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DATE: December 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 28, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 139(5)/ 170: The consequence of amalgamation is that the amalgamating companies lose their separate identity and cease to exist. The successor is obliged u/s 170 to file a revised return to reflect the effect of the amalgamation. The fact that the revised return is filed after the due date specified in s. 139(5) is irrelevant as the scheme approved by the NCLT provides for it. The assessee is also not required to seek condonation of delay u/s 119(2)(b) (Dalmia Power 418 ITR 242 (Mad) reversed)

The more advisable course from the point of view of the Revenue would be to make one assessment on the Transferee Company taking into account the income of both of Transferor or Transferee Companies and also to make separate protective assessments on both the Transferor and Transferee Companies separately. There may be a certain practical difficulty in adopting this course inasmuch as separate balance-sheets may not be available for the Transferor and Transferee Companies. But that may not be an insuperable problem inasmuch as assessment can always be made, on the available material, even without a balance-sheet. In certain cases, best judgment assessment may also be resorted to

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DATE: December 17, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 916 days: While a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay & the consideration does not depend on the status of the party, even so the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. While considering condonation of delay, routine explanation is not enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation (Mst Katiji 1987(2) SCC 107 distinguished)

In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent.

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DATE: December 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Effect of dismissal of SLP: It is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger

It is evident that all the above orders were non-speaking orders, inasmuch as they were confined to a mere refusal to grant special leave to appeal to the petitioners therein. At this juncture, it is useful to recall that it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger

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DATE: December 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 244A: Interest on refund is compensation for unauthorized retention of money by the Department. When the collection is illegal & amount is refunded, it should carry interest in the matter of course. There is no reason to deny payment of interest to the deductor who had deducted tax at source and deposited the same with the Treasury. The Department is directed to pay interest as prescribed u/s 244-A at the earliest (UOI vs. Tata Chemicals 363 ITR 658 (SC) followed)

When the said amount is refunded it should carry interest in the matter of course. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and retention of the money collected unauthorizedly by the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the Revenue to refund such amount with interest inasmuch as they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited

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DATE: November 21, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 4/ 56: Amount received by assessee for relinquishing secretaryship of educational society cannot be treated as a capital receipt. The question of the principle of capital asset being invoked does not arise. The receipt is assessable as income from other sources. It may have been a different matter if it was a case of life time appointment of the assessee as Secretary of the concerned Institution but no such evidence was produced by the assessee (CIT vs. Ramachandra Rao 330 ITR 0322 affirmed)

The substance of the admission is that the appellant was holding the post of Secretary of the Institution [Paramahamsa Foundation (R) Trust] until 1996 but he left the institution after new members were elected as the managing committee. That being the case, the question of appellant invoking the principle of capital asset does not arise. It may have been a different matter if it was a case of life time appointment of the appellant as Secretary of the concerned Institution. No such evidence was produced by the appellant before the assessing officer or before us

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DATE: November 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Appeal u/s 246A reg denial of liability to pay buy-back tax u/s 115QA: The expression “denies his liability to be assessed” in s. 246A takes within its fold every case where the assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act. It is not confined to the liability to be assessed u/s 143(3) but applies also to the liability to pay tax u/s 115QA. If there is adequate appellate remedy, a Writ Petition under Article 226 cannot be entertained (Kanpur Coal Syndicate 53 ITR 225 (SC) & Chhabil Dass Agarwal 357 ITR 357 (SC) followed)

If the submission of the appellant is accepted and the concerned expression as stated hereinabove in Section 246(1)(a) or in Section 246A(1)(a) is to be considered as relatable to the liability of an assessee to be assessed under Section 143(3) as contended, there would be no appellate remedy in case of any determination under Section 115QA. The issues may arise not just confined to the question whether the company is liable at all but may also relate to other facets including the extent of liability and also with regard to computation. If the submission is accepted, every time the dispute will be required to be taken up in proceedings such as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which normally would not be entertained in case of any disputed questions of fact or concerning factual aspects of the matter. The assessee may thus, not only lose a remedy of having the matter considered on factual facets of the matter but would also stand deprived of regular channels of challenges available to it under the hierarchy of fora available under the Act

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DATE: November 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 16, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 1754 days: If the stand of the Applicant in the Affidavit that he had no knowledge about the passing of the order is not expressly refuted by the Respondent, the question of disbelieving the stand of the Applicant cannot arise. For this reason, indulgence should be shown to the Applicant by condoning the delay

Unless that fact was to be refuted, the question of disbelieving the stand taken by the appellant(s) on affidavit, cannot arise and for which reason, the High Court should have shown indulgence to the appellant(s) by condoning the delay in filing the concerned appeal(s). This aspect has been glossed over by the High Court

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DATE: October 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Doctrine of mutuality: A club registered as a 'company' u/s 25 of Companies Act is not like other companies as it has no shareholders, no dividends declared, and no distribution of profits takes place. Such clubs cannot be treated as separate in law from their members. The ratio decidendi in Bacha F. Guzdar 27 ITR 1 does not apply to such clubs. When a club supplies goods to its members, there is no "sale" and sales-tax cannot be levied (Bangalore Club 350 ITR 509 (SC), Venkatesh Premises Coop Soc 402 ITR 670 (SC) & other imp judgements referred)

if persons carry on a certain activity in such a way that there is a commonality between contributors of funds and participators in the activity, a complete identity between the two is then established. This identity is not snapped because the surplus that arises from the common fund is not distributed among the members – it is enough that there is a 44 right of disposal over the surplus, and in exercise of that right they may agree that on winding up, the surplus will be transferred to a club or association with similar activities. Most importantly, the surplus that is made does not come back to the members of the club as shareholders of a company in the form of dividends upon their shares. Since the members perform the activities of the club for themselves, the fact that they incorporate a legal entity to do it for them makes no difference.

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DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Recall of ex-parte order: A 'power of attorney holder' is an 'agent' and 'Principal Officer' u/s 2(35). If a CA is granted a POA, service upon him of a notice is valid. If a notice is duly served upon the litigant through its authorized representative, and it was provided sufficient opportunity to appear before the Court and contest the matter but the litigant choses to let the matter proceed exparte, the order cannot be recalled

In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata1 this Court held that : “A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent.”

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DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Undisclosed income/ expenditure: A letter written in refutal of allegations contained in a news items with a without-prejudice offer cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure or as an unconditional offer to pay tax. Also, the disclosure is by the USA Co and not by the assessee. It is not the case of the Dept that the amount has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the assessee so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the assessee

In our opinion, such communication(s) cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure as such. What is significant to note is that in the present case, the disclosure is attributed to Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., USA, filed by it in the proceedings in USA; and not by the assessee as such. It is not the case of the Department that the amount referred to in the said disclosure has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the appellant – assessee under instruction, so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the appellant.

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