Search Results For: Supreme Court


ITO vs. Urban Improvement Trust (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: October 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 15, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 10(20) Interpretation of statutes: Law on whether "functional test" as laid down in UOI vs. R.C. Jain, (1981) 2 SCC 308 is still good law explained in the context of whether the statutory functions conducted by a municipal committee enables it to qualify as a 'local authority'

The High Court based its decision on the fact that functions carried out by the assessee are statutory functions and it is carrying on the functions for the benefit of the State Government for urban development. The said reasoning cannot lead to the conclusion that it is a Municipal Committee within the meaning of Section 10(20) Explanation Clause (iii). The High Court has not adverted to the relevant facts and circumstances and without considering the relevant aspects has arrived at erroneous conclusions. Judgments of the High Court are unsustainable

CIT vs. Hapur Pilkhuwa Development Authority (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
We are shocked that the UOI through the CIT has taken the matter so casually. The petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. Petition dismissed with costs of Rs.10 lacs to be paid (by the exchequer)

First of all this petition has been filed after a delay of 596 days. There is an inadequate and unconvincing explanation given for the delay in filing the petition. Secondly, it is mentioned in the proforma for first listing that a similar matter being C.A. No. 7096/2012 is pending in this Court. However, the office has given a report stating that C.A. No. 7096/2012 was decided by this Court as far back as on 27.09.2012. In other words, the petitioners have given a totally misleading statement before this Court. We are shocked that the Union of India through the Commissioner of Income Tax has taken the matter so casually

CIT vs. Classic Binding Industries (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: August 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 80-IC: An assessee who avails of deduction for a period of 5 years @ 100% of profits and gains is entitled to deduction on 'substantial expansion' for remaining 5 Assessment Years @ 25% (or 30% where the assessee is a company) and not @ 100% (Mahabir Industries v. PCIT 256 TM 201 (SC) distinguished)

As pointed out above, once the assessees had started claiming deduction under Section 80-IC and the initial Assessment Year has commenced within the aforesaid period of 10 years, there cannot be another initial Assessment Year thereby allowing 100% deduction for the next 5 years also when sub-section (3), in no uncertain terms, provides for deduction @ 25% only for the next 5 years. It may be asserted again that the assessees accept the legal position that they cannot claim deduction of more than 10 years in all under Section 80-IC

PCIT vs. Monnet Ispat And Energy Ltd (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: August 10, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 23, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Income-tax dues, being in the nature of Crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons. Given s. 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, the Code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-tax Act

Given Section 238 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016, it is obvious that the Code will override anything inconsistent contained in any other enactment, including the Income-Tax Act. We may also refer in this Connection to Dena Bank vs. Bhikhabhai Prabhudas Parekh and Co. & Ors. (2000) 5 SCC 694 and its progeny, making it clear that income-tax dues, being in the nature of Crown debts, do not take precedence even over secured creditors, who are private persons

Commissioner of Customs vs. Dilip Kumar (Supreme Court) (Constitution Bench)

COURT: ,
CORAM: , , , ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL: ,
DATE: July 30, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 31, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
Entire law on interpretation of statues relating to 'purposive interpretation', 'strict interpretation', 'literal interpretation', etc explained. Difference in interpretation of statutes vs. exemption notifications explained. Q whether there is doubt or ambiguity in interpretation of a statute or notification benefit of doubt should go to the taxpayer or to the revenue explained. Law on Doctrine of substantial compliance and “intended use” also explained

Literally exemption is freedom from liability, tax or duty. Fiscally, it may assume varying shapes, specially, in a growing economy. For instance tax holiday to new units, concessional rate of tax to goods or persons for limited period or with the specific objective etc. That is why its construction, unlike charging provision, has to be tested on different touchstone. In fact, an exemption provision is like an exception and on normal principle of construction or interpretation of statutes it is construed strictly either because of legislative intention or on economic justification of inequitable burden or progressive approach of fiscal provisions intended to augment State revenue. But once exception or exemption becomes applicable no rule or principles requires it to be construed strictly. Truly speaking liberal and strict construction of an exemption provision are to be invoked at different stages of interpreting it. When the question is whether a subject falls in the notification or in the exemption clause then it being in nature of exception is to be construed strictly and against the subject, but once ambiguity or doubt about applicability is lifted and the subject falls in the notification then full play should be given to it and it calls for a wider and liberal construction

PCIT vs. LG Electronics India Pvt Ltd (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 20, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 28, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 220(6): CBDT's OMs dated 29.02.2016 & 31.07.2017 by which AO's have been directed to grant stay of disputed demand on payment of 20%/ 15% does not fetter the power of the AO & CIT to grant stay on payment of amounts lesser than 15%/ 20%. The AO/ CIT have to deal with the prima facie merits and give reasons for rejection of the stay application

Having heard Shri Vikramjit Banerjee, learned ASG appearing on behalf of the appellant, and giving credence to the fact that he has argued before us that the administrative Circular will not operate as a fetter on the Commissioner since it is a quasi judicial authority, we only need to clarify that in all cases like the present, it will be open to the authorities, on the facts of individual cases, to grant deposit orders of a lesser amount than 20%, pending appeal

Kudrat Sandhu vs. UOI (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: , ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 18, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
ITAT Appointment Rules: Persons selected as Member of the ITAT will continue till the age of 62 years and the person holding the post of President, shall continue till the age of 65 years

At this juncture, we may note that there is some confusion with regard to the Income Tax Appellate Tribunal (ITAT) as regards the age of superannuation. We make it clear that the person selected as Member of the ITAT will continue till the age of 62 years and the person holding the post of President, shall continue till the age of 65 years

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)(S. 194-I)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 194-I TDS: Amounts paid as part of the lease premium or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments. Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent and subject to TDS

(1) Amounts paid as part of the lease premium in terms of the time schedule (s) to the Lease Deeds executed between the petitioners and GNOIDA, or biannual or annual payments for a limited/specific period towards acquisition of lease hold rights are not subject to TDS, being capital payments; (2) Amounts constituting annual lease rent, expressed in terms of percentage (e.g. 1%) of the total premium for the duration of the lease, are rent, and therefore subject to TDS

CIT (TDS) vs. Canara Bank (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 194A TDS: Meaning of the expression "corporation" explained. Difference between "established by an Act" and "established under an Act" explained. Important principles of interpretation of fiscal statutes explained. Though NOIDA is not a "local authority", it is a "corporation established by the Act" and so payments to it are not liable to TDS u/s 194A

It is, therefore, clear that there is a well marked distinction between a body which is created by the statute and a body which after having come into existence is governed in accordance with the provisions of the statute. In other words the position seems to be that the institution concerned must owe its very existence to a statute which would be the fountainhead of its powers. The question in such cases to be asked is, if there is no statute would the institution have any legal existence. If the answer is in the negative, then undoubtedly it is a statutory body, but if the institution has a separate existence of its own without any reference to the statute concerned but is merely governed by the statutory provisions it cannot be said to be a statutory body

New Okhla Industrial Development Authority (NOIDA) vs. CCIT (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: July 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 10(20): Law on whether an industrial township referred to in proviso to Article 243Q is equivalent to a "municipality" and a "local authority" explained. Law on interpretation of statutes as to the scope of an "Explanation" and "Proviso" explained. There is no concept of "equity" or "presumption" or "intendment" in a taxing statute. Only the language has to be seen

What she argued was that looking to the nature of the functions enjoined upon the appellant committee, it must be deemed to be a municipal committee within the meaning of that expression in clause (iii) of the Explanation. We regret our inability to accept that submission. We say so for two distinct reasons. Firstly because the expression “municipal committee” appears in a taxing statute and must, Therefore, be construed strictly. It is fairly well-settled by a long line of decisions rendered by the Supreme Court that while interpreting a taxing statute, one has simply to look to what is clearly stated therein. There is, in fiscal statutes, no room for any intendment nor is there any equity about the levy sanctioned under the same

Top