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DATE: February 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
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CITATION:
Reopening of assessment: If no assessment order is passed, there cannot be a notice for re-assessment inasmuch as the question of re-assessment arises only when there is an assessment in the first instance

The ratio of the judgment in Trustees of H.E.H. The Nizam’s Supplemental Family Trust v. CIT [2000]242 ITR 381 SC is that in those situations where there is no assessment order passed, there cannot be a notice for re-assessment inasmuch as the question of re-assessment arises only when there is an assessment in the first instance

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether consideration for user of software is assessable as "royalty" in the light of the different definitions in s. 9(1)(vi) and Article 12 of the DTAA and the conflicting judgements of various High Courts explained

A comparison of the definition of ‘royalty’ as provided under the DTAA (as reproduced above) with the definition of ‘royalty’ as provided under Income Tax Act shows that the same are not at para materia with each other.The definition provided under the DTAA is the very short and restrictive definition, whereas, the definition of the royalty as provided under the Income Tax Act is a very wide and inclusive but vague. A careful reading of the relevant provision under the DTAA and under the Income Tax Act reveals that the DTAA covers only a part of the items mentioned under sub clause (i) to (v)to Explanation 2 to section 9(1)(vi). We may mention here that the section9(1)(vi) having sub clauses (a), (b), & (c) is very vast to cover consideration paid for any right, property or information used or services utilized for the purpose of business or profession. Further, we find that in the said sub clauses(a), (b) & (c) of section 9(1) (vi), the wording is somewhat vague and negatively written.

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
Entire law on difference between premium (salami) paid to acquire a lease and rent paid to use a lease explained in the context of whether a lease results in a transfer u.s 2(47)

By its nature the salami being a non-recurring payment -made by a tenant to the landlord at the inception of the grant of the lease has a/ways been regarded as a receipt of a capital nature in the hands of the landlord. The finding that had been recorded by the Tribunal was that this payment was made to the assessee by the tenants for getting them accepted as tenants. In other words, it was by way of a premium or salami that these payments were received by the assessee as a consideration for granting monthly tenancies to the tenants. Obviously, it was a non-recurring payment made by the tenants to the assessee for the purpose of getting the monthly tenancy. Every payment by way of a salami or a premium need not necessarily be held to be of a capital nature or on capital account, but since prima facie that is the nature of such payment it is for the department to establish facts which would go to show that such payment was in the – nature of income and not on capital account

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DATE: February 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Severe strictures passed against the ITAT for taking the view that the presumption laid down in HDFC Bank 366 ITR 505 (Bom) and Reliance Utilities 313 ITR 340 (Bom) that investments in tax-free securities must be deemed to have come out of own funds and (ii) Law laid down in India Advantage (Bom) that s. 14A and Rule 8D does not apply to securities held as stock-in-trade cannot be applied as both propositions are contrary to Godrej & Boyce 328 ITR 81 (Bom). ITAT's order reversed on the ground that it is "Judicial Indiscipline" leading to complete chaos and anarchy in the administration of law

The impugned order of the Tribunal seems to question the decision of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. (supra) to the extent it relied upon the decision of this Court in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra). This is by observing that the decision in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.(supra) it must be appreciated was rendered in the context of Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and its parameters are different from that of Section 14A of the Act. This Court in its order in HDFC Bank Ltd.(supra) consciously applied the principle of presumption as laid down in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra) and in fact quoted the relevant paragraph to emphasize that the same principle / test of presumption would apply to decide whether or not interest expenditure could be disallowed under Section 14A of the Act in respect of the income arising out of tax free securities. It is not the office of Tribunal to disregard a binding decision of this court. This is particularly so when the decision in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra) has been consciously applied by this Court while rendering a decision in the context of Section 14A of the Act

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DATE: January 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: Providing the assessee with the recorded reasons towards the end of the limitation period and passing a reassessment order without dealing with the objections results in gross harassment to the assessee which the Pr. CIT should note & remedy

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax would take serious note of the above and after examining the facts, if necessary, take appropriate remedial action to ensure that an assessee is not made to suffer for no fault on its part. This is particularly so as almost the entire period of two years from the end of the financial year in which the notice is issued was consumed by the Assessing Officer in failing to give reasons recorded in support of the impugned notice. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer proceeds to pass a draft Assessment order without dealing with the objections filed by the Petitioner. We could have on that date or even earlier passed an order setting aside the draft assessment order dated 30th March 2015 as it was passed without disposing of the objections. Thus, clearly without jurisdiction. However, we were of the view that although this appears to be a gross case of harassing an Assessee, the Principal Commissioner would take note and adopt remedial action / proceedings

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DATE: February 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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Transfer Pricing: Even if TNMM is found acceptable as regards all other transactions, it is open to the TPO to segregate a portion and subject it to an entirely different method i.e. CUP if the assessee does not provide satisfactory replies to his queries

The narrow controversy which this Court is called upon to decide is as to whether the adoption of the CUP method by the revenue authorities was justified. What the assessee urges essentially is that whereas the TP report furnished by it applied the TNMM method which was found acceptable as regards all other transactions/business activities, it was not open to the revenue to segregate a portion and subject it to an entirely different method, i.e. CUP. The assessee relies upon paras 3.6, 3.9 and 3.10 of the OECD guidelines in support of its contentions. It also relies upon certain rulings of different Benches of the ITAT to urge that such sequential segregation and setting portion of the TP exercise – so to say, to break with the integrity is unjustified and unsupported by the text of the law, i.e. Section 92C of the Income Tax Act. The assessee also relies upon Rule 10E of the Income Tax Rules, which guide the proper approach of the TPO in such matters

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DATE: February 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10, 2010-11
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Transfer Pricing: The existence of an "international transaction" w.r.t. AMP Expenditure cannot be assumed. The onus is on the TPO to prove such transaction. There is no machinery provision to ascertain the price to promote the AE's brand values. The AMP Expenditure should be treated as operating cost to apply TNMM and determine ALP of transactions with AE

The operating profit cost to the total operating cost was adopted as Profit Level Indicator which means that the AMP expenditure was not considered as a part of the operating cost. This goes to show that the AMP expenditure was not subsumed in the operating profitability of the assessee-company. Therefore, in order to determine the ALP of international transaction with its AE, it is sine qua non that the AMP expenditure should be considered as a part of the operating cost

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DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1991-92
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S. 40(a)(iii): Salaries paid to expatriate employees overseas on which tax was paid in accordance with CBDT Circular dated 685 dated 17/20.06.1994 and Circular 686 dated 12.8.94 is permissible as a deduction even though the tax is not paid within the time limit but is paid subsequently

An absence of a provision similar to the proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act cannot be read as to disentitle an Assessee to claim a deduction even though it has complied with the condition under sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act. A plain reading of proviso to sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act indicates that where an Assessee has not deducted or paid the tax at source in terms of Chapter XVII B in respect of any sum as specified under sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act, the Assessee can, nonetheless, claim a deduction in the year in which the assessee deposits the tax. This benefit is not available to an assessee in respect of payments chargeable under the head “Salaries” which fall within sub-clause (iii) of clause (a) of Section 40 and not sub-clause (i) of clause (a) of Section 40 of the Act. Thus, an assessee would not be entitled to claim deduction on account of salaries if it fails to deduct or pay the amount under Chapter XVII B of the Act. In cases where such assessee deposits the amount in a subsequent year, the Assessee would still not be able to claim the deduction in the year in which such tax is deposited; his claim for deduction can be considered only in respect of the year to which such expense relates. Therefore, in cases where the assessments stand concluded, the Assessee would lose the benefit of deduction for the expenses incurred on account of its failure to have deposited the tax at source. Thus, concededly, in the present case the Assessee has lost its right to claim a deduction for a period of six years – AY 1985-86 to AY 1990-91- even though the Assessee has paid the TDS on the expenses pertaining to said period

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DATE: February 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 2, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 44AB/ 271B: Belief that a mutual association like a club is not liable for tax audit is a bona fide one and constitutes reasonable cause u/s 273B

Under the general law relating to mutual concerns, the surplus accruing to a mutual concern cannot be regarded as income, profits or gains for the purpose of the Act (s.4), and where the contributors are to receive back a part of their own contributions, the complete identity between the contributors and recipients negatives the idea of any profit, for no man can make profit out of himself. Therefore, a mutual concern can carry on an activity with its members, though the surplus arising from such activity is not taxable income or profit. The principle of mutuality has also been accepted in the case of a voluntary organization, which receives contributions from its members. The assessee’s contention that Section 44AB of the Act is not applicable to a club being a mutual concern is supported by several judgements

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DATE: February 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80HHC: Sale proceeds of scrap cannot be included in total turnover

The issue in these appeals pertains to the question whether the proceeds generated from the sale of scrap would be included in the total turnover. In the recent decision of this Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Punjab Stainless Steel Industries & Ors. reported in [2014] 364 ITR 144 (SC) it has been held that sale proceeds generated from the sale of scrap would not be included in the total turnover for the purpose of deduction under Section 80HHC of the Income Tax Act, 1961

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