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DATE: November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 2(47)(v): Immovable property can be regarded to have been transferred on the date of execution of the Development Agreement and irrevocable General Power of Attorney only if the terms indicate that complete control is given to the developer. If the entire consideration is not received by the assessee and physical possession of the property is not parted with, there is no transfer u/s 2(47)(v)

What binds this Court is that the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia v/s. Commissioner of Income Tax (2003) 260 ITR 491 (Bom). The Division Bench held that the date of contract is relevant provided the terms of the contract indicate passing off or transferring of complete control over the property in favour of the developer. The Division Bench laid down the test for determining the date which should be taken into account for determining the relevant accounting year in which the liability accrues. Admittedly, on the date of execution of the development agreement, the entire consideration was not received by the respondent assessee. The physical possession of the property subject matter of development agreement was parted with by the respondent assessee on 1st March, 2008. It was held that on that day, complete control over the property was passed on to the developer

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DATE: December 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14, 2009-10
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Coercive Tax Recovery: The AO wanted to preempt the Tribunal from dealing with the Stay application. The Act and conduct of the Revenue officials is against judicial conscience. Canons of law, justice and ethics have been broken down by the officials of the Department. An effort has been made to render the provisions of the law inoperative, debarring the assessee from availing any remedy from the higher forum

The act ion of the coercive recovery on the par t of the Assessing officer was against the elementary principal of rule of law. That the state is expected to act fairly. The undue haste on the part of the Assessing officer in recovering the amount was not only contrary to the binding decision of the Court but also shocking to the judicial conscience. The entire action was directed at rendering the Tribunal and the assessee helpless so that no relief can be granted in favour of the assessee. The Tribunal could not be silent spectator of the arbitrary and illegal act ion on the part of the Assessing officer so as to frustrate the legal process provided under the Act. The grant of refund of the amount that has been coercively recovered by the department was in the exercise of the tribunal’s inherent powers to ensure that the assessee is not left high and dry only on account of illegal and highhanded actions on the part of revenue and the assessing officer

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DATE: December 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 11(1)(a) vs. 32: Even if the entire expenditure incurred for acquisition of a capital asset is treated as application of income for charitable purposes u/s 11(1)(a) of the Act, the assessee is also entitled to depreciation u/s 32. The argument that the grant of depreciation amounts to giving double benefit to the assessee is not acceptable. S. 11(6) which bars depreciation on expenditure applied for charitable purposes is prospective and applies only from AY 2015-16

Income of a Charitable Trust derived form building, plant and machinery and furniture was liable to be computed in normal commercial manner although the Trust may not be carrying on any business and the assets in respect whereof depreciation is claimed may not be business assets. In all such cases, section 32 of the Income Tax Act providing for depreciation for computation of income derived from business or profession is not applicable. However, the income of the Trust is required to be computed under section 11 on commercial principles after providing for allowance for normal depreciation and deduction thereof from gross income of the Trust

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DATE: December 18, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 22, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
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S. 54: Acquisition of new flat in an apartment under construction should be considered as a case of “Construction” and not “Purchase”. The date of commencement of construction is not relevant for purpose of s. 54. The fact that the construction may have commenced prior to the date of transfer of the old asset is irrelevant. If the construction is completed within 3 years from the date of transfer, the exemption is available

For the purpose of sec. 54 of the Act, we have to see whether the assessee has completed the construction within three years from the date of transfer of old asset. In the instant case, there is no dispute that the assessee took possession of the new flat within three years from the date of sale of old residential flat. Accordingly, we are of the view that the assessee has complied with the time limit prescribed u/s 54 of the Act. Since the amount invested in the new flat prior to the due date for furnishing return of income was more than the amount of capital gain, the requirements of depositing any money under capital gains account scheme does not arise in the instant case. Further, the Hon’ble High Court has held in the case of ITO Vs. K.C.Gopalan (2000)(162 CTR 0566) that there is no requirement that the sale proceeds realised on sale of old residential house alone should be utilised

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DATE: April 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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Bogus LTCG from Penny stocks: The assessee has not tendered cogent evidence to explain how the shares in an unknown company worth Rs.5 had jumped to Rs.485 in no time. The fantastic sale price was not at all possible as there was no economic or financial basis to justify the price rise. the assessee had indulged in a dubious share transaction meant to account for the undisclosed income in the garb of long term capital gain. The gain has accordingly to be assessed as undisclosed credit u/s 68

The assessee had indulged in a dubious share transaction meant to account for the undisclosed income in the garb of long term capital gain. While so observing, the authorities held that the assessee had not tendered cogent evidence to explain as to how the shares in an unknown company worth Rs.5/had jumped to Rs.485/in no time. The Income Tax Appellate Tribunal held that the fantastic sale price was not at all possible as there was no economic or financial basis as to how a share worth Rs.5/of a little known company would jump from Rs.5/to Rs.485/. The findings recorded by the authorities are pure findings of facts based on a proper appreciation of the material on record. While recording the said findings, the authorities have followed the tests laid down by the Hon’ble Supreme Court and this Court in several decisions

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DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Taxability of subsidies: A subsidy granted by the Govt to achieve the objects of acceleration of industrial development and generation of employment is capital in nature and not revenue. The fact that the incentives are not available unless and until commercial production has started, and that the incentives are not given to the assessee expressly for the purpose of purchasing capital assets or for the purpose of purchasing machinery is irrelevant. The object has to be seen and not the form in which it is granted

The aforesaid object is clear and unequivocal. The object of the grant of the subsidy was in order that persons come forward to construct Multiplex Theatre Complexes, the idea being that exemption from entertainment duty for a period of three years and partial remission for a period of two years should go towards helping the industry to set up such highly capital intensive entertainment centers. This being the case, it is difficult to accept Mr. Narasimha’s argument that it is only the immediate object and not the larger object which must be kept in mind in that the subsidy scheme kicks in only post construction, that is when cinema tickets are actually sold

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DATE: November 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

Taxability of subsidies: Supreme Court stays judgement of the Delhi High Court in CIT vs. Bhushan Steels And Strips Ltd which held that if the recipient has the flexibility of using it for any purpose and is not confined to using it for capital purposes, the subsidy is revenue in nature and is taxable as profits

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DATE: December 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 80-IB: The incentive meant for small scale industrial undertakings cannot be availed by undertakings which do not continue as small scale industrial undertakings during the relevant period. Each assessment year is a different assessment year. The fact that the object of legislature is to encourage industrial expansion does not mean that the incentive should remain applicable even where on account of industrial expansion, the small scale industrial undertakings ceases to be small scale industrial undertakings. The fact that in the initial year eligibility was satisfied is irrelevant

The observations in the impugned order are that the object of legislature is to encourage industrial expansion which implies that incentive should remain applicable even where on account of industrial expansion small scale industrial undertakings ceases to be small scale industrial undertakings. We are unable to appreciate the logic for these observations. Incentive is given to a particular category of industry for a specified purpose. An incentive meant for small scale industrial undertaking cannot be availed by an assessee which is not such an undertaking. It does not, in any manner, mean that the object of permitting industrial expansion is defeated, if benefit is not allowed to other undertakings. On this logic, incentive must be given irrespective of any condition as the incentive certainly helps further expansion by reducing the tax burden. The concept of vertical equity is well known under which all the assessees need not be uniformally taxed. Progressive taxation is a well known element of tax policy. Higher slabs of tax or higher tax burden on an assessee having higher income or higher capacity cannot in any manner, be considered unreasonable

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DATE: November 29, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Taxability of mesne profits: High Court's approach of dismissing the Dept's appeal only because the Tribunal relied on Narang Overseas 111 ITD 1 (Mum) (SB) and the appeal against which had been dismissed for non-removal of defects is not correct. The High Court ought to decide the question on merits

High Court has dismissed the appeal preferred by the appellant herein only on the ground that the decision relied upon by the Tribunal i.e. in the case of Narang Overseas Pvt. Ltd. v. ACIT, Mumbai – (2008) 111 ITD 1 (Mum) (SB)], the appeal was preferred before the High Court and for non-removal of the defects the appeal has been dismissed. We are of the considered opinion that this was not a correct approach of the High Court for the simple reason that merely because one authority has followed its own decision in another case and that matter in appeal has been dismissed on technical grounds still the High Court has to decide the question on merits

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DATE: November 28, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 80-IC: Entire law on concept of "initial assessment year" and "substantial expansion" explained. Also, law on interpretation of statutes which confer incentives for promoting development explained. Law on interpretation when there is doubt also explained. Law on whether CBDT Circulars are mere external aids in interpretation of a statute or more also explained

“substantial expansion” can be on more than one occasion. Meaning of expression “substantial expansion” is defined in clause [8(ix)] of Section 80-IC and with each such endeavour, if the assessee fulfills the criteria then there cannot be any prohibition with regard thereto. For what is important, in our considered view, is not the number of expansions, but the period within which such expansions can be carried out within the window period [7.1.2003 to 1.4.2012], and it is here we find the words “begun” or “begins” and “undertakes substantial expansion” during the said period, as stipulated under clause (b) sub-section 2 of Section 80- IC, to be of significance. The only rider imposed is by virtue of sub-section (6) of Section 80-IA, which caps the deduction with respect to Assessment Years to which a unit is entitled to