Search Results For: Abhay Manohar Sapre J


PCIT vs. A. A. Estate Pvt. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 16, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 20, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 260A: There is a distinction between questions proposed by the appellant for admission of the appeal (u/s 260­A(2)(c)) and the questions framed by the Court (u/s 260­A(3)). The High Court has to formulate substantial question of law and only thereafter hear the appeal on merits. If the High Court is of the view that the appeal does not involve any substantial question of law, it should record a categorical finding to that effect & dismiss the appeal in limine. However, it cannot, without admitting the appeal and framing any question of law, issue notice to the respondent, hear both parties on the questions urged by the appellant and dismiss it. This is not in conformity with the mandatory procedure prescribed in s. 260­A

It was, however, not done and instead the High Court without admitting the appeal and framing any question of law issued notice of appeal to the respondent­ assessee, heard both the parties on the questions urged by the appellant and dismissed it. In our view, the respondent had a right to argue “at the time of hearing” of the appeal that the questions framed were not involved in the appeal and this the respondent could urge by taking recourse to sub­ section (5) of Section 260­A of the Act. But this stage in this case did not arise because as mentioned above, the High Court neither admitted the appeal nor framed any question as required under sub­section (3) of Section 260­A of the Act. The expression “such question” referred to in sub­ section (5) of Section 260­A of the Act means the questions which are framed by the High Court under sub­section (3) of Section 260­A at the time of admission of the appeal and not the one proposed in Section 260­A (2) (c) of the Act by the appellant

PCIT vs. Nokia India Pvt. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 8, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 9, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: 1999-00
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CITATION:
S. 147 Reopening: High Court should decide (i) validity of s. 148 notice where assessment is made u/s 143(1) & not u/s 143(3), (ii) whether notice can be said to be based on change of opinion if there is no foundation to form any such opinion, (iii) Whether requirements of s. 148 are satisfied, namely, that it contains the facts constituting the "reasons to believe" and furnishes the necessary details for assessing the escaped income and (iv) whether finding recorded by ITAT on merits is legally sustainable

The objections raised by the respondent (assessee) to the notice contending inter alia that since the impugned notice was based on “change of the opinion” and hence bad in law was upheld by the ITAT resulting in allowing the respondent’s appeal and further by dismissing the Revenue’s appeal by the High Court. The Revenue has felt aggrieved by the order of the High Court dismissing their appeal in limine and has filed the present appeal by way of special leave in this Court

CIT vs. Gopal Shri Scrips Pvt. Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: March 12, 2019 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 15, 2019 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Defunct companies: The fact that the assessee company stands dissolved as a defunct company u/s 560(5) of the Companies Act, 1956 does not mean that income-tax proceedings & appeals become infructuous. The liability against such companies has to be dealt with in accordance with s. 506(5) proviso (a) of the Companies Act and Chapter XV of the Income Tax Act which deal with "liability in special cases" and "discontinuance of business or dissolution"

The High Court failed to notice Section 506(5) proviso (a) of the Companies Act and further failed to notice Chapter XV of the Income Tax Act which deals with “liability in special cases” and its clause (L) which deals with “discontinuance of business or dissolution”. The aforementioned two provisions, namely, one under the Companies Act and the other under the Income Tax Act specifically deal with the cases of the Companies, whose name has been struck off under Section 506 (5) of the Companies Act. These provisions provide as to how and in what manner the liability against such Company arising under the Companies Act and under the Income Tax Act is required to be dealt with

Mangammal @ Thulasi vs. T.B. Raju (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 19, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 18, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (HUF Law): U/s 29-A of the TN Amendment, only daughters of a coparcener who were not married at the time of commencement of the amendment of 1989 are is entitled to claim partition in the Hindu Joint Family Property. Married daughters are not coparceners and are not entitled to institute suit for partition and separate possession (Danamma @ Suman Surpur Vs. Amar 2018 (1) Scale 657 distinguished)

Any property inherited upto four generations of male lineage from the father, father’s father or father’s father’s father i.e. father, grand father etc., is termed as ancestral property. In other words, property inherited from mother, grandmother, uncle and even brother is not ancestral property. In ancestral property, the right of property accrues to the coparcener on birth. The concept of ancestral property is in existence since time immemorial. In the State of Tamil Nadu, in order to give equal position to the females in ancestral property, in the year 1989, the State Government enacted the Hindu Succession (Tamil Nadu Amendment) Act, 1989 effective from March 25, 1989 which brought an amendment in the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 (for brevity “the Act”) by adding Section 29-A vide Chapter II-A under the heading of Succession by Survivorship

CIT vs. Calcutta Export Company (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): The amendment to s. 40(a)(ia) by the Finance Act, 2010 w.e.f 01.04.2010 to provide that all TDS made during the previous year can be deposited with the Government by the due date of filing the return of income should be interpreted liberally and equitably and applied retrospectively from the date when s. 40(a)(ia) was inserted i.e., with effect from the AY 2005-2006 so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates. The amendment is curative in nature and should be given retrospective operation as if the amended provision existed even at the time of its insertion

Hence, in light of the forgoing discussion and the binding effect of the judgment given in Allied Moters 224 ITR 677(SC), we are of the view that the amended provision of Sec 40(a)(ia) of the IT Act should be interpreted liberally and equitable and applies retrospectively from the date when Section 40(a)(ia) was inserted i.e., with effect from the Assessment Year 2005-2006 so that an assessee should not suffer unintended and deleterious consequences beyond what the object and purpose of the provision mandates. As the developments with regard to the Section recorded above shows that the amendment was curative in nature, it should be given retrospective operation as if the amended provision existed even at the time of its insertion. Since the assessee has filed its returns on 01.08.2005 i.e., in accordance with the due date under the provisions of Section 139 IT Act, hence, is allowed to claim the benefit of the amendment made by Finance Act, 2010 to the provisions of Section 40(a)(ia) of the IT Act.

CIT vs. S. Ajit Kumar (Supreme Court)

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DATE: May 2, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 158BB Block Assessment: While it is a cardinal principle of law that in order to add any income in the block assessment, evidence of such income must be found in the course of the search u/s 132, any material or evidence found/collected in a survey u/s 133A which has been simultaneously made at the premises of a connected person can also be utilized while making the Block Assessment. The same would fall under the words “and such other materials or information as are available with the Assessing Officer and relatable to such evidence” occurring in s. 158 BB

It is a cardinal principle of law that in order to add any income in the block assessment, evidence of such must be found in the course of the search under Section 132 of the IT Act or in any proceedings simultaneously conducted in the premises of the assessee, relatives and/or persons who are connected with the assessee and are having transaction/dealings with such assessee. In the present case, the moot question is whether the fact of cash payment of Rs 95.16 lakhs can be added under the head of the undisclosed income of the assessee in block assessment. The power of survey has been provided under Section 133A of the IT Act. Therefore, any material or evidence found/collected in a Survey which has been simultaneously made at the premises of a connected person can be utilized while making the Block Assessment in respect of an assessee under Section 158BB read with Section 158 BH of the IT Act. The same would fall under the words “and such other materials or information as are available with the Assessing Officer and relatable to such evidence” occurring in Section158 BB of the Act. In the present case, the Assessing Officer was justified in taking the adverse material collected or found during the survey or any other method while making the Block Assessment.

CIT vs. Mahindra and Mahindra Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
Loan Waiver - Applicability of S. 28(iv) & 41(1): (a) S. 28(iv) does not apply if the receipts are in the nature of cash or money (b) S. 41(1) does not apply if the waiver of loan does not amount to cessation of trading liability i.e if the assessee has not claimed any deduction u/s 36 (1) (iii) of the IT Act qua the payment of interest in any previous year

On a perusal of section 41(1), it is evident that it is a sine qua non that there should be an allowance or deduction claimed by the assessee in any assessment for any year in respect of loss, expenditure or trading liability incurred by the assessee. Then, subsequently, during any previous year, if the creditor remits or waives any such liability, then the assessee is liable to pay tax under Section 41 of the IT Act. The objective behind this Section is simple. It is made to ensure that the assessee does not get away with a double benefit once by way of deduction and another by not being taxed on the benefit received by him in the later year with reference to deduction allowed earlier in case of remission of such liability

CIT vs. Container Corporation of India Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 2, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 80-IA(4): Inland Container Depots (ICDs) are Inland Ports and income earned out of these Depots are eligible for deduction. However, the actual computation is to be made in accordance with the different Notifications issued by the Customs department with regard to different ICDs located at different places

Though both the Notification and communication are not binding on CBDT to decide whether ICDs can be termed as Inland Ports within the meaning of Section 80-IA of the IT Act, the appellant herein is unable to put forward any reasonable explanation as to why these notifications and communication should not be relied to hold ICDs as Inland Ports. Unless shown otherwise, it cannot be held that the term ‘Inland Ports’ is used differently under Section 80-IA of the IT Act. All these facts taken together clear the position beyond any doubt that the ICDs are Inland Ports and subject to the provisions of the Section and deduction can be claimed for the income earned out of these Depots. However, the actual computation is to be made in accordance with the different Notifications issued by the Customs department with regard to different ICDs located at different places.

CIT vs. Carpet India (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 27, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 30, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 80HHC: Law laid down in Baby Marine Exports 290 ITR 323 & Sushil Kumar Gupta 210 TM 251 (SC) is not correct. Question whether supporting manufacturer who receives export incentives in the form of duty draw back (DDB), Duty Entitlement Pass Book (DEPB) etc. is entitled for deduction u/s 80HHC is referred to the larger Bench

we are not in the agreement with the decisions in Baby Marine Exports 290 ITR 323 & Sushil Kumar Gupta 210 TM 251 (SC) and as Explanation (baa) of Section 80HHC specifically reduces deduction of 90% of the amount referable to Section 28 (iiia) to (iiie) of the IT Act, hence, we are of the view that these decisions require re-consideration by a larger Bench since this issue has larger implication in terms of monetary benefits for both the parties

CIT vs. Shree Rama Multi Tech Ltd (Supreme Court)

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DATE: April 24, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 26, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 56: Interest accrued on account of deposit of share application money is not taxable income. Such interest is inextricably linked with the requirement to raise share capital and is thus adjustable towards the expenditures involved for the share issue. The fact that part of the share application money would normally have to be returned to unsuccessful applicants, and therefore, the entire share application money would not ultimately be appropriated by the Company, make no significant difference. The Interest earned from share application money has statutorily required to be kept in separate account and was being adjusted towards the cost of raising share capital

The common rationale that is followed in Bokaro Steel Ltd (1999) 236 ITR 315 (SC) and Karnal Cooperative Sugar Mills Ltd. (2000) 243 ITR 2 (SC) is that if there is any surplus money which is lying idle and it has been deposited in the bank for the purpose of earning interest then it is liable to be taxed as income from other sources but if the income accrued is merely incidental and not the prime purpose of doing the act in question which resulted into accrual of some additional income then the income is not liable to be assessed and is eligible to be claimed as deduction. Putting the above rationale in terms of the present case, if the share application money that is received is deposited in the bank in light of the statutory mandatory requirement then the accrued interest is not liable to be taxed and is eligible for deduction against the public issue expenses.

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