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DATE: February 1, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 14, 2018 (Date of publication)
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Hindu Undivided Family (HUF) Law: The very factum of birth in a coparcenary creates the coparcenary. Therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth. The amendment to s. 6 of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 in 2005 statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth. Consequently, married daughters can be said to be the coparceners in the HUF and are entitled to the ancestral property even if they were born prior to the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act

Section 6, as amended, stipulates that on and from the commencement of the amended Act, 2005, the daughter of a coparcener shall by birth become a coparcener in her own right in the same manner as the son. It is apparent that the status conferred upon sons under the old section and the old Hindu Law was to treat them as coparceners since birth. The amended provision now statutorily recognizes the rights of coparceners of daughters as well since birth. The section uses the words in the same manner as the son. It should therefore be apparent that both the sons and the daughters of a coparcener have been conferred the right of becoming coparceners by birth. It is the very factum of birth in a coparcenary that creates the coparcenary, therefore the sons and daughters of a coparcener become coparceners by virtue of birth

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DATE: February 19, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 27, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 143(2) service of notice: If the assessee is not available to take service of the s. 143(2) notice, service on the authorized representative is sufficient to draw inference of deemed service of notice on the assessee. The fact that the authorized representative is disowned by the assessee is irrelevant

The non-availability of the respondent – Assessee to receive the notice sent by registered post as many as on two occasions and service of notice on 19th October, 2006 on the authorized representative of the respondent Assessee whom the respondent Assessee now disowns, in our considered view, is sufficient to draw an inference of deemed service of notice on the respondent – Assessee and sufficient compliance of the requirement of Section 143(2) of the Income Tax Act, 1961

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DATE: February 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 17, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 12A: The CIT has no power to cancel/withdraw/recall the registration certificate granted u/s 12A until express power to do so was granted by s. 12AA(3). Though the grant of certificate is a quasi judicial function, s. 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be applied to support the order of cancellation of the registration certificate

The CIT had no express power of cancellation of the registration certificate once granted by him to the assessee under Section 12A till 01.10.2004. It is for the reasons that, first, there was no express provision in the Act vesting the CIT with the power to cancel the registration certificate granted under Section 12A of the Act. Second, the order passed under Section 12A by the CIT is a quasi judicial order and being quasi judicial in nature, it could be withdrawn/recalled by the CIT only when there was express power vested in him under the Act to do so. In this case there was no such express power

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DATE: February 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Appointment of Tribunal Members under new rules: interim directions issued regarding the method for selection of Tribunal Members and their terms and period of appointment

All appointments to be made in pursuance to the selection made by the interim Search-cum-Selection Committee shall abide by the conditions of service as per the old Acts and the Rules. A further direction to the effect that all the selections made by the aforementioned interim selection committee and the consequential appointment of all the selectees as Chairman/Judicial/Administrative members shall be for a period as has been provided in the old Acts and the Rules

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DATE: January 31, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Entire law on whether the computation provisions of Rule 8D is retrospective explained in the light of established principles of interpretation of statutes read with verdicts in Vatika Townships 367 ITR 466 (SC), Gold Coin Health 304 ITR 308 (SC) and other verdicts

There is no indication in Rule 8D to the effect that Rule 8D intended to apply retrospectively. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation for interpreting retrospectivity of a fiscal statute and looking into the nature and purpose of subsection (2) and subsection (3) of Section 14A as well as purpose and intent of Rule 8D coupled with the explanatory notes in the Finance Bill, 2006 and the departmental understanding as reflected by Circular dated 28.12.2006, we are of the considered opinion that Rule 8D was intended to operate prospectively.

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DATE: January 18, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
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S. 2(22)(e) Deemed Dividend: The term “shareholder”, post amendment, has only to be a person who is the beneficial owner of shares. One cannot be a registered owner and beneficial owner in the sense of a beneficiary of a trust or otherwise at the same time. The moment there is a shareholder, who need not necessarily be a member of the Company on its register, who is the beneficial owner of shares, the Section gets attracted without more. To state that two conditions have to be satisfied, namely, that the shareholder must first be a registered shareholder and thereafter, also be a beneficial owner is not only mutually contradictory but is plainly incorrect. Prima facie, Ankitech/ Madhur Housing is wrongly decided and should be reconsidered by larger bench

The whole object of the provision is clear from the Explanatory memorandum and the literal language of the newly inserted definition clause which is to get over the two judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove. This is why “shareholder” now, post amendment, has only to be a person who is the beneficial owner of shares. One cannot be a registered owner and beneficial owner in the sense of a beneficiary of a trust or otherwise at the same time. It is clear therefore that the moment there is a shareholder, who need not necessarily be a member of the Company on its register, who is the beneficial owner of shares, the Section gets attracted without more. To state, therefore, that two conditions have to be satisfied, namely, that the shareholder must first be a registered shareholder and thereafter, also be a beneficial owner is not only mutually contradictory but is plainly incorrect. Also, what is important is the addition, by way of amendment, of such beneficial owner holding not less than 10% of voting power. This is another indicator that the amendment speaks only of a beneficial shareholder who can compel the registered owner to vote in a particular way, as has been held in a catena of decisions starting from Mathalone vs. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., [1954] SCR 117

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DATE: December 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 11(1)(a) vs. 32: Even if the entire expenditure incurred for acquisition of a capital asset is treated as application of income for charitable purposes u/s 11(1)(a) of the Act, the assessee is also entitled to depreciation u/s 32. The argument that the grant of depreciation amounts to giving double benefit to the assessee is not acceptable. S. 11(6) which bars depreciation on expenditure applied for charitable purposes is prospective and applies only from AY 2015-16

Income of a Charitable Trust derived form building, plant and machinery and furniture was liable to be computed in normal commercial manner although the Trust may not be carrying on any business and the assets in respect whereof depreciation is claimed may not be business assets. In all such cases, section 32 of the Income Tax Act providing for depreciation for computation of income derived from business or profession is not applicable. However, the income of the Trust is required to be computed under section 11 on commercial principles after providing for allowance for normal depreciation and deduction thereof from gross income of the Trust

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DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
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Taxability of subsidies: A subsidy granted by the Govt to achieve the objects of acceleration of industrial development and generation of employment is capital in nature and not revenue. The fact that the incentives are not available unless and until commercial production has started, and that the incentives are not given to the assessee expressly for the purpose of purchasing capital assets or for the purpose of purchasing machinery is irrelevant. The object has to be seen and not the form in which it is granted

The aforesaid object is clear and unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was in order that persons come forward to construct Multiplex Theatre Complexes, the idea being that exemption from entertainment duty for a period of three years and partial remission for a period of two years should go towards helping the industry to set up such highly capital intensive entertainment centers. This being the case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha’s argument that it is only the immediate object and not the larger object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when cinema tickets are actually sold

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DATE: November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips Ltd which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

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DATE: December 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
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S. 80-IB: The incentive meant for small scale industrial undertakings cannot be availed by undertakings which do not continue as small scale industrial undertakings during the relevant period. Each assessment year is a different assessment year. The fact that the object of legislature is to encourage industrial expansion does not mean that the incentive should remain applicable even where on account of industrial expansion, the small scale industrial undertakings ceases to be small scale industrial undertakings. The fact that in the initial year eligibility was satisfied is irrelevant

The observations in the impugned order are that the object of legislature is to encourage industrial expansion which implies that incentive should remain applicable even where on account of industrial expansion small scale industrial undertakings ceases to be small scale industrial undertakings. We are unable to appreciate the logic for these observations. Incentive is given to a particular category of industry for a specified purpose. An incentive meant for small scale industrial undertaking cannot be availed by an assessee which is not such an undertaking. It does not, in any manner, mean that the object of permitting industrial expansion is defeated, if benefit is not allowed to other undertakings. On this logic, incentive must be given irrespective of any condition as the incentive certainly helps further expansion by reducing the tax burden. The concept of vertical equity is well known under which all the assessees need not be uniformally taxed. Progressive taxation is a well known element of tax policy. Higher slabs of tax or higher tax burden on an assessee having higher income or higher capacity cannot in any manner, be considered unreasonable

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