Search Results For: Sanjay Kishan Kaul J


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DATE: September 11, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 12, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 1976-77
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(i) To decide whether a particular source is business income, one has to look to the notions of what is the business activity. The activity must have a set purpose. The fact that the assessee does not carry on business activity for profit motive is not material as profit making is not an essential ingredient (ii) The Act requires determination of ‘real income’ on the basis of ordinary commercial principles of accountancy. To determine the ‘real income’, permissible expenses are required to be set off. Every application of income towards business objective of the assessee is a business expenditure and nothing else (iii) Mediation inter se the Government authorities or Government departments is an efficacious remedy. A Committee of legal experts presided by a retired Judge can give its imprimatur to the settlement (iv) A vibrant system of Advance Ruling can go a long way in reducing taxation litigation. This is true even of disputes between the taxation department and private persons, who are more than willing to comply with the law of the land but find some ambiguity.

In the case of a business, the profits must be arrived at on ordinary commercial principles. The scheme of the IT Act requires the determination of ‘real income’ on the basis of ordinary commercial principles of accountancy. To determine the ‘real income’, permissible expenses are required to be set off. There is, thus, a clear distinction between deductions made for ascertaining real profits and thereafter distributions made out of profits.The distribution would be application of income. There is also a distinction between real profits ascertained on commercial principles and profits fixed by a statute for a specific purpose. Income tax is a tax on real income.

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DATE: January 17, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2020 (Date of publication)
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Condonation of delay: There are large gaps which are unexplained. It is not known whether any action was taken against the officers who are responsible for the inordinate delay. The highest Court cannot be a walk in place to file any time irrespective of period of limitation prescribed. To blame it on the inefficiency of the administration is no more good excuse. Administration directed to hold an inquiry into the aspect as to who is responsible for such inordinate delay and take suitable action against the officers concerned (Post Master General vs. Living Media (2012) 3 SCC 563 referred)

This is one more case which we have defined as “Certificate Cases” – the object being only to obtain dismissal from the Supreme Court. We have perused the application for condonation of delay also. There are large gaps which are unexplained and there are no instructions with the counsel whether any action was taken against the officers who are responsible for the inordinate delay

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DATE: November 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
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Taxability of mesne profits: High Court's approach of dismissing the Dept's appeal only because the Tribunal relied on Narang Overseas 111 ITD 1 (Mum) (SB) and the appeal against which had been dismissed for non-removal of defects is not correct. The High Court ought to decide the question on merits

High Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant herein only on the ground that the decision relied upon by the Tribunal i.e. in the case of Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, Mumbai – (2008) 111 ITD 1 (Mum) (SB)], the appeal was preferred before the High Court and for non-removal of the defects the appeal has been dismissed. We are of the considered opinion that this was not a correct approach of the High Court for the simple reason that merely because one authority has followed its own decision in another case and that matter in appeal has been dismissed on technical grounds still the High Court has to decide the question on merits

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DATE: November 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
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Low Tax Effect Circular: The view of the two-judge bench in Suman Dhamija & Gemini Distilleries that CBDT's low tax Circular dated 09.02.2011 cannot be given retrospective effect cannot be followed as it is contrary to the three-judge bench verdict in Surya Herbal. A beneficial circular has to be applied retrospectively while an oppressive circular has to be applied prospectively. Circular dated 9.2.2011 has retrospective operation except for two caveats: (i) The Circular should not be applied ipso facto when the matter has cascading effect and/or (ii) where common principles are involved in subsequent group of matters or a large number of matters

We are of the view that the matter needs to be put to rest and a clarity be obtained in view of the impact of this issue on pending cases before the High Courts as well as the cases which have been disposed of by various High Courts by applying the Circular of 2011 to pending litigations. In our view the matter has been squarely put to rest taking further care of the interest of the Revenue by the order passed by the three Judges Bench of this Court in Surya Herbal Ltd. case (supra), which had put two caveats even to the retrospective application of the Circular. The subsequent orders have been passed by the two Judges Bench without those orders being brought to the notice of the Court, a duty which was cast on the Department to have done so to avoid the ambiguity which has arisen. Thus, the said view of the three Judges Bench would hold water and the Circular would apply even to pending matters but subject to the two caveats provided in Surya Herbal Ltd. case (supra).

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DATE: October 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 25, 2017 (Date of publication)
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Permanent Establishment (PE) under Article 5 of DTAA: Entire law on concept of “fixed place of business”, “service PE” and “agency PE” explained. The fact that there is close association and dependence between the US company and the Indian companies is irrelevant. The functions performed, assets used and risk assumed, is not a proper and appropriate test to determine whether there is a location PE

The Income Tax Act, in particular Section 90 thereof, does not speak of the concept of a PE. This is a creation only of the DTAA. By virtue of Article 7(1) of the DTAA, the business income of companies which are incorporated in the US will be taxable only in the US, unless it is found that they were PEs in India, in which event their business income, to the extent to which it is attributable to such PEs, would be taxable in India. Article 5 of the DTAA set out hereinabove provides for three distinct types of PEs with which we are concerned in the present case: fixed place of business PE under Articles 5(1) and 5(2)(a) to 5(2)(k); service PE under Article 5(2)(l) and agency PE under Article 5(4). Specific and detailed criteria are set out in the aforesaid provisions in order to fulfill the conditions of these PEs existing in India. The burden of proving the fact that a foreign assessee has a PE in India and must, therefore, suffer tax from the business generated from such PE is initially on the Revenue

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DATE: October 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
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S. 2(22)(e): Any payment by a closely-held company by way of advance or loan to a concern in which a substantial shareholder is a member holding a substantial interest is deemed to be “dividend” on the presumption that the loans or advances would ultimately be made available to the shareholders of the company giving the loan or advance. However, the legal fiction in s. 2(22)(e) does not extend to, or broaden the concept of, a “shareholder”

U/s 2(22)(e), any payment by a closely-held company by way of advance or loan to a concern in which a substantial shareholder is a member holding a substantial interest is deemed to be “dividend” on the presumption that the loans or advances would ultimately be made available to the shareholders of the company giving the loan or advance. The legal fiction in s. 2(22)(e) enlarges the definition of dividend but does not extend to, or broaden the concept of, a “shareholder”. As the assessee was not a shareholder of the paying company, the “dividend” was not assessable in its hands

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DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
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S. 153A search assessment: Supreme Court stays operation of the judgement of the Delhi High Court in Dayawanti Gupta vs. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del). The High Court dealt with the issue whether an assessment u/s 153A can be made even if no incriminating material has been found during s. 132 search proceedings

In Dayawanti Gupta vs. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del), the assessee argued before the Delhi High Court that since no incriminating material was found during or pursuant to the search, additions, made on the basis of block assessment, were unsustainable inasmuch as they revisited finally settled assessments. It was submitted that for completing a block assessment, founded on search proceedings and notice under Section 153A, the assessing officer has to base the order on fresh materials found during the search, in the form of books of accounts, articles seized, or other similar materials. In this case, the revenue could not substantiate its plea that the assesses had concealed their income, because nothing suspect which could result in an addition to the income assessed during the previous years was in fact seized or taken into custody. Therefore, the four assessments for the block period in question had to be set aside

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DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
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S. 2(47)/ 45: Entire law on whether a joint development agreement entered into by an owner of land with a developer constitutes a "transfer" u/s 2(47) and whether the same gives rise to capital gains chargeable to tax u/s 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act explained in the context of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and real income theory

If an agreement, like the JDA in the present case, is not registered, then it shall have no effect in law for the purposes of Section 53A. In short, there is no agreement in the eyes of law which can be enforced under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This being the case, we are of the view that the High Court was right in stating that in order to qualify as a “transfer” of a capital asset under Section 2(47)(v) of the Act, there must be a “contract” which can be enforced in law under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. A reading of Section 17(1A) and Section 49 of the Registration Act shows that in the eyes of law, there is no contract which can be taken cognizance of, for the purpose specified in Section 53A. The ITAT was not correct in referring to the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” in Section 2(47)(v) in order to arrive at the opposite conclusion. This expression was used by the legislature ever since sub-section (v) was inserted by the Finance Act of 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. All that is meant by this expression is to refer to the ingredients of applicability of Section 53A to the contracts mentioned therein. It is only where the contract contains all the six features mentioned in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (supra), that the Section applies, and this is what is meant by the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A”. This expression cannot be stretched to refer to an amendment that was made years later in 2001, so as to then say that though registration of a contract is required by the Amendment Act of 2001, yet the aforesaid expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” would somehow refer only to the nature of contract mentioned in Section 53A, which would then in turn not require registration. As has been stated above, there is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. This being the case, and it being clear that the said JDA was never registered, since the JDA has no efficacy in the eye of law, obviously no “transfer” can be said to have taken place under the aforesaid document