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DATE: January 15, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 17, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 50C: The 3rd Proviso to s. 50C, inserted by the Finance Act 2018, provides that s. 50C will not apply if the difference between the stamp duty valuation and the actual consideration does not exceed 5%. This tolerance band was increased to 10% by the Finance Act 2020. Though the amendments are stated to be prospective, they are curative in nature and must be held to relate back to the date when Section 50C was inserted, i.e. 1st April 2003. Accordingly, if the valuation of a property, for the purpose of stamp duty valuation, is 10% more than the stated sale consideration, the stated sale consideration will be accepted at the face value and the anti-avoidance provisions under section 50C will not be invoked

As noted by the Central Board of Direct Taxes circular # 8 of 2018, explaining the reason for the insertion of the third proviso to Section 50C(1), has observed that “It has been pointed out that the variation between stamp duty value and actual consideration received can occur in respect of similar properties in the same area because of a variety of factors, including the shape of the plot or location”. Once the CBDT itself accepts that these variations could be on account of a variety of factors, essentially bonafide factors, and, for this reason, Section 50C(1) should not come into play, it was an “unintended consequence” of Section 50(1) that even in such bonafide situations, this provision, which is inherently in the nature of an anti-avoidance provision, is invoked. Once this situation is sought to be addressed, as is the settled legal position- as we will see a little later in our analysis, this situation needs to be addressed in entirety for the entire period in which such legal provisions had effect, and not for a specific time period only. There is no good reason for holding the curative amendment to be only as prospective in effect.

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DATE: January 13, 2021 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2021 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 17(2)(vi): (i) ESOP benefits granted to an assessee when he was resident and in consideration for services rendered in India is taxable even though the assessee is a non-resident in the year of exercise. S. 17(2)(vi) decides the timing of the income to be the year of exercise of the ESOPs but does not dilute or negate the fact that the benefit had arisen at the point of time when the ESOP rights were granted.

(ii) Article 15 of the India-UAE DTAA permits taxation of ESOP benefit, which is included in the scope of the expression "other similar remuneration" appearing immediately after the words "salaries and wages", in the jurisdiction in which the related employment is exercised. Thus, an assessee who gets ESOP benefits in respect of his service in U.A.E. and he exercises these options at a later point of time, say after returning to India and ceasing to be a non-resident, will still have the treaty protection of that income under article 15(1). Conversely, when the assessee gets the ESOP benefit on account of rendering services in India, he cannot have the benefit of article 15 in respect of the said income.

We find that so far as the ESOP benefit is concerned, while the income has arisen to the assessee in the current year, admittedly the related rights were granted to the assessee in 2007 and in consideration for the services which were rendered by the assessee prior to the rights being granted- which were rendered in India all along. The character of income may be inchoate at that stage but certainly what is being sought to be taxed now, on account of the specific provision under section 17(2)(vi), is a fruit of services rendered much earlier and the benefit, which has now become a taxable income, accrued to the assessee in 2007. All that section 17(2)(vi) decides is the timing of an income, but it does not dilute or negate the fact that the benefit, in which is being sought to be taxed, had arisen much earlier i.e. at the point of time when the ESOP rights were granted. On these facts, in our considered view, the income, even if it was inchoate at the point of time when the options were granted, has accrued and has arisen in India. The assessee is a non- resident in the current assessment year, but quite clearly, the benefit, in respect of which the income is bring sought to be taxed now, had arisen at an earlier point of time in India. Viewed thus, the income in respect of ESOP grant benefit accrued and had arisen at the point of time when the ESOP rights were granted, even though the taxability in respect of the same, on account of the specific legal provisions under section 17(2)(vi), has arisen in the present in this year.

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DATE: February 28, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 92A(2): The law in Diageo India Pvt Ltd 47 SOT 252 that the definition of "Associated Enterprises" in section 92A(1)(a) & (b) is the basic rule which is unaffected by the specific instances referred to in s. 92A(2) is not good law in view of the amendment by the FA 2002 and CBDT Circular No. 8 dated 27.08.2008. The correct law as held in Veer Gems 95 taxmann.16 (Guj) is that S. 92A(2) restricts the scope of S. 92A(1) and it is only when the criterion specified in sub section (2) is satisfied, two enterprises can be treated as associated enterprises. Judgements of non jurisdictional High Courts are binding on the Tribunal

Section 92A(2) governs the operation of Section 92A(1) by controlling the definition of participation in management or capital or control by one of the enterprise in the other enterprise. If a form of participation in management, capital or control is not recognized by Section 92A(2), even if it ends up in de facto or even de jure participation in management, capital or control by one of the enterprise in the other enterprise, it does not result in the related enterprises being treated as ‘associated enterprises’. Section 92A(1) and (2), in that sense, are required to be read together, even though Section 92A(2) does provide several deeming fictions which prima facie stretch the basic rule in Section 92A(1) quite considerably on the basis of, what appears to be, manner of participation in “control” of the other enterprise. What is thus clear that as long as the provisions of one of the clauses in Section 92A(2) are not satisfied, even if an enterprise has a de facto participation capital, management or control over the other enterprises, the two enterprises cannot be said to be associated enterprises

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DATE: November 27, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
Law on taxation under DTAAs of "transparent entities" & "representative assesseess" explained: When an assessee is a representative assessee of a tax transparent entity, it is the status of beneficiaries or constituents of tax transparent entities which is relevant for the purpose of determining treaty protection (Linklaters LLP 9 ITR (Trib) 217 (Mum) followed)

The principle emerging out of this analysis of legal position is that when an assessee is a representative assessee of a tax transparent entity, it is the status of beneficiaries or constituents of tax transparent entities which is relevant for the purpose of determining treaty protection. Viewed thus, this is beyond doubt that the income in question has actually accrued to the taxable entities on the Netherlands, which, according to the approach adopted by the Assessing Officer, is sine qua non for tax treaty protection. It would thus appear that the treaty protection has indeed been wrongly declined to the assessee

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DATE: April 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 27, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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CITATION:
S. 92C/ Rule 10B: If the TPO is not satisfied with the assessee's method of benchmarking royalty payments, he should independently benchmark the ALP by adopting any one of the prescribed methods. He cannot determine The ALP at nil on an ad-hoc basis. TNMM is the most appropriate method for determining the ALP of royalty and not the CUP method. If an authority like the RBI or Commerce Ministry has approved the rate of royalty, it carries persuasive value that the rate is at ALP

The Transfer Pricing Officer has not proceeded to benchmark the payment of royalty by applying any of the prescribed methods provided under the statute. Without assigning any reason, the Transfer Pricing Officer has determined the arm’s length price of the royalty payment at nil. Prima-facie, it appears, the determination of arm’s length price of royalty payment at nil by the Transfer Pricing Officer is completely on ad-hoc basis without following the due process of law as provided under the statute

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DATE: May 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 19, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
Bogus Purchases: The CIT(A) is not justified in enhancing the assessment to disallow 100% of the bogus purchases. The only addition which can be made is to account for profit element embedded in the purchase transactions to factorize for profit earned by assessee against possible purchase of material in the grey market and undue benefit of VAT against such bogus purchases (PCIT vs. Mohommad Haji Adam (Bom HC) followed

The assessee was in possession of primary purchase documents and the payments to the suppliers was through banking channels. The assessee had established corresponding sales before Ld. AO. The books of accounts were audited wherein quantitative details of stock was provided. We are of the considered opinion that there could be no sale without actual purchase of material keeping in view the fact that the assessee was engaged in trading activities. At the same time, the assessee failed to produce even a single supplier to confirm the purchase transactions. The delivery of material could not be substantiated.

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DATE: January 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 251(1)(a): The CIT(A) has no jurisdiction to permit an assessee to withdraw an appeal and to dismiss it in limine. Notwithstanding the request seeking withdrawal of the appeal, the CIT(A) is obliged and duty bound under the Act to decide the appeal on merits

This is amply clear from the Section 251(1)(a) and (b) and Explanation to Section 251(2) of the Act which requires the CIT(A) to apply his mind to all the issues which arise from the impugned order before him whether or not the same has been raised by the appellant before him. Accordingly, the law does not empower the CIT(A) to dismiss the appeal for non-prosecution as is evident from the provisions of the Act

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DATE: October 10, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 18, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus share capital: The ITAT is an adjudicator and not an investigator. It has to rely upon the investigation / enquiry conducted by the AO. The Dept cannot fault the ITAT's order and seek a recall on the ground that an order of SEBI, though available, was not produced before the ITAT at the hearing. The negligence or laches lies with the Dept and for such negligence or laches, the order of the ITAT cannot be termed as erroneous u/s 254(2)

After the passing of the order of the Tribunal the Department has come forward with the final order of the SEBI by stating that, though, it was available at the time of hearing of appeal but it could not be brought to the notice of the Tribunal. Thus, as could be seen whatever negligence or laches for not bringing the final order of SEBI to the notice of the Tribunal lies with the Department and for such negligence or laches of the Department, the appeal order passed by the Tribunal cannot be termed as erroneous to bring it within the ambit of section 254(2) of the Act.

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DATE: May 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 7, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 45/ 48: Portfolio Management Scheme (PMS) fees paid by the assessee to the PMS Manager neither falls under the category of transfer fees nor cost of acquisition/improvement. Consequently it is not deductible while computing capital gains from sale of the shares (All judgements referred)

In the instant case, the deduction on account of fees paid for PMS had been claimed by the assessee as deduction in computing capital gains arising from sale of shares and securities. He however had failed to explain as to how the said fees could be considered as cost of acquisition of the shares and securities or the cost of any improvement thereto. He had also failed to explain as to how the said fees could be treated as expenditure incurred wholly and exclusively in connection with sale of shares and securities. On the other hand, the basis on which the said fees was paid by the assessee showed that it had no direct nexus with the purchase and sale of shares and as rightly contended by the revenue, the said fees was payable by the assessee going by the basis thereof even without there being any purchase or sale of shares in a particular period

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DATE: June 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 139(5): There is no bar / restriction that an assessee cannot file a revised return of income after issuance of notice u/s 143(2). A revised return of income can be filed even in course of the assessment proceedings provided the time limit prescribed u/s 139(5) is available. The Departmental Authorities are not expected to deny assessee’s legitimate claim by raising technical objection

There is no bar / restriction in the provisions of section 139(5) of the Act that the assessee cannot file a revised return of income after issuance of notice under section 143(2) of the Act. It is trite law, the assessee can file a revised return of income even in course of the assessment proceedings, provided, the time limit prescribed under section 139(5) of the Act is available. That being the case, the revised return of income filed by the assessee under section 139(5) of the Act cannot be held as invalid

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