In the present facts it is undisputed that the respondent assessee is in the business of development of real estate projects and letting of property is not the business of the respondent assessee. In both the decisions relied upon by Mr. Pinto i.e. Chennai Properties (supra) and Rayala Corporation (supra), the Supreme Court on facts found that the appellant was in the business of letting out its property on lease and earning rent therefrom. Clearly it is not so in this case.
The approach of the Appellate Tribunal is completely erroneous. What was heard before the Appellate Tribunal was the application for stay. There was no occasion for the Appellate Tribunal to go into the merits and decide the appeal itself by holding that it was devoid of any merits
The existence of such agreement between two jurisdictional Commissioners is a condition precedent for passing the order of transfer. Except for the request which came from the investigation office, Chennai of transferring the case, there is no reference whatsoever to any such agreement. Clause (b) of subsection (2) of section 127 provides for consequences when there is no such agreement. When the jurisdiction to pass an order of transfer under clause (a) of subsection (2) of Section 127 can be exercised only when there is such an agreement, the fact that such an agreement exists ought to have been stated in the the show cause notice as the same is a jurisdictional fact. Apart from the failure to mention the same in the show cause notice, the only stand of the revenue is that there is an agreement by implication
What binds this Court is that the judgment of the Division Bench in the case of Chaturbhuj Dwarkadas Kapadia v/s. Commissioner of Income Tax (2003) 260 ITR 491 (Bom). The Division Bench held that the date of contract is relevant provided the terms of the contract indicate passing off or transferring of complete control over the property in favour of the developer. The Division Bench laid down the test for determining the date which should be taken into account for determining the relevant accounting year in which the liability accrues. Admittedly, on the date of execution of the development agreement, the entire consideration was not received by the respondent assessee. The physical possession of the property subject matter of development agreement was parted with by the respondent assessee on 1st March, 2008. It was held that on that day, complete control over the property was passed on to the developer
||Bombay High Court
||A. K. Menon J., M. S. Sanklecha J
||54F, Rules 18 and 29 of ITAT Rules
||54F deduction, additional evidence
||March 10, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
||April 7, 2017 (Date of publication)
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(i) Additional Evidence: Ordinarily an application seeking admission of additional evidence under Rules 18 and 29 of ITAT Rules requires an order to be passed. If the ITAT rejects the application, reasons thereof have to be stated.
(ii) S. 54F: The allotment letter issued by the developer does not confer title until the agreement for sale under the provisions of the MOFA is registered. Failure to deposit the amount of consideration not utilized towards the purchase of new flat in the specified bank account before the due date of filing return of Income u/s 139(1) is fatal to the claim for exemption. Humayun Suleman Merchant vs. CCIT is not per incuriam
In the fact situation at hand we are afraid the assessee can derive no benefit from the provisions of circular No.672 dated 16th December, 1993 inasmuch as the scheme contemplated in paragraph 2 of circular No.471 is not available to the appellant. The appellant has to obtain the allotment letter from the developer under the provision of Maharashtra Ownership of Flats Act, 1963 (MOFA) and not from the co-operative society. The allotment letter issued by the developer does not confer title until the agreement for sale under the provisions of the MOFA is registered. In the present case, however, it is not in dispute that the agreement for sale was entered into only on 24th November, 2008 beyond the period of three years from the date of surrender of tenancy which was 13th September, 2005. Moreover, the developer had no approval for construction of the 9th floor of Wing ‘C’, wherein the assessee had booked three flats and such approval was received by the builders only on 7th September, 2010. Thus, according to us there is no question of assessee establishing the title over the property which was not been approved for construction at the material time
It is clear that so called mistake as claimed by the assessee, was only after notices dated 14th January, 2009 were issued under Sections 142 and 143 of the Act. It was only an attempt to preempt the Revenue finding out the assessee had furnished inaccurate particulars. Therefore, it cannot be said that it was voluntary disclosure.
The Revenue had filed an appeal from the order of the Tribunal in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt. Ltd. (supra) deleting the penalty. This appeal being CIT vs. Nayan Builders and Developers [(2014) 368 ITR 722] was not entertained by this Court. It upheld the view of the Tribunal that the imposition of penalty was not justified as admission of appeal in quantum proceeding on this issue as substantial question of law was proof enough of the issue being debatable. The aforesaid decision in Nayan Builders and Developers Pvt.Ltd (supra) was also followed by this Court in CIT-8 vs. Aditya Birla Power Co. Ltd. in Income Tax Appeal No. 851 of 2014 rendered on 2nd December, 2015
It is undisputed position before us that the notice under Section 143(2) of the Act which was handed over to the post office on 30th November, 2007 was incorrectly addressed i.e. it was addressed to the assessee’s old office at Nariman Point, Mumbai. In terms of Section 282 of the Act as existing in 2007 a notice may be served on the person named therein either by post or as if it were a summons issued by the Court under the Code of Civil Procedure. Section 27 of the General Clauses Act provides that where any Central Act requires a document to be served by post where the expression “serve” or “given” or “sent” shall be deemed to have been effected by properly addressing, prepaying and posting. In such cases, unless the contrary is proved which would be deemed to have been served at the time when the letter would be delivered in the ordinary course of post to the addressee. In this case admittedly the envelope containing the notice was wrongly addressed. Thus the presumption under Section 27 of the General Clauses Act cannot be invoked
The grievance of the Revenue as submitted by Mr.Kotangale is a submission made on the basis of suspicion and not on the basis of any evidence on record which would indicate that the respondent – assessee and persons searched were all part of the same group. Be that as it may, the requirement of Section 153C of the Act cannot be ignored at the alter of suspicion. The Revenue has to strictly comply with Section 153C of the Act. We are of the view that non satisfaction of the condition precedent viz. the seized document must belong to the respondent – assessee is a jurisdictional issue and non satisfaction thereof would make the entire proceedings taken thereunder null and void. The issue of Section 69C of the Act can only arise for consideration if the proceedings under Section 153C of the Act are upheld