Search Results For: Domestic Tax


Danisco India Private Ltd vs. UOI (Delhi High Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 5, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 20, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 206AA TDS: The requirement (pre amendment) that TDS should be deducted at 20% on payments to non-residents even though the income is chargeable to tax at a lower rate under the DTAA is not acceptable because the DTAA has primacy over the Act. S. 206AA (as it existed) has to be read down to mean that where the non-resident payee is resident in a territory with which India has a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement, the rate of taxation would be as dictated by the provisions of the treaty

Having regard to the position of law explained in Azadi Bachao Andolan Vs. Union of India, (2003) 263 ITR 706 (SC) and later followed in numerous decisions that a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement acquires primacy in such cases, where reciprocating states mutually agree upon acceptable principles for tax treatment, the provision in Section 206AA (as it existed) has to be read down to mean that where the deductee i.e the overseas resident business concern conducts its operation from a territory, whose Government has entered into a Double Taxation Avoidance Agreement with India, the rate of taxation would be as dictated by the provisions of the treaty

Industrial Infrastructure Development Corporation (Gwalior) M.P. Ltd vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 16, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 17, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 12A: The CIT has no power to cancel/withdraw/recall the registration certificate granted u/s 12A until express power to do so was granted by s. 12AA(3). Though the grant of certificate is a quasi judicial function, s. 21 of the General Clauses Act cannot be applied to support the order of cancellation of the registration certificate

The CIT had no express power of cancellation of the registration certificate once granted by him to the assessee under Section 12A till 01.10.2004. It is for the reasons that, first, there was no express provision in the Act vesting the CIT with the power to cancel the registration certificate granted under Section 12A of the Act. Second, the order passed under Section 12A by the CIT is a quasi judicial order and being quasi judicial in nature, it could be withdrawn/recalled by the CIT only when there was express power vested in him under the Act to do so. In this case there was no such express power

CIT vs. NGC Networks (India) Pvt. Ltd (Bombay High Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE: ,
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 29, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i) TDS disallowance: A party cannot be called upon to perform an impossible Act i.e. to comply with a provision not in force at the relevant time but introduced later by retrospective amendment. S. 40(a)(i) disallowance can be made only if the royalty falls under Explanation 2 to s. 9(1)(vi) but not if it falls under Explanation 6 to s. 9(1)(vi)

The view taken by the Tribunal that a party cannot be called upon to perform an impossible Act i.e. to comply with a provision not in force at the relevant time but introduced later by retrospective amendment. This is in accord with the view taken by this Court in CIT v/s. Cello Plast (2012) 209 Taxmann 617 – wherein this Court has applied the legal maxim lex non cogit ad impossibilia (law does not compel a man to do what he cannot possibly perform)

Rashtriya Chemicals & Fertilizers Limited vs. CIT (ITAT Mumbai)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): , ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 14, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 263: Even if there is lack of inquiry by the AO and the assessment order is "erroneous" under Explanation 2 to s. 263, the order is not "prejudicial to the interests of the Revenue" because Fringe Benefit Tax is not "tax" as defined in s. 2(43) and cannot be disallowed u/s 40(a)(v) or added back to "Book Profits" u/s 115JB

The only question that survives for our consideration is that whether the omission to carry out the stated adjustment in the Book profits as envisaged by Ld. CIT has made the quantum order erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue and whether the stated adjustment as suggested by Ld. CIT was tenable in law or not? In other words, we are concerned with whether the twin prime conditions viz. erroneous and prejudicial to the interest of the revenue for invoking the provisions of Section 263 was fulfilled in the instant case or not

Pr CIT vs. Shree Gopal Housing & Plantation Corporation (Bombay High Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 6, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) Penalty: The law in Nayan Builders 368 ITR 722 (Bom) does not mean as a matter of rule that in case where the High Court admits an appeal relating to quantum proceedings ipso facto i.e. without anything more, the penalty order gets vitiated. The question of entertaining an appeal from an order imposing / deleting penalty would have to be decided on a case to case basis. There can be no universal rule to the effect that no penalty can be levied if quantum appeal is admitted on a substantial question of law

Each appeal in respect of the order deleting / imposing a penalty by the Tribunal would have to be considered in relation to the facts arising therein and also in the quantum proceedings. It cannot be said as a matter of rule that in case where this Court admits an appeal relating to quantum proceedings ipso facto i.e. without anything more, the penalty order get vitiated. Thus, the question of entertaining an appeal from an order imposing / deleting penalty would have to be decided on a case to case basis. There can be no universal rule to the effect that no penalty, if quantum appeal is admitted on a substantial question of law

Seema Sabharwal vs. ITO (ITAT Chandigarh)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 5, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2013-14
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 54: If agreement for purchase of new residential house is made and entire purchase price is paid within three years from the date of transfer of the old asset, exemption u/s 54 is available. It is not required that the house must be completed within 3 years. The requirement in s. 54(2) that the capital gains should be deposited in the CGAS scheme is merely an enabling provision. If the assessee shows during assessment proceedings that the capital gains have been reinvested in the new residential house, exemption cannot be denied merely the amount was not deposited in the CGAS

If the assessee at the time of assessment proceedings, proves that he has already invested the capital gains on the purchase / construction of the new residential house within the stipulated period, the benefit under the substantive provisions of section 54(1) cannot be denied to the assessee. Any different or otherwise strict construction of sub section (2), in our view, will defeat the very purpose and object of the exemption provisions of section 54 of the Act

Rajat B Mehta vs. ITO (ITAT Ahmedabad)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: February 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 10, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 54: The expression “cost of the residential house so purchased” in s. 54 is not confined to the cost of civil construction but includes furniture and fixtures if they are an integral part of the purchase. The fact that the assessee did not make the claim is no reason to deny the claim if he is otherwise entitled to it (Scope of Srinivas R Desai 155 TTJ 743 (Ahd) expanded)

The expression used in the statute is “cost of the residential house so purchased” and it does not necessarily mean that the cost of the residential house must remain confined to the cost of civil construction alone. A residential house may have many other things, other than civil construction and including things like furniture and fixtures, as its integral part and may also be on sale as an integral deal. There are, for example, situations in which the residential units for sale come, as a package deal, with things like air-conditioners, geysers, fans, electric fittings, furniture, modular kitchens and dishwashers. If these things are integral part of the house being purchased, the cost of house has to essentially include the cost of these things as well

CIT vs. Essar Teleholdings Ltd (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS:
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 31, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 1, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2003-04
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Entire law on whether the computation provisions of Rule 8D is retrospective explained in the light of established principles of interpretation of statutes read with verdicts in Vatika Townships 367 ITR 466 (SC), Gold Coin Health 304 ITR 308 (SC) and other verdicts

There is no indication in Rule 8D to the effect that Rule 8D intended to apply retrospectively. Applying the principles of statutory interpretation for interpreting retrospectivity of a fiscal statute and looking into the nature and purpose of subsection (2) and subsection (3) of Section 14A as well as purpose and intent of Rule 8D coupled with the explanatory notes in the Finance Bill, 2006 and the departmental understanding as reflected by Circular dated 28.12.2006, we are of the considered opinion that Rule 8D was intended to operate prospectively.

National Travel Service vs. CIT (Supreme Court)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S):
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: January 18, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 2(22)(e) Deemed Dividend: The term “shareholder”, post amendment, has only to be a person who is the beneficial owner of shares. One cannot be a registered owner and beneficial owner in the sense of a beneficiary of a trust or otherwise at the same time. The moment there is a shareholder, who need not necessarily be a member of the Company on its register, who is the beneficial owner of shares, the Section gets attracted without more. To state that two conditions have to be satisfied, namely, that the shareholder must first be a registered shareholder and thereafter, also be a beneficial owner is not only mutually contradictory but is plainly incorrect. Prima facie, Ankitech/ Madhur Housing is wrongly decided and should be reconsidered by larger bench

The whole object of the provision is clear from the Explanatory memorandum and the literal language of the newly inserted definition clause which is to get over the two judgments of this Court referred to hereinabove. This is why “shareholder” now, post amendment, has only to be a person who is the beneficial owner of shares. One cannot be a registered owner and beneficial owner in the sense of a beneficiary of a trust or otherwise at the same time. It is clear therefore that the moment there is a shareholder, who need not necessarily be a member of the Company on its register, who is the beneficial owner of shares, the Section gets attracted without more. To state, therefore, that two conditions have to be satisfied, namely, that the shareholder must first be a registered shareholder and thereafter, also be a beneficial owner is not only mutually contradictory but is plainly incorrect. Also, what is important is the addition, by way of amendment, of such beneficial owner holding not less than 10% of voting power. This is another indicator that the amendment speaks only of a beneficial shareholder who can compel the registered owner to vote in a particular way, as has been held in a catena of decisions starting from Mathalone vs. Bombay Life Assurance Co. Ltd., [1954] SCR 117

Vastukar Township Pvt. Ltd vs. DCIT (ITAT Jaipur)

COURT:
CORAM: ,
SECTION(S): ,
GENRE:
CATCH WORDS: , , , ,
COUNSEL:
DATE: December 22, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
FILE: Click here to view full post with file download link
CITATION:
S. 145(2): Law on how revenue should be recognized by a developer of property under the “percentage completion method” in the light of Accounting Standards AS-1, AS-7 & AS-9, the Guidance Note on Accounting for Real Estate Transactions issued by the ICAI and several judgements on the issue explained

As per AS 7, the recognition of revenue and expenses by reference to the stage of completion of a contract is often referred to as the percentage completion method. Under this method, contract revenue is matched with the contract costs incurred in reaching the stage of completion, resulting in the reporting of revenue, expenses and profit which can be attributed to the proportion of work completed

Top