Category: Supreme Court

Archive for the ‘Supreme Court’ Category


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DATE: February 19, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 12AA: Registration can be applied for by a newly registered trust. There is no stipulation that the trust should have already been in existence and should have undertaken any activities before making the application for registration. The term ‘activities’ in s. 12AA includes ‘proposed activities’. The CIT must consider whether the objects of the Trust are genuinely charitable in nature and whether the activities which the Trust proposed to carry on are genuine in the sense that they are in line with the objects of the Trust. However, he cannot refuse registration on the ground that no activities are carried out

Since section 12AA pertains to the registration of the Trust and not to assess of what a trust has actually done, we are of the view that the term ‘activities’ in the provision includes ‘proposed activities’. That is to say, a Commissioner is bound to consider whether the objects of the Trust are genuinely charitable in nature and whether the activities which the Trust proposed to carry on are genuine in the sense that they are in line with the objects of the Trust. In contrast, the position would be different where the Commissioner proposes to cancel the registration of a Trust under sub-section (3) of section 12AA of the Act. There the Commissioner would be bound to record the finding that an activity or activities actually carried on by the Trust are not genuine being not in accordance with the objects of the Trust. Similarly, the situation would be different where the trust has before applying for registration found to have undertaken activities contrary to the objects of the Trust.

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DATE: March 5, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 7, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
S. 80-IA(4): As per s. 575 of the Companies Act, the conversion of a partnership firm into a company under Part IX causes a statutory vesting of all assets of the firm into the company without the need for a conveyance. The business of the firm is carried on by the company and the latter is eligible for the benefits of s. 80-IA.

It is manifest that all properties, movable and immovable (including actionable claims) belonging to or vested in a company at the date of its registration would vest in the company as incorporated under the Act. In other words, the property acquired by a promoter can be claimed by the company after its incorporation without any need for conveyance on account of statutory vesting. On such statutory vesting, all the properties of the firm, in law, vest in the company and the firm is succeeded by the company. The firm ceases to exist and assumes the status of a company after its registration as a company. A priori, it must follow that the business is carried on by the enterprise owned by a company registered in India and the agreement entered into between the erstwhile partnership firm and the State Government, by legal implication, assumes the character of an agreement between the company registered in India and the State Government for (i) developing, (ii) maintaining and operating or (iii) developing, maintaining and operating a new infrastructure facility.

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DATE: February 7, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 15, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: 2000-01
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CITATION:
U/s 43B(a), deduction is allowed on “any sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess or fee.” The scheme of s. 43B is to allow deduction when the sum is actually paid. (i) The credit of Excise Duty earned under MODVAT scheme is not sum payable by the assessee by way of tax, duty, cess. It is merely the incident of Excise Duty that has shifted from the manufacturer to the purchaser and not the liability to the same. Consequently, the unutilised credit under MODVAT scheme does not qualify for deduction u/s 43B. (ii) The sales tax paid by the appellant was debited to a separate account titled ‘Sales Tax recoverable account’ and is liable for disallowance u/s 43B.

Deductions under Section 43B is allowable only when sum is actually paid by the assessee. In the present case, the Excise Duty leviable on appellant on manufacture of vehicles was already adjusted in the concerned assessment year from the credit of Excise Duty under the MODVAT scheme. The unutilised credit in the MODVAT scheme cannot be treated as sum actually paid by the appellant. The assessee when pays the cost of raw materials where the duty is embedded, it does not ipso facto mean that assessee is the one who is liable to pay Excise Duty on such raw material/inputs. It is merely the incident of Excise Duty that has shifted from the manufacturer to the purchaser and not the liability to the same

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DATE: February 4, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 68 Bogus share capital/ premium: Application seeking open court oral hearing is rejected. There is no substance in the Review Petition seeking review of PCIT vs. NRA Iron & Steel Pvt. Ltd (2019) 412 ITR 161 (SC) and the same is dismissed

We have gone through the contents in the Review Petition and do not find any substance in the submissions raised therein. Consequently, this Review Petition is dismissed

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DATE: January 17, 2020 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 8, 2020 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay: There are large gaps which are unexplained. It is not known whether any action was taken against the officers who are responsible for the inordinate delay. The highest Court cannot be a walk in place to file any time irrespective of period of limitation prescribed. To blame it on the inefficiency of the administration is no more good excuse. Administration directed to hold an inquiry into the aspect as to who is responsible for such inordinate delay and take suitable action against the officers concerned (Post Master General vs. Living Media (2012) 3 SCC 563 referred)

This is one more case which we have defined as “Certificate Cases” – the object being only to obtain dismissal from the Supreme Court. We have perused the application for condonation of delay also. There are large gaps which are unexplained and there are no instructions with the counsel whether any action was taken against the officers who are responsible for the inordinate delay

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DATE: December 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 28, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2016-17
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CITATION:
S. 139(5)/ 170: The consequence of amalgamation is that the amalgamating companies lose their separate identity and cease to exist. The successor is obliged u/s 170 to file a revised return to reflect the effect of the amalgamation. The fact that the revised return is filed after the due date specified in s. 139(5) is irrelevant as the scheme approved by the NCLT provides for it. The assessee is also not required to seek condonation of delay u/s 119(2)(b) (Dalmia Power 418 ITR 242 (Mad) reversed)

The more advisable course from the point of view of the Revenue would be to make one assessment on the Transferee Company taking into account the income of both of Transferor or Transferee Companies and also to make separate protective assessments on both the Transferor and Transferee Companies separately. There may be a certain practical difficulty in adopting this course inasmuch as separate balance-sheets may not be available for the Transferor and Transferee Companies. But that may not be an insuperable problem inasmuch as assessment can always be made, on the available material, even without a balance-sheet. In certain cases, best judgment assessment may also be resorted to

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DATE: December 17, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 916 days: While a liberal approach is to be taken in the matter of condonation of delay & the consideration does not depend on the status of the party, even so the condonation of long delay should not be automatic since the accrued right or adverse consequence to the opposite party is also to be kept in perspective. While considering condonation of delay, routine explanation is not enough but it should be in the nature of indicating “sufficient cause” to justify the delay which will depend on the backdrop of each case and will have to be weighed carefully by the Courts based on the fact situation (Mst Katiji 1987(2) SCC 107 distinguished)

In the case of Katiji (Supra) the entire conspectus relating to condonation of delay has been kept in focus. However, what cannot also be lost sight is that the consideration therein was in the background of dismissal of the application seeking condonation of delay in a case where there was delay of four days pitted against the consideration that was required to be made on merits regarding the upward revision of compensation amounting to 800 per cent.

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DATE: December 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Effect of dismissal of SLP: It is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP by the Supreme Court against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger

It is evident that all the above orders were non-speaking orders, inasmuch as they were confined to a mere refusal to grant special leave to appeal to the petitioners therein. At this juncture, it is useful to recall that it is well-settled that the dismissal of an SLP against an order or judgment of a lower forum is not an affirmation of the same. If such an order of this Court is non-speaking, it does not constitute a declaration of law under Article 141 of the Constitution, or attract the doctrine of merger

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DATE: December 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 244A: Interest on refund is compensation for unauthorized retention of money by the Department. When the collection is illegal & amount is refunded, it should carry interest in the matter of course. There is no reason to deny payment of interest to the deductor who had deducted tax at source and deposited the same with the Treasury. The Department is directed to pay interest as prescribed u/s 244-A at the earliest (UOI vs. Tata Chemicals 363 ITR 658 (SC) followed)

When the said amount is refunded it should carry interest in the matter of course. As held by the Courts while awarding interest, it is a kind of compensation of use and retention of the money collected unauthorizedly by the Department. When the collection is illegal, there is corresponding obligation on the Revenue to refund such amount with interest inasmuch as they have retained and enjoyed the money deposited

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DATE: November 21, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 4/ 56: Amount received by assessee for relinquishing secretaryship of educational society cannot be treated as a capital receipt. The question of the principle of capital asset being invoked does not arise. The receipt is assessable as income from other sources. It may have been a different matter if it was a case of life time appointment of the assessee as Secretary of the concerned Institution but no such evidence was produced by the assessee (CIT vs. Ramachandra Rao 330 ITR 0322 affirmed)

The substance of the admission is that the appellant was holding the post of Secretary of the Institution [Paramahamsa Foundation (R) Trust] until 1996 but he left the institution after new members were elected as the managing committee. That being the case, the question of appellant invoking the principle of capital asset does not arise. It may have been a different matter if it was a case of life time appointment of the appellant as Secretary of the concerned Institution. No such evidence was produced by the appellant before the assessing officer or before us