to on whom the onus is to show that the purchase and sale of shares are bogus and the circumstances required to be proved by the AO

The purchase of shares in the immediately preceding year was accepted by the Department in an order u/s 147 r.w.s 143(3) of the Act. The shares were evidenced by entries in the demat statement and consideration was received through banking channel. There was no clinching material to say that the impugned transaction was bogus. Also, the statement recorded during the search on M/s Alliance Intermediaries & Network Pvt. Ltd. does not contain any infirmity qua the impugned transaction. Therefore, the addition as income from undisclosed income was liable to be deleted

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Narayan Tatu Rane vs. ITO (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08, 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 263: There is doubt whether Explanation 2(a) to s. 263, inserted by FA 2015 w.e.f. 01.04.2015 has retrospective effect. The said Explanation does not override the law that the CIT cannot fault an assessment order without conducting his own inquiry or verification to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law

Even though there is a doubt as to whether the said explanation, which was inserted by Finance Act 2015 w.e.f. 1.4.2015, would be applicable to the year under consideration, yet we are of the view that the said Explanation cannot be said to have over ridden the law interpreted by Hon’ble Delhi High Court, referred above. If that be the case, then the CIT can find fault with each and every assessment order, without conducting any enquiry or verification in order to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law and order for revision. He can also force the AO to conduct the enquiries in the manner preferred by CIT, thus prejudicing the independent application of mind of the AO. Definitely, that could not be the intention of the legislature in inserting Explanation 2 to sec. 263 of the Act, since it would lead to unending litigations and there would not be any point of finality in the legal proceedings

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

ACIT vs. M/s. BSR & Co (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): Payments by a CA firm to foreign professional entities for services rendered abroad is not taxable under Articles 12 and 15 of the India-USA DTAA. The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vii) to tax services rendered outside India does not apply in the context of a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) in the hands of the payer

Ostensibly, the requirement of rendering services in India in order to attract section 9(1)(vii) of the Act was removed by insertion of Explanation by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1/4/1976. This has been understood by the Revenue to say that inspite of the services having been rendered by the recipients outside India, the same is taxable in India by applying the aforesaid amendment. In our view, such retrospective amendment would be determinative of the tax liability in the hands of the recipients of income. So however, in the present case, what is held against the assessee is the failure to deduct tax at source at the time of payment of such income. Ostensibly, dehors the aforesaid amendment, the impugned income was not subject to tax deduction at source in India as per the prevailing legal position. Taxability of a sum in the hands of recipient, on account of a subsequent retrospective amendment would not expose the assessee-payer to an impossible situation of requiring deduction of tax at source on the date of payment. Therefore, on this count also the assessee cannot be held to be in default in not deducting tax at source so as to trigger the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Lahoti Overseas Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Mumbai)

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DATE: March 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
A liberal view must be taken in matters of condonation of delay. A delay of 2191 days caused by an employee leaving the services of the assessee and not handing over papers to the assessee deserves to be condoned

In every case of delay, there can be some lapses on the part of the litigant concern. That alone is not enough to turn down the plea and to shut the doors against him, unless and until, it makes a mala-fide or a dilatory statutory, the court must show utmost consideration to such litigant. In matters concerning the filing of appeals, in exercise of the statutory right, a refusal to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, which may lead to miscarriage of justice. Since the employee who was earlier handling the tax matters of the assessee company, while leaving the job of the assessee company, did not handover the relevant papers either to the assessee or to the next person, a fact which caused the delay, the delay was liable to be condoned by taking a lenient view

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Adobe Systems Inc vs. ADIT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
Entire law on what constitutes a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India in terms of Article 5(1), 5(2)(l) or Article 5(5) of the Indo-USA DTAA explained. If the alleged PE has been assessed on ALP basis in terms of Article 7, no income has escaped escapement so as to justify issue of s. 148 notice

Even if the subsidiary of a foreign company is considered as its PE, only such income as is attributable in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 can be brought to tax. In the present case, there is no dispute that Adobe India – which according to the AO is the Assessee’s PE – has been independently taxed on income from R&D services and such tax has been computed on the basis that its dealings with the Assessee are at arm’s length (that is, at ALP). Therefore, even if Adobe India is considered to be the Assessee’s PE, the entire income which could be brought in the net of tax in the hands of the Assessee has already been so taxed in the hands of Adobe India. There is no material that would even remotely suggest that the Assessee has undertaken any activity in India other than services which have already been subjected to ALP scrutiny/adjustment in the hands of Adobe India

Posted in All Judgements, High Court

Tata Teleservices Limited vs. CBDT (Delhi High Court)

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DATE: May 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 143(1D): Instruction No.1 of 2015 dated 13.01.2015 which curtails the discretion of the AO by 'preventing' him from processing the return and granting refund, where notice has been issued to the assessee u/s 143(2), is unsustainable in law and quashed

The real effect of the instruction is to curtail the discretion of the AO by ‘preventing’ him from processing the return, where notice has been issued to the Assessee under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the legislative intent was that the return would not be processed at all once a notice is issued under Section 143 (2) of the Act, then the legislature ought to have used express language and not the expression “shall not be necessary”. By the device of issuing an instruction in purported exercise of its power under Section 119 of the Act, the CBDT cannot proceed to interpret or instruct the income tax department to “prevent” the issue of refund. In the event that a notice is issued to the Assessee under Section 143 (2) of the Act, it will be a matter the discretion of the concerned AO whether he should process the return

Posted in All Judgements, High Court
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