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DATE: September 22, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 30, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 32(1)(ii) Depreciation on non-compete fee: The AO should consider whether the verdict in Sharp Business System 211 TM 576 (Del) that non-compete rights are not intangible assets for depreciation can apply to a case where there is no joint venture between the person paying the non-competition fee and the recipient and both parties are outsiders. Law laid down in Nat Steel Equipments vs. CCE AIR 1988 SC 631 on the meaning of the term "similar" to be considered

The Assessing Officer shall redecide this issue afresh after comparing the facts in the case of the assessee with the case of Delhi High Court in Sharp Business Systems (supra) in accordance with law and give clear finding how the case of assessee is covered or not covered by the decision of Delhi High Court in the case of Sharp Business Systems. We may point out that in the case of the assessee there was no joint venture between the person paying the non competition fee and the person receiving the non competition fee. Both the parties were entirely outsiders and the time of the continuity of the agreement was also 10 years not 07 years. We also direct the Assessing Officer that while considering the decision of Delhi High Court he should also consider the decision of Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Nat Steel Equipments vs. Collector of Central Excise reported in AIR 1988 SC 631 as in our opinion this decision will also have bearing in the case of the assessee

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DATE: June 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: (i) The computation under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2) is to be made without resorting to the computation as contemplated u/s 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income tax Rules 1962, (ii) Only those investments are to be considered for computing the average value of investment which yielded exempt income during the year

(i) The computation under clause (f) of Explanation 1 to section 115JB(2) is to be made without resorting to the computation as contemplated u/s 14A read with Rule 8D of the Income tax Rules 1962. (ii) Only those investments are to be considered for computing the average value of investment which yielded exempt income during the year.

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DATE: January 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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CITATION:
S. 41(1)/ 115JB: Entire law explained whether remission of a loan can be assessed as income u/s 41(1) and if not whether the same can be added to "book profit" for purposes of MAT tax u/s 115JB

Waiver of loan taken for acquisition of a capital asset and on capital account cannot be taxed u/s 41(1), as it is neither on revenue account nor a remission of a trading liability so as to attract tax in the year of remission. A capital surplus thus, in respect of waiver of loan amount cannot be regarded as being amount available for distribution through the profit & loss account. This follows from the very definition of expression ‘capital reserve’ that it must be accounted directly to the credit of the capital reserve account instead of being credited to the profit & loss account so as to ensure that it is not left for being distributed through the profit & loss account

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DATE: January 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi)/ Article 12: Law on whether consideration received for licensing of software programmes can be assessed as "royalty" u/s 9(1)(vi) and Article 12 of the DTAA explained

If we analyse and compare various provisions of the Copyright Act with the relevant clauses of the master agreement, it is noted that the said agreement does not permit HLL to carry out any alteration or conversion of any nature, so as to fall within the definition of ‘adaptation’ as defined in Copyright Act, 1957. The right given to the customer for reproduction was only for the limited purpose so as to make it usable for all the offices of HLL in India and no right was given to HLL for commercial exploitation of the same. It is also noted that the terms of the agreement do not allow or authorise HLL to do any of the acts covered by the definition of ‘copyright’. Under these circumstances, the payment made by HLL cannot be construed as payment made towards ‘use’ of copyright particularly when the provisions of Indian Income-tax Act and DTAA are read together with the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957

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DATE: August 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Transfer Pricing: The assessee is obliged to carry out a bench-marking exercise with independent comparables and prove that its transactions with AEs are at arms length. Mere fact that the transaction is approved by the RBI and Govt is not sufficient

The RBI approval/FIPB approval is not determinative of ALP and cannot be considered to be a valid CUP. Automatic route under which FIPB approvals or RBI approvals are granted have been devised for the “ease of doing business”. These approvals emanate from other legislation or policy and are not in relation to determination of Arm’s Length Price. The purpose of the RBI approval/FIPB approval is entirely different and cannot be equated with the arm’s length principle. The approvals of rates given by the DIPP and the RBI are for different purposes, like for promotion of industries, management of foreign exchange etc. and it varies in accordance with the business practices prevalent at different times which are clear from the RBI approvals themselves. Going by the relevant TP provisions as enshrined under the Act and relevant Rules, it is mandatory that the appellant has to independently benchmark its international transaction with independent comparables so as to arrive at arm’s length price

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DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
Entire law on whether consideration for alienation of rights under a "Call Option agreement" for shares is taxable as "capital gains" or as "income from other sources" in the context of the India-Singapore DTAA explained

In common parlance, a call option is reckoned as a contract in which the holder (buyer) has the right (but not an obligation) to buy a specified quantity of a security/shares at a specified price (strike price) within a fixed period of time. For the writer (seller) of a call option, it represents an obligation to sell the underlying security at the strike price if the option is exercised. The call option writer is paid a premium for taking on the risk associated with the obligation. Here in the present case, there is very peculiar agreement/ arrangement, where the strike price has been mentioned as US $ 1 and the fixed period of time for exercising the call option has been fixed for 150 years. This factum itself means that the call option in the shares have been given for perpetuity. Not only that, an irrevocable power of attorney has also been executed in favour of the ING Bank in respect of all the shares in PHIL confirming that, assessee will not at any time purport to revoke the same, which inter-alia shows that assessee has alienated a substantive and valuable rights as an owner of the shares in perpetuity, albeit without dejure alienating the shares itself

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DATE: June 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi)/ Article 12: Consideration received for sale of computer software programme in CD Rom is not assessable as “royalty”. The retrospective amendment in Explanation 4 to section 9(1)(vi) to tax such receipts as royalty has no application to DTAA if the definition of the term “royalty” in the DTAA has remained unchanged

The retrospective amendment brought into statute with effect from 01.06.1976 cannot be read into the DTAA, because the treaty has not been correspondingly amended in line with new enlarged definition of ‘royalty’. The alteration in the provisions of the Act cannot be per se read into the treaty unless there is a corresponding negotiation between the two sovereign nations to amend the specific provision of “royalty” in the same line. The limitation clause cannot be read into the treaty for applying the provisions of domestic law like in Article 7 in some of the treaties, where domestic laws are made applicable. Here in this case, the ‘royalty’ has been specifically defined in the treaty and amendment to the definition of such term under the Act would not have any bearing on the definition of such term in the context of DTAA. A treaty which has entered between the two sovereign nations, then one country cannot unilaterally alter its provision

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DATE: June 10, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 263: In challenging the validity of a s. 263 revision order, the validity of the underlying s. 143(3) assessment order which is sought to be revised can be examined even if the said assessment order has not been challenged and has become final. If the assessment order is passed on a non-existent entity, the revision order is void

There is no doubt that after passing of the original assessment order, the primary (i.e. original proceedings) had come to an end and attained finality and, therefore, outcome of the same cannot be disturbed, and therefore, the original assessment order framed to conclude the primary proceedings had also attained finality and it also cannot be disturbed at the instance of the assessee, except as permitted under the law and by following the due process of law. Under these circumstances, it can be said that effect of the original assessment order cannot be erased or modified subsequently. In other words, whatever tax liability had been determined in the original assessment order that had already become final and that cannot be sought to be disturbed by the assessee. But, the issue that arises here is that if the original assessment order is illegal in terms of its jurisdiction or if the same is null & void in the eyes of law on any jurisdictional grounds, then, whether it can give rise to initiation of further proceedings and whether such subsequent proceedings would be valid under the law as contained in Income Tax Act? It has been vehemently argued before us that the subsequent proceedings (i.e. collateral proceedings) derive strength only from the order passed in the original proceedings (i.e. primary proceedings). Thus, if order passed in the original proceedings is itself illegal, then that cannot give rise to valid revision proceedings

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08, 2008-09
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S. 263: There is doubt whether Explanation 2(a) to s. 263, inserted by FA 2015 w.e.f. 01.04.2015 has retrospective effect. The said Explanation does not override the law that the CIT cannot fault an assessment order without conducting his own inquiry or verification to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law

Even though there is a doubt as to whether the said explanation, which was inserted by Finance Act 2015 w.e.f. 1.4.2015, would be applicable to the year under consideration, yet we are of the view that the said Explanation cannot be said to have over ridden the law interpreted by Hon’ble Delhi High Court, referred above. If that be the case, then the CIT can find fault with each and every assessment order, without conducting any enquiry or verification in order to establish that the assessment order is not sustainable in law and order for revision. He can also force the AO to conduct the enquiries in the manner preferred by CIT, thus prejudicing the independent application of mind of the AO. Definitely, that could not be the intention of the legislature in inserting Explanation 2 to sec. 263 of the Act, since it would lead to unending litigations and there would not be any point of finality in the legal proceedings

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