Search Results For: M. S. Sanklecha J


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DATE: March 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
(i) Additional Evidence: Ordinarily an application seeking admission of additional evidence under Rules 18 and 29 of ITAT Rules requires an order to be passed. If the ITAT rejects the application, reasons thereof have to be stated.

(ii) S. 54F: The allotment letter issued by the developer does not confer title until the agreement for sale under the provisions of the MOFA is registered. Failure to deposit the amount of consideration not utilized towards the purchase of new flat in the specified bank account before the due date of filing return of Income u/s 139(1) is fatal to the claim for exemption. Humayun Suleman Merchant vs. CCIT is not per incuriam

In the fact situation at hand we are afraid the assessee can derive no benefit from the provisions of circular No.672 dated 16th December, 1993 inasmuch as the scheme contemplated in paragraph 2 of circular No.471 is not available to the appellant. The appellant has to obtain the allotment letter from the developer under the provision of Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA) and not from the co-operative society. The allotment letter issued by the developer does not confer title until the agreement for sale under the provisions of the MOFA is registered. In the present case, however, it is not in dispute that the agreement for sale was entered into only on 24th November, 2008 beyond the period of three years from the date of surrender of tenancy which was 13th September, 2005. Moreover, the developer had no approval for construction of the 9th floor of Wing ‘C’, wherein the assessee had booked three flats and such approval was received by the builders only on 7th September, 2010. Thus, according to us there is no question of assessee establishing the title over the property which was not been approved for construction at the material time

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DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): A disclosure of income, or withdrawal of claim for deduction, by the assessee after a specific s. 142(1)/ 143(2) notice is issued cannot be said to be a "voluntary disclosure" so as to avoid the levy of penalty. The argument that the earlier non-disclosure of income/ wrong claim for expenditure was due to "mistake" is not an acceptable defense (Mak Data 358 ITR 593 (SC) followed, Price Waterhouse Coopers 348 ITR 306 (SC) distinguished)

It is clear that so called mistake as claimed by the assessee, was only after notices dated 14th January, 2009 were issued under Sections 142 and 143 of the Act. It was only an attempt to preempt the Revenue finding out the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was voluntary disclosure.

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DATE: February 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): If the quantum appeal is admitted by the High Court, it means that the issue is debatable and penalty cannot be levied. Argument of the Dept that Nayan Builders 368 ITR 722 (Bom) does not lay down this proposition is not correct

The Revenue had filed an appeal from the order of the Tribunal in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) deleting the penalty. This appeal being CIT vs. Nayan Builders and Developers [(2014) 368 ITR 722] was not entertained by this Court. It upheld the view of the Tribunal that the imposition of penalty was not justified as admission of appeal in quantum proceeding on this issue as substantial question of law was proof enough of the issue being debatable. The aforesaid decision in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt.Ltd (supra) was also followed by this Court in CIT-8 vs. Aditya Birla Power Co. Ltd. in Income Tax Appeal No. 851 of 2014 rendered on 2nd December, 2015

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DATE: February 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 292BB: The issue of a notice u/s 143(2) bearing the wrong (old) address of the assessee does not amount to a valid service of the notice u/s 282 r.w.s. 27 of the General Clauses Act. The non-service of a notice u/s 143(2) before the expiry of 12 months from the end of the month in which the return was filed renders the assessment void. As the assessee objected to the same before completion of proceedings, the assessment order is not saved by s. 292BB

It is undisputed position before us that the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act which was handed over to the post office on 30th November, 2007 was incorrectly addressed i.e. it was addressed to the assessee’s old office at Nariman Point, Mumbai. In terms of Section 282 of the Act as existing in 2007 a notice may be served on the person named therein either by post or as if it were a summons issued by the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act provides that where any Central Act requires a document to be served by post where the expression “serve” or “given” or “sent” shall be deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting. In such cases, unless the contrary is proved which would be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post to the addressee. In this case admittedly the envelope containing the notice was wrongly addressed. Thus the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked

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DATE: February 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 153C: The requirement that the documents found during search should “belong” to the assessee is a condition precedent and a jurisdictional issue. The non-satisfaction of the condition renders the entire proceedings null and void. The fact that the searched person and the assessee are alleged to be “hand in glove” is irrelevant

The grievance of the Revenue as submitted by Mr.Kotangale is a submission made on the basis of suspicion and not on the basis of any evidence on record which would indicate that the respondent – assessee and persons searched were all part of the same group. Be that as it may, the requirement of Section 153C of the Act cannot be ignored at the alter of suspicion. The Revenue has to strictly comply with Section 153C of the Act. We are of the view that non satisfaction of the condition precedent viz. the seized document must belong to the respondent – assessee is a jurisdictional issue and non satisfaction thereof would make the entire proceedings taken thereunder null and void. The issue of Section 69C of the Act can only arise for consideration if the proceedings under Section 153C of the Act are upheld

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DATE: January 31, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 80-IB(10): The profits of an undertaking eligible for deduction cannot be treated as "inflated" in the absence of material on record to show that there is an arrangement between the eligible unit and the non-eligible unit to generate more than ordinary profits for the eligible unit. The mere fact that there are common customers of both the units does not by itself indicate transfer of profits to the eligible unit

We note the fact that the CIT(A) has rendered a finding that there is nothing on record to indicate that there is any arrangement between the Appellant’s Jammu unit and his wife’s unit at Valsad to generate more than ordinary profits or any transfer of goods and/or services inter se, below the market price, resulting in inflated profits to the Appellant’s Jammu unit. Even before us, nothing has been shown by the Revenue that there is any business transacted between Appellant’s unit at Jammu and his wife’s unit at Valsad which resulted in inflating the profits being earned by the Appellant or that there is any transaction between them. The Tribunal has without considering the validity of the above finding of CIT(A), adopted the test of common customers of both the Appellant’s Jammu unit and his wife’s unit at Valsad, to conclude that profits of the Appellants, are inflated. Common customers by itself in the absence of some arrangement between the parties does not indicate transfer of profits to Appellant’s Jammu unit

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DATE: February 1, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): Plea that the appeal was mistakenly withdrawn on the advice of Counsel and that the same should be restored should be backed by evidence. If the assessee voluntarily withdraws the appeal, he cannot seek restoration on the ground that the withdrawal was an apparent mistake

At the very outset we must point out that it is the petitioner’s case that he acted on the advise of the Counsel in withdrawing the appeal. However, this submission of the petitioner is without there being anything on record from the Advocate concerned that he advised the petitioner to withdraw his appeal. Further the communication dated 23rd April, 2010 addressed to the Tribunal for withdrawal of the appeal was by the petitioner himself and in that communication he does not mention that the appeal is being withdrawn on account of legal advise. In fact it is an unconditional withdrawal of the appeal

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DATE: January 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 68: Even if the premium at which the shares are issued defies commercial prudence, the receipt cannot be assessed as "unexplained credit" if the identity of the payer, genuineness of the transaction and capacity of the subscriber are not disputed. Interest earned on short-term fixed deposits is assessable as "profits and gains of business" and not as "income from other sources"

Mr.Chhotaray the learned counsel for the Revenue states that the impugned order itself holds that share premium of Rs.490/per share defies all commercial prudence. Therefore it has to be considered to be cash credit. We find that the Tribunal has examined the case of the Revenue on the parameters of Section 68 of the Act and found on facts that it is not so hit. Therefore, Section 68 of the Act cannot be invoked. The Revenue has not been able to show in any manner the factual finding recorded by the Tribunal is perverse in any manner

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DATE: January 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Failure by the AO to specify in the s. 274 notice whether the penalty is being initiated for 'furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income' or for 'concealment of income' is fatal. It reflects non-application of mind and renders the levy of penalty invalid (Manjunatha Cotton 359 ITR 565 (Kar) followed)

The above submission on the part of the Revenue is in the face of the decision of the Supreme Court in Ashok Pai v/s. CIT 292 ITR 11 [relied upon in Manjunath Cotton & Ginning Factory (supra)] – wherein it is observed that concealment of income and furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income in Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, carry different meanings/ connotations. Therefore, the satisfaction of the Assessing Officer with regard to only one of the two breaches mentioned under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, for initiation of penalty proceedings will not warrant/ permit penalty being imposed for the other breach. This is more so, as an Assessee would respond to the ground on which the penalty has been initiated/notice issued. It must, therefore, follow that the order imposing penalty has to be made only on the ground of which the penalty proceedings has been initiated, and it cannot be on a fresh ground of which the Assessee has no notice

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DATE: January 30, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 3, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 28/29: There is a distiction between "setting up of business" and "commencement of business". All expenditure after "setting up" is deductible business expenditure even if the business has not commenced. A business is "set up" when steps are taken to recruit employees and take premises etc

A similar issue viz. distinction between setting up of business and commencement of business had come up for consideration before this Court in Western India Vegetable Products Ltd. vs. Commissioner of Income Tax 1954 Vol. 26 ITR Page 151. This Court had held that business is said to have been set up when it is established and ready to be commence. However, there may be an interval between a business which is set up and a business which is commenced. However, all expenses incurred during the interregnum between setting up of business and commencement of business would be permissible deductions