Year: 2016

Archive for 2016


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DATE: May 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1981-82
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S. 153: In a case of conferment of “concurrent” jurisdiction upon the ITO & IAC, the ITO does not stand denuded of powers to make an assessment. It is open to the ITO to assume jurisdiction and pass the assessment order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers. S. 144B applies only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO

It is not the IAC who exercises the powers or performs the functions of the ITO, even when such a power was conferred upon him, concurrently with the ITO. The significant feature of Section 125A of the Act is that even when the IAC is given the same powers and functions which are to be performed by the ITO in relation to any area or classes or person or income or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, on the conferment of such powers, the ITO does not stand denuded of those powers. With conferment of such powers on the IAC gives him “concurrent” jurisdiction which means that both, ITO as well as the IAC, are empowered to exercise those functions including passing assessment order. It is still open to the ITO to assume the jurisdiction and pass the order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers in respect of the assessment year. Provisions of Section 144B would not apply only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers that are borne out from the bare reading of sub-Section (4) of Section 125B

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DATE: May 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-2000
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S. 143(1)/ 147: Entire law on the reopening of s. 143(1) assessments in the light of Zuari Estate Development 373 ITR 661 (SC) explained

Whereas in a case where the initial assessment order is under Section 143 (3), and it is sought to be reopened within four years from the expiry of the relevant assessment year, the AO has to base his ‘reasons to believe’ that income has escaped assessment on some fresh tangible material that provides the nexus or link to the formation of such belief. In a case where the initial return is processed under Section 143 (1) of the Act and intimation is sent to the Assessee, the reopening of such assessment no doubt requires the AO to form reasons to believe that income has escaped assessment, but such reasons do not require any fresh tangible material

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Bogus purchase and sale of shares: Law explained as to on whom the onus is to show that the purchase and sale of shares are bogus and the circumstances required to be proved by the AO

The purchase of shares in the immediately preceding year was accepted by the Department in an order u/s 147 r.w.s 143(3) of the Act. The shares were evidenced by entries in the demat statement and consideration was received through banking channel. There was no clinching material to say that the impugned transaction was bogus. Also, the statement recorded during the search on M/s Alliance Intermediaries & Network Pvt. Ltd. does not contain any infirmity qua the impugned transaction. Therefore, the addition as income from undisclosed income was liable to be deleted

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08, 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 263: There is doubt whether Explanation 2(a) to s. 263, inserted by FA 2015 w.e.f. 01.04.2015 has retrospective effect. The said Explanation does not override the law that the CIT cannot fault an assessment order without conducting his own inquiry or verification to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law

Even though there is a doubt as to whether the said explanation, which was inserted by Finance Act 2015 w.e.f. 1.4.2015, would be applicable to the year under consideration, yet we are of the view that the said Explanation cannot be said to have over ridden the law interpreted by Hon’ble Delhi High Court, referred above. If that be the case, then the CIT can find fault with each and every assessment order, without conducting any enquiry or verification in order to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law and order for revision. He can also force the AO to conduct the enquiries in the manner preferred by CIT, thus prejudicing the independent application of mind of the AO. Definitely, that could not be the intention of the legislature in inserting Explanation 2 to sec. 263 of the Act, since it would lead to unending litigations and there would not be any point of finality in the legal proceedings

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): Payments by a CA firm to foreign professional entities for services rendered abroad is not taxable under Articles 12 and 15 of the India-USA DTAA. The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vii) to tax services rendered outside India does not apply in the context of a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) in the hands of the payer

Ostensibly, the requirement of rendering services in India in order to attract section 9(1)(vii) of the Act was removed by insertion of Explanation by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1/4/1976. This has been understood by the Revenue to say that inspite of the services having been rendered by the recipients outside India, the same is taxable in India by applying the aforesaid amendment. In our view, such retrospective amendment would be determinative of the tax liability in the hands of the recipients of income. So however, in the present case, what is held against the assessee is the failure to deduct tax at source at the time of payment of such income. Ostensibly, dehors the aforesaid amendment, the impugned income was not subject to tax deduction at source in India as per the prevailing legal position. Taxability of a sum in the hands of recipient, on account of a subsequent retrospective amendment would not expose the assessee-payer to an impossible situation of requiring deduction of tax at source on the date of payment. Therefore, on this count also the assessee cannot be held to be in default in not deducting tax at source so as to trigger the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Act

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DATE: March 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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A liberal view must be taken in matters of condonation of delay. A delay of 2191 days caused by an employee leaving the services of the assessee and not handing over papers to the assessee deserves to be condoned

In every case of delay, there can be some lapses on the part of the litigant concern. That alone is not enough to turn down the plea and to shut the doors against him, unless and until, it makes a mala-fide or a dilatory statutory, the court must show utmost consideration to such litigant. In matters concerning the filing of appeals, in exercise of the statutory right, a refusal to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, which may lead to miscarriage of justice. Since the employee who was earlier handling the tax matters of the assessee company, while leaving the job of the assessee company, did not handover the relevant papers either to the assessee or to the next person, a fact which caused the delay, the delay was liable to be condoned by taking a lenient view

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DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
Entire law on what constitutes a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India in terms of Article 5(1), 5(2)(l) or Article 5(5) of the Indo-USA DTAA explained. If the alleged PE has been assessed on ALP basis in terms of Article 7, no income has escaped escapement so as to justify issue of s. 148 notice

Even if the subsidiary of a foreign company is considered as its PE, only such income as is attributable in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 can be brought to tax. In the present case, there is no dispute that Adobe India – which according to the AO is the Assessee’s PE – has been independently taxed on income from R&D services and such tax has been computed on the basis that its dealings with the Assessee are at arm’s length (that is, at ALP). Therefore, even if Adobe India is considered to be the Assessee’s PE, the entire income which could be brought in the net of tax in the hands of the Assessee has already been so taxed in the hands of Adobe India. There is no material that would even remotely suggest that the Assessee has undertaken any activity in India other than services which have already been subjected to ALP scrutiny/adjustment in the hands of Adobe India

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DATE: May 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 143(1D): Instruction No.1 of 2015 dated 13.01.2015 which curtails the discretion of the AO by 'preventing' him from processing the return and granting refund, where notice has been issued to the assessee u/s 143(2), is unsustainable in law and quashed

The real effect of the instruction is to curtail the discretion of the AO by ‘preventing’ him from processing the return, where notice has been issued to the Assessee under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the legislative intent was that the return would not be processed at all once a notice is issued under Section 143 (2) of the Act, then the legislature ought to have used express language and not the expression “shall not be necessary”. By the device of issuing an instruction in purported exercise of its power under Section 119 of the Act, the CBDT cannot proceed to interpret or instruct the income tax department to “prevent” the issue of refund. In the event that a notice is issued to the Assessee under Section 143 (2) of the Act, it will be a matter the discretion of the concerned AO whether he should process the return

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) penalty on Bogus Purchases: If the assessment order in the quantum proceedings is altered by an appellate authority in a significant way, the very basis of initiation of the penalty proceedings is rendered non-existent and the AO cannot continue the penalty proceedings on the basis of the same notice

Once the assessment order of the AO in the quantum proceedings was altered by the CIT (A) in a significant way, the very basis of initiation of the penalty proceedings was rendered non-existent. The AO could not have thereafter continued the penalty proceedings on the basis of the same notice. Also, the Court concurs with the CIT (A) and the ITAT that once the finding of the AO on bogus purchases was set aside, it could not be said that there was any concealment of facts or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the Assessee that warranted the imposition of penalty under Section 271 (1) (c) of the Act

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DATE: March 18, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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Inability of the assessee, an Advocate, to reconcile the professional receipts with the TDS certificates and to give a detailed party-wise breakup of fees receipts does not mean that the difference can be assessed as undisclosed income

The assessee was engaged as an Advocate to argue the matters by what is popularly known as Advocates on record or instructing Advocates method, meaning thereby the client does not engage the assessee directly but a professional or the Advocate engaged by the client requests the assessee to argue the case. The brief is then taken as the counsel brief. That being the practice, the assessee gave an explanation that the breakup as desired cannot be given and with regard to all payments. It is pointed out that at times, assessee receives fees directly from the clients or from the instructing Advocates or Chartered Accountants if such professionals have collected the amounts from the clients. Under these circumstances, the breakup as desired cannot be placed on record