Search Results For: 2(47)


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DATE: January 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 45 Capital Gains: The allottee gets title to property on issue of allotment letter. The payment of installments is only a follow­-up action. Taking delivery of possession is only a formality. Accordingly, the date of allotment is the date on which the purchaser of a residential unit can be stated to have acquired the property (CBDT Circulars applied)

It was noted that such allotment is final unless it is cancelled or the allottee withdraw from the scheme and such allotment would be cancelled only under exceptional circumstances. It was noted that the allottee gets title to the property on the issue of allotment letter and the payment of installments was only a follow­up action and taking the delivery of possession is only a formality

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DATE: November 29, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 2(47) Transfer: The reduction of share capital of a company by way of reducing the face value of each share from Rs. 1,000 to Rs. 500 amounts to "extinguishment of rights" and is a "transfer" u/s 2(47) of the Act. The assessee is eligible to claim a capital loss therefrom (Kartikeya V. Sarabhai vs. CIT 228 ITR 163 (SC) & other judgements followed)

Sec. 2(47) which is an inclusive definition, inter alia, provides that relinquishment of an asset or extinguishment of any right there in amounts to a transfer of a capital asset. While, it is no doubt true that the appellant continues to remain a shareholder of the company even with the reduction of a share capital but it is not possible to accept the contention that there has been no extinguishment of any part of his right as a shareholder qua the company. It is not necessary that for a capital gain to arise that there must be a sale of a capital asset. Sale is only one of the modes of transfer envisaged by s. 2(47) of the Act. Relinquishment of the asset or the extinguishment of any right in it, which may not amount to sale, can also be considered as a transfer and any profit or gain which arises from the transfer of a capital asset is liable to be taxed under s. 45 of the Act

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DATE: November 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 21, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 2(47) Transfer: Law on whether conversion of preference shares into equity shares constitutes a "transfer" and whether capital gains can be assessed on the basis of the market value of the equity shares explained (Santosh L. Chowgule 234 ITR 787 (Bom) & Trustees of H.E.H. The Nizam 102 ITR 248 (AP) distinguished. CBDT Circular dated 12.05.1984 referred

Where one type of shares is converted into another type of share (including conversion of debentures into equity shares), there is, in fact, no “transfer” of a capital asset within the meaning of section 2(47) of the Income Tax Act, 1961. Hence, any profits derived from such conversion are not liable to capital gains tax under section 45(1) of the Act. However, when such newly converted share is actually transferred at a later date, the cost of acquisition of such share for the purpose of computing the capital gains shall be calculated with reference to the cost of the acquisition of the original share of stock from which it is derived

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DATE: October 29, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 6, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 2(47) Transfer for Capital Gains: The fact that an agreement for sale of property is registered does not make it a conveyance. The sale or transfer is not complete on the date of the execution of the agreement if there are obligations to be fulfilled by both parties

The sale or transfer was not complete on the date of the execution of the agreement as is now urged and erroneously understood by the Assessing Officer and the Commissioner. The Tribunal was right in its conclusion that on facts, the agreement executed on 14th February, 2011 is but an agreement for sale of immovable property. The law then prevailing required such an agreement to be registered. In any event merely because it is registered, that does not partake the character of a conveyance or a sale deed automatically. Thus, the possession also was not handed over but was to be handed over on compliance with certain obligations by the Vendor

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DATE: September 17, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 2(14)/ 28(va): The "right to sue" which arises on breach of a development agreement is a "personal right" and not a "capital asset" which can be transferred. Consequently, the damages received for relinquishment of the "right to sue" is a non-taxable capital receipt (all judgements considered)

A development agreement was executed which enabled the assessee to utilize the land for construction and for sharing of profits. This right/advantage accrued to the assessee was sought to be taken away from the assessee by way of sale of land. The prospective purchaser as well as the defaulting party (owner) perceived threat of filing suit by developer and consequently paid damages/ compensation to shun the possible legal battle. The intrinsic point with respect to accrual of ‘right to sue’ has to be seen in the light of overriding circumstances as to how the parties have perceived the presence of looming legal battle from their point of view. I t is an admitted position that the defaulting party has made the assessee a confirming party in the sale by virtue of such development agreement and a compensation was paid to avoid litigation. This amply shows the existence of ‘right to sue’ in the perception of the defaulting party.

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DATE: September 7, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 13, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 2(47)/ 54: Though an unregistered agreement to sell does not entitle the parties to seek part performance u/s. 53A of the Transfer of Property Act, 1882, it can be a basis for a suit for specific performance in view of s. 49 of the Registration Act. Consequently, even an unregistered agreement creates a right in favour of the buyer and constitutes a "transfer" of the old property u/s 2(47) for purposes of determining whether the purchase of the new property is within one year of the date of "transfer" of the old property

Thus, a right in respect of the capital asset (old residential property in question) has been transferred by the assessee in favour of the vendee/transferee on 16.09.2011 and, therefore, since purchase of the new property on 04.10.2010 which fact has been disputed by the AO/Ld. CIT(A) the purchase of the property is well within one year from the date of transfer as per sec. 2(47) of the Act, therefore, we allow the appeal of the assesse

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DATE: June 1, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 45: Argument that the allotment of shares by the assessee's holding co to foreign investors at huge valuation results in a "transfer"/ "indirect transfer" of the assessee's assets to the foreign investors is not correct. Argument that a multi layered holding structure was deliberately created to avoid taxes in India and to conceal the information about the ultimate beneficiaries is also not correct

The AO had held that a multi layered holding structure was deliberately created to avoid taxes in India and to conceal the information about the ultimate beneficiaries. Having AE.s outside India in itself cannot be held against an assessee. Because of advancement of technology, the globe has become a villge. So, the nature of business has changed a lot. In our humble opinion, assessees are free to decide the manner in which they want to run their businesses.It is said that a citizen is perfectly entitled to exercise his ingenuity so to arrange his affairs as may make it possible for him legally and lawfully not to pay tax, and if his ingenuity succeeds, however reluctant the Court may be to acknowledge the cleverness of the assessee,the Court must give effect to the letter of the taxation law rather than strain that letter against the assessee.

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DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 45: Entire law on whether a joint development agreement entered into by an owner of land with a developer constitutes a "transfer" u/s 2(47) and whether the same gives rise to capital gains chargeable to tax u/s 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act explained in the context of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and real income theory

If an agreement, like the JDA in the present case, is not registered, then it shall have no effect in law for the purposes of Section 53A. In short, there is no agreement in the eyes of law which can be enforced under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This being the case, we are of the view that the High Court was right in stating that in order to qualify as a “transfer” of a capital asset under Section 2(47)(v) of the Act, there must be a “contract” which can be enforced in law under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. A reading of Section 17(1A) and Section 49 of the Registration Act shows that in the eyes of law, there is no contract which can be taken cognizance of, for the purpose specified in Section 53A. The ITAT was not correct in referring to the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” in Section 2(47)(v) in order to arrive at the opposite conclusion. This expression was used by the legislature ever since sub-section (v) was inserted by the Finance Act of 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. All that is meant by this expression is to refer to the ingredients of applicability of Section 53A to the contracts mentioned therein. It is only where the contract contains all the six features mentioned in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (supra), that the Section applies, and this is what is meant by the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A”. This expression cannot be stretched to refer to an amendment that was made years later in 2001, so as to then say that though registration of a contract is required by the Amendment Act of 2001, yet the aforesaid expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” would somehow refer only to the nature of contract mentioned in Section 53A, which would then in turn not require registration. As has been stated above, there is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. This being the case, and it being clear that the said JDA was never registered, since the JDA has no efficacy in the eye of law, obviously no “transfer” can be said to have taken place under the aforesaid document

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DATE: June 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 21, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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CITATION:
Capital Gains: While a family arrangement/settlement does not amount to a "transfer" u/s 2(47) as it only recognizes "pre-existing rights" between the parties, the same applies only to members of the families and not to transfers made by corporate entities. The corporate veil can never be lifted at the instance of the company itself because that would amount to its denying its own corporate existence. The fact that the Company is wholly owned by the members of the family is irrelevant

There is no dispute before us that a family arrangement/settlement would not amount to a transfer. So far as the members of Mohota family are concerned, who are parties to the family settlement, any transfer inter se between them on account of family settlement would not result in a transfer so as to attract the provisions of the Capital gain tax under the Act. However, in the present case, we are not concerned with the members of Mohota family who were parties to the family settlement, but with transfer of share done by the Company incorporated under the Companies Act having separate/independent corporate existence, perpetual succession and common seal. This Company is independent and distinct from it’s members

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DATE: February 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
Capital gains: While s. 2(42A) uses the term "held", the other provisions use the terms "acquired", "purchased" and "owner". Accordingly, for considering whether an asset is a "long-term capital asset", the period of holding must be computed on a de facto basis. The letter of allottment, even though not "ownership", must be taken as the date of holding the asset

Perusal of the definition of the term “short-term capital asset” in section 2(42A) shows that the legislature has used the expression ‘held’. It is further noted by us that in various other allied or similar sections, the legislature has preferred to use the expression ‘acquired’ or ‘purchased’ e.g. in section 54 / 54F. Thus, it shows that the legislature was conscious while making use of this expression. The expressions like ‘owned’ has not been used for the purpose of determining the nature of asset as short term capital asset or long term capital asset. Thus, the intention of the legislature is clear that for the purpose of determining the nature of capital gain, the legislature was concerned with the period during which the asset was held by the assessee for all practical purposes on de facto basis. The legislature was apparently not concerned with absolute legal ownership of the asset for determining the holding period. Thus, we have to ascertain the point of time from which it can be said that assessee started holding the asset on de facto basis