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DATE: March 11, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 254: We express our pain and anxiety. The Tribunal ought not to have recorded any such concession on the part of the AR contrary to the written submissions. There is no justification on the part of the ld. Members of the Tribunal to record any such concession on behalf of the assessee. In future, if any such concession is made by any AR on behalf of the assessees, the Tribunal should take either an Affidavit or at least a written endorsement made on the record of the case duly signed by them, so that no such occasion of taking a stand contra to the alleged concession, would arise before higher Courts

Expressing again our anguish and pain on the same, we direct that in future, if any such concession is made by any Authorised Representative on behalf of the Assessees, the Tribunal should take either an Affidavit from Assessee and the counsel on behalf of the Assessee or atleast a written endorsement made on the record of the case duly signed by them, so that no such occasion of taking a stand otherwise or contra to the alleged concession made by them, would arise before the higher Courts

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DATE: January 4, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 41(1) (old & unpaid liability for sundry creditors): It is well settled through series of judgments that merely because a debt has not been repaid for over three years, would not automatically imply cessation of liability. Exhaustion of period of limitation may prevent filing of recovery proceedings in a Court of law, nevertheless it cannot be stated by itself that the liability to repay the amount had ceased. Such liability cannot be termed as bogus

It is well settled through series of judgments that merely because a debt has not been repaid for over three years, would not automatically imply cessation of liability. Exhaustion of period of limitation may prevent filing of recovery proceedings in a Court of law, nevertheless it cannot be stated by itself that the liability to repay the amount had ceased. Going by this logic itself, the Assessing Officer, in our opinion, committed an error invoking Section 41(1) of the Act

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DATE: August 30, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 14, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98
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S. 147/148: It is mandatory for the AO to follow the procedure laid down in GKN Driveshafts 259 ITR 19 (SC) and to pass a separate order to deal with the objections. The disposal of the objections in the assessment order is not sufficient compliance with the procedure. The failure to follow the procedure renders the assumption of jurisdiction by the Assessing Officer ultra vires (Bayer Material Science 382 ITR 333 (Bom) & KSS Petron (Bom) followed)

The moot question is, therefore, the disposal of the objections by the Assessing Officer in his assessment order dated 26th March, 2004 constitutes sufficient compliance with the procedure prescribed by the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. (supra) or, whether it was necessary for the Assessing Officer to have first disposed of the Appellant’s objections by passing a speaking order and only upon communication of the same to the Appellants, proceeded to reopen the assessment

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DATE: August 29, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 14, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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ITAT offers suggestions on how to remove hindrances to India's goal to become a $5 Trillion economy. Violations of tax laws by new assessees occur because of lack of proper advice. Instead of letting these sparks of economic change stifle and die due to fear of compliances, they should be assisted by the State. (i) Set up a Tax Advisory Cell consisting of public spirited Revenue officers with strong ethics, full awareness of tax laws and people skills (ii) Identify new successful businesses as the agents of economic change (e.g. Haldiram, Lijjat Papad) and assist them, (iii) Create a Tax Compliance Scheme specially for the benefits of these new ventures so as to address their past lack of compliance

In my experience as a dispenser of Justice, I have noticed that generally the violations of tax laws by new assessees do not occur because they are so desired but because of sheer lack of proper advice. Instead of letting these sparks of economic change stifle and die due to fear of compliances, I firmly believe for the detailed reasons set out hereinabove that they be urgent ly assisted in the interests of the State. Such sparks may be reflected at times in part time enterprising housewives, illiterate, semi-skilled men/women or teenagers. I would seriously exhort and urge the State through the tax administration to provide a platform specially created to assist these ventures to remain relevant and tax compliant

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DATE: August 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 14, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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S. 10AA/ 115JB: Even income arising from the business of a SEZ Unit, which is exempt u/s 10AA, is subject to MAT from AY 2012-13 onwards owing to the insertion of the proviso to s. 115JB(6). The earlier judgements holding that the exemption provisions would prevail over s. 115JB are not good law after the insertion of the proviso to s. 115JB(6) (CBDT Circular No. 2/2012 dated 22.5.2012 referred)

It is thus seen that the Special Economic Zones Act, 2005 had initially inserted sub-section (6) in section 115JB of the Act to provide that the provisions of section 115JB shall not apply to income accrued or arising on or after 1-4-2005 from any business carried on, or services rendered, by an entrepreneur in a unit of SEZ or a developer of SEZ. Thus, a company carrying on the specified business in a unit in SEZ or as a developer of SEZ was not liable to pay MAT on the profits derived from the said business. However, the Finance Act, 2011 brought-in a sunset clause and inserts a proviso to sub- section (6) to provide that, with effect from 1-4-2012, the provisions of sub- section shall cease to have effect. Accordingly, a SEZ developer or any entrepreneur carrying on business in an SEZ unit (being a company) would be liable to pay MAT on the profits arising from the development of SEZ or the business carried on in an SEZ unit with assessment year 2012-13 and onwards

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DATE: February 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Liability of professionals acting as Non-executive directors: Practicing professionals are prohibited from acting as full time directors. They can only act as non-executive directors not performing administrative duties. Such persons cannot be prosecuted for offenses committed by the company. it will be a travesty of justice to prosecute all Directors if the offense is committed without their knowledge. The accounts are signed by such directors in a routine manner and they are not subject to vicarious liability (Homi Phiroz Ranina & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra 2003 (3) Mh.L.J. 34 followed)

In Homi Phiroz Ranina & Ors. vs. State of Maharashtra & Ors., the complaint was filed for delay in remitting the tax deducted. The applicant has taken stand that he was non- executive Director of the company and they are also practising advocates and, therefore, they are prohibited under the law to act as full time directors. They could only act as non-executive directors not exercising administrative powers or peforming administrative duties. It is held that unless the complaint discloses a prima facie case against the applicant/accused of their liability and obligation as principal officers in the day to day affairs of the company as Directors of the company, the applicants cannot be prosecuted for the offences committed by the company and held that it will be a travesty of justice to prosecute all the Directors if the offence is committed without their knowledge

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DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 147/148/292B: The officer recording the reasons u/s 148(2) for reopening the assessment & the officer issuing notice u/s 148(1) has to be the same person. If the reasons are recorded by the DCIT but the notice is issued by the ITO, the reassessment proceedings are invalid. The s. 148 notice is a jurisdictional notice. Any inherent defect therein cannot be cured u/s 292B. The fact that the assessee participated in the proceedings is irrelevant

Since the notice under section 148 of the Act is a jurisdictional notice, any inherent defect therein cannot be cured under section 292B of the Act. A notice under section 148(1) of the Act would be a valid notice if the jurisdictional Assessing Officer records the reasons for reopening the assessment as contemplated under subsection (2) of section 148 and thereafter the same officer namely the jurisdictional Assessing Officer issues the notice under section 148(1) of the Act.

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DATE: August 27, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 254(1): The Tribunal should not make general observations that there are "contrary decisions". This statement led us to direct counsel to examine the law and bring to our attention any decision contrary to the view taken by the Supreme Court in Mahalaxmi Sugar Mills 123 ITR 429 etc. We are now informed by Counsel that there are no contrary decisions. All this effort and time would have been saved if the Tribunal had made specific reference to contrary decisions or not stated so in the absence of referring to the citations. We request the Tribunal to be specific about the decisions and make a mention of the citation in the order and not make general observations

All this effort and time would have been saved if the Tribunal had made specific reference to contrary decisions or not stated so in the absence of referring to the citations. Therefore, we would request the Tribunal to be specific about the decisions and make a mention of the citation in the order and not make general observations as in this case.

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DATE: August 29, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10
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S. 144C/ 254: (i) Condonation of delay of 1018 days: None should be deprived of an adjudication on merits unless it is found that the litigant deliberately delayed the filing of appeal. Delay due to improper legal advice should be condoned. A technical view of dismissing the appeal on the ground of delay should not be taken if the legal issue has to be decided for other years (ii) A draft assessment order u/s 144C issued with a notice of demand u/s 156 and a s/ 271(1)(c) penalty notice is null and void (Eaton Fluid Power 96 TM.com 512 followed, BS Ltd 94 TM.com 346 (Hyd) distinguished)

It is relevant to note the judgment of the Hon’ble Bombay High Court in Vijay Vishin Meghani Vs. DCIT & Anr (2017) 398 ITR 250 (Bom) holding that none should be deprived of an adjudication on merits unless it is found that the litigant deliberately delayed the filing of appeal. Similar to the cases under consideration, in that case too, delay of 2984 days crept in due to improper legal advice. Relying on Concord of India Ins. Co. Limited VS Nirmala Devi (1979) 118 ITR 507 (SC), the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court condoned the delay. In yet another case in Anil Kumar Nehru and Another vs. ACIT (2017) 98 CCH 0469 BomHC, there was a delay of 1662 days in filing the appeal. Such a delay was not condoned by the Hon’ble High Court. In further appeal, condoning the delay, the Hon’ble Supreme Court in Anil Kumar Nehru vs. ACIT (2018) 103 CCH 0231 ISCC, held that : `It is a matter of record that on the identical issue raised by the appellant in respect of earlier assessment, the appeal is pending before the High Court. In these circumstances, the High Court should not have taken such a technical view of dismissing the appeal in the instant case on the ground of delay, when it has to decide the question of law between the parties in any case in respect of earlier assessment year.

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DATE: August 20, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 6, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
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S. 254(2): (i) Delay of 420 days in filing appeal due to subsequent decision of the Supreme Court is a valid ground for condonation of delay (ii) An order can be said to suffer from a "mistake apparent from the record" if it contrary to a subsequent judgement of the Supreme Court. Courts do not make any new law; they only clarify the legal position which was earlier not correctly understood. Such legal position clarified by Courts has retrospective effect as the law was always the same

It is also well – settled that a judicial decision acts retrospectively. According to Blackstonian theory, it is not the function of the Court to pronounce a ‘new rule’ but to maintain and expound the ‘old one’. In other words, the Judges do not make law; they only discover or find the correct law.The law has always been the same. If a subsequent decision alters the earlier one, it (the later decision) does not make a new law. It only discovers the correct principle of law which has to be applied retrospectively. To put it differently, even where an earlier decision of the Court operated for quite sometime, the decision rendered later on would have retrospective effect, clarifying the legal position which was earlier not correctly understood