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DATE: January 12, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Managerial services rendered by a UK Co to an Indian Co, even if technical in nature, is not assessable as “fees for technical services” under Article 13 of India-UK DTAA if it does not “make available” any skill, technical know-how etc

To fit into the terminology ‘make available’, the technical knowledge, skills etc must remain with the person receiving the services even after the particular contract comes to an end. The services offered may be the product of intense technological effort and lot of technical knowledge and experience of the service provider would have gone into it. But, that is not enough to fall within the description of services which make available the technical knowledge, etc. The technical knowledge or skills of the provider should be imparted to and absorbed by the receiver so that the receiver can deploy similar technology or techniques in future without depending on the provider

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DATE: January 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Amount received by a FII under a settlement for giving up right to sue is not assessable as either capital gains or as business profits. In principle, a FII is an "investor" and not a "trader" in stocks. On facts, applying Circular No. 4 of 2007, Aberdeen is an investor in shares

The Circular No.4 of 2007 issued by the CBDT quotes three principles laid down by this Authority in the case of Fidelity Group 288 ITR 641 in order to determine whether shares held are investment or stock-in-trade. First principle is how the shares were valued in the books of accounts, i.e., whether they were valued as stock-in-trade or held as investment. In this case the books of accounts show that the shares were held as investment. The second principle is to verify whether there are substantial transactions, their magnitude etc, maintenance of books of accounts and finding the ratio between purchases and sales. In this case the shares of Satyam were purchased, held as investment and sold only after the fraud became public. The third principle suggests that ordinarily purchases and sales of shares with the motive of realizing profit would lead to inference of trade/adventure in the nature of trade; where the object of the investment in shares of companies is to derive income by way of dividends etc, the transactions of purchases and sales of share would yield capital gains and not business profits. This principle also suggests that in this case the object of the investment is not to have business profit because the shares of Satyam were not being purchased and sold at regular interval. In the light of this even CBDT Circular No.4 of 2007 does not support the stand of Revenue that Aberdeen investors were engaged in trading business

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DATE: November 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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An installation project which does not last more than 183 days in a fiscal year is not a "Permanent Establishment" and the business profits are taxable only in Singapore under Article 7(1) of the India-Singapore DTAA

Since the project executed by the applicant in India for Brahmaputra continued only for 178 days in a fiscal year and as the duration of the project is less than 183 days in a fiscal year, Permanent Establishment of the applicant cannot be constituted in India for the FY 2012-13 as per the provisions of Article 5.3 of the India-Singapore DTAA. Hence, the business profits accruing or arising to the applicant by way of the execution of the project under reference is taxable only in the country where the applicant is a resident, as per Article 7.1 of India-Singapore DTAA

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DATE: January 7, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 271C: Penalty for failure to deduct TDS cannot be levied if Dept is unable to show contumacious conduct on the part of the assessee

We have carefully considered the rival submissions. In the instant case we are not dealing with collection of tax u/s 201(1) or compensatory interest u/s 201(1A). The case of the assessee is that these amounts have already been paid so as to end dispute with Revenue. In the present appeals we are concerned with levy of penalty u/s 271-C for which it is necessary to establish that there was contumacious conduct on the part of the assessee. We find that on similar facts Hon’ble Delhi High Court have deleted levy of penalty u/s 271-C in the cae of M/s. Itochu Corporation, reported in 268 ITR 172 (Del) and in the case of CIT Vs. Mitsui & Company Ltd. Reported in 272 ITR 545

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DATE: January 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1984-85
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CITATION:
S. 256: While findings of fact found by the Tribunal are final and the High Court cannot reappraise the same, the High Court can take note of facts on record which are lost sight of by the Tribunal and also construe certain facts to be of significance as against the different view of the Tribunal

It is well settled that issues of fact determined by the Tribunal are final and the High Court in exercise of its reference jurisdiction should not act as an appellate Court to review such findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal by a process of reappreciation and reappraisal of the evidence on record. The aforesaid position in law has been consistently laid down by this Court in several of its pronouncements out of which, illustratively, reference may be made to Karnani Properties Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal [82 ITR 547], Rameshwar Prasad Bagla vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, U.P. [87 ITR 421], Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City vs. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. [68 ITR 200] and K. Ravindranathan Nair vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax [247 ITR 178]

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DATE: January 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 147: Reopening of assessment to take remedial action pursuant to audit objections as per Instruction No. 9 of 2006 is not valid if AO disagrees with the objections. Instruction No. 9 cannot override the requirement in s. 147 that AO should form his own belief that income has escaped assessment

The Court holds instruction No. 9 of the CBDT dated 7th November, 2006 cannot possibly override the statutory powers to be exercised by an AO in terms of Section 147 of the Act. In other words the said instruction has to be read consistent with proviso (a) to Section 119 (1) of the Act and cannot, as was erroneously understood by the Respondent, compel the AO to issue the notice u/s 148. If the CBDT Instruction No. 9/2006 is read to the contrary, it would fall foul of Section 119 of the Act.

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DATE: January 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi): While consideration paid to acquire the right to use software is assessable as "royalty", payments made for purchase of software as a product is not for use or the right to use the software and is not assessable as "royalty"

In the cases where an Assessee acquires the right to use a software the payment so made would amount to royalty. However in cases where the payments are made for purchase of software as a product, the consideration paid cannot be considered to be for use or the right to use the software. It is well settled that where software is sold as a product it would amount to sale of goods. In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 (SC), the Supreme Court examined the transactions relating to the purchase and sale of software recorded on a CD in the context of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The court held the same to be goods within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act and consequently exigible to sales tax under the said Act. Clearly, the consideration paid for purchase of goods cannot be considered as ‘royalty’. Thus, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where consideration is paid to acquire the right to use a patent or a copyright and cases where payment is made to acquire patented or a copyrighted product/ material. In cases where payments are made to acquire products which are patented or copyrighted, the consideration paid would have to be treated as a payment for purchase of the product rather than consideration for use of the patent or copyright

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 50B/43(6)(c): In computing the net worth for computing capital gains from a slump sale, depreciation on assets have to be deducted even if not claimed by the assessee

Plainly, the purpose of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act is to provide a methodology to compute the written down value of the block of assets transferred by an Assessee as a part of the undertaking or division sold by way of a slump sale. The reference to Clause C is clearly not for the purposes of computing the block of assets remaining with the Assessee after the slump sale. It is apparent from the above that the intended object and scope of Clause C as used in Section 50B of the Act is totally different than the purpose of the said provision when read as a part of Section 43 of the Act. In the circumstances, clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act must be read in a manner to expressly include the computation provisions of Clause C without reference to other the import of the said provisions of Section 43 of the Act. In our view, the ITAT fell into error in importing the interpretation of Clause C read as a part of Section 43 of the Act, to interpret the scope of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act

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DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 79: The transfer of shares of an Indian company by a holding Co (Yum Asia) to another holding Co (Yum Singapore) results in change of “beneficial ownership” of shares and results in disallowance of b/fd losses even though the ultimate beneficial owner remains Yum USA. The corporate veil cannot be pierced to regard the ultimate holding Co as the beneficial owner

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT, the Court finds that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be AEs of Yum USA, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India does not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of Section 79 of the Act, Yum India cannot be permitted to set off the carry forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years

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DATE: December 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10 to 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): As the Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” has been struck down in Pepsi Foods 376 ITR 87 (Del) as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, the law laid down in Narang Overseas 295 ITR 22 (Bom) & Ronuk Industries 333 ITR 99 (Bom) that the ITAT has power to grant stay beyond 365 days has to be followed

The ratio of the decision of this Court in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even to the substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act. The basis of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) was that the power to grant stay or interim relief has to be read as coextensive with the power to grant final relief. The object being that in the absence of the power to grant interim relief the final relief itself may be defeated. This Court thereafter followed the decision of the Apex Court in “CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills(P) Ltd., (2005(180) ELT 434 (SC)) and held that notwithstanding the pre-substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act the Tribunal continues to have powers to grant interim relief. In the above view, therefore, the ratio of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even in case of substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act

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