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Posted on by Rakesh Fanindra Joshi — No Comments ↓
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DATE: December 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 17, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 251: The CIT(A) has no power to enhance by discovering a new source of income which is neither discussed in the assessment order nor mentioned in the return of income filed by the assessee

It is well settled law laid down by the Hon’ble Apex Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Shapoorji Pallonji Mistry, 44 ITR 891 (SC) and Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Rai Bahadur Hardutroy Motilal Chamaria, 66 ITR 443 (SC) and subsequently followed by the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in Commissioner of Income Tax Vs. Sardari Lal & Co., 251 ITR 864 (Delhi)(SB) that the CIT(A) is not competent to enhance assessment in appeal by discovering new source of income not mentioned in return or consider by the Assessing Officer in assessment. We hold that the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals) has exceeded his jurisdiction in making addition u/s. 2(22)(e) of the Act as there is no reference of such income either in the return of income or in the assessment proceedings

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DATE: February 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Penalty cannot be levied if the omission to offer income, and the wrong claim of deduction, was by oversight and the auditors did not point it out. Also, the failure of the AO to specify the limb under which penalty u/s 271(1)(c) is imposed is a fatal error

Undisputedly, in the return of income assessee has failed to offer interest on fixed deposit amounting to ` 5,92,186 and loss claimed on account of fixed asset written–off amounting to Rs 1,82,242. It is also a fact on record that in the course of assessment proceedings, the assessee accepted the taxability of these items of income and offered them to tax. The assessee has explained that non–disclosure of aforesaid two items of income is due to oversight and due to the fact that neither in the tax audit nor in the statutory audit such omission was pointed out. We find merit in the aforesaid explanation of the assessee

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DATE: March 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 14A & Rule 8D: Disallowance under Rule 8D is not compulsory or mandatory. S. 14A(2) & Rule 8D cannot be invoked unless the AO examines the accounts and records the finding why the assessee's claim/ computation is not proper (entire law discussed and important judgements referred)

Thus, Rule 8D is not attracted and applicable to assessee who have exempt income and it is not compulsory and necessary that an assessee must voluntarily compute disallowance as per Rule 8D of the Rules. Where the disallowance or ‘nil’ disallowance made by the assessee is found to be unsatisfactory on examination of accounts, the assessing officer is entitled and authorised to compute the deduction under Rule 8D of the Rules. This pre-condition and stipulation as noticed below is also mandated in sub Rule (1) to Rule 8D of the Rules

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DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 145: The average cost method of valuing inventories is an accepted method of valuation approved by the accounting standards issued by the ICAI. The AO is not entitled to disregard the method if the assessee has consistently followed the method

The Assessing Officer sought to question the method of accounting only because the assessee has not been regularly following the same or the income is not computed in accordance with the standards notified under subsection (2). We do not find that there was any material with regard to the standards and notified. It is only whether the assessee was consistent in following the method of accounting provided in subsection (1) of Section 145 of the Income Tax Act, 1961. If that is the other eventuality in which the Assessing Officer derives his power in terms of Section 145, then, in para 12 the Tribunal has found that the assessee has maintained proper books of account. No defect has been pointed out by the Assessing Officer either in the purchases or in the sales

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DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 10, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(i): The capital gains arising on transfer by a foreign company of shares in another foreign company holding assets in India is liable to tax in India. The argument that the transfer is a mere re-organisation of assets within the group and that there is no “real income” is not acceptable. The argument that the India-UK DTAA should be given a “static” interpretation and that the retrospective amendment to s. 9 by the Finance Act 2012 should be ignored is also not acceptable. Where the DTAA provides that the income shall be chargeable to tax in accordance with the provision of the domestic law, the said domestic law has to be the amended law

Coming to the decision of the Hon’ble Delhi High Court in case of DIT Vs. New Skies Satellite BV wherein the Hon’ble High court has held that in relation to applicability of Article 3(2) of the relevant DTAAs, that it can apply only to terms not defined in the DTAA. Since the relevant DTAAs in the case before them defined ‘royalty’, Article 3(2) could not be applied. For terms which are defined under the DTAA, there is no need to refer to the laws in force in the Contracting States, especially to deduce the meaning of the definition under the DTAA. Further, the court has held that neither act of parliament supply or alter the boundaries of DTAA or supply redundancy to any part of its. Similarly, according to us, the provisions of DTAA where it simply provides that particular income would be chargeable to tax in accordance with the provisions of domestic laws, such article in DTAA also cannot the limit the boundaries of domestic tax laws. In view of this, we do not find any force in the argument of the assessee and dismiss ground No. 3.12 of the appeal

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DATE: February 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): Entire law explained on whether levy of penalty is automatic if return filed by the assessee u/s 153A discloses higher income than in the return filed u/s 139(1) in the context of the law as it stood prior to, and after, the insertion of Explanation 5 to s. 271(1)(c). Also, the law on levy of penalty on revised returns explained

When the A.O. has accepted the revised return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, no occasion arises to refer to the previous return filed under Section 139 of the Act. For all purposes, including for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act, the return that has to be looked at is the one filed under Section 153A. In fact, the second proviso to Section 153A(1) provides that “assessment or reassessment, if any, relating to any assessment year falling within the period of six assessment years referred to in this sub-section pending on the date of initiation of the search under Section 132 or making of requisition under Section 132A, as the case may be, shall abate.” What is clear from this is that Section 153A is in the nature of a second chance given to the assessee, which incidentally gives him an opportunity to make good omission, if any, in the original return. Once the A.O. accepts the revised return filed under Section 153A, the original return under Section 139 abates and becomes non-est. Now, it is trite to say that the “concealment” has to be seen with reference to the return that it is filed by the assessee. Thus, for the purpose of levying penalty under Section 271(1)(c), what has to be seen is whether there is any concealment in the return filed by the assessee under Section 153A, and not vis-a vis the original return under Section 139

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DATE: February 16, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 194-I: S. 105 of the Transfer of Property Act distinguishes between 'premium' for acquiring the lease and 'rent' for enjoying user of the property. Payment towards 'premium' for the lease (even if paid annually) is a capital payment and is not subject to s. 194-I TDS. CBDT Circular No. 35/2016 dated 13.10.2016 referred

That brings the court to the next question, which is as to the nature of the payments made towards lease. Do they constitute rent so as to attract Section 194-I? The court is of opinion that clearly these payments are not “rent”. That they are annual payments cannot be doubted. Yet, part of the payment is clearly capital in nature. Clause 1 of the lease deeds entered into in each of the cases, clearly points to the fact that a small percentage of the agreed amounts were paid as part of the lease premium and were towards acquisition of the asset; they fell, consequently in the capital stream and were not “rents”. The balance of such premium payments were spread over a period of 8 to 10 years, in specified annual or bi-annual installments. Here, distinction between a single payment made at the time of the settlement of the demised property and recurring payments made during the period of its enjoyment by the lessee is to be made. This distinction is clearly recognized in Section 105 of the Transfer of Property Act, which defines both premium and rent. Such payments were held to constitute capital and not “rent” or advance rent,

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DATE: February 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c): If the quantum appeal is admitted by the High Court, it means that the issue is debatable and penalty cannot be levied. Argument of the Dept that Nayan Builders 368 ITR 722 (Bom) does not lay down this proposition is not correct

The Revenue had filed an appeal from the order of the Tribunal in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) deleting the penalty. This appeal being CIT vs. Nayan Builders and Developers [(2014) 368 ITR 722] was not entertained by this Court. It upheld the view of the Tribunal that the imposition of penalty was not justified as admission of appeal in quantum proceeding on this issue as substantial question of law was proof enough of the issue being debatable. The aforesaid decision in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt.Ltd (supra) was also followed by this Court in CIT-8 vs. Aditya Birla Power Co. Ltd. in Income Tax Appeal No. 851 of 2014 rendered on 2nd December, 2015

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DATE: February 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9(1)(vii)/ Article 12: In order to constitute “technical services”, services catering to the special needs of the person using them must be rendered. The provision of a common facility is not “technical services”. Amount paid towards reimbursement of a common technical computer facility is not “fees for technical services”. Amount received by way of reimbursement of expenses does not have the character of income

It is clearly held that no technical services are provided by the assessee to the agents. Once these are accepted, by no stretch of imagination, payments made by the agents can be treated as fee for technical service. It is in the nature of reimbursement of cost whereby the three agents paid their proportionate share of the expenses incurred on these said systems and for maintaining those systems. It is reemphasised that neither the AO nor the CIT (A) has stated that there was any profit element embedded in the payments received by the assessee from its agents in India. Record shows that the assessee had given the calculations of the total costs and pro-rata division thereof among the agents for reimbursement. Not only that, the assessee have even submitted before the Transfer Pricing Officer that these payments were reimbursement in the hands of the assessee and the reimbursement was accepted as such at arm’s length. Once the character of the payment is found to be in the nature of reimbursement of the expenses, it cannot be income chargeable to tax

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DATE: February 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
Capital gains: While s. 2(42A) uses the term "held", the other provisions use the terms "acquired", "purchased" and "owner". Accordingly, for considering whether an asset is a "long-term capital asset", the period of holding must be computed on a de facto basis. The letter of allottment, even though not "ownership", must be taken as the date of holding the asset

Perusal of the definition of the term “short-term capital asset” in section 2(42A) shows that the legislature has used the expression ‘held’. It is further noted by us that in various other allied or similar sections, the legislature has preferred to use the expression ‘acquired’ or ‘purchased’ e.g. in section 54 / 54F. Thus, it shows that the legislature was conscious while making use of this expression. The expressions like ‘owned’ has not been used for the purpose of determining the nature of asset as short term capital asset or long term capital asset. Thus, the intention of the legislature is clear that for the purpose of determining the nature of capital gain, the legislature was concerned with the period during which the asset was held by the assessee for all practical purposes on de facto basis. The legislature was apparently not concerned with absolute legal ownership of the asset for determining the holding period. Thus, we have to ascertain the point of time from which it can be said that assessee started holding the asset on de facto basis

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