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DATE: July 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 292C: Addition cannot be made on the basis of a document which is silent as to the payer and payee of the amount in question and does it disclose that the payment was made by cheque or cash nor it is proved that the document is in the handwriting of assessee or at least bears his signatures

The ITAT in the impugned order noted that the document was “silent as to the payer and payee of the amount in question nor does it disclose that the payment was made by cheque or cash nor it is proved that the document is in the handwriting of assessee or at least bears his signatures.” In the considered view of the Court, the addition of Rs.80,50,000 merely on the basis of a single document without making any further enquiry was not justified. No attempt was made by the AO to find out if in fact it constituted estimates relating the construction of project of Omaxe Ltd

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DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 19, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 153B(2)(a): Merely visiting the premises on the pretext of concluding the search but not actually finding anything new for being seized cannot give rise to a second panchnama so as to extend the limitation period for passing the s. 153A assessment order. In such event, there would be no occasion to draw up a panchnama at all. The visit and the panchnama drawn up on that date cannot lead to postponement of the period for completion of assessment with reference to s. 153B (2) (a) of the Act

The Court is not prepared to accept the plea of the Revenue that merely because a panchnama was drawn up on 15th May, 2007 showing that the search was ‘finally concluded’ on that date, it postponed the period of limitation in terms of Section 153B (2) (a) of the Act. It had to be the “last panchnama drawn in relation to any person in whose case the warrant of authorization has been issued”. The last panchnama, no doubt, is dated 15th May, 2007 but what it records is the seizure of the jewellery items not of any of the persons searched but the wives of one of the directors i.e., of Ms. Neena Jain who was not even a director of any of these entities. Therefore, even assuming that the jewellery of Ms. Neena Jain was seized under panchnama of 15th May, 2007, as far as the searched entities are concerned, the Revenue cannot take advantage of Section 153B (2) (a) to contend that the period of limitation in respect of them stands extended for completing of assessment up to 31st December, 2009

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DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 19, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
Interest on NPAs: While determining the tax liability of an assessee, two factors come into play, namely, (i) the recognition of income in terms of the recognised accounting principles and (ii) the computation thereof in terms of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. While the computation of taxability is solely governed by the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the accounting principles have no role to play, the recognition of income stands on a different footing. Insofar as income recognition is concerned, the RBI Directions prevail in view of s. 45Q of the RBI Act and s. 145 has no role to play. The AO has to follow the RBI Directions

Section 45Q finds place in Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act. Thus, the provisions of Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act have an overriding effect qua other enactments to the extent the same are inconsistent with the provisions contained therein. In order to reflect a bank’s actual financial health in its balance sheet, the Reserve Bank has introduced prudential norms for income recognition, asset classification and provisioning for advances portfolio of the co-operative banks. The guidelines provided thereunder are mandatory and it is incumbent upon all cooperative banks to follow the same. Insofar as income recognition is concerned, clause 4.1.1 of the circular provides that the policy of income recognition has to be objective and based on the record of recovery. Income from non-performing assets (NPA) is not recognised on accrual basis but is booked as income only when it is actually received. Therefore, banks should not take to income account interest on non-performing assets on accrual basis. Thus, in view of the mandate of the RBI Guidelines the assessee cannot recognise income from non-performing assets on accrual basis but can book such income only when it is actually received. Thus, this is a case where at the threshold, the assessee, in view of the RBI Guidelines, cannot recognise income from NPA on accrual basis. This is, therefore, a case pertaining to recognition of income and not computation of the income of the assessee

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DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 5(2)(a): Salary of a non-resident seafarer for services rendered outside India on-board foreign ships accrues outside India and is not assessable in India even if received by the seafarer into the NRE bank account maintained in India by the seafarer. CBDT Circular No. 13/2017 dated 11.04.2017 is clarificatory

Whether on the facts and in the circumstances of the case and in law, income by way of salary which became due and has accrued to the assessee, a non-resident, for services rendered outside India and which is not chargeable to tax in India on the “due” or “accrual” basis, can be said to be chargeable to tax on the “receipt” basis merely because the foreign employers, on the instructions of the assessee, have remitted a part of amount of salary to the assessee’s NRE bank account in India?

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DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1995-96
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Whether subsidy is a capital receipt or a revenue receipt: If the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, it means that the policy makers envision greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units. Such subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

How a state frames its policy to achieve its objectives and attain larger developmental goals depends upon the experience, vision and genius of its representatives. Therefore, to say that the indication of the limit of subsidy as the capital expended, means that it replenished the capital expenditure and therefore, the subsidy is capital, would not be justified. The specific provision for capital subsidy in the main scheme and the lack of such a subsidy in the supplementary scheme (of 1991) meant that the recipient, i.e. the assessee had the flexibility of using it for any purpose. Unlike in Commissioner of Income Tax v. Ponni Sugars & Chemicals [2008] 306 ITR 392 (SC), the absence of any condition towards capital utilization meant that the policy makers envisioned greater profitability as an incentive for investors to expand units, for rapid industrialization of the state, ensuring greater employment. Clearly, the subsidy was revenue in nature

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DATE: July 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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GST on legal services: There is no clarity whether all legal services (not restricted to representational services) provided by legal practitioners would be governed by the reverse charge mechanism. Legal practitioners are under genuine doubt whether they require to get themselves registered. The Court directs that no coercive action be taken against any lawyer or law firms for non-compliance with any legal requirement under the CGST Act, the IGST Act or the DGST Act till a clarification is issued by the Central Government and the GNCTD and till further orders in that regard by the Court

It is plain that as of date there is no clarity on whether all legal services (not restricted to representational services) provided by legal practitioners and firms would be governed by the reverse charge mechanism. If in fact all legal services are to be governed by the reverse charge mechanism than there would be no purpose in requiring legal practitioners and law firms to compulsorily get registered under the CGST, IGST and/or DGST Acts. Those seeking voluntary registration would anyway avail of the facility under Section 25 (3) of the CGST Act (and the corresponding provision of the other two statutes). There is therefore prima facie merit in the contention of Mr Mittal that the legal practitioners are under a genuine doubt whether they require to get themselves registered under the three statutes. In the circumstances, the Court directs that no coercive action be taken against any lawyer or law firms for non-compliance with any legal requirement under the CGST Act, the IGST Act or the DGST Act till a clarification is issued by the Central Government and the GNCTD and till further orders in that regard by this Court

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DATE: July 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 68 Bogus share capital: Mere fact that parties to whom the share certificates were issued and who had paid the share capital money were not traceable and did not appear before the AO in response to summons does not mean that the transaction can be treated as bogus if the documentation shows the genuineness of the transaction

The Assessing Officer added Rs.95 lakhs as income under Section 68 of the Income Tax Act only on the ground that the parties to whom the share certificates were issued and who had paid the share money had not appeared before the Assessing Officer and the summons could not be served on the addresses given as they were not traced and in respect of some of the parties who had appeared, it was observed that just before issuance of cheques, the amount was deposited in their account

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DATE: June 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 92A Transfer Pricing: The mere fact that an enterprise has de facto participation in the capital, management or control over the other enterprise does not make the two enterprises "associated enterprises" so as to subject their transactions to the rigors of transfer pricing law

A plain reading of Section 92A makes the legal position quite clear. The basic rule for treating the enterprises as associated enterprises is set out in Section 92A(1). The illustrations in which basic rule finds application are set out in Section 92A(2). Section 92A(1) lays down the basic rule that in order to be treated as associated enterprise one enterprise, in relation to another enterprise, participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, “in the management or control or capital of the other enterprise” or when “one or more persons who participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in its management or control or capital, are the same persons who participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of the other enterprise” . Section 92(A)(2) only provides illustrations of the cases in which such an enterprise participates in management, capital or control of another enterprise. In other words, what Section 92A (1) decides is the principle on the basis of which one has to examine whether or not two or more enterprise are associated enterprise or not.

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DATE: June 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 158BFA(1): If the delay in filing the return is completely attributable to the revenue for non-furnishing of copies of the documents and not giving inspection of the documents seized within a reasonable time after making the demand, the interest has to waived. Though s. 158BFA(1) does not (pre 2002) confer the power to waive interest, it has to be read in on equitable construction because the subject cannot be made to pay for the negligence of the Officers of the State (J. H. Gotla 4 SCC 343 followed)

This now takes us to the final issue viz. is it open under the provisions of Section 158-BFA(1) of the Act to the Assessing Officer to waive interest imposable thereunder even in the absence of any discretion provided to waive interest under Section 158-BFA(1) of the Act. There can be no dispute that bare reading of the section does not provide for any discretion to waive and/or reduce the interest imposable on account of the late filing of the return of income. It is a settled position in law that a fiscal statute has to be strictly interpreted, particularly when there is no ambiguity in the statute. The normal rule of interpreting a fiscal statute is the literal rule of interpretation. However, when the Parliament makes a law, it proceeds on the basis that the Executive i.e. the State will act fairly and not cause unjustified burden upon the subject. The provisions of Section 158BFA(1) of the Act proceeds on the above premise and it was expected of the State to grant copies of the documents seized and/or inspection of the record as expeditiously as possible, so as to enable the appellant to file his return of income. This particularly so, as to delay in filing of return, leads to levy of interest. This not having been done, as was expected under the Statute, the subject cannot be made to pay for the negligence of the Officers of the State. Therefore, in a case like this where strict construction may result in injustice, an equitable construction may be preferred

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DATE: July 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 221: A reading of s. 221 conjointly with the definition of “tax” in s. 2(43) leads to the irresistible conclusion that the phraseology “tax in arrears” in s. 221 would not take within its realm the interest component. The AO can impose penalty for default in making the payment of tax, but the same shall not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. Tax in arrears would not include the interest payable u/s 220(2) of the Act

Reading Section 221 in its entirety, it is abundantly clear that the aspect of default in payment of tax and the amount of interest payable are treated as distinct and separate components. The section categorically and specifically states that when an Assessee is in default or is deemed to be in default in making payment of tax, he shall in addition to the amount of arrears and the amount of interest payable under SubSection 2 of Section 220, be liable, to pay penalty, however the amount of penalty does not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. The terminology “default in making a payment of tax and amount of interest payable” are considered to be separate for imposition of penalty and penalty is to be levied on account of default in making a payment of tax. However, the total amount of penalty shall not exceed the amount of tax in arrears. The said penalty for non payment of the tax is in addition to the levy of interest under SubSection 2 of Section 220. Under no principle of interpretation, the arrears of tax as laid down in the said Section would include the amount of interest payable under SubSection 2 of Section 220. The amount of penalty will have to be restricted on the arrears of tax, which would not include the interest component charged under Section 220(2) of the Act

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