Search Results For: Supreme Court


CIT vs. SSA’s Emerald Meadows (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of publication)
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S. 271(1)(c): Omission by the AO to explicitly specify in the penalty notice as to whether penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation

Whether, omission if assessing officer to explicitly mention that penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or that for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation even when it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assessee had concealed income in the facts and circumstances of the case?

Posted in All Judgements, Tribunal

Gopal And Sons (HUF) vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 2(22)(2) Deemed Dividend: The argument that as the shares are issued in the name of the Karta, the HUF is not the “registered shareholder” and so s. 2(22)(e) will not apply to loans paid to the HUF is not correct because in the annual returns filed with the ROC, the HUF is shown as the registered and beneficial shareholder. In any case, the HUF is the beneficial shareholder. Even if it is assumed that the Karta is the registered shareholder and not the HUF, as per Explanation 3 to s. 2(22), any payment to a concern (i.e. the HUF) in which the shareholder (i.e. the Karta) has a substantial interest is also covered

Section 2(22)(e) of the Act creates a fiction, thereby bringing any amount paid otherwise than as a dividend into the net of dividend under certain circumstances. It gives an artificial definition of ‘dividend’. It does not take into account that dividend which is actually declared or received. The dividend taken note of by this provision is a deemed dividend and not a real dividend. Loan or payment made by the company to its shareholder is actually not a dividend. In fact, such a loan to a shareholder has to be returned by the shareholder to the company. It does not become income of the shareholder. Notwithstanding the same, for certain purposes, the Legislature has deemed such a loan or payment as ‘dividend’ and made it taxable at the hands of the said shareholder. It is, therefore, not in dispute that such a provision which is a deemed provision and fictionally creates certain kinds of receipts as dividends, is to be given strict interpretation. It follows that unless all the conditions contained in the said provision are fulfilled, the receipt cannot be deemed as dividends. Further, in case of doubt or where two views are possible, benefit shall accrue in favour of the assessee

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Ian Peter Morris vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: November 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 192/ 234B: Where receipt is by way of salary, TDS deductions u/s 192 has to be made. No question of payment of advance tax can arise in cases of receipt by way of 'salary'. Consequently, S. 234B & 234C which levy interest for deferment of advance tax have no application

A perusal of the relevant provisions of Chapter VII of the Act [Part A, B, C and F of Chapter VII] would go to show that against salary a deduction, at the requisite rate at which income tax is to be paid by the person entitled to receive the salary, is required to be made by the employer failing which the employer is liable to pay simple interest thereon. The provisions relating to payment of advance tax is contained in Part ‘C’ and interest thereon in Part ‘F’ of Chapter VII of the Act. In cases where receipt is by way of salary, deductions under Section 192 of the Act is required to be made. No question of payment of advance tax under Part ‘C’ of Chapter VII of the Act can arise in cases of receipt by way of ‘salary’. If that is so, Part ‘F’ of Chapter VII dealing with interest chargeable in certain cases (Section 234B – Interest for defaults in payment of advance tax and Section 234C – Interest for deferment of advance tax) would have no application to the present situation

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Yokogawa India Limited (Supreme Court)

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DATE: December 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 10A/ 10B: Though s. 10A/ 10B were amended by FA 2000 w.e.f. 01.04.2001 to change "exemption" to "deduction", the "deduction" contemplated therein is qua the eligible undertaking of an assessee standing on its own and without reference to the other eligible or non-eligible units or undertakings of the assessee. The benefit of deduction is given by the Act to the individual undertaking and resultantly flows to the assessee. The deduction of the profits and gains of the business of an eligible undertaking has to be made independently and before giving effect to the provisions for set off and carry forward contained in s. 70, 72 and 74. The deductions u/s 10A/10B are prior to the commencement of the exercise to be undertaken under Chapter VI of the Act for arriving at the total income of the assessee from the gross total income

If the specific provisions of the Act provide [first proviso to Sections 10A(1); 10A (1A) and 10A (4)] that the unit that is contemplated for grant of benefit of deduction is the eligible undertaking and that is also how the contemporaneous Circular of the department (No.794 dated 09.08.2000) understood the situation, it is only logical and natural that the stage of deduction of the profits and gains of the business of an eligible undertaking has to be made independently and, therefore, immediately after the stage of determination of its profits and gains. At that stage the aggregate of the incomes under other heads and the provisions for set off and carry forward contained in Sections 70, 72 and 74 of the Act would be premature for application. The deductions under Section 10A therefore would be prior to the commencement of the exercise to be undertaken under Chapter VI of the Act for arriving at the total income of the assessee from the gross total income. The somewhat discordant use of the expression “total income of the assessee” in Section 10A has already been dealt with earlier and in the overall scenario unfolded by the provisions of Section 10A the aforesaid discord can be reconciled by understanding the expression “total income of the assessee” in Section 10A as ‘total income of the undertaking’

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Jeans Knit Private Limited vs. DCIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: December 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 148: A Writ Petition to challenge the issue of a reopening notice u/s 148 is maintainable as per the law laid down in Calcutta Discount 41 ITR 191 (SC). The law laid down in Chhabil Dass Agarwal 357 ITR 357 (SC) deals with the maintainability of a Writ to challenge the reassessment order and does not apply to a challenge to the reassessment notice

The High Courts dismissed the writ petitions preferred by the assessee challenging the issuance of notice under Section 148 of the Income Tax Act, 1961 and the reasons which were recorded by the Assessing Officer for reopening the assessment. The writ petitions were dismissed by the High Courts as not maintainable. The aforesaid view taken is contrary to the law laid down by this Court in Calcutta Discount Limited Company vs. Incom Tax Officer, Companies District I, Calcutta & Anr. [(1961) 41 ITR 191 (SC)]

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Siemens Public Communications Network Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: December 7, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 4: Law laid down in Sahney Steel 228 ITR 253 (SC) and Ponni Sugars 306 ITR 392 (SC) regarding the taxability of subsidies as a revenue receipt does not apply to voluntary subsidies (subvention) paid by a holding company to its loss making subsidiary. The said subsidy is to protect the capital investment of the holding company and is a capital receipt in the hands of the recipient

The question of law that was presented before the High Court, namely, whether subvention was capital or revenue receipt, was sought to be answered by the High Court by making a reference to two decisions of this Court in Sahney Steel & Press Works Ltd., Hyderabad versus Commissioner of Income Tax, A.P.-I, Hyderabad [(1997) 7 SCC 764]/ 228 ITR 253 and Commissioner of Income Tax, Madras versus Ponni Sugars and Chemicals Limited [(2008) 9 SCC 337]/ 306 ITR 392 (SC). The view expressed by this Court that unless the grant-in-aid received by an Assessee is utilized for acquisition of an asset, the same must be understood to be in the nature of a revenue receipt was held by the High Court to be a principle of law applicable to all situations. The aforesaid view tends to overlook the fact that in both Ponni Sugars (supra) and Sahney Steel (supra) the subsidies received were in the nature of grant-in-aid from public funds and not by way of voluntary contribution by the parent Company as in the present cases. The above apart, the voluntary payments made by the parent Company to its loss making Indian company can also be understood to be payments made in order to protect the capital investment of the Assessee Company. If that is so, we will have no hesitation to hold that the payments made to the Assessee Company by the parent Company for Assessment Years in question cannot be held to be revenue receipts

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Maharao Bhim Singh of Kota vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: December 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 6, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1978-79
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CITATION:
S. 10(19A): Though principles of res judicata do not apply, the Dept should not endlessly pursue matters which have attained finality in earlier years. Principles of interpretation of statutes explained. Interplay between s. 10(19A), s. 23 of the Income-tax Act & s. 5(iii) of the Wealth-tax Act explained

Though principle of res judicata does not apply to income-tax proceedings and each assessment year is an independent year in itself, yet, in our view, in the absence of any valid and convincing reason, there was no justification on the part of the Revenue to have pursued the same issue again to higher Courts. There should be a finality attached to the issue once it stands decided by the higher Courts on merits. This principle, in our view, applies to this case on all force against the Revenue

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Ashok Prapann Sharma vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: November 24, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1989-90
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CITATION:
S. 55(2): In determining the cost of acquisition as on 01.04.1974 (or 01.04.1981), the value declared in the wealth-tax return as well as the comparable sales, even if later in point of time, have to be considered. The High Court should not interfere with findings of fact, unless palpably incorrect

A declaration in the return filed by the Assessee under the Wealth Tax Act would certainly be a relevant fact for determination of the cost of acquisition which under Section 55(2) of the Act to be determined by a determination of fair market value. Equally relevant for the purposes of aforesaid determination would be the comparable sales though slightly subsequent in point of time for which appropriate adjustments can be made as had been made by the learned Tribunal (from Rs.70/- per square yard to Rs.50/- per square yard). Comparable sales, if otherwise genuine and proved, cannot be shunted out from the process of consideration of relevant materials. The same had been taken into account by the learned Tribunal which is the last fact finding authority under the Act. Unless such cognizance was palpably incorrect and, therefore, perverse, the High Court should not have interfered with the order of the Tribunal. The order of the High Court overlooks the aforesaid severe limitation on the exercise of jurisdiction under Section 260A of the Act

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Vatsala Shenoy vs. JCIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 50B: Important law explained on what constitutes a "slump sale" and whether capital gains on liquidation of a firm are chargeable to tax

The assessees, however, are attempting the wriggle out from payment of capital gain tax on the ground that it was a “slump sale” within the meaning of Section 2(42C) of the Act and there was no mechanism at that time as to how the capital gain is to be computed in such circumstances, which was provided for the first time by Section 50B of the Act with effect from April 01, 2000. However, this argument fails in view of the fact that the assets were put to sale after their valuation. There was a specific and separate valuation for land as well as building and also machinery. Such valuation has to be treated as that of a partnership firm which had already stood dissolved

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

G. S. Homes & Hotels P. Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 21, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1996-97
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CITATION:
Refundable deposits received by a housing company for allotment of flats and future maintenance is business income. However, share capital received for allotment of flats is a capital receipt and not income. The principles of mutuality does not apply to such transactions

The Karnataka High Court held, following Shree Nirmal Commercial vs. CIT 193 ITR 694 (Bom) and 213 ITR 361 (FB), that share capital and refundable deposits received by a housing company from its shareholders in consideration of allotting area to them is assessable as business profits. It was also held that the principles of mutuality are not applicable. It was also held that deposits received from the shareholders for future maintenance is assessable as business income. On appeal to the Supreme Court HELD

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court