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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to curtail the period available to file rectification applications from four years to six months cannot apply to appellate orders passed prior to that date because that would take away a vested right

The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision

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DATE: July 27, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 24, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 144C: Though service of the notice is not a condition precedent to conferment of jurisdiction upon the AO to deal with the matter, it is a condition precedent to making of the order of assessment. Accordingly, the s. 143(2) notice has not only to be issued before the expiry of the limitation period but has also to be served upon the assessee before the expiry of the limitation period. Conflict between VRA Cotton Mills (P&H) and Lunar Diamonds 281 ITR 1 (Del) explained in light of CBDT Circular No. 549 dated 31.10.1989

Service under the 1961 Act is not a condition precedent to conferment of jurisdiction in the ITO to deal with the matter but it is a condition precedent to making of the order of assessment. The Hon’ble High Court, in our opinion, lost sight of the distinction and under a wrong basis felt bound by the judgment in Banarsi Devi’s case

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DATE: January 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
For purposes of filing a rectification application, the period of limitation of six months commences from the date of receipt of the order sought to be rectified by the assessee and not from the date of passing of the order

The second part of the Section requires that the Tribunal shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by either party to the appeal before it. The party to the appeal can bring the fact of apparent mistake on record only after going through the order made by the tribunal. Therefore, to read that the period of limitation has to computed at any time within six months from the date of the order does not fit in either with legislative intent or the language employed by the provision.

15. There is another angle from which the matter can be approached. It is only the party to the appeal who finds that the order contains a mistake apparent from the record and is aggrieved by such mistake, would be in a position to move an application seeking rectification of the order. Therefore also, unless and until a party to the appeal is in a position to go through and study the order it would not be possible, nor can it be envisaged, that a party can claim to be aggrieved by the mistake apparent from the record. Hence, even on this count the period of limitation has to be read and understood so as to mean from the date of the receipt of the order

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DATE: April 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The amendment by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to specify the time limit of 6 months to file a rectification application applies even to applications filed with respect to appeal orders passed prior to the date of the amendment. The Tribunal has no power to condone the delay in filing a Miscellaneous Application

It is to be noted that the earlier period of ‘four years’ has been substituted with ‘six months’ by the Finance Act, 2016 with effect from 01/06/2016. However, we find that no distinction has been made in this section between orders passed before 01/06/2016 and orders passed after 01/06/2016. Moreover, the Tribunal order was dated 22/03/2013 and therefore, the Revenue had ample time to go through the same and pin point the mistakes in the order but it has failed to do so. Therefore, we find no force in these miscellaneous petitions primarily because of the reason that the Statute does not authorize us to entertain any petition which has been filed u/s 254(2) at any time beyond a period of six months from the date of the order

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DATE: July 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): The period of limitation for filing a rectification application is six months from the end of the month in which the “order is passed” and not from the date of “receipt of the order”. Even if a liberal view is taken, it can be considered as the date of uploading of the order on the ITAT website. The uploaded orders can be accessed by the assessee and constitutes service of the order upon the assessee

Section 254(2) of the Act refers to the period of limitation reckoning from the end of the month in which the order Is passed’ and not from the ‘date of receipt of the order’. As rightly pointed out by the Ld DR, the expressions “passed” “initiated” and “served / received” are not interchangeable and the Legislature in its wisdom expressly used the phraseology depending on the intention. In the instant case, the expression “passed” cannot be stretched to mean that the period of limitation should be reckoned from the date of receipt of the order. Even if a liberal view has to be taken, it can be considered as the date of uploading of the order. Ordinarily anything which is uploaded in the public domain can be accessed by the public at large and even the assessee would have access to the order and such a date always be treated as the service of the order

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DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 19, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 153B(2)(a): Merely visiting the premises on the pretext of concluding the search but not actually finding anything new for being seized cannot give rise to a second panchnama so as to extend the limitation period for passing the s. 153A assessment order. In such event, there would be no occasion to draw up a panchnama at all. The visit and the panchnama drawn up on that date cannot lead to postponement of the period for completion of assessment with reference to s. 153B (2) (a) of the Act

The Court is not prepared to accept the plea of the Revenue that merely because a panchnama was drawn up on 15th May, 2007 showing that the search was ‘finally concluded’ on that date, it postponed the period of limitation in terms of Section 153B (2) (a) of the Act. It had to be the “last panchnama drawn in relation to any person in whose case the warrant of authorization has been issued”. The last panchnama, no doubt, is dated 15th May, 2007 but what it records is the seizure of the jewellery items not of any of the persons searched but the wives of one of the directors i.e., of Ms. Neena Jain who was not even a director of any of these entities. Therefore, even assuming that the jewellery of Ms. Neena Jain was seized under panchnama of 15th May, 2007, as far as the searched entities are concerned, the Revenue cannot take advantage of Section 153B (2) (a) to contend that the period of limitation in respect of them stands extended for completing of assessment up to 31st December, 2009

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DATE: September 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 18, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BE(1)(b): A panchnama for purposes of opening a locker and vacating s. 132(3) prohibitory orders does not amount to conclusion of the search for purposes of extending limitation for passing the block assessment order

Now the legal issue qua the search is whether the block assessment as made by the AO was barred by limitation u/s 158BE(1)(b) of the Act. According to the provisions of section 158BE (1)(b) of the Act order in the block assessment has to be passed by the AO within two years from the end of the month in which the search was conducted and concluded. Now the issue to be adjudicated is whether the search concluded in 17.12.1999/23.12.1999 or 14.02.2000

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DATE: August 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 275: Penalty proceedings for contravention of Sections 269SS & 269T are not related to the assessment proceeding but are independent of it. Therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising out of the assessment proceedings has no relevance. Consequently, the limitation prescribed by s. 275(1)(a) does not apply. The limitation period prescribed in s. 275(1)(c) applies to such penalty proceedings

penalty proceedings for default in not having transactions through the bank as required under Sections 269SS and 269T are not related to the assessment proceeding but are independent of it, therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising out of the assessment proceedings or the other proceedings during which the penalty proceedings under Sections 271D and 271E may have been initiated has no relevance for sustaining or not sustaining the penalty proceedings. It was held that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 275 was not attracted to such proceedings

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DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BC: A stay on the conduct of a "special audit" u/s 142(2A) amounts to a "stay of the assessment proceedings" and extends limitation u/s 158BE. One warrant of authorisation can be used for multiple visits and searches and limitation commences only after the panchnama records the conclusion of the search

As a general rule, therefore, when there is no stay of the assessment proceedings passed by the Court, Explanation 1 to Section 158BE of the Act may not be attracted. However, this general statement of legal principle has to be read subject to an exception in order to interpret it rationally and practically. In those cases where stay of some other nature is granted than the stay of the assessment proceedings but the effect of such stay is to prevent the assessing officer from effectively passing assessment order, even that kind of stay order may be treated as stay of the assessment proceedings because of the reason that such stay order becomes an obstacle for the assessing officer to pass an assessment order thereby preventing the assessing officer to proceed with the assessment proceedings and carry out appropriate assessment

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DATE: May 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1981-82
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CITATION:
S. 153: In a case of conferment of “concurrent” jurisdiction upon the ITO & IAC, the ITO does not stand denuded of powers to make an assessment. It is open to the ITO to assume jurisdiction and pass the assessment order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers. S. 144B applies only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO

It is not the IAC who exercises the powers or performs the functions of the ITO, even when such a power was conferred upon him, concurrently with the ITO. The significant feature of Section 125A of the Act is that even when the IAC is given the same powers and functions which are to be performed by the ITO in relation to any area or classes or person or income or classes of income or cases or classes of cases, on the conferment of such powers, the ITO does not stand denuded of those powers. With conferment of such powers on the IAC gives him “concurrent” jurisdiction which means that both, ITO as well as the IAC, are empowered to exercise those functions including passing assessment order. It is still open to the ITO to assume the jurisdiction and pass the order in case the IAC does not exercise those powers in respect of the assessment year. Provisions of Section 144B would not apply only if the IAC exercises powers or performs the functions of an ITO. What is important is the actual exercise of powers and not merely conferment of the powers that are borne out from the bare reading of sub-Section (4) of Section 125B

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