Category: Supreme Court

Archive for the ‘Supreme Court’ Category


Commissioner of Customs vs. Dilip Kumar (Supreme Court) (Constitution Bench)

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DATE: July 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Entire law on interpretation of statues relating to 'purposive interpretation', 'strict interpretation', 'literal interpretation', etc explained. Difference in interpretation of statutes vs. exemption notifications explained. Q whether there is doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of a statute or notification benefit of doubt should go to the taxpayer or to the revenue explained. Law on Doctrine of substantial compliance and “intended use” also explained

Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally, it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for limited period or with the specific objective etc. That is why its construction, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In fact, an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principles requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject, but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction

PCIT vs. LG Electronics India Pvt Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: July 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 28, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): CBDT's OMs dated 29.02.2016 & 31.07.2017 by which AO's have been directed to grant stay of disputed demand on payment of 20%/ 15% does not fetter the power of the AO & CIT to grant stay on payment of amounts lesser than 15%/ 20%. The AO/ CIT have to deal with the prima facie merits and give reasons for rejection of the stay application

Having heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the appellant, and giving credence to the fact that he has argued before us that the administrative Circular will not operate as a fetter on the Commissioner since it is a quasi judicial authority, we only need to clarify that in all cases like the present, it will be open to the authorities, on the facts of individual cases, to grant deposit orders of a lesser amount than 20%, pending appeal

Kudrat Sandhu vs. UOI (Supreme Court)

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DATE: July 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 18, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
ITAT Appointment Rules: Persons selected as Member of the ITAT will continue till the age of 62 years and the person holding the post of President, shall continue till the age of 65 years

At this juncture, we may note that there is some confusion with regard to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) as regards the age of superannuation. We make it clear that the person selected as Member of the ITAT will continue till the age of 62 years and the person holding the post of President, shall continue till the age of 65 years

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)(S. 194-I)

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 194-I TDS: Amounts paid as part of the lease premium or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments. Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent and subject to TDS

(1) Amounts paid as part of the lease premium in terms of the time schedule (s) to the Lease Deeds executed between the petitioners and GNOIDA, or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments; (2) Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent, and therefore subject to TDS

CIT (TDS) vs. Canara Bank (Supreme Court)

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 194A TDS: Meaning of the expression "corporation" explained. Difference between "established by an Act" and "established under an Act" explained. Important principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes explained. Though NOIDA is not a "local authority", it is a "corporation established by the Act" and so payments to it are not liable to TDS u/s 194A

It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. CCIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 10(20): Law on whether an industrial township referred to in proviso to Article 243Q is equivalent to a "municipality" and a "local authority" explained. Law on interpretation of statutes as to the scope of an "Explanation" and "Proviso" explained. There is no concept of "equity" or "presumption" or "intendment" in a taxing statute. Only the language has to be seen

What she argued was that looking to the nature of the functions enjoined upon the appellant committee, it must be deemed to be a municipal committee within the meaning of that expression in clause (iii) of the Explanation. We regret our inability to accept that submission. We say so for two distinct reasons. Firstly because the expression “municipal committee” appears in a taxing statute and must, Therefore, be construed strictly. It is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court that while interpreting a taxing statute, one has simply to look to what is clearly stated therein. There is, in fiscal statutes, no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about the levy sanctioned under the same

PCIT vs. Tejua Rohitkumar Kapadia (Supreme Court)

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DATE: May 4, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 30, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 69 Bogus Purchases: Purchases cannot be treated as Bogus if (a) they are duly supported by bills, (b) all payments are made by account payee cheques, (c) the supplier has confirmed the transactions, (d) there is no evidence to show that the purchase consideration has come back to the assessee in cash, (e) the sales out of purchases have been accepted & (f) the supplier has accounted for the purchases made by the assessee and paid taxes thereon

It can thus be seen that the appellate authority as well as the Tribunal came to concurrent conclusion that the purchases already made by the assessee from Raj Impex were duly supported by bills and payments were made by Account Payee cheque. Raj Impacts also confirmed the transactions. There was no evidence to show that the amount was recycled back to the assessee. Particularly, when it was found that the assessee the trader had also shown sales out of purchases made from Raj Impex which were also accepted by the Revenue, no question of law arises

CIT vs. Sunita Dhadda (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 28, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 6, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 143(3)/ 292C: If the AO wants to rely upon documents found with third parties, the presumption u/s 292C against the assessee is not available. As per the principles of natural justice, the AO has to provide the evidence to the assessee & grant opportunity of cross-examination. Secondary evidences cannot be relied on as if neither the person who prepared the documents nor the witnesses are produced. The violation of natural justice renders the assessment void. The Dept cannot be given a second chance (All judgements considered)

Cross-examination is one part of the principles of natural justice: A Constitution Bench of this Court in State of M.P. v. Chintaman Sadashiva Vaishampayan AIR 1961 SC 1623, held that the rules of natural justice, require that a party must be given the opportunity to adduce all relevant evidence upon which he relies, and further that, the evidence of the opposite party should be taken in his presence, and that he should be given the opportunity of cross-examining the witnesses examined by that party. Not providing the said opportunity to cross-examine witnesses, would violate the principles of natural justice

Mahabir Industries vs. PCIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: May 18, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 80-IC: The fact that the assessee has earlier availed deduction u/s 80-IA & 80-IB is of no concern because deduction u/s 80-IC is available from the "initial year" i.e. the year of completion of substantial expansion. The inclusion of period for the deduction availed u/s 80-IA & 80-IB, for the purpose of counting ten years, is provided in sub-section (6) of s. 80-IC and it is limited to those industrial undertakings or enterprises which are set-up in the North-Eastern Region

If the assessee had earlier availed deduction under Section 80-IA and Section 80-IB, that would be of no concern inasmuch as on carrying out substantial expansion, which was carried out and completed in the Assessment Year 2006-07, the assessee became entitled to deduction under Section 80-IC from the initial year. The term ‘initial year’ is referable to the year in which substantial expansion has been completed, which legal position is stated by the High Court itself and even accepted by the Department as it has not challenged that part of the judgment. The inclusion of period for the deduction is availed under Section 80-IA and Section 80-IB, for the purpose of counting ten years, is provided in sub-section (6) of Section 80-IC and it is limited to those industrial undertakings or enterprises which are set-up in the North-Eastern Region. By making specific provision of this kind, the Legislature has shown its intent, namely, where the industry is not located in North- Eastern State, the period for which deduction is availed earlier by an assessee under Section 80-IA and Section 80-IB will not be reckoned for the purpose of availing benefit of deduction under Section 80-IC of the Act.

Mangammal @ Thulasi vs. T.B. Raju (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 19, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 18, 2018 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HUF Law): U/s 29-A of the TN Amendment, only daughters of a coparcener who were not married at the time of commencement of the amendment of 1989 are is entitled to claim partition in the Hindu Joint Family Property. Married daughters are not coparceners and are not entitled to institute suit for partition and separate possession (Danamma @ Suman Surpur Vs. Amar 2018 (1) Scale 657 distinguished)

Any property inherited upto four generations of male lineage from the father, father’s father or father’s father’s father i.e. father, grand father etc., is termed as ancestral property. In other words, property inherited from mother, grandmother, uncle and even brother is not ancestral property. In ancestral property, the right of property accrues to the coparcener on birth. The concept of ancestral property is in existence since time immemorial. In the State of Tamil Nadu, in order to give equal position to the females in ancestral property, in the year 1989, the State Government enacted the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 effective from March 25, 1989 which brought an amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for brevity “the Act”) by adding Section 29-A vide Chapter II-A under the heading of Succession by Survivorship

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