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DATE: March 19, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 24, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 143(1-A): The object of s. 143(1- A) is the prevention of evasion of tax. As it has the deterrent effect of preventing tax evasion, it should be made to apply only to tax evaders. It can only be invoked where it is found on facts that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee. The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it

Taking a cue from Varghese case, we therefore, hold that Section 143(1-A) can only be invoked where it is found on facts that the lesser amount stated in the return filed by the assessee is a result of an attempt to evade tax lawfully payable by the assessee. The burden of proving that the assessee has so attempted to evade tax is on the Revenue which may be discharged by the Revenue by establishing facts and circumstances from which a reasonable inference can be drawn that the assessee has, in fact, attempted to evade tax lawfully payable by it

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DATE: March 5, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 153C: Compliance with the requirements of s. 153C is mandatory. (i) If the AO of the searched person is different from the AO of the other person, the AO of the searched person is required to transmit the satisfaction note & seized documents to the AO of the other person. He is also required to make a note in the file of the searched person that he has done so. However, the same is for administrative convenience and the failure by the AO of the searched person to make a note in the file of the searched person, will not vitiate the proceedings u/s 153C. (ii) If the AO of the searched person and the other person is the same, it is sufficient for the AO to note in the satisfaction note that the documents seized from the searched person belonged to the other person. Once the note says so, the requirement of s. 153C is fulfilled. In such case, there can be one satisfaction note prepared by the AO, as he himself is the AO of the searched person and also the AO of the other person. However, he must be conscious and satisfied that the documents seized/recovered from the searched person belonged to the other person. In such a situation, the satisfaction note would be qua the other person. The requirement of transmitting the documents so seized from the searched person would not be there as he himself will be the AO of the searched person and the other person and therefore there is no question of transmitting such seized documents to himself

This Court had an occasion to consider the scheme of Section 153C of the Act and the conditions precedent to be fulfilled/complied with before issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act in the case of Calcutta Knitwears (2014) 6 SCC 444 as well as by the Delhi High Court in the case of Pepsi Food Pvt. Ltd (367) ITR 112 (Delhi). As held, before issuing notice under Section 153C of the Act, the Assessing Officer of the searched person must be “satisfied” that, inter alia, any document seized or requisitioned “belongs to” a person other than the searched person. That thereafter, after recording such satisfaction by the Assessing Officer of the searched person, he may transmit the records/documents/things/papers etc. to the Assessing Officer having jurisdiction over such other person. After receipt of the aforesaid satisfaction and upon examination of such other documents relating to such other person, the jurisdictional Assessing Officer may proceed 7 to issue a notice for the purpose of completion of the assessment under Section 158BD of the Act and the other provisions of Chapter XIV-B shall apply.

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DATE: February 7, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01
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CITATION:
U/s 43B(a), deduction is allowed on “any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee.” The scheme of s. 43B is to allow deduction when the sum is actually paid. (i) The credit of Excise Duty earned under MODVAT scheme is not sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess. It is merely the incident of Excise Duty that has shifted from the manufacturer to the purchaser and not the liability to the same. Consequently, the unutilised credit under MODVAT scheme does not qualify for deduction u/s 43B. (ii) The sales tax paid by the appellant was debited to a separate account titled ‘Sales Tax recoverable account’ and is liable for disallowance u/s 43B.

Deductions under Section 43B is allowable only when sum is actually paid by the assessee. In the present case, the Excise Duty leviable on appellant on manufacture of vehicles was already adjusted in the concerned assessment year from the credit of Excise Duty under the MODVAT scheme. The unutilised credit in the MODVAT scheme cannot be treated as sum actually paid by the appellant. The assessee when pays the cost of raw materials where the duty is embedded, it does not ipso facto mean that assessee is the one who is liable to pay Excise Duty on such raw material/inputs. It is merely the incident of Excise Duty that has shifted from the manufacturer to the purchaser and not the liability to the same

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DATE: February 21, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 29, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 43B: The conversion of outstanding interest into loan does not amount to "actual payment" of the interest in order to qualify for deduction in view of the retrospective insertion of Explanation 3C to s. 43B (Eicher Motors 315 ITR 312 (MP) & Pennar Profiles (T&AP) approved)

Expln. 3C has now in clear terms provided that such conversion of interest amount into loan shall not be deemed to be regarded as “actually paid” amount within the meaning of Section 43B. In view of clear legislative mandate removing this doubt and making the intention of legislature clear in relation to such transaction, it is not now necessary for this Court to interpret the unamended Section 43B in detail, nor it is necessary for this Court to take note of facts in detail as also the submissions urged in support of various contentions except to place reliance on Expln. 3C to Section 43B and answer the questions against the assessee and in favour of Revenue

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DATE: October 26, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Condonation of abnormal delay of 1371 days in removing office objections: High Court refused to condone delay and held that Dept must "set its own house in order by sacking and removing the delinquent and negligent officials or penalising them otherwise so as to subserve larger public interest". The Supreme Court reversed this holding High Court ought to have condoned the delay and not dismissed the appeal. Dept to pay costs of Rs. 1 lakh (from taxpayers' funds) for condonation of delay

No doubt, there is a long delay in removing the objections, we are of the opinion that in a case like this the High Court should have condoned the delay in removing the office objections and heard the2matter on merits

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DATE: October 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 10(20) Interpretation of statutes: Law on whether "functional test" as laid down in UOI vs. R.C. Jain, (1981) 2 SCC 308 is still good law explained in the context of whether the statutory functions conducted by a municipal committee enables it to qualify as a 'local authority'

The High Court based its decision on the fact that functions carried out by the assessee are statutory functions and it is carrying on the functions for the benefit of the State Government for urban development. The said reasoning cannot lead to the conclusion that it is a Municipal Committee within the meaning of Section 10(20) Explanation Clause (iii). The High Court has not adverted to the relevant facts and circumstances and without considering the relevant aspects has arrived at erroneous conclusions. Judgments of the High Court are unsustainable

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DATE: August 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80-IC: An assessee who avails of deduction for a period of 5 years @ 100% of profits and gains is entitled to deduction on 'substantial expansion' for remaining 5 Assessment Years @ 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) and not @ 100% (Mahabir Industries v. PCIT 256 TM 201 (SC) distinguished)

As pointed out above, once the assessees had started claiming deduction under Section 80-IC and the initial Assessment Year has commenced within the aforesaid period of 10 years, there cannot be another initial Assessment Year thereby allowing 100% deduction for the next 5 years also when sub-section (3), in no uncertain terms, provides for deduction @ 25% only for the next 5 years. It may be asserted again that the assessees accept the legal position that they cannot claim deduction of more than 10 years in all under Section 80-IC

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 194-I TDS: Amounts paid as part of the lease premium or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments. Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent and subject to TDS

(1) Amounts paid as part of the lease premium in terms of the time schedule (s) to the Lease Deeds executed between the petitioners and GNOIDA, or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments; (2) Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent, and therefore subject to TDS

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 194A TDS: Meaning of the expression "corporation" explained. Difference between "established by an Act" and "established under an Act" explained. Important principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes explained. Though NOIDA is not a "local authority", it is a "corporation established by the Act" and so payments to it are not liable to TDS u/s 194A

It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 10(20): Law on whether an industrial township referred to in proviso to Article 243Q is equivalent to a "municipality" and a "local authority" explained. Law on interpretation of statutes as to the scope of an "Explanation" and "Proviso" explained. There is no concept of "equity" or "presumption" or "intendment" in a taxing statute. Only the language has to be seen

What she argued was that looking to the nature of the functions enjoined upon the appellant committee, it must be deemed to be a municipal committee within the meaning of that expression in clause (iii) of the Explanation. We regret our inability to accept that submission. We say so for two distinct reasons. Firstly because the expression “municipal committee” appears in a taxing statute and must, Therefore, be construed strictly. It is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court that while interpreting a taxing statute, one has simply to look to what is clearly stated therein. There is, in fiscal statutes, no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about the levy sanctioned under the same

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