Month: July 2018

Archive for July, 2018


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DATE: June 19, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 151: If the CIT merely states "Yes, I am satisfied" while granting sanction to the reopening, it means that the sanction is merely mechanical and he has not applied independent mind. There is not an iota of material on record as to what documents he had perused and what were the reasons for his being satisfied to accord the sanction to initiate the reopening of assessment (All judgements referred)

Apparently, from the approval recorded and words used that “Yes. I am satisfied.”, it has proved on record that the sanction is merely mechanical and Addl. CIT has not applied independent mind while according sanction as there is not an iota of material on record as to what documents he had perused and what were the reasons for his being satisfied to accord the sanction to initiate the reopening of assessment u/s 148 of the Act

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DATE: July 4, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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CITATION:
S. 50C is a deeming provision and applies only to the transfer of land or building. It does not apply to the transfer of "booking rights" and to right to purchase flats in a building

It is essential that for application of Sec. 50C that the transfer must be of a capital asset, being land or building or both. If the capital asset under transfer cannot be described as “land or building or both” then section 50C will cease to apply. Booking advance cannot be equated with the capital asset and therefore section 50C cannot be invoked

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DATE: May 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 45/ 48: Portfolio Management Scheme (PMS) fees paid by the assessee to the PMS Manager neither falls under the category of transfer fees nor cost of acquisition/improvement. Consequently it is not deductible while computing capital gains from sale of the shares (All judgements referred)

In the instant case, the deduction on account of fees paid for PMS had been claimed by the assessee as deduction in computing capital gains arising from sale of shares and securities. He however had failed to explain as to how the said fees could be considered as cost of acquisition of the shares and securities or the cost of any improvement thereto. He had also failed to explain as to how the said fees could be treated as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with sale of shares and securities. On the other hand, the basis on which the said fees was paid by the assessee showed that it had no direct nexus with the purchase and sale of shares and as rightly contended by the revenue, the said fees was payable by the assessee going by the basis thereof even without there being any purchase or sale of shares in a particular period

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DATE: June 28, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 5, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
Difference between "Res Judicata" and "Consistency Principle" explained. While "res judicate" does not apply to income-tax matters, the principles of consistency does. If the Revenue has accepted a practice and consistently applied and followed it, the Revenue is bound by it. The Revenue can change the practice only if there is a change in law or change in facts and not otherwise

The reason why courts have held parties to the opinion expressed in a decision in one assessment year to the same opinion in a subsequent year is not because of any principle of res judicata but because of the theory of precedent or the precedential value of the earlier pronouncement. Where facts and law in a subsequent assessment year are the same, no authority whether quasijudicial or judicial can generally be permitted to take a different view

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DATE: June 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 5, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus share capital: If the alleged share applicants do not appear before the AO pursuant to the s. 131 summons and the documentation is inadequate, it is a "completely bogus claim". The assessee cannot argue that the AO should have made inquiries from the AO of the share applicants as to their credit-worthiness

The appellant-assessee has referred to a judgment of this Court reported at 114 ITR 689 for the proposition that upon the identity of the person who has put in the money being established by the assessee, the onus is on the Revenue to discredit the explanation offered in terms of Section 68 of the Act. In the present case, there was no plausible explanation that was furnished by the assessee. At any rate, the identities of the alleged share applicants could not be established and the documents of the alleged share applicants carried by the assessee before the Assessing Officer did not reveal the investments that the assessee claimed such alleged applicants had made in the assessee

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DATE: June 29, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 5, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 56(2)(viia) is a counter evasion mechanism to prevent laundering of unaccounted income under the garb of gifts. The primary condition for invoking S. 56(2)(viia) is that the asset gifted should become a “capital asset” and property in the hands of recipient. If the assessee-company has purchased shares under a buyback scheme and the said shares are extinguished by writing down the share capital, the shares do not become capital asset of the assessee-company and hence s. 56(2)(viia) cannot be invoked in the hands of the assessee company

The provisions of sec. 56(2)(viia) should be applicable only in cases where the receipt of shares become property in the hands of recipient and the shares shall become property of the recipient only if it is “shares of any other company”. In the instant case, the assessee herein has purchased its own shares under buyback scheme and the same has been extinguished by reducing the capital and hence the tests of “becoming property” and also “shares of any other company” fail in this case. Accordingly we are of the view that the tax authorities are not justified in invoking the provisions of sec. 56(2)(viia) for buyback of own shares

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 10(20): Law on whether an industrial township referred to in proviso to Article 243Q is equivalent to a "municipality" and a "local authority" explained. Law on interpretation of statutes as to the scope of an "Explanation" and "Proviso" explained. There is no concept of "equity" or "presumption" or "intendment" in a taxing statute. Only the language has to be seen

What she argued was that looking to the nature of the functions enjoined upon the appellant committee, it must be deemed to be a municipal committee within the meaning of that expression in clause (iii) of the Explanation. We regret our inability to accept that submission. We say so for two distinct reasons. Firstly because the expression “municipal committee” appears in a taxing statute and must, Therefore, be construed strictly. It is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court that while interpreting a taxing statute, one has simply to look to what is clearly stated therein. There is, in fiscal statutes, no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about the levy sanctioned under the same

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DATE: June 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 9/ 195(1) TDS: Law on whether commision paid to non-resident agents for services rendered outside India accrues in India and whether the assessee is liable to deduct TDS thereon explained (All judgements referred)

Section 195 of the Act has to be read alongwith the charging Section 4,5 and 9 of the Act. One should not read Section 195 of the Act to mean that the moment there is a remittance, the obligation to deduct tax automatically arises. Section 195 of the Act clearly provides that unless the income is chargeable to lax in India, there is no obligation to withhold tax. In order to determine whether the income could be deemed to accrue or arise in India, section 9 of the Act is the basis

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DATE: May 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 2(42C)/ 50B: A transaction by which an undertaking is transferred in consideration of the allottment of shares is an "exchange" and not a "sale". The fact that the agreement refers to the parties as "seller" and "purchaser" is irrelevant. S. 2(42C)/ 50B apply only to "sale" and not to "exchange". Entire law on "estoppel" explained. As there is no estoppel against a statute, an assessee is entitled to raise the claim regarding non-taxability at any stage of the proceedings

In the present case the consideration was not money but equity shares and debentures and hence the transaction was not a “Sale” but an “Exchange” and consequently, the provisions of Section 50B of the I.T. Act, are not attracted. In the case of CIT vs. Bharat Bijlee Ltd. (365 ITR 258) where an undertaking was transferred under a Scheme of Arrangement to a company which allotted preference shares and bonds as consideration to the Transferor company. Following the decision of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Motor & General Stores (P) Ltd. (66 ITR 692), the jurisdictional High Court held that the provisions of section 50B were inapplicable to the transaction