Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category


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DATE: November 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 25, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 264 Revision: Powers and duties of the CIT while dealing with a revision application filed by an assessee explained

Commissioner cannot refuse to entertain a revision petition filed by the assessee under Section 264 of the Act if it is maintainable on the ground that a similar issue has arisen for consideration in another year and is pending adjudication in appeal or another forum. Negative stipulations are clearly not attracted. When a statutory right is conferred on an assessee, the same imposes an obligation on the authority. New and extraneous conditions, not mandated and stipulated, expressly or by implication, cannot be imposed to deny recourse to a remedy and right of the assessee to have his claim examined on merits

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DATE: November 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 145(2) ICDS: S. 145 (2) has to be read down to restrict power of the Central Government to notify ICDS that do not seek to override binding judicial precedents or provisions of the Act. If s. 145 (2) is not so read down it would be ultra vires the Act and Article 141 read with Article 144 and 265 of the Constitution. The ICDS which overrule the provisions of the Act, the Rules thereunder and the judicial precedents applicable thereto, are struck down as ultra vires the Act. To that extent, Notification Nos. 87 and 88 dated 29.09.2016 and Circular No. 10 of 2017 issued by the CBDT are also held to be ultra vires the Act and struck down as such

Section 145 (2), as amended, has to be read down to restrict power of the Central Government to notify ICDS that do not seek to override binding judicial precedents or provisions of the Act. The power to enact a validation law is an essential legislative power that can be exercised, in the context of the Act, only by the Parliament and not by the executive. If Section 145 (2) of the Act as amended is not so read down it would be ultra vires the Act and Article 141 read with Article 144 and 265 of the Constitution. The ICDS is not meant to overrule the provisions of the Act, the Rules thereunder and the judicial precedents applicable thereto as they stand. ICDS I which does away with the concept of ‘prudence’ is contrary to the Act and binding judicial precedents and is therefore unsustainable in law.

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DATE: November 8, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 263 Revision: The failure to issue notice on any particular issue does not vitiate the exercise of power u/s 263, as long as the assessee is heard and given opportunity. The lack of opportunity at the revisional stage does not vitiate the entire order, or the proceedings. It is a curable defect. The CIT has power to consider all aspects which were the subject matter of the AO’s order, if in his opinion, they are erroneous, despite the assessee’s appeal on that or some other aspect

It is in the context of the above position that this Court has repeatedly held that unlike the power of reopening an assessment under Section 147 of the Act, the power of revision under Section 263 is not contingent on the giving of a notice to show cause. In fact, Section 263 has been understood not to require any specific show cause notice to be served on the assessee. Rather, what is required under the said provision is an opportunity of hearing to the assessee. The two requirements are different; the first would comprehend a prior notice detailing the specific grounds on which revision of the assessment order is tentatively being proposed

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DATE: October 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 10A/ 10B: Entire law on the concept of "derived from" the undertaking and "purposive interpretation" of statutes explained. The incidental activity of parking surplus funds with banks or advancing of staff loans by assessees covered u/s 10-A or 10-B is an integral part of their export business activity and a business decision taken in view of the commercial expediency. Such incidental income cannot be delinked from the profits and gains derived by the undertaking engaged from the export of specified goods and cannot be taxed separately u/s 56 of the Act

Sections 10-A and 10-B of the Act are special provisions and complete code in themselves and deal with profits and gains derived by the assessee of a special nature and character like 100% Export Oriented Units (EOUs.) situated in Special Economic Zones (SEZs), STPI, etc., where the entire profits and gains of the entire Undertaking making 100% exports of articles including software as is the fact in the present case, the assessee is given 100% deduction of profit and gains of such export business and therefore incidental income of such undertaking by way of interest on the temporarily parked funds in Banks or even interest on staff loans would constitute part of profits and gains of such special Undertakings and these cases cannot be compared with deductions under Sections 80-HH or 80-IB in Chapter VI-A of the Act where an assessee dealing with several activities or commodities may inter alia earn profits and gains from the specified activity and therefore in those cases, the Hon’ble Supreme Court has held that the interest income would not be the income “derived from” such Undertakings doing such special business activity

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 254(2) Limitation period: The amendment to s. 254(2) w.e.f. 01.06.2016 to curtail the period available to file rectification applications from four years to six months cannot apply to appellate orders passed prior to that date because that would take away a vested right

The reason for the said principle is not far to seek. Though periods of limitation, being procedural law, are to be applied retrospectively, yet if a shorter period of limitation is provided by a later amendment to a statute, such period would render the vested right of action contained in the statute nugatory as such right of action would now become time barred under the amended provision

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DATE: September 19, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Strictures by ITAT against ICAI deprecated: It is very unfortunate that the Tribunal, out of sheer desperation and frustration and agitated by the fact that the Revenue is not opposing the request for condonation of delay blamed the assessee's Chartered Accountant and the ICAI on how they should conduct themselves. The Tribunal completely misdirected itself by taking irrelevant factors into account. Delay of 2984 days in filing the appeal caused by wrong advice of a professional is capable of condonation. However, even if the assessee has acted bona fide, he can be held liable for payment of costs to balance rights and equities

Thus, we find that the Tribunal, out of sheer desperation and frustration and agitated by the fact that the Revenue is not opposing the request for condonation of delay, turned its attention towards the assessee’s Chartered Accountant. It is unfortunate that thereafter paragraphs after paragraphs are devoted to how a Chartered Accountant ought to conduct himself and while advising litigants in tax matters. How a Chartered Accountant, as a professional, should be aware that legal proceedings should be filed in time and if there are adverse orders, how proper advice should be given. It is very unfortunate that the Tribunal has, apart from seeking to advice professionals, blamed not only individual Chartered Accountants but equally the Institute of Chartered Accountants of India. It is unfortunate that Courts of law or Tribunals, which are the last fact finding authorities in this case, adopted this course

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DATE: September 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
A Chartered Accountant who is accused of offering a bribe to an Income-tax Officer for performing an official act can be tried under sections 7 and 13 (1)(d) of the Prevention of Corruption Act and s. 120-B of the IPC. The fact that the CA is not a “public servant” is irrelevant

The third fold of argument that the accused No.2 is not a public servant and is beyond the contemplation of the statute. The words occurring at Section 8 of the Act “Whoever accepts or obtains, or agrees to accept, or attempts to obtain, from any person, for himself or for any other person, any gratification…………” covers the persons other than the public servants contemplated by definition clause (c) of section 2 of the Act and that does not require much elaboration. Regarding the contention that section 7 of the P.C.Act cannot be invoked against accused No.1 is not within the competency of the petitioner to urge before this court. Even otherwise the charge sheet material contains voice recording of the accused Nos.1 and 2 and the complainant and also there is material that this petitioner made demand for bribe on behalf of the 1st accused

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DATE: September 19, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: The AO is not entitled to make any disallowance under Rule 8D if he does not specifically record that he is not satisfied with the correctness of the assessee's claim. The fact that the CIT(A) and ITAT were not satisfied with the assessee's disallowance and enhanced it does not mean that Rule 8D becomes applicable and the disallowance should be computed as per the prescribed formula

The Assessing Officer did not specifically record that he is not satisfied with the correctness of the claim of the assessee in respect of the expenditure in relation to the income which does not form part of the total income under the Act. However, he felt obliged and going by the presence of Rule 8D that once Section 14A is attracted, the disallowance is to be made as per Rule 8D only which has been prescribed by the Legislature. The Assessing Officer has not adverted to the plain language of subsection (2) of Section 14A

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DATE: September 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: Steps to be undertaken in identification of comparable transactions/entities while fixing the ALP and the margin explained. Though the TNMM method allows broad flexibility tolerance in the selection of comparables, broad functionality is not sufficient to find the comparable entity. There must be similarity with the controlled transaction

In so far as identifying comparable transactions/entities is concerned, the same would not differ irrespective of the transfer pricing method adopted. In other words, the comparable transactions/entities must be selected on the basis of similarity with the controlled transaction entity. Comparability of controlled and uncontrolled transactions has to be judged, inter alia, with reference to comparability factors as indicated under rule 10B(2) of the Income Tax Rules, 1962. Comparability analysis by the transactional net margin method may be less sensitive to certain dissimilarities between the tested party and the comparables. However, that cannot be the consideration for diluting the standards of selecting comparable transactions/entities. A higher product and functional similarity would strengthen the efficacy of the method in ascertaining a reliable arm’s length price. Therefore, as far as possible, the comparables must be selected keeping in view the comparability factors as specified. Wide deviations in profit level indicator must trigger further investigations/analysis

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DATE: September 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Transfer Pricing: A giant risk taking company like Infosys Technologies with huge significant intangibles and having huge assets leading to the exorbitant turnover is not comparable with a captive unit which is subject to minimum/ limited risk. The fact that the functional profile of Infosys is similar to that of the assessee is irrelevant

When we examine the profile of the assessee company vis-à-vis Infosys Technologies Limited in the light of the judgment in CIT vs. Agnity India Technologies Pvt. Ltd. (supra), there is no comparability for benchmarking the international transactions for the reasons inter alia that Infosys Technologies Limited is a giant risk taking company whereas, on the other hand, the assessee is a captive unit of its parent company and prone to minimum/ limited risk; that the Infosys Technologies Limited is having huge significant intangibles and having huge assets leading to the exorbitant turnover; that it is not in dispute that functional profile of assessee company and CIT vs. Agnity India Technologies Pvt. Ltd. is similar