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COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL: , ,
DATE: March 25, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 27, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Customs Act: It is a settled proposition that when a law requires a thing to be done in a particular manner, it has to be done in the prescribed manner and proceeding in any other manner is necessarily forbidden. An order is vitiated if it is passed in violation of the principles of natural justice. Where there is a breach of principles of natural justice, existence of an alternate remedy of appeal would be no bar to exercise of jurisdiction under Article 226 of the Constitution of India

In the light of the discussions made above, we are of the unhesitant view that the impugned order in original is clearly unsustainable in law being in violation of the principles of natural justice as well as the statutory provisions as alluded to hereinabove. In the circumstances, relegating the petitioner to the forum of appeal does not arise. Consequently, we set aside the impugned order in original dated 23.09.2020 and direct that the proper officer may proceed with the matter afresh, if he is so inclined, by following the mandate of section 124 of the Customs Act and Rule 12 of the Customs Valuation (Determination of Value of Imported Goods) Rules, 2007. We further direct that respondent No.2 shall assign the hearing to a proper officer other than respondent No.3, who had passed the impugned order in original

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COURT:
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COUNSEL: ,
DATE: February 11, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 20, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 271AAB: Penalty u/s 271AAB can only be levied on "undisclosed income". The expression ‘undisclosed income’ is given a definite and specific meaning. It has not been described in an inclusive manner so as to enable the tax authorities to give a wider or elastic meaning. Species of income which is not specifically covered by the definition cannot be brought within its ambit. Such penal provisions are required to be interpreted in a strict, specific and restricted manner. Income declared by the assessee in the return of income or found or assessed by the AO in the assessment proceedings may be relevant for assessment of the income under section 68 /69 and other related provisions of the Act and also for the levy of penalty u/s 271(1)(c) of the Act. However, if it does not fall within the four corners of the definition of “undisclosed income”, penalty u/s 271AAB cannot be levied

The Assessing Officer has levied penalty @ 10% of the alleged undisclosed income, however, it is a matter of record in this case that the assessee has not made any surrender of any undisclosed income during the search action. The assessing officer has not initiated the penalty proceedings u/s 271AAB of the Act on the basis of or in consequence of the said search action, rather the assessing officer, has initiated the penalty proceedings during the assessment proceedings solely on the ground that the assessee has disclosed certain income from undisclosed sources in the return of income and paid due taxes thereupon

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COURT:
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COUNSEL: ,
DATE: March 16, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 20, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
A notice issued u/s 142(1) requiring the assessee to furnish a return of income when the assessee had already earlier filed a return is not valid. Once a valid return of income was available on record, which was already processed issuing notice u/s 142(1) of the Act asking the assessee to furnish fresh notice in itself is invalid making subsequently proceedings void ab initio. The assessment order has to be quashed for want of jurisdiction

In our considered opinion, once a valid return of income was available on record, which was already processed issuing notice u/s 142(1) of the Act asking the assessee to furnish fresh notice in itself is invalid making subsequently proceedings void ab initio.

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COURT:
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DATE: March 4, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 13, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 90, 91: An Indian taxpayer is not entitled to claim refunds from the Government of India of taxes paid by the said taxpayer outside India, i.e., to the foreign Governments, in respect of the income taxes paid abroad on income earned in the respective tax jurisdictions, if the said income is not taxed in India due to a loss. However, the taxes paid abroad are allowable as a deduction in the computation of the business income of the assessee (Entire law is discussed in detail)

In the present case, our entire focus was on whether these foreign tax credits could be allowed even when such tax credits lead to a situation in which taxes paid abroad could be refunded in India, but that must not be construed to mean that, as a corollary to our decision, these foreign tax credits would have been allowed, even if there is no domestic tax liability in respect of the related income in India if it was not to result in such a refund situation. At the cost of repetition, we may add that, for the detailed reasons set out earlier, we have our reservations on the applicability of the Wipro decision (supra) on this bench, being situated outside of the jurisdiction of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court, and we are of the considered view that full tax credit for source taxation cannot, as such and to that extent, be extended in the residence jurisdiction when a tax treaty sanctions only proportionate credit, and does not, in any case, specifically provide for the full foreign tax credit. A full tax credit, which goes beyond eliminating double taxation of an income, actually ends up subsidizing the foreign exchequer, to the extent that the taxes paid to the foreign exchequer are allowed to discharge exclusive domestic tax liability, rather than eliminating double taxation of an income, and that is the reason that even in the solitary full credit situation visualized in the Indian tax treaties, in the Indo Namibia tax treaty (supra), it’s one-way traffic inasmuch as while India, as a relatively developed nation, offers, under article 23(2), full credit for taxes paid in Namibia, whereas, in contrast, Namibia, as a developing nation, offers, under article 23(1), proportionate credit for taxes paid in India. It reinforces our understanding that the full foreign tax credits cannot be inferred to be permissible as a matter of course and normal practice

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DATE: February 12, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 153A, 153C search assessments: (i) A statement recorded u/s 132(4) has evidentiary value but cannot justify the additions in the absence of corroborative material. (ii) The statement also cannot, on a standalone basis, constitute 'incriminating material' so as to empower the AO to frame a block assessment u/s 153A (iii) If the statement was recorded in the course of search conducted in the case of a third party, and assuming the statement is construed as 'incriminating material belonging to or pertaining to a person other than person searched', the only legal recourse available to the department is to proceed in terms of S. 153C of the Act by handing over the same to the AO who has jurisdiction over such person. An assessment framed u/s 153A on the basis of alleged incriminating material (being the statement recorded under 132(4) of the Act) is not valid. The Assessee also had no opportunity to cross-examine the said witness (All imp judgements referred)

Now, coming to the aspect viz the invocation of section 153A on the basis of the statement recorded in search action against a third person. We may note that the AO has used this statement on oath recorded in the course of search conducted in the case of a third party (i.e., search of Pradeep Kumar Jindal) for making the additions in the hands of the assessee. As per the mandate of Section 153C, if this statement was to be construed as an incriminating material belonging to or pertaining to a person other than person searched (as referred to in Section 153A), then the only legal recourse available to the department was to proceed in terms of Section 153C of the Act by handing over the same to the AO who has jurisdiction over such person. Here, the assessment has been framed under section 153A on the basis of alleged incriminating material (being the statement recorded under 132(4) of the Act). As noted above, the Assessee had no opportunity to cross-examine the said witness, but that apart, the mandatory procedure under section 153C has not been followed.

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COURT:
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DATE: March 2, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Taxability of sums received for supply of software as "royalty": Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs, the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/ distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases

Given the definition of royalties contained in Article 12 of the DTAAs mentioned in paragraph 41 of this judgment, it is clear that there is no obligation on the persons mentioned in section 195 of the Income Tax Act to deduct tax at source, as the distribution agreements/EULAs in the facts of these cases do not create any interest or right in such distributors/end-users, which would amount to the use of or right to use any copyright. The provisions contained in the Income Tax Act (section 9(1)(vi), along with explanations 2 and 4 thereof), which deal with royalty, not being more beneficial to the assessees, have no application in the facts of these cases. Our answer to the question posed before us, is that the amounts paid by resident Indian end-users/distributors to non-resident computer software manufacturers/suppliers, as consideration for the resale/use of the computer software through EULAs/distribution agreements, is not the payment of royalty for the use of copyright in the computer software, and that the same does not give rise to any income taxable in India, as a result of which the persons referred to in section 195 of the Income Tax Act were not liable to deduct any TDS under section 195 of the Income Tax Act. The answer to this question will apply to all four categories of cases enumerated by us in paragraph 4 of this judgment

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DATE: January 15, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 10(38) Bogus Capital Gains from Penny Stock: The fact that there was an astounding 4849.2% jump in the share price within two years, which is not supported by the financials, does not justify the AO's conclusion that the assessee converted unaccounted money into fictitious exempt LTCG to evade taxes. The finding is unsupported by material on record & is purely an assumption based on conjecture. The theory of human behavior and preponderance of probabilities, based on Sumati Dayal v. CIT 214 ITR 801 (SC), cannot be cited as a basis to turn a blind eye to the evidence

The startling spike in the share price and other factors may be enough to show circumstances that might create suspicion; however the Court has to decide an issue on the basis of evidence and proof, and not on suspicion alone. The theory of human behavior and preponderance of probabilities cannot be cited as a basis to turn a blind eye to the evidence produced by the Respondent

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DATE: August 5, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 1994-95
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CITATION:
S. 482 CrPC: Prosecution launched in 2008 u/s 276C, 277 & 278B of the Income-tax Act, 1961 for alleged tax evasion in AY 1994-95 deserves to be quashed because the assessee has paid the tax and the penalty & also taking into account the year in which the alleged offence was committed. The assessee has been paying income-tax regularly & has not been prosecuted for any false disclosure either earlier or thereafter. It would only be in the nature of harassment to the petitioners, and an abuse of the process of the Court, if this case is allowed to be continued. (Note: The Supreme Court has directed issue of notice on the Dept's SLP)

This Court, in a number of cases, has defined the scope and ambit of the powers under Section 482 Cr.P.C. A High Court, exercising its power under the aforesaid section, has an inherent power to act ex debito justitiae to do real and substantial justice, for the administration of which alone it exists, or to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court. It has been clarified that the inherent powers of the Court under Section 482 Cr.P.C. can be exercised to give an effect to an order under the Cr.P.C., to prevent the abuse of the process of the Court and to otherwise secure the ends of justice. No doubt, a caution has been laid that such powers are to be exercised sparingly, carefully and with much circumspection, but in a case of this kind, where the entire liability has been paid to the Government and there has not been any loss to the public exchequer, allowing this case to be continued after eleven years would only be an abuse of the process of the Court.

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COUNSEL: , , , ,
DATE: January 19, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 153D: The approving authority (JCIT) has to give approval for "each" assessment year after applying independent mind to the material on record to see whether the cases are un-abated or abated assessments and their effect. However, the JCIT has granted common approval for all AYs. Further, he did not have the seized material nor the appraisal report or other material at the time of granting approval. Therefore, the approval granted is merely technical approval just to complete the formality and without application of mind. The approval has been granted without application of mind and is invalid, bad in Law and is liable to be quashed

In our considered and humble opinion, no procedure for grant of approval has been provided u/s.153D of the Act and the Income tax Rules, 1962. However, when legislature has enacted some provision to be exercised by a higher revenue authority enabling the AO to pass assessment or reassessment orders in the search cases, then, it is the duty of the approving authority to exercise such power by applying his judicious, vigilant and cautious efforts. We are of the view that the obligation on the approval granting authority is of two folds, one the one hand, he has to apply his mind to secure in-build for the department against any omission or negligence by the AO in taxing right income in the hands of right person in the right assessment year and on the other hand he is also responsible and duty bound to do justice with the taxpayer/assessee by granting protection against arbitrary or unjust or unsustainable exercise and decision by the AO crating baseless tax liability on the assessee and thus he has to discharge his duties as superior authority. Thus, granting approval u/s.153D of the Act is not merely an official formality but it is a supervisory act which requires proper application of administrative and judicial skill by the authority on the application of mind and this exercise should be discernible from the order of approval u/s.153D of the Act

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COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: December 16, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2015-16
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CITATION:
S. 10(38) Bogus Capital Gains from Penny Stocks: The documents demonstrates that the assessee had purchased shares through Brokers for which the payment was made through banking channels. The assessee had sold shares through an authorized stock broker and payment was received through baking channels after deduction of STT. The AO has not doubted any of the documents. The only objection raised is that the script from which the assessee had earned Long Term Capital Gain has been held by the Investigation Wing of the Revenue to be a paper entity and that this scrip was being used for creating artificial capital gain. The objection is not acceptable (Udit Kalra (Delhi High Court) distinguished)

On going through the aforesaid judgment, we find that no question of law was formulated by Hon’ble High Court of Delhi in the said case and there is only dismissal of appeal in limine and the Hon’ble High Court found that the issue involved is a question of fact as held by Hon’ble Apex Court in Kunhayyammed vs State of Kerala reported in 245 ITR 360 and also in CIT vs. Rashtradoot (HUF) reported in 412 ITR 17. Even on merits and facts, the said judgment in the case of Udit Kalra vs ITO (supra) is distinguishable as in that case the scrips of the company were delisted on stock exchange, whereas, in the instant case, the interim order of SEBI in the cases of M/s Esteem Bio and M/s Turbotech have been cooled down by subsequent order of SEBI placed by assessees in its paper book. Thus, the case of Udit Kalra vs ITO relied by ld. DR is clearly distinguishable on facts and is not applicable to the facts of assessee. Thus, we hold that the case of assessee is factually and materially distinguishable from the facts of the case of Udit Kalra vs ITO so relied by ld DR

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