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DATE: November 21, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 7, 2019 (Date of publication)
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CITATION:
S. 4/ 56: Amount received by assessee for relinquishing secretaryship of educational society cannot be treated as a capital receipt. The question of the principle of capital asset being invoked does not arise. The receipt is assessable as income from other sources. It may have been a different matter if it was a case of life time appointment of the assessee as Secretary of the concerned Institution but no such evidence was produced by the assessee (CIT vs. Ramachandra Rao 330 ITR 0322 affirmed)

The substance of the admission is that the appellant was holding the post of Secretary of the Institution [Paramahamsa Foundation (R) Trust] until 1996 but he left the institution after new members were elected as the managing committee. That being the case, the question of appellant invoking the principle of capital asset does not arise. It may have been a different matter if it was a case of life time appointment of the appellant as Secretary of the concerned Institution. No such evidence was produced by the appellant before the assessing officer or before us

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DATE: November 22, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 30, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Appeal u/s 246A reg denial of liability to pay buy-back tax u/s 115QA: The expression “denies his liability to be assessed” in s. 246A takes within its fold every case where the assessee denies his liability to be assessed under the Act. It is not confined to the liability to be assessed u/s 143(3) but applies also to the liability to pay tax u/s 115QA. If there is adequate appellate remedy, a Writ Petition under Article 226 cannot be entertained (Kanpur Coal Syndicate 53 ITR 225 (SC) & Chhabil Dass Agarwal 357 ITR 357 (SC) followed)

If the submission of the appellant is accepted and the concerned expression as stated hereinabove in Section 246(1)(a) or in Section 246A(1)(a) is to be considered as relatable to the liability of an assessee to be assessed under Section 143(3) as contended, there would be no appellate remedy in case of any determination under Section 115QA. The issues may arise not just confined to the question whether the company is liable at all but may also relate to other facets including the extent of liability and also with regard to computation. If the submission is accepted, every time the dispute will be required to be taken up in proceedings such as a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution, which normally would not be entertained in case of any disputed questions of fact or concerning factual aspects of the matter. The assessee may thus, not only lose a remedy of having the matter considered on factual facets of the matter but would also stand deprived of regular channels of challenges available to it under the hierarchy of fora available under the Act

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DATE: November 7, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 16, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Condonation of delay of 1754 days: If the stand of the Applicant in the Affidavit that he had no knowledge about the passing of the order is not expressly refuted by the Respondent, the question of disbelieving the stand of the Applicant cannot arise. For this reason, indulgence should be shown to the Applicant by condoning the delay

Unless that fact was to be refuted, the question of disbelieving the stand taken by the appellant(s) on affidavit, cannot arise and for which reason, the High Court should have shown indulgence to the appellant(s) by condoning the delay in filing the concerned appeal(s). This aspect has been glossed over by the High Court

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DATE: October 3, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Doctrine of mutuality: A club registered as a 'company' u/s 25 of Companies Act is not like other companies as it has no shareholders, no dividends declared, and no distribution of profits takes place. Such clubs cannot be treated as separate in law from their members. The ratio decidendi in Bacha F. Guzdar 27 ITR 1 does not apply to such clubs. When a club supplies goods to its members, there is no "sale" and sales-tax cannot be levied (Bangalore Club 350 ITR 509 (SC), Venkatesh Premises Coop Soc 402 ITR 670 (SC) & other imp judgements referred)

if persons carry on a certain activity in such a way that there is a commonality between contributors of funds and participators in the activity, a complete identity between the two is then established. This identity is not snapped because the surplus that arises from the common fund is not distributed among the members – it is enough that there is a 44 right of disposal over the surplus, and in exercise of that right they may agree that on winding up, the surplus will be transferred to a club or association with similar activities. Most importantly, the surplus that is made does not come back to the members of the club as shareholders of a company in the form of dividends upon their shares. Since the members perform the activities of the club for themselves, the fact that they incorporate a legal entity to do it for them makes no difference.

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DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Recall of ex-parte order: A 'power of attorney holder' is an 'agent' and 'Principal Officer' u/s 2(35). If a CA is granted a POA, service upon him of a notice is valid. If a notice is duly served upon the litigant through its authorized representative, and it was provided sufficient opportunity to appear before the Court and contest the matter but the litigant choses to let the matter proceed exparte, the order cannot be recalled

In State of Rajasthan v. Basant Nehata1 this Court held that : “A grant of power of attorney is essentially governed by Chapter X of the Contract Act. By reason of a deed of power of attorney, an agent is formally appointed to act for the principal in one transaction or a series of transactions or to manage the affairs of the principal generally conferring necessary authority upon another person. A deed of power of attorney is executed by the principal in favour of the agent.”

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DATE: October 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 25, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Undisclosed income/ expenditure: A letter written in refutal of allegations contained in a news items with a without-prejudice offer cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure or as an unconditional offer to pay tax. Also, the disclosure is by the USA Co and not by the assessee. It is not the case of the Dept that the amount has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the assessee so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the assessee

In our opinion, such communication(s) cannot be treated as admission of non-disclosure as such. What is significant to note is that in the present case, the disclosure is attributed to Goodyear Tyre & Rubber Co., USA, filed by it in the proceedings in USA; and not by the assessee as such. It is not the case of the Department that the amount referred to in the said disclosure has been received in the accounts of the assessee or spent for and on behalf of the appellant – assessee under instruction, so as to be treated as undisclosed income of the appellant.

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DATE: August 21, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 23, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 68/69 Bogus Purchases: Disallowance cannot be made solely on third party information without subjecting it to further scrutiny. The assessee has prima facie discharged the initial burden of substantiating the purchases through various documentation including purchase bills, transportation bills, confirmed copy of accounts and the fact of payment through cheques, & VAT Registration of the sellers & their Income Tax Return. The AO has also not provided a copy of the statements to the assessee, thus denying it opportunity of cross examination

The entire disallowance in this case is based on third party information gathered by the Investigation Wing of the Department, which have not been independently subjected to further verification by the AO who has not provided the copy of such statements to the appellant, thus denying opportunity of cross examination to the appellant, who has prima facie discharged the initial burden of substantiating the purchases through various documentation including purchase bills, transportation bills, confirmed copy of accounts and the fact of payment through cheques, & VAT Registration of the sellers & their Income Tax Returnthe entire disallowance in this case is based on third party information gathered by the Investigation Wing of the Department, which have not been independently subjected to further verification by the AO who has not provided the copy of such statements to the appellant, thus denying opportunity of cross examination to the appellant, who has prima facie discharged the initial burden of substantiating the purchases through various documentation including purchase bills, transportation bills, confirmed copy of accounts and the fact of payment through cheques, & VAT Registration of the sellers & their Income Tax Return

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DATE: October 15, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 21, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2019-20
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CITATION:
Black Money Act: It is not correct to say that while exercising powers under Sections 85 and 86 of the Black Money Act, the Central Government has made the said Act retrospectively applicable from 01.07.2015. The penal provisions u/s 50 and 51 of the Black Money Act would come into play only when an assessee has failed to take benefit of S. 59 and neither disclosed assets covered by the Black Money Act nor paid the tax and penalty thereon

Sub­-section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act, itself provides that save as otherwise provided in this Act, it shall come into force on 1 st day of July, 2015. A conjoint reading of the various provisions would reveal, that the Assessing Officer can charge the taxes only from the assessment year commencing on or after 01.04.2016. However, the value of the said asset has to be as per its valuation in the previous year. As such, even if there was no change of date in sub­section (3) of Section 1 of the Black Money Act, the value of the asset was to be determined as per its valuation in the previous year. The date has been changed only for the purpose of enabling the assessee(s) to take benefit of Section 59 of the Black Money Act. The power has been exercised only in order to remove difficulties. The penal provisions under Sections 50 and 51 of the Black Money Act would come into play only when an assessee has failed to take benefit of Section 59 and neither disclosed assets covered by the Black Money Act nor paid the tax and penalty thereon. As such, we find that the High Court was not right in holding that, by the notification/order impugned before it, the penal provisions were made retrospectively applicable

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DATE: October 18, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 19, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 143(2): Mere mentioning of new address in the return of income is not enough. If change of address is not specifically intimated to the AO, he is justified in sending the notice at the address mentioned in PAN database. If the notice is sent within the period prescribed in s. 143(2), actual service of the notice upon the assessee is immaterial

It is required to be noted that notices under Section 143(2) of the 1961 Act are issued on selection of case generated under automated system of the Department which picks up the address of the assessee from the database of the PAN. Therefore, the change of address in the database of PAN is must, in case of change in the name of the company and/or any change in the registered office or the corporate office and the same has to be intimated to the Registrar of Companies in the prescribed format 12 (Form 18) and after completing with the said requirement, the assessee is required to approach the Department with the copy of the said document and the assessee is also required to make an application for change of address in the departmental database of PAN, which in the present case the assessee has failed to do so.

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DATE: September 26, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: October 2, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
A concession given by Counsel, if it is a concession in law and contrary to the statutory rules, is not binding on the litigant for the reason that there cannot be any estoppel against law (see also Himalayan Cooperative Group Housing Society Vs. Balwan Singh (2015) 7 SCC 373 Bharat Heavy Electricals Ltd vs. Mahendra Prasad Jakhmola & V. Ramesh vs. ACIT (Madras High Court)

The concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal was a concession in law and contrary to the statutory rules. Such concession is not binding on the State for the reason that there cannot be any estoppel against law. The rules provide for a specific Grade of Pay, therefore, the concession given by the learned State Counsel before the Tribunal is not binding on the appellant