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DATE: May 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01 to 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 153A: Entire law explained on whether concluded assessments can be reopened u/s 153A even in the absence of incriminating material found during the search in the light of the apparently conflicting verdicts in CIT vs. Kabul Chawla 380 ITR 573 (Del) and Dayawanti Gupta v. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del)

Section 153A of the Act is titled “Assessment in case of search or requisition”. It is connected to Section 132 which deals with ‘search and seizure’. Both these provisions, therefore, have to be read together. Section 153A is indeed an extremely potent power which enables the Revenue to re-open at least six years of assessments earlier to the year of search. It is not to be exercised lightly. It is only if during the course of search under Section 132 incriminating material justifying the re-opening of the assessments for six previous years is found that the invocation of Section 153A qua each of the AYs would be justified. The question whether unearthing of incriminating material relating to any one of the AYs could justify the re-opening of the assessment for all the earlier AYs was considered both in CIT v. Anil Kumar Bhatia and CIT v. Chetan Das Lachman Das. Incidentally, both these decisions were discussed threadbare in the decision of this Court in Kabul Chawla 380 ITR 573 (Del)

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DATE: May 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 25, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Bogus purchases: In view of the Supreme Court’s order in Vijay Proteins Ltd vs. CIT whereby the verdicts of the Gujarat High Court in Sanjay Oilcake Industries vs. CIT 316 ITR 274 (Guj) and N.K. Industries Ltd vs. Dy. CIT were confirmed, the AO has to accept the law and verify whether the transaction is genuine or not on the basis of the aforesaid three judgments

Considering the law declared by the Supreme Court in the case of Vijay Proteins Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax, Special Leave to Appeal decided on 06.04.2015 whereby the Supreme Court has dismissed the SLP and confirmed the order dated 09.12.2014 passed by the Gujarat High Court and other decisions of the High Court of Gujarat in the case of Sanjay Oilcake Industries Vs. Commissioner of Income Tax (2009) 316 ITR 274 (Guj) and N.K. Industries Ltd. Vs. Dy. C.I.T., Tax Appeal No.240/2003 decided on 20.06.2016, the parties are bound by the principle of law pronounced in the aforesaid three judgments

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DATE: March 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital: Fact that the investigation wing’s report alleged that the assessee was beneficiary to bogus transactions and that the identity of shareholders, genuineness etc was suspect is not sufficient. The AO is bound to conduct scrutiny of documents produced by the assessee and cannot rest content by placing reliance on the report of the investigation wing

The assessee had provided several documents that could have showed light into whether truly the transactions were genuine. It was not a case where the share applicants are merely provided confirmation letters. They had provided their particulars, PAN details, assessment particulars, mode of payment for share application money, i.e. through banks, bank statements, cheque numbers in question, copies of minutes of resolutions authorizing the applications, copies of balance sheets, profit and loss accounts for the year under consideration and even bank statements showing the source of payments made by the companies to the assessee as well as their master debt with ROC particulars. The AO strangely failed to conduct any scrutiny of documents and rested content by placing reliance merely on a report of the Investigation Wing. This reveals spectacular disregard to an AO’s duties in the remand proceedings which the Revenue seeks to inflict upon the assessee in this case

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DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 145: If the AO has not rejected the books of account, it means that the assessee has maintained the books of accounts in accordance with the prescribed standards as per s. 145 of the Act. If so, the AO is not entitled to make any addition on account of sale of goods out of books or for investment in stock out of undisclosed sources

On perusal of the impugned judgment and order of the Tribunal dated 27.10.2009 reveals that the assessee has maintained the books of accounts in accordance with the prescribed standard as per Section 145 of ‘the Act’. The account books have not been rejected by the assessing officer. In view of the above, the Tribunal formed an opinion where once the account books are expected to be maintained in the prescribed accounting standard, the assessing officer could not have made any additions towards the sale of rice treating it to be outside the books of accounts or towards investing in stock of rice and wheat outside the books of accounts

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DATE: March 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 12, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Valid service of notice: Law explained on whether sending a notice by RPAD and its return by the postal authorities with the remark "addressee refused to accept" amounts to a valid service or not

When it was sent by R.P.A.D. to the address, it was returned by the postal authorities with the remark, that the addressee refused to accept the packet. That is why it is returned. Thus, the presumption that when the addressee whose address is set out on the envelope had an occasion to notice and peruse the packet, meant for him, but he refuses to accept it, then, that is deemed to be served. The addressee in this case is correctly described. There is no dispute about his identity. Even his address is correct. It is at that address the packet is carried and by the concerned postal authority. The duly authorised person carrying the packet reached the address. On noticing the addressee, he serves it, but the addressee after having perused the packet refused to accept it. It is in these circumstances, the postal remark that the concerned person has refused to accept; hence, returned to the sender denotes good and valid service.

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DATE: December 2, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
NOC from Advocate to appoint new advocate: A litigant has the absolute right to appoint an advocate of his choice and to terminate his services any time and for whatever reason. There is no concept of an "irrevocable vakalatnama". A party has the absolute freedom to change his advocate. Fairness demands that the party should inform his advocate already on record though this is not a condition precedent to appoint a new advocate. The Registry cannot insist on a NOC from the old advocate and refuse to take the new vakalatnama on record

There is nothing known as irrevocable vakalatnama. The right of a party to withdraw vakalatnama or authorization given to an advocate is absolute. Hence, a party may discharge his advocate any time, with or without cause by withdrawing his vakalatnama or authorization. On discharging the advocate, the party has the right to have the case file returned to him from the advocate, and any refusal by the advocate to return the file amounts to misconduct under Section 35 of the Advocates Act, 1961. In any proceeding, including civil and criminal, a party has an absolute right to appoint a new Advocate. Under no circumstance, a party can be denied of his right to appoint a new advocate of his choice. Therefore, it follows that any rule or law imposing restriction on the said right can’t be construed as mandatory. Accordingly, Courts, Tribunals or other authorities shall not ask for ‘no objection’ of the advocate already on record, to accept the vakalatnama filed by a new advocate

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DATE: March 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Service of notice by Whatsapp: The purpose of service is put the other party to notice and to give him a copy of the papers. The mode is irrelevant. The rules and procedure are not so ancient or rigid that only antiquated methods of service through a bailiff or by beat of drum is acceptable. E-Mail & Whatsapp are not formally approved but if service is shown to be effected and is acknowledged it cannot be said that the Defendants had ‘no notice’. Defendants who avoid and evade service by regular modes cannot be permitted to take advantage of that evasion

It cannot be that our rules and procedure are either so ancient or so rigid (or both) that without some antiquated formal service mode through a bailiff or even by beat of drum or pattaki, a party cannot be said to have been ‘properly’ served. The purpose of service is put the other party to notice and to give him a copy of the papers. The mode is surely irrelevant. We have not formally approved of email and other modes as acceptable simply because there are inherent limitation to proving service. Where an alternative mode is used, however, and service is shown to be effected, and is acknowledged, then surely it cannot be suggested that the Defendants had ‘no notice’. To say that is untrue; they may not have had service by registered post or through the bailiff, but they most certainly had notice. They had copies of the papers. They were told of the next date. A copy of the previous order was sent to them. Defendants who avoid and evade service by regular modes cannot be permitted to take advantage of that evasion

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DATE: March 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 1, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): CBDT's instruction dated 29.02.2016 on stay of demand by the AO does not require the assessee to make a pre-deposit of 15% of the disputed demand. As per the Instruction, if the AO requires the assessee to pay less, or more, than 15% of the demand, the sanction of the Pr. CIT is required. If the AO demands 15% to be paid, the assessee is entitled to approach the Pr CIT for review of the AO's decision

The interpretation by the Assessing Officer that at the time of submitting stay application and/or before stay application is taken up for consideration on merits, the assessee is required to deposit 15% of the disputed demand as pre-deposit is absolutely based on misinterpretation and/or misreading of the modified Instructions dated 29th February 2016. What Clause-4 provides is that the Assessing Officer may/shall grant stay of demand till disposal of first appeal on payment of 15% of the disputed demand, unless the case falls in the category mentioned in para 4 [B] of the modified instructions dated 29th February 2016. Under the circumstances, the impugned decision of the respondent no. 2 in rejecting the stay application and consequently directing the petitioner to deposit 100% of the disputed demand on the ground that the petitioner has not deposited 15% of the disputed demand as a pre-deposit before his application for stay is considered on merits cannot be sustained and the same deserves to be quashed and set-aside

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DATE: March 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Bogus share capital: Mere fact that payment was received by cheque or that the applicants were companies borne on the file of the Registrar of Companies does not prove that the transaction was genuine. Even under the unamended s. 68, the onus is on the assessee prove the creditworthiness of the subscribers. Argument that the amendment to s. 68 is not retrospective is not required to be considered

We have already observed that the judgment in the case of Rajmandir Estates Private Ltd. (supra) was delivered considering the unamended provision of Section 68 of the Act. In the case of the assessees before us, there is no differing feature so far as applicability of the said statutory provision is concerned, even though the Tribunal in Subhalakshmi Vanijya Pvt. Ltd. (supra) had held that the provisos to Section 68 of the Act are retrospective in their operation, and delivered the decision against the assessee in that case that reasoning. In the appeal of Rajmandir Estates Private Ltd. (supra), the Coordinate Bench did not consider it necessary to examine the question of retroactivity of the aforesaid provision. The Coordinate Bench found the order of the C.I.T. to be valid examining the order applying the unamended provision of Section 68 of the Act only. We do not find any other distinguishing element in these appeals which would require addressing the question as to whether the amendment to Section 68 of the Act was retrospective in operation or not. Neither do we need to address the issue that if the inquiries, as directed, revealed that share capital infused were actually unaccounted money, whether the same could be taxed in accordance with Section 56(2) (vii b) or not

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DATE: April 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Strictures passed regarding the "standard excuses" of the department for delay in filing appeals, namely, budgetary constraints, lack of infrastructure to make soft copies, change of standing counsel etc

The Court finds that the standard excuse that the Department is putting forth in all such applications for condonation of delay in re-filing the appeal is two-fold. The first is regarding the budgetary constraints of the Department which delayed payment of the differential court fees as a result of the Court Fees Delhi Amendment Act, 2012 which came into force on 1st August 2012. The second is regarding the practice directions issued by the Court pertaining to filing of soft copies of the paperbooks in tax matters

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