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DATE: April 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 153A assessment cannot be made for the AYs in which incriminating material is not recovered even though incriminating material may be recovered for other years in the block of 6 years

It has been noticed by the ITAT in the impugned order that for the AYs in question no incriminating material qua the Assessee was found. In that view of the matter, and in light of the decision of this Court in CIT v. Kabul Chawla [2016] 380 ITR 573 (Delhi), the Court is of the view that the impugned order of the ITAT suffers from no legal infirmity and no substantial question of law arises for determination

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DATE: April 12, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 4, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 271C: Concept of "Reasonable Cause" for avoiding levy of penalty for TDS default explained

“Reasonable cause” for the purpose of application of Section 271C in the backdrop of Section 273B has been explained by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in the case of Woodward Governors India (P) Ltd. Vs. CIT (2002) 253 ITR 0745 to mean a probable cause, an honest belief founded on reasonable grounds, of the existence of a state of circumstances, which assuming them to be true, would reasonably lead any ordinarily prudent and cautious man, placed in the position of the person concerned to come to the conclusion that same was the right thing to do. The cause should not be found to be frivolous, without substance or foundation

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DATE: January 20, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 195/ 40(a)(ia): Commission paid to a non-resident for services rendered outside India is not chargeable to tax in India and is not liable for TDS. Insertion of Explanation 4 to s. 9(1)(i) and Explanation 2 to s. 195(1) by FA 2012 w.r.e.f. 01.04.1962 and insertion of Explanation below s. 9 (2) by FA 2010, w.r.e.f. 01.06.1976 makes no difference to the law

The commission payments to the non-resident agents are not taxable in India, as the agents are remaining outside, services are rendered abroad and payments are also made abroad. The contention of the Revenue that the Tribunal ought not to have relied upon G.E.India Technology’s case, cited supra, in view of insertion of Explanation 4 to Section 9 (1) (i) of the Act with corresponding introduction of Explanation 2 to Section 195 (1) of the Act, both by the Finance Act, 2012, with retrospective effect from 01.04.1962 is not correct. When the transaction does not attract the provisions of Section 9 of the Act, then there is no question of applying Explanation 4 to Section 9 of the Act

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DATE: April 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 28(iv): The waiver by the lender of even the principal amount of loan constitutes a "benefit" arising from business and is assessable to tax as income. Logitronics 333 ITR 386 (Del), Rollatainers 339 ITR 54 (Del), Mahindra & Mahindra 261 ITR 501 (Bom) and Iskraemeco Regent 196 TM 103 (Mad) not followed

In our considered view, the waiver of a portion of the loan would certainly tantamount to the value of a benefit. This benefit may not arise from “the business” of the assessee. But, it certainly arises from “business”. The absence of the prefix “the” to the word “business” makes a world of difference

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DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 54F: The demolition of a structure does not amount to a "transfer". It is not correct to contend that Vania Silk Mills 191 ITR 647 (SC) is overruled by Grace Collis 248 ITR 323 (SC). Lower authorities cannot refuse to apply binding High Court judgements on the basis that the High Court has not considered a Supreme Court judgement

The demolition of the structure would not constitute a transfer of the assets in terms of Section 54(3) of the Act in view of the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. v. CIT, reported in 191 ITR 647. In the above case, the Apex Court has held that when an asset is destroyed, there is no question of transfer taking place under the Act. The Apex court held that in terms of the Act that the words ‘Extinguishment of any right’ in Section 2(47) of the Act, does not include an extinguishment of right on account of destruction. It has to be an extinguishment of right on account of transfer. Thus, a destruction of assets when not on account of any transfer would not be hit by Section 54F(3) of the Act. Counsel for the revenue seeks to distinguish the decision of the Apex Court in the matter of Vania Silk Mills P. Ltd. (Supra) that the destruction in that case took place because of fire and hence it was involuntary. This distinction is of no consequence. In our view of the decision of the Apex Court in Vania Silk Mills (Supra) would squarely apply to the facts of the present case

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DATE: April 26, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 15, 17, 192: Concept of "salary" explained. Held that as "tips" are paid to employees of the assessee from an outsider on a voluntary basis and the employees have no vested right to receive the same, the same is not "salary" and the assessee has no obligation to deduct TDS

It can be seen, on an analysis of Section 15, that for the said Section to apply, there should be a vested right in an employee to claim any salary from an employer or former employer, whether due or not if paid; or paid or allowed, though not due. In CIT v. L.W. Russel reported in 53 ITR 91 (SC), this Court dealt with the provisions of Section 7(1) of the 1922 Act, which preceded Sections 15 and 17 of the present Act and held that it is necessary for the employee to have a vested right to receive an amount from his employer before he could be brought to tax under the head “salaries”; Tips being purely voluntary amounts that may or may not be paid by customers for services rendered to them would not, therefore, fall within Section 15(b) at all. Also, it is clear that salary must be paid or allowed to an employee in the previous year “by or on behalf of” an employer. Even assuming that the expression “allowed” is an expression of width, the salary must be paid by or on behalf of an employer. It must first be noticed that the expression “employer” is different from the expression “person”. An “employer” is a person who employs another person under a contract of employment, express or implied, to perform work for the employer. Therefore, Section 15(b) necessarily has reference to the contract of employment between employer and employee, and salary paid or allowed must therefore have reference to such contract of employment.

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DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 245: Approach of the department of setting off / adjusting refund against demand without serving a prior s. 245 intimation to the assessee and without providing opportunity of hearing to assessee & without arriving at a satisfaction to the effect that such adjustment of refund can only be the mode of recovery of demand is bad in law. Dept directed to refund the amount set off / adjusted together with interest

In our view, the power under Section 245 of the Act, is a discretionary power given to each of the tax officers in the higher echelons to “set off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount against the same, if any, remaining payable under this Act by the person to whom the refund is due.‟ That this power is discretionary and not mandatory is indicated by the word “may”. Secondly, the set off is in lieu of payment of refund. Thirdly, before invoking the power, the officer is expected to give an intimation in writing to the Assessee to whom the refund is due informing him of the action proposed to be taken under this Section

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DATE: April 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05 to 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 10(23C): Meaning of expression "existing solely for the purpose of education and without any profit motive" explained. Mere fact that there is huge surplus (in excess of 6 to 15%) and minimal expenditure does not imply profit motive if the surplus is ploughed back into educational activities. Fees collected from students, though as per statute, is not a funding by the Government

In the present case, we find that during a short period of a decade i.e. from the year 1999 to 2010 the University had generated a surplus of about Rs.500 crores. There is no doubt that the huge surplus has been collected/accumulated by realizing fees under different heads in consonance with the powers vested in the University under Section 23 of the VTU Act. The difference between the fees collected and the actual expenditure incurred for the purposes for which fees were collected is significant. In fact the expenditure incurred represents only a minuscule part of the fees collected. No remission, rebate or concession in the amount of fees charged under the different heads for the next Academic Year(s) had been granted to the students. The surplus generated is far in excess of what has been held by this Court to be permissible (6 to 15%)

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DATE: April 20, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 147: If the assessee responds to the S. 142(1)/ 143(2) notices, it means that he has submitted to the AO's jurisdiction and is estopped for filing a Writ Petition to challenge the same. The fact that the jurisdiction is challenged while participating in the proceedings is irrelevant

The petitioners have filed detailed information called for by the Assessing Officer under Section 142(1) and 143(2) of the Act and thus participated in the assessment proceedings. This having been done, it is not open for the petitioners to now contend that this Court should exercise its extraordinary jurisdiction and prohibit the Authorities from proceeding further with the impugned notice. This is particularly so as the question of jurisdiction has been raised by the petitioners before the Assessing Officer during the assessment proceedings under the Act. In the present facts, the petitioners have participated in the proceedings before the Assessing Officer. The objections to the reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer in support of the impugned notice during the assessment proceedings is to point out to him the reassessment proceedings are bad as the requirement of Sections 147 and 148 of the Act are not satisfied. It would be completely different scenario where the petitioners have not participated in the proceedings before the Assessing Officer and object to exercise of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer at the very threshold and not while participating in the reassessment proceedings. In such cases, it is not a case of a party seeking identical relief by two parallel modes. The orders passed by the Assessing Officer are subject to effective, efficacious alternative remedy under the Act

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DATE: April 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148, 151: Law on validity of reopening where S. 148 notice is issued in a mechanical manner, based on information received from another AO, and sanction is accorded by the CIT in a mechanical explained

The AO has mechanically issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act, on the basis of information allegedly received by him from the Directorate of Income Tax (Investigation), New Delhi. Keeping in view of the facts and circumstances of the present case and the case law applicable in the case of the assessee, we are of the considered view that the reopening in the case of the assessee for the asstt. Year in dispute is bad in law and deserves to be quashed. Even otherwise, a perusal of the above demonstrates that the Addl. CIT has written “Approved” which establishes that he has not recorded proper satisfaction / approval, before issue of notice u/s. 148 of the I.T. Act. Thereafter, the AO has mechanically issued notice u/s. 148 of the Act, on the basis of information allegedly received by him from the Directorate of Income Tax (Investigation), New Delhi

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