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Plastiblends India Limited vs. ACIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 9, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 14, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1997-98 to 2000-01
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CITATION:
S. 80-IA contains substantive and procedural provisions for computation of special deduction. Any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has to be rejected. The claim for 100% deduction, without taking into consideration depreciation, is anathema to the scheme u/s 80-IA of the Act which is linked to profits. If the contention of the assessees is accepted, it would allow them to inflate the profits linked incentives provided u/s 80-IA of the Act which cannot be permitted

It may be stated at the cost of the repetition that judgment in Mahendra Mills was rendered while construing the provisions of Section 32 of the Act, as it existed at the relevant time, whereas we are concerned with the provisions of Chapter VI-A of the Act. Marked distinction between the two Chapters, as already held by this Court in the judgments noted above, is that not only Section 80-IA is a code by itself, it contains the provision for special deduction which is linked to profits. In contrast, Chapter IV of the Act, which allows depreciation under Section 32 of the Act is linked to investment. This Court has also made it clear that Section 80-IA of the Act not only contains substantive but procedural provisions for computation of special deduction. Thus, any device adopted to reduce or inflate the profits of eligible business has to be rejected. The assessees/appellants want 100% deduction, without taking into consideration depreciation which they want to utilise in the subsequent years. This would be anathema to the scheme under Section 80-IA of the Act which is linked to profits and if the contention of the assessees is accepted, it would allow them to inflate the profits linked incentives provided under Section 80-IA of the Act which cannot be permitted

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Dayawanti vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 153A search assessment: Supreme Court stays operation of the judgement of the Delhi High Court in Dayawanti Gupta vs. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del). The High Court dealt with the issue whether an assessment u/s 153A can be made even if no incriminating material has been found during s. 132 search proceedings

In Dayawanti Gupta vs. CIT 390 ITR 496 (Del), the assessee argued before the Delhi High Court that since no incriminating material was found during or pursuant to the search, additions, made on the basis of block assessment, were unsustainable inasmuch as they revisited finally settled assessments. It was submitted that for completing a block assessment, founded on search proceedings and notice under Section 153A, the assessing officer has to base the order on fresh materials found during the search, in the form of books of accounts, articles seized, or other similar materials. In this case, the revenue could not substantiate its plea that the assesses had concealed their income, because nothing suspect which could result in an addition to the income assessed during the previous years was in fact seized or taken into custody. Therefore, the four assessments for the block period in question had to be set aside

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Balbir Singh Maini (Supreme Court)

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DATE: October 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 2(47)/ 45: Entire law on whether a joint development agreement entered into by an owner of land with a developer constitutes a "transfer" u/s 2(47) and whether the same gives rise to capital gains chargeable to tax u/s 45 and 48 of the Income-tax Act explained in the context of the provisions of the Transfer of Property Act, Registration Act and real income theory

If an agreement, like the JDA in the present case, is not registered, then it shall have no effect in law for the purposes of Section 53A. In short, there is no agreement in the eyes of law which can be enforced under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. This being the case, we are of the view that the High Court was right in stating that in order to qualify as a “transfer” of a capital asset under Section 2(47)(v) of the Act, there must be a “contract” which can be enforced in law under Section 53A of the Transfer of Property Act. A reading of Section 17(1A) and Section 49 of the Registration Act shows that in the eyes of law, there is no contract which can be taken cognizance of, for the purpose specified in Section 53A. The ITAT was not correct in referring to the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” in Section 2(47)(v) in order to arrive at the opposite conclusion. This expression was used by the legislature ever since sub-section (v) was inserted by the Finance Act of 1987 w.e.f. 01.04.1988. All that is meant by this expression is to refer to the ingredients of applicability of Section 53A to the contracts mentioned therein. It is only where the contract contains all the six features mentioned in Shrimant Shamrao Suryavanshi (supra), that the Section applies, and this is what is meant by the expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A”. This expression cannot be stretched to refer to an amendment that was made years later in 2001, so as to then say that though registration of a contract is required by the Amendment Act of 2001, yet the aforesaid expression “of the nature referred to in Section 53A” would somehow refer only to the nature of contract mentioned in Section 53A, which would then in turn not require registration. As has been stated above, there is no contract in the eye of law in force under Section 53A after 2001 unless the said contract is registered. This being the case, and it being clear that the said JDA was never registered, since the JDA has no efficacy in the eye of law, obviously no “transfer” can be said to have taken place under the aforesaid document

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Chet Ram (HUF)

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DATE: September 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 45(5): Enhanced compensation and interest thereon under an interim order passed by the High Court in pending appeals relating to land acquisition matter are liable to be assessed for income tax in the year in which it has been received

Section 45(5) read as a whole [including 3 clause (c)] not only deals with reworking as urged on behalf of the asseess but also with the change in the full value of the consideration (computation) and since the enhanced compensation/consideration (including interest under Section 28 of the 1894 Act) becomes payable/paid under the 1894 Act at different stages, the receipt of such enhanced compensation/consideration is to be taxed in the year of receipt subject to adjustment, if any, under Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act, later on. Hence, the year in which enhanced compensation is received is the year of taxability. Consequently, even in cases where pending appeal, the Court/tribunal/authority before which appeal is pending, permits the claimant to withdraw against security or otherwise the enhanced compensation (which is in dispute) the same is liable to be taxed under Section 45(5) of the 1961 Act. This is the scheme of Section 45(5) and Section 155 (16) of the 1961 Act. We may clarify that even before the insertion of Section 45(5)(c) and Section 155(16) w.e.f. 1-4-2004, the receipt of enhanced compensation under Section 45(5)(b) was taxable in the year of receipt which is only reinforced by insertion of clause (c) because the right to receive payment under the 1894 Act is not in doubt

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

M/s N. K. Jewellers vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: September 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 132: The plea that the search proceedings initiated u/s 132 are invalid and that the block assessment proceedings are without jurisdiction cannot be entertained because s. 132A provides that the 'reason to believe' or 'reason to suspect', as the case may be, shall not be disclosed to any person or any authority or the Appellate Tribunal as recorded by Income Tax Authority u/s 132 or 132A

In view of the amendment made in Section 132A of the Income Tax Act, 1961 by Finance Act of 2017, the ‘reason to believe’ or ‘reason to suspect’, as the case may be, shall not be disclosed to any person or any authority or the Appellate Tribunal as recorded by Income Tax Authority under Section 132 or Section 132A. We, therefore, cannot go into that question at all. Even otherwise, we find that the explanation given by the appellant regarding the amount of cash of Rs.30 lacs found by the GRP and seized by the authorities has been disbelieved and has been treated as income not recorded in the Books of Account maintained by it

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

UOI vs. Tata Tea Co. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: September 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 115-O Dividend Distribution Tax: Entire law on the constitutional validity of Dividend Distribution Tax (DDT) under Article 246 of the Constitution read with Entry 82 of List I and Entry 46 of List II in the Seventh Schedule and whether tea companies are liable for the tax on only 40% of the dividend income explained

This Court, however, while considering the nature of dividend in the above case held that although when the initial source which has produced the revenue is land used for agricultural purposes but to give to the words ‘revenue derived from land’, apart from its direct association or relation with the land, an unrestricted meaning shall be unwarranted. Again as noted above Nalin Behari Lal Singha (supra) observation was made that shares of its profits declared as distributable among the shareholders is not impressed with the character of the profit from which it reaches the hands of the shareholder. We, thus, find substances in the submission of the learned counsel for the Union of India that when the dividend is declared to be distributed and paid to company’s shareholder it is not impressed with character of source of its income

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Adiveppa vs. Bhimappa (Supreme Court)

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DATE: September 6, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
HUF Law: It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property

It is a settled principle of Hindu law that there lies a legal presumption that every Hindu family is joint in food, worship and estate and in the absence of any proof of division, such legal presumption continues to operate in the family. The burden, therefore, lies upon the member who after admitting the existence of jointness in the family properties asserts his claim that some properties out of entire lot of ancestral properties are his self-acquired property. (See-Mulla – Hindu Law, 22nd Edition Article 23 “Presumption as to co-parcenary and self acquired property”- pages 346 and 347)

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. Travancore Cochin Udyoga Mandal (Supreme Court)

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DATE: August 17, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1992-93
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CITATION:
S. 37(1): in order to decide whether disputed lease rent is deductible in the year of fixation or in the year the dispute attains finality, the nature of fixation of rent, its payment, recovery etc. and whether it is statutory or contractual, have bearing. The Tribunal is required to bring the facts on record

The question as to whether the fixation of rent and its payment is statutory or contractual and, if so, its effect while claiming deduction under the Income Tax Act and, if so, in which year of assessment is a mixed question of law and fact. In our considered opinion, in order to decide the issue of deduction, the nature of fixation of rent, its payment, recovery etc. and whether it is statutory or contractual, has some bearing over the question

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

Maharaja Amrinder Singh vs. CWT (Supreme Court)

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DATE: September 5, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 9, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 1981-82, 1982-83, 1983-84
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CITATION:
S. 260A/27A: Meaning of "substantial question of law" explained. The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty case on Court

The High Court cannot proceed to hear a second appeal without formulating the substantial question of law involved in the appeal and if it does so it acts illegally and in abnegation or abdication of the duty case on Court. The existence of substantial question of law is the sine qua non for the exercise of the jurisdiction under the amended Section 100 of the Code

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court

CIT vs. S. V. Gopala Rao (Supreme Court)

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DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 8, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 119: The CBDT has no jurisdiction to issue a Circular to amend the legislative provisions set out in the Act. Such action is ultra vires and liable to be quashed

The Central Board of Direct Taxes (CBDT) issued a Circular under Section 119 of the Income Tax Act,1961. In fact, it amended the provisions contained in Rule 68B of the IInd Schedule to the Income Tax Act, 1961, which otherwise have statutory force. Such legislative provisions cannot be amended by CBDT in exercise of its power under Section 119 of the Act. The High Court has, therefore, rightly held the circular ultra virus and quashed the same.

Posted in All Judgements, Supreme Court
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