In the light of the above legal position, what we need to decide at the outset is whether the amounts paid by the assessee to the non-resident agents could be termed as “consideration for the rendering of any managerial, technical and consultancy services”. As we do so, it is useful to bear in mind the fact that even going by the stand of the Assessing Officer, at best services rendered by the nonresident to the agent included technical services but it is for this reason that the amounts paid to these agents, on account of commission on exports, should be treated as fees for technical services. Even proceeding on the assumption that these non-resident agents did render the technical services, which, as we will see a little later, an incorrect assumption anyway, what is important to appreciate is that the amounts paid by the assessee to these agents constituted consideration for the orders secured by the agents and not the services alleged rendered by the agents. The event triggering crystallization of liability of the assessee, under the commission agency agreement, is the event of securing orders and not the rendition of alleged technical services. In a situation in which the agent does not render any of the services but secures the business anyway, the agent is entitled to his commission which is computed in terms of a percentage of the value of the order
The discount under ESOP is in the nature of employees cost and is hence deductible during the vesting period w.r.t. the market price of shares at the time of grant of options to the employees. The amount of discount claimed as deduction during the vesting period is required to be reversed in relation to the unvesting/lapsing options at the appropriate time. However, an adjustment to the income is called for at the time of exercise of option by the amount of difference in the amount of discount calculated with reference the market price at the time of grant of option and the market price at the time of exercise of option. No accounting principle can be determinative in the matter of computation of total income under the Act
||Duvvuru RL Reddy (JM), Sanjay Arora (AM)
||Draft assessment order
||December 30, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
||January 18, 2017 (Date of publication)
Click here to view full post with file download link
S. 144C: The lapse committed by the AO in passing the assessment order without first passing a draft order, against which the assesee may file objections with the DRP, seeking its directions to the AO, is only a procedural irregularity, which does not impinge on the jurisdiction on the AO to pass the assessment order. The assessee has no vested right against procedure. However, as the lapse was held to be fatal in Vijay Television 369 ITR 113 (Mad), the same has to be followed
The lapse committed by the AO in passing the assessment order without first passing a draft order, against which the assesee may file objections with the DRP, seeking its directions to the AO, is only a procedural irregularity, which does not impinge on the jurisdiction on the AO to pass the assessment order, which he assumes on the issue of notice u/s. 143(2), even as observed by the Hon’ble jurisdictional High Court itself in a number of cases, reference to one of which, i.e., R.V. Sarojini Devi v. IAC  242 ITR 329 (Mad) stands made in the decision itself (also refer Asst. CIT v. Hotel Blue Moon  321 ITR 362 (SC)). Reference in this regard may be made to the decision in Daewon Kang Up Co. Ltd. v. DDIT Guduthur Bros. v. ITO  40 ITR 298 (SC), wherein the Apex Court clarified that the AO assumes jurisdiction to assess on issue of a valid notice, and which obtained till the same remained to be disposed of. The proceedings completed without allowing the assessee an opportunity of being heard was an illegality, vitiating the proceedings, which would relate back in time, having occurred during the course of the assessment proceedings itself. The impugned order was to be set aside, and the proceedings to commence from the stage the illegality or the irregularity had occurred
Purchase and sale of shares outside the floor of Stock Exchange is not an unlawful activity. Off-market transactions are not illegal. It is always possible for the parties to enter into transactions even without the help of brokers. Therefore, it is not possible to hold that the transactions reported by the assessee were quite sham on the legal proposition arrived at by the CIT(A) that off-market transactions are not permissible. The assessee has stated that the transactions were made with the help of professional mediators who are experts in off-market transactions. When the transactions were off-market transactions, there is no relevance in seeking details of share transactions from Stock Exchanges. Such attempts would be futile. Stock Exchanges cannot give details of transactions entered into between the parties outside their floor. Therefore, the reliance placed by the assessing authority on the communications received from the Stock Exchanges that the particulars of share transactions entered into by the assessee were not available in their records, is out of place. There is no evidential value for such reliance placed by the assessing authority. The assessee had made it very clear that the transactions were not concluded on the floor of the Stock Exchange. The matter being so, there is no probative value for the negative replies solicited by the assessing authority from the respective Stock Exchanges. We are of the considered view that the materials collected by the assessing authority from the Stock Exchanges are not valid to dispel or disbelieve the contentions of the assessee
The lower authorities have not brought on record any concrete evidence for disallowing the long term capital gain of the assessee. The AO should have issued notices and summons to M/s RFL and ACPL under section 133(6) and 131 of the Act for the production of the necessary financial information before rejecting the claim of the assessee. We find that all the necessary information which were available with the assessee had been brought on record by the assessee before the lower authorities. In case ACPL has not filed the financial statements with the stock exchange then the assessee for the fault of ACPL cannot be held guilty under the income tax proceedings. The assessee in the instant case has made the transactions for the sale and purchase of the shares through a valid stock broker who was in existence at the relevant time with the stock exchange and this fact has not been doubted by the lower authorities. In view of the above we hold that the lower authorities had not brought on record sufficient reasons for disallowing the claim of the assessee
There is a difference between ‘Contract of work and ‘Contract of service’. The two words convey different ideas. In the ‘Contract of work’ the activity is predominantly physical; it is tangible. In the activity referred as ‘Contract of service’, the dominant feature of the activity is intellectual, or at least, mental. Certainly, ‘Contract of work’ also involves intellectual exercise to some extent. Even a gardener has to bestow sufficient care in doing his job; so is the case with a mason, carpenter or a builder. But the physical (tangible) aspect is more dominant than the intellectual aspect. In contrast, in the case of rendering any kind of ‘service’, intellectual aspect plays the dominant role. In the case under consideration, the scope of work mentioned in the agreement clearly explains that it is ‘contract of work’ to dismantle the machinery, therefore, it is not a ‘contract of service’ hence payment by the assessee is not for technical services, therefore, the assessee company is not liable to deduct TDS
Whether, omission if assessing officer to explicitly mention that penalty proceedings are being initiated for furnishing of inaccurate particulars or that for concealment of income makes the penalty order liable for cancellation even when it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt that the assessee had concealed income in the facts and circumstances of the case?
Thus, these amounts when received as advance under an Agreement to Sale of a capital asset are invested in specified bonds the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act is available. Moreover, on almost identical facts, this Court in Parveen P. Bharucha Vs. DCIT, 348 ITR 325, held that the earnest money received on sale of asset, when invested in specified bonds under Section 54EC of the Act, is entitled to the benefit of Section 54EC of the Act. This was in the context of reopening of an assessment and reliance was placed upon CBDT Circular No. 359 dated 10th May, 1983 in the context of Section 54E of the Act
The objective of ATAG was undertaking sales and marketing related activities for the brand of the appellant in Singapore. The said factual assertion has not been rebutted by the AO in the impugned assessment order. There is nothing on record to show that the said subsidiary company was doing any activity completely independent and unrelated to the activities carried out by the appellant company. Thus, the claim of the appellant that the investment was made for commercial purposes and not for purpose of accretion of investment cannot be rejected
Now the issue which requires our consideration is whether the addition can be sustained solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav, when there is no material placed on record that Shri Hanuman Yadav has made any claim against the assessee in any court of law seeking cancellation of sale deed or filing a recovery suit. The Coordinate Bench of the Tribunal after following the ratio laid down by Hon’ble Supreme Court under the similar circumstances in Union of India vs. T. R. Verma 1957 SC 882 and Kishan Chand Chellaram vs. CIT, 125 ITR 713 (SC) has held in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010 that in the absence of any conclusive evidence the document could not have been disbelieved. The D/R could not point out any binding precedent wherein it has been held that the oral statement would over ride the documentary evidence. Therefore, respectfully following the decision of the Coordinate Bench in the case of Ghanshyam Das Agarwal vs. ITO in ITA No. 1161/JP/2010, we are of the view that the AO was not justified to make addition solely on the basis of the statement of Shri Hanuman Yadav when there was a registered sale deed and more particularly when the maker of statement has not challenged the sale deed before any court of law. It is also not placed on record whether the sale deed was executed under coercion.