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DATE: November 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 143(3): An addition towards income cannot be made merely on the basis of the statement of a third party that an amount has been paid to the assessee in the absence of conclusive evidence

Now the issue which requires our consideration is whether the addition can be sustained solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav, when there is no material placed on record that Shri Hanuman Yadav has made any claim against the assessee in any court of law seeking cancellation of sale deed or filing a recovery suit. The Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal after following the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court under the similar circumstances in Union of India vs. T. R. Verma 1957 SC 882 and Kishan Chand Chellaram vs. CIT, 125 ITR 713 (SC) has held in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010 that in the absence of any conclusive evidence the document could not have been disbelieved. The D/R could not point out any binding precedent wherein it has been held that the oral statement would over ride the documentary evidence. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010, we are of the view that the AO was not justified to make addition solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav when there was a registered sale deed and more particularly when the maker of statement has not challenged the sale deed before any court of law. It is also not placed on record whether the sale deed was executed under coercion.

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 2(22)(2) Deemed Dividend: The argument that as the shares are issued in the name of the Karta, the HUF is not the “registered shareholder” and so s. 2(22)(e) will not apply to loans paid to the HUF is not correct because in the annual returns filed with the ROC, the HUF is shown as the registered and beneficial shareholder. In any case, the HUF is the beneficial shareholder. Even if it is assumed that the Karta is the registered shareholder and not the HUF, as per Explanation 3 to s. 2(22), any payment to a concern (i.e. the HUF) in which the shareholder (i.e. the Karta) has a substantial interest is also covered

Section 2(22)(e) of the Act creates a fiction, thereby bringing any amount paid otherwise than as a dividend into the net of dividend under certain circumstances. It gives an artificial definition of ‘dividend’. It does not take into account that dividend which is actually declared or received. The dividend taken note of by this provision is a deemed dividend and not a real dividend. Loan or payment made by the company to its shareholder is actually not a dividend. In fact, such a loan to a shareholder has to be returned by the shareholder to the company. It does not become income of the shareholder. Notwithstanding the same, for certain purposes, the Legislature has deemed such a loan or payment as ‘dividend’ and made it taxable at the hands of the said shareholder. It is, therefore, not in dispute that such a provision which is a deemed provision and fictionally creates certain kinds of receipts as dividends, is to be given strict interpretation. It follows that unless all the conditions contained in the said provision are fulfilled, the receipt cannot be deemed as dividends. Further, in case of doubt or where two views are possible, benefit shall accrue in favour of the assessee

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DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 5, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 10(23C)(vi)/ (via)/ 80G: The law laid down in Visvesvaraya Technological University vs. ACIT 384 ITR 37 (SC) is that the generation of surplus is not fatal to the grant of exemption u/s 10(23C)(vi)(via)/ 80G if such surplus is utilized for charitable purposes. The fact that the hospital charges of the assessee, as compared to other commercial establishments, are very nominal, throws further light on its charitable character

In view of the findings of the Apex Court in paragraphs 8 and 9 of its judgment in Visvesvaraya’s case (supra), as reproduced earlier, we unhesitantly conclude that even if substantial surplus is generated, but the same is found to have been ploughed back for building infrastructure/assets, which in turn are used for educational/charitable purposes, the institution would not lose its charitable character. In the case before us, it has not been disputed that the assessee is registered under Section 12A and that it has been held entitled to the grant of exemption under Section 10 (23C)(vi) of the Act as per orders of this Court passed in C.W.P. No. 6031 of 2009, upheld by the Apex Court in Civil Appeal No. 9606 of 2013. It has further come on record that the assessee was granted exemption under Section 80G of the Act from the year 1997 till the passing of the impugned order. Further, the finding of the Tribunal, that the assessee has never mis-utilized its funds, has not been assailed before us. The generated surplus having been ploughed back for expansion purposes also remains undisputed by the Revenue as no challenge to the same has been made. In fact, the utilization of surplus for large scale expansion at the behest of the assessee was also acknowledged by the Commissioner. The Tribunal had further detailed in its order the receipts, expenditure, capital expenditure, income/surplus of receipts over expenditure, income applied for the charitable purposes and percentage of the income applied in a tabulated form, which clearly depicted utilization of surplus by the assessee for only charitable purposes

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DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 5, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 50C: The stamp duty value on the date of the agreement to sell has to be adopted and not the value on the date of the deed of sale. The proviso to s. 50C, though inserted by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.04.2017, has to be given retrospective effect from 01.04.2003 as it is intended to remove an undue hardship and is curative in nature

The facts relating to the market value as on the date of agreement to sale and as on the date of sale deed is not disputed. The only dispute is whether the stamp duty value as on the date of agreement to sale or sale deed to be considered for the purpose of computation of capital gain. The purpose of introducing section 50C of the Act was to counter suppression of sale consideration of sale of immovable properties. Before insertion of section 50C of the Act to the statute, there are lot of litigations as to consideration shown in document conveying title and payment of stamp duty. To overcome the litigations, the provision of section 50C of the Act has been inserted to the statute w.e.f. 1.6.2003 wherein it is made mandatory to adopt value u/s 50C of the Act for the purpose of determination of consideration. A proviso to section 50C of the Act has been inserted by the Finance Act, 2016 w.e.f. 1.4.2017 to resolve the genuine and intended hardship, in the case in which the date of agreement to sale is prior to the date of sale and market value of the property as on the date of agreement to sale and date of sale deed is different

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DATE: December 15, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 5/ 9: Salary received by a non-resident for services rendered abroad accrues outside India and is not chargeable to tax in India. The source of the receipt is not relevant. The CIT has wide powers u/s 264 and has to exercise them in favour of the assessee in terms of CBDT Circular No. 14 (XL-35) dated 11.04.1955

The relevant test to be applied to decide whether the income accrued to a non-resident in India or outside is concerned, is to find the place where the services were rendered, in order to consider where the income accrued. The source of the income was not relevant for the purposes of ascertaining whether the income had accrued in India or outside India. The question whether the petitioner has rendered services in India or not is a question of fact

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DATE: January 21, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-99, 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi)/ Article 12: Law on whether consideration received for licensing of software programmes can be assessed as "royalty" u/s 9(1)(vi) and Article 12 of the DTAA explained

If we analyse and compare various provisions of the Copyright Act with the relevant clauses of the master agreement, it is noted that the said agreement does not permit HLL to carry out any alteration or conversion of any nature, so as to fall within the definition of ‘adaptation’ as defined in Copyright Act, 1957. The right given to the customer for reproduction was only for the limited purpose so as to make it usable for all the offices of HLL in India and no right was given to HLL for commercial exploitation of the same. It is also noted that the terms of the agreement do not allow or authorise HLL to do any of the acts covered by the definition of ‘copyright’. Under these circumstances, the payment made by HLL cannot be construed as payment made towards ‘use’ of copyright particularly when the provisions of Indian Income-tax Act and DTAA are read together with the provisions of the Copyright Act, 1957

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DATE: November 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 143(2)/ 143(3): Proper service of the notice u/s 143(2) is mandatory and its failure renders the assessment order void. The fact that an unauthorized person appeared on behalf of the assessee before the AO does not mean that the notice was properly served

The contention of the AR was that Shri M.Sankar is not a concerned person representing the assessee to receive such notice and the notice was served on improper person. We also find from the assessment order that Shri Sanjib Sarkar being one of the partners appeared on 10-12- 2010 before the AO for first time and the order sheet at page no-1 of paper book supports the same. We further find that the AO recorded the issuance of notice u/s. 142(1) on 19-7-2010 for fixing the hearing on 02-08-2010 and thereafter, according to assessment order, probably, after 26-08-2010 another notice for initiation of penalty proceedings u/s. 271(1)(b)of the Act was issued. Therefore, it goes to show that a person claiming to be representing the assessee as partner appeared before the AO for the first time on 10-12-2010 in response to notice issued u/s. 271(1)(b) of the Act and it concluded that the service of notice u/sec 143(2) on 30-09-09 and issuance of notice thereafter u/sec 142(1) of the Act was not in the knowledge of the assessee and as rightly contended by the AR notice u/sec 143(2) of the Act was not properly served on the assessee

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DATE: December 21, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 271(1)(c): The law in Dilip Shroff 291 ITR 519 (SC) & Kaushalya 216 ITR 660 (Bom) requires a show-cause notice u/s 274 to be issued after due application of mind. The non-specification in the notice as to whether penalty is proposed for concealment or for furnishing of inaccurate particulars reflects non-application of mind and renders it void. The fact that the assessee participated in the penalty proceedings does not save it u/s 292B/292BB

A combined reading of the decision rendered by Hon’ble Bombay High Court in the case of Smt. B Kaushalya and Others (216 ITR 660) and the decision rendered by Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Dilip N Shroff (supra) would make it clear that there should be application of mind on the part of the AO at the time of issuing notice. In the case of Lakhdir Lalji (supra), the AO issued notice u/s 274 for concealment of particulars of income but levied penalty for furnishing inaccurate particulars of income. The Hon’ble Gujarat High Court quashed the penalty since the basis for the penalty proceedings disappeared when it was held that there was no suppression of income. The Hon’ble Kerala High Court has struck down the penalty imposed in the case of N.N.Subramania Iyer Vs. Union of India (supra), when there is no indication in the notice for what contravention the petitioner was called upon to show cause why a penalty should not be imposed. In the instant case, the AO did not specify the charge for which penalty proceedings were initiated and further he has issued a notice meant for calling the assessee to furnish the return of income. Hence, in the instant case, the assessing officer did not specify the charge for which the penalty proceedings were initiated and also issued an incorrect notice. Both the acts of the AO, in our view, clearly show that the AO did not apply his mind when he issued notice to the assessee and he was not sure as to what purpose the notice was issued

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DATE: October 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D disallowance applies also to dividends received from strategic investments in subsidiaries. S. 40A(2) disallowance is not applicable to co-operative societies. As per Circular No. 14 (XL-35) of 1955 dated 11.4.1955, the AO is obliged to assist the assessee and allow deduction even if not claimed

We are also of the considered view, that strategic investment made by the assessee in its subsidiary Saraswat Infotech Limited as well in the other securities which are capable of yielding exempt income i.e. by way of dividend etc. which are exempt from tax shall be included while computing disallowance u/s 14A of the Act as per the scheme of the Act as contained in provisions of Section 14A of the Act as the statute does not grant any exemption to the strategic investments which are capable of yielding exempt income to be excluded while computing disallowance u/s 14A of the Act and hence the investment made by the assessee in subsidiary company M/s Saraswat Infotech Limited and all other securities which are capable of yielding exempt income by way of dividend etc shall be included for the purposes of disallowance of expenditure incurred in relation to the earning of exempt income , as stipulated u/s 14A of the Act. Our decision is fortified by the recent decision of Hon’ble Karnataka High Court in the case of United Breweries Limited v. DCIT in ITA No. 419/2009 vide orders dated 31-05-2016 and also decision of the tribunal in the case of ACIT v. Uma Polymers Limited in ITA no 5366/Mum/2012 and CO No. 234/Mum/2013 vide orders dated 30-09-2015

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DATE: December 23, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 29, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 2(15)/11: Impact of the amendment to the definition of "charitable purpose" in s. 2(15) by insertion of a proviso by the Finance Act, 2008 and whether it supersedes the verdicts in Loka Shikshana Trust 101 ITR 234 (SC), Surat Art Silk Cloth Mfrs. Association 121 ITR 1 (SC) etc explained

If the legislature intended the latter part of the proviso to apply to the word “advancement” as well and not merely to the words “object of general public utility”, it would have worded the amendment entirely differently. The proviso would have expressly been made applicable to the advancement as well as to the object of general public utility. That the legislature did not do so is an indication that it accepted the interpretation of the Supreme Court of Section 2(15) as it originally stood and retained the effect of the section in that regard in the 2009 amendment. The ratio of the judgment in Surat Art Silk’s case (supra), in this regard, therefore, remains the same

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