Category: Supreme Court

Archive for the ‘Supreme Court’ Category


Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: December 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 6, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1978-79
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CITATION:
S. 10(19A): Though principles of res judicata do not apply, the Dept should not endlessly pursue matters which have attained finality in earlier years. Principles of interpretation of statutes explained. Interplay between s. 10(19A), s. 23 of the Income-tax Act & s. 5(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act explained

Though principle of res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings and each assessment year is an independent year in itself, yet, in our view, in the absence of any valid and convincing reason, there was no justification on the part of the Revenue to have pursued the same issue again to higher Courts. There should be a finality attached to the issue once it stands decided by the higher Courts on merits. This principle, in our view, applies to this case on all force against the Revenue

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Ashok Prapann Sharma vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: November 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1989-90
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S. 55(2): In determining the cost of acquisition as on 01.04.1974 (or 01.04.1981), the value declared in the wealth-tax return as well as the comparable sales, even if later in point of time, have to be considered. The High Court should not interfere with findings of fact, unless palpably incorrect

A declaration in the return filed by the Assessee under the Wealth Tax Act would certainly be a relevant fact for determination of the cost of acquisition which under Section 55(2) of the Act to be determined by a determination of fair market value. Equally relevant for the purposes of aforesaid determination would be the comparable sales though slightly subsequent in point of time for which appropriate adjustments can be made as had been made by the learned Tribunal (from Rs.70/- per square yard to Rs.50/- per square yard). Comparable sales, if otherwise genuine and proved, cannot be shunted out from the process of consideration of relevant materials. The same had been taken into account by the learned Tribunal which is the last fact finding authority under the Act. Unless such cognizance was palpably incorrect and, therefore, perverse, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of the Tribunal. The order of the High Court overlooks the aforesaid severe limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Vatsala Shenoy vs. JCIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 50B: Important law explained on what constitutes a "slump sale" and whether capital gains on liquidation of a firm are chargeable to tax

The assessees, however, are attempting the wriggle out from payment of capital gain tax on the ground that it was a “slump sale” within the meaning of Section 2(42C) of the Act and there was no mechanism at that time as to how the capital gain is to be computed in such circumstances, which was provided for the first time by Section 50B of the Act with effect from April 01, 2000. However, this argument fails in view of the fact that the assets were put to sale after their valuation. There was a specific and separate valuation for land as well as building and also machinery. Such valuation has to be treated as that of a partnership firm which had already stood dissolved

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Dharamshibhai Sonani vs. DCIT (ITAT Ahmedabad)

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DATE: September 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 50C: The proviso to s. 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016 w.e.f. 01.04.2017 to provide that the stamp duty valuation of property on the date of execution of the agreement to sell should be adopted instead of the valuation on the date of execution of the sale deed is curative and intended to remove an undue hardship to the assessee and an apparent incongruity. It should accordingly be given retrospective effect from 1st April 2003, i.e. the date effective from which s. 50C was introduced

The Proviso to Section 50C inserted by the Finance Act 2016, with effect from 1st April 2017, on the recommendation of the Income Tax Simplification Committee (Easwar Committee) recognizes the genuine and intended hardship in the cases in which the date of agreement to sell is prior to the date of sale and introduces welcome amendments to the statue to take the remedial measures. However, this brings no relief to the assessee as the amendment is introduced only with prospective effect from 1st April 2017. There cannot be any dispute that this amendment in the scheme of Section 50C has been made to remove an incongruity, resulting in undue hardship to the assessee, as is evident from the observation in Easwar Committee report to the effect that “The (then prevailing) provisions of section 50C do not provide any relief where the seller has entered into an agreement to sell the asset much before the actual date of transfer of the immovable property and the sale consideration has been fixed in such agreement” recognizing the incongruity that the date agreement of sell has been ignored in the statute even though it was crucial as it was at this point of time that the sale consideration is finalized. The incongruity in the statute was glaring and undue hardship not in dispute

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

G. S. Homes & Hotels P. Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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Refundable deposits received by a housing company for allotment of flats and future maintenance is business income. However, share capital received for allotment of flats is a capital receipt and not income. The principles of mutuality does not apply to such transactions

The Karnataka High Court held, following Shree Nirmal Commercial vs. CIT 193 ITR 694 (Bom) and 213 ITR 361 (FB), that share capital and refundable deposits received by a housing company from its shareholders in consideration of allotting area to them is assessable as business profits. It was also held that the principles of mutuality are not applicable. It was also held that deposits received from the shareholders for future maintenance is assessable as business income. On appeal to the Supreme Court HELD

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Amin Merchant vs. Chairman CBEC (Supreme Court)

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DATE: July 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2016 (Date of publication)
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The fact that the Finance Minster announced a concession in Parliament does not entitle the assessee to relief if the same is not set out in the Finance Act

The whole thrust of the appellant is that the proposals of the Finance Minister were duly approved by the Parliament. No doubt, the appellant has placed before this Court the proposals of the Finance Minister which discloses the intention of the Government but there is no material placed before us to demonstrate that the budget proposals are duly accepted by the Parliament. We are unable to agree with the argument advanced by the appellant for the reason that he is unable to make note of the difference between a proposal moved before the Parliament and a statutory provision enacted by the Parliament, because the process of Taxation involves various considerations and criteria

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Babita Lila vs. UOI (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 31, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Prosecution: Important law relating to the territorial jurisdiction and competence of the Deputy Director of Income-tax to lodge a complaint for evasion of tax explained

The Parliament has unmistakably designated the Deputy Commissioner (Appeals) to be the appellate forum from the orders as enumerated under Section 246(1) of the Act. This however, in our view, as observed hereinabove does not detract from the recognition of this authority to be the appellate forum before whom appeals from the decisions of an assessing officer or of an officer of the same rank thereto would generally and ordinarily lie even in the contingencies not referred to in particular in sub section 1 of Section 246. This is more so, to reiterate, in absence of any provision under the Act envisaging the Deputy Director of Income Tax to be an appellate forum in any eventuality beyond those contemplated in Section 246(1) of the Act. Neither the hierarchy of the income tax authorities as listed in Section 116 of the Act nor in the notification issued under Section 118 thereof, nor their duties, functions, jurisdictions as prescribed by the cognate provisions alluded heretobefore, permit a deduction that in the scheme of the legislation, the Deputy Director of Income Tax has been conceived also to be an appellate forum to which appeals from the orders/decisions of the I.T.Os./assessing officers would ordinarily lie within the meaning of Section 195(4) of the Code. The Deputy Director of Income Tax (Investigation)-I Bhopal, (M.P.), in our unhesitant opinion, therefore cannot be construed to be an authority to whom appeal would ordinarily lie from the decisions/orders of the I.T.Os. involved in the search proceedings in the case in hand so as to empower him to lodge the complaint in view of the restrictive preconditions imposed by Section 195 of the Code. The complaint filed by the Deputy Director of Income Tax, (Investigation)-I, Bhopal (M.P.), thus on an overall analysis of the facts of the case and the law involved has to be held as incompetent

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Hissaria Brothers (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 275: Penalty proceedings for contravention of Sections 269SS & 269T are not related to the assessment proceeding but are independent of it. Therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising out of the assessment proceedings has no relevance. Consequently, the limitation prescribed by s. 275(1)(a) does not apply. The limitation period prescribed in s. 275(1)(c) applies to such penalty proceedings

penalty proceedings for default in not having transactions through the bank as required under Sections 269SS and 269T are not related to the assessment proceeding but are independent of it, therefore, the completion of appellate proceedings arising out of the assessment proceedings or the other proceedings during which the penalty proceedings under Sections 271D and 271E may have been initiated has no relevance for sustaining or not sustaining the penalty proceedings. It was held that clause (a) of sub-section (1) of Section 275 was not attracted to such proceedings

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Karnataka Planters Coffee Curing Work (P) Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 22, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 26, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 68: When the facts show that the loan applications of 37 alleged trade creditors were processed and handled by the assessee and that the loan amounts were not reflected in the returns of the alleged creditors, the High Court erred in remanding the matter to the AO on the ground that the AO ought to given notice to the alleged trade creditors

Both the Assessing Officer and the C.I.T. had recorded findings of fact adverse to the Assessee which has been upheld by the learned single judge of the High Court. The Division Bench of the High Court in the Writ Appeal thought it appropriate to reverse the said findings on the ground that the 37 persons who had advanced the loan to the Assessee ought to have been given notice. The jurisdiction of the Division Bench in a Writ Appeal is primarily one of adjudication of questions 6 of law. Findings of fact recorded concurrently by the authorities under the Act and also in the first round of the writ proceedings by the learned single judge are not to be lightly disturbed

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Rayala Corporation Pvt. Ltd vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 28: Income from letting of property on rent by an assessee engaged in the business of letting is assessable as "business profits" u/s 28 and not as "Income from house property" u/s 22

The issue involved in these appeals is no more res integra as this Court has decided in the case of Chennai Properties and Investments Ltd. v. Commissioner of Income Tax [2015] 373 ITR 673 (SC) that if an assessee is having his house property and by way of business he is giving the property on rent and if he is receiving rent from the said property as his business income, the said income, even if in the nature of rent, should be treated as “Business Income” because the assessee is having a business of renting his property and the rent which he receives is in the nature of his business income

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court