Search Results For: Deepak Chopra


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DATE: April 6, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2021 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A) Stay by ITAT: Since the object of the 3rd proviso to s. 254(2A) is the automatic vacation of a stay that has been granted on the completion of 365 days, whether or not the assessee is responsible for the delay caused in hearing the appeal, such object being itself discriminatory, is liable to be struck down as violating Article 14 of the Constitution of India. Also, the said proviso would result in the automatic vacation of a stay upon the expiry of 365 days even if the Appellate Tribunal could not take up the appeal in time for no fault of the assessee. Further, vacation of stay in favour of the revenue would ensue even if the revenue is itself responsible for the delay in hearing the appeal. In this sense, the said proviso is also manifestly arbitrary being a provision which is capricious, irrational and disproportionate so far as the assessee is concerned. Consequently, the third proviso to s. 254(2A) will now be read without the word “even” and the words “is not” after the words “delay in disposing of the appeal”. Any order of stay shall stand vacated after the expiry of the period or periods mentioned in the Section only if the delay in disposing of the appeal is attributable to the assessee.

Judged by both these parameters, there can be no doubt that the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, introduced by the Finance Act, 2008, would be both arbitrary and discriminatory and, therefore, liable to be struck down as offending Article 14 of the Constitution of India. First and foremost, as has correctly been held in the impugned judgment, unequals are treated equally in that no differentiation is made by the third proviso between the assessees who 23 https://itatonline.org are responsible for delaying the proceedings and assessees who are not so responsible. This is a little peculiar in that the legislature itself has made the aforesaid differentiation in the second proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act, making it clear that a stay order may be extended upto a period of 365 days upon satisfaction that the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee. We have already seen as to how, as correctly held by Narang Overseas (supra), the second proviso was introduced by the Finance Act, 2007 to mitigate the rigour of the first proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act in its previous avatar. Ordinarily, the Appellate Tribunal, where possible, is to hear and decide appeals within a period of four years from the end of the financial year in which such appeal is filed. It is only when a stay of the impugned order before the Appellate Tribunal is granted, that the appeal is required to be disposed of within 365 days. So far as the disposal of an appeal by the Appellate Tribunal is concerned, this is a directory provision. However, so far as vacation of stay on expiry of the said period is concerned, this condition becomes mandatory so far as the assessee is concerned. The object sought to be achieved by the third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Income Tax Act is without doubt the speedy disposal of appeals before the Appellate Tribunal in cases in which a stay has been granted in favour of the assessee.

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DATE: April 10, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 28, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254: President/ Sr. VP of the ITAT should take appropriate steps and expedite hearing in old appeals. A tabular statement indicating the age of the old appeals as well as an action plan of the ITAT with respect to the likely time for their disposal, having regard to the priorities that ITAT may set in this regard, shall also be filed in court

The petitioner’s grievance in this case is that the income tax appeals, pertaining to assessment years of about 20 years ago, filed by the petitioner, have been pending for 10 to 16 years (2003-2009). In the light of these averments, this court is of the opinion that the President or the Senior Vice President concerned of the Tribunal should take appropriate steps and expedite the hearing in these appeals

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DATE: July 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 28, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): CBDT's OMs dated 29.02.2016 & 31.07.2017 by which AO's have been directed to grant stay of disputed demand on payment of 20%/ 15% does not fetter the power of the AO & CIT to grant stay on payment of amounts lesser than 15%/ 20%. The AO/ CIT have to deal with the prima facie merits and give reasons for rejection of the stay application

Having heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the appellant, and giving credence to the fact that he has argued before us that the administrative Circular will not operate as a fetter on the Commissioner since it is a quasi judicial authority, we only need to clarify that in all cases like the present, it will be open to the authorities, on the facts of individual cases, to grant deposit orders of a lesser amount than 20%, pending appeal

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DATE: June 5, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
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CITATION:
Entire law explained on (a) whether a subsidiary of a foreign company constitutes "business connection" and/ or "fixed Permanent Establishment" and/or "Dependent Agent Permanent Establishment" of assessee in India, (b) whether any attributes of profits on account of signing, network planning and negotiation of off-shore supply contracts in India could be attributed to such business connection/ permanent establishment and (c) whether notional interest on delayed consideration of supply of equipment and licensing of software taxable in the hands of assessee as interest from vendor financing

HELD by majority in favour of the assessee:

According to the Supreme Court in Formula One World Championship Ltd. vs. CIT, reported in 394 ITR 80 (SC), the ‘disposal test’ is paramount which needs to be seen while analyzing fixed place PE under Article 5(1). Though in our humble understanding, the test of permanency qua fixed place has been slightly diluted by the Hon’ble Court but not the “disposal test”. Again this judgment of Hon’ble Supreme Court has been reiterated and referred extensively in a subsequent judgment by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of ADIT vs. E-Fund IT Solution (2017) 86 taxmann.com 240, wherein the Hon’ble Apex Court had quoted extensively the same views and commentaries and also the judgment of Formula One World Championship Ltd. and held that there must exist a fixed place in India which is at disposal of foreign enterprise through which they carry on their own business. In that case, the Indian subsidiary company of the foreign enterprise was rendering support services which enabled the foreign enterprise in turn to render services to its client and the outsourcing of work to the Indian subsidiary was held to be not giving rise to fixed place of PE. This judgment of the Hon’ble Supreme Court nearly clinches the issue before hand in so far as role of Indian subsidiary while deciding the fix place PE.

HELD by minority in favour of the revenue:

The assessee company had a PE in India by way of the premises and existence of its Indian subsidiary Nokia India Pvt Ltd, and that the profit attributable to the specified operations of this PE are 3.75% of total sales of the equipment in India. The plea of the assessee against the existence of business connection and the existence of permanent establishment is to be rejected, and plea of the assessee on the attribution of profit is to be partly accepted in the terms

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DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 245R(2): A notice u/s 143(2)(ii) cannot be issued in a routine, casual or mechanical manner but after forming an opinion that it is "necessary or expedient" to do so. A S. 143(2) notice in the standard form is not a bar u/s 245R(2) for admission of an AAR application for advance ruling

Under Section 143 (2) (ii) of the Act, an AO can serve on the Assessee a notice requiring him to attend his office and produce any evidence on which the Assessee seeks to rely in support of return if the AO “considers it necessary or expedient to ensure that the Assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not underpaid the tax in any manner’. Therefore, the scope of the enquiry that an AO can undertake in terms of Section 143 (2) (ii) is a wide ranging one. What is relevant for the present case is that prior to issuance of the notice under Section 143 (2) (ii) the AO has to form an opinion that it is ‘necessary or expedient’ to ensure that an Assessee has not (i) understated the income or (ii) has not computed excessive loss, or (iii) has not underpaid the tax in any manner. The AO is, therefore, not expected to issue a notice under Section 143 (2) (ii) in a routine or casual or mechanical manner

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DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04, 2004-05 and 2005-06
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CITATION:
Important principles laid down whether profits arising from off-shore supply of goods can be taxed in India on basis that (a) the goods continued in the possession of seller till acceptance of the goods by buyer in India, (b) the seller had a liaison office in India, (c) the seller had a wholly-owned subsidiary in India which negotiated contacts with the buyer, (d) installation, commissioning etc services were provided in India etc

The controversy whether the Assessee has a PE in India is interlinked to the finding that Nortel India had discharged some of the obligations of the Assessee under the Equipment Contract. Whilst, the Income Tax Authorities have held that the contracts entered into with Reliance – the Equipment Contact, Software Contract and Services Contract – are essentially a part of the singular turnkey contract, the Assessee contends to the contrary. Further, the Income Tax Authorities have held that a part of the Equipment Contract assigned to the Assessee was, in fact, performed by Nortel India. This too, is stoutly disputed by the Assessee. The question whether the Assessee has a PE in India is clearly interlinked with the issue whether Nortel India or Nortel LO had performed any of the functions or discharged any of the obligations assumed by the Assessee. Assessee argued that agreement for supply of hardware (Equipment Contract) could have been directly executed between Reliance and the Assessee but owing to relaince’s insistence on an Indian company being responsible for the entire works, agreements were executed between Nortel India and Reliance, with Nortel Canada as a surety.

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DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): The Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. It is struck down as violative of Article 14. The ITAT has the power to extend stay even beyond 365 days

While it could be argued that the condition that the stay order could be extended beyond a period of 180 days only if the delay in disposing of the appeal was not attributable to the assessee was a reasonable condition on the power of the Tribunal to the grant an order of stay, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be argued that where the assessee is not responsible for the delay in the disposal of the appeal, yet the Tribunal has no power to extend the stay beyond the period of 365 days. The intention of the legislature, which has been made explicit by insertion of the words – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– renders the right of appeal granted to the assessee by the statute to be illusory for no fault on the part of the assessee. The stay, which was available to him prior to the 365 days having passed, is snatched away simply because the Tribunal has, for whatever reason, not attributable to the assessee, been unable to dispose of the appeal

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DATE: January 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 92C: Transactions which are not closely linked cannot be aggregated for determining ALP. Cherry-picking is not allowed. If there are a number of comparable uncontrolled transactions, the average price has to be taken

The mandate of this section is to determine the ALP of ‘an’ international transaction. The term ‘transaction’ has been defined under rule 10A(d) to mean ‘a number of closely linked transactions’. It follows that the ALP of more than one transaction can be determined as one unit, only if they are closely linked transactions. In such a case, the plural of international transactions shall be considered as a singular for the purposes of benchmarking as a single transaction

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DATE: November 25, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 3, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 147: After the expiry of the time limit for issue of s. 143(2) notice, the AO has no jurisdiction to make a reference to the TPO. The TPO's report cannot form the basis for reopening the assessment

The assessee filed the return of income of 29th October 2007, and that the time limit for issuance of notice, under section 143(2), selecting the case for scrutiny assessment expired on 30th September 2008. It is also an admitted position …

EXL India Business Services Pvt Ltd vs. ACIT (ITAT Delhi) Read More »

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DATE: August 14, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 1, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07 to 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 153C cannot be invoked unless the AO is satisfied for cogent reasons that the seized documents do not belong to the searched person. Finding of photocopies with the searched person does not mean they "belong" to the person holding the originals. The distinction between "belongs to" and "relates to" or "refers to" must be borne in mind by the AO

(i) First of all, it is nobody’s case that the Jaipuria Group had disclaimed these documents as belonging to them. Unless and until it is established that the documents do not belong to the searched person, the provisions of Section …

Pepsi India Holdings Private Ltd vs. ACIT (Delhi High Court) Read More »