Category: All Judgements

Archive for the ‘All Judgements’ Category


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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(ia): Payments by a CA firm to foreign professional entities for services rendered abroad is not taxable under Articles 12 and 15 of the India-USA DTAA. The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vii) to tax services rendered outside India does not apply in the context of a disallowance u/s 40(a)(ia) in the hands of the payer

Ostensibly, the requirement of rendering services in India in order to attract section 9(1)(vii) of the Act was removed by insertion of Explanation by the Finance Act, 2010 with retrospective effect from 1/4/1976. This has been understood by the Revenue to say that inspite of the services having been rendered by the recipients outside India, the same is taxable in India by applying the aforesaid amendment. In our view, such retrospective amendment would be determinative of the tax liability in the hands of the recipients of income. So however, in the present case, what is held against the assessee is the failure to deduct tax at source at the time of payment of such income. Ostensibly, dehors the aforesaid amendment, the impugned income was not subject to tax deduction at source in India as per the prevailing legal position. Taxability of a sum in the hands of recipient, on account of a subsequent retrospective amendment would not expose the assessee-payer to an impossible situation of requiring deduction of tax at source on the date of payment. Therefore, on this count also the assessee cannot be held to be in default in not deducting tax at source so as to trigger the disallowance under section 40(a)(i) of the Act

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DATE: March 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 20, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
A liberal view must be taken in matters of condonation of delay. A delay of 2191 days caused by an employee leaving the services of the assessee and not handing over papers to the assessee deserves to be condoned

In every case of delay, there can be some lapses on the part of the litigant concern. That alone is not enough to turn down the plea and to shut the doors against him, unless and until, it makes a mala-fide or a dilatory statutory, the court must show utmost consideration to such litigant. In matters concerning the filing of appeals, in exercise of the statutory right, a refusal to condone the delay can result in a meritorious matter being thrown out at the threshold, which may lead to miscarriage of justice. Since the employee who was earlier handling the tax matters of the assessee company, while leaving the job of the assessee company, did not handover the relevant papers either to the assessee or to the next person, a fact which caused the delay, the delay was liable to be condoned by taking a lenient view

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DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05, 2005-06, 2006-07
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CITATION:
Entire law on what constitutes a Permanent Establishment (PE) in India in terms of Article 5(1), 5(2)(l) or Article 5(5) of the Indo-USA DTAA explained. If the alleged PE has been assessed on ALP basis in terms of Article 7, no income has escaped escapement so as to justify issue of s. 148 notice

Even if the subsidiary of a foreign company is considered as its PE, only such income as is attributable in terms of paragraphs 1 and 2 of Article 7 can be brought to tax. In the present case, there is no dispute that Adobe India – which according to the AO is the Assessee’s PE – has been independently taxed on income from R&D services and such tax has been computed on the basis that its dealings with the Assessee are at arm’s length (that is, at ALP). Therefore, even if Adobe India is considered to be the Assessee’s PE, the entire income which could be brought in the net of tax in the hands of the Assessee has already been so taxed in the hands of Adobe India. There is no material that would even remotely suggest that the Assessee has undertaken any activity in India other than services which have already been subjected to ALP scrutiny/adjustment in the hands of Adobe India

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DATE: May 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13, 2013-14, 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 143(1D): Instruction No.1 of 2015 dated 13.01.2015 which curtails the discretion of the AO by 'preventing' him from processing the return and granting refund, where notice has been issued to the assessee u/s 143(2), is unsustainable in law and quashed

The real effect of the instruction is to curtail the discretion of the AO by ‘preventing’ him from processing the return, where notice has been issued to the Assessee under Section 143(2) of the Act. If the legislative intent was that the return would not be processed at all once a notice is issued under Section 143 (2) of the Act, then the legislature ought to have used express language and not the expression “shall not be necessary”. By the device of issuing an instruction in purported exercise of its power under Section 119 of the Act, the CBDT cannot proceed to interpret or instruct the income tax department to “prevent” the issue of refund. In the event that a notice is issued to the Assessee under Section 143 (2) of the Act, it will be a matter the discretion of the concerned AO whether he should process the return

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CITATION:
S. 271(1)(c) penalty on Bogus Purchases: If the assessment order in the quantum proceedings is altered by an appellate authority in a significant way, the very basis of initiation of the penalty proceedings is rendered non-existent and the AO cannot continue the penalty proceedings on the basis of the same notice

Once the assessment order of the AO in the quantum proceedings was altered by the CIT (A) in a significant way, the very basis of initiation of the penalty proceedings was rendered non-existent. The AO could not have thereafter continued the penalty proceedings on the basis of the same notice. Also, the Court concurs with the CIT (A) and the ITAT that once the finding of the AO on bogus purchases was set aside, it could not be said that there was any concealment of facts or furnishing of inaccurate particulars by the Assessee that warranted the imposition of penalty under Section 271 (1) (c) of the Act

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DATE: March 18, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
Inability of the assessee, an Advocate, to reconcile the professional receipts with the TDS certificates and to give a detailed party-wise breakup of fees receipts does not mean that the difference can be assessed as undisclosed income

The assessee was engaged as an Advocate to argue the matters by what is popularly known as Advocates on record or instructing Advocates method, meaning thereby the client does not engage the assessee directly but a professional or the Advocate engaged by the client requests the assessee to argue the case. The brief is then taken as the counsel brief. That being the practice, the assessee gave an explanation that the breakup as desired cannot be given and with regard to all payments. It is pointed out that at times, assessee receives fees directly from the clients or from the instructing Advocates or Chartered Accountants if such professionals have collected the amounts from the clients. Under these circumstances, the breakup as desired cannot be placed on record

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DATE: April 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 17, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 143(2)/ 245R(2): A notice u/s 143(2)(ii) cannot be issued in a routine, casual or mechanical manner but after forming an opinion that it is "necessary or expedient" to do so. A S. 143(2) notice in the standard form is not a bar u/s 245R(2) for admission of an AAR application for advance ruling

Under Section 143 (2) (ii) of the Act, an AO can serve on the Assessee a notice requiring him to attend his office and produce any evidence on which the Assessee seeks to rely in support of return if the AO “considers it necessary or expedient to ensure that the Assessee has not understated the income or has not computed excessive loss or has not underpaid the tax in any manner’. Therefore, the scope of the enquiry that an AO can undertake in terms of Section 143 (2) (ii) is a wide ranging one. What is relevant for the present case is that prior to issuance of the notice under Section 143 (2) (ii) the AO has to form an opinion that it is ‘necessary or expedient’ to ensure that an Assessee has not (i) understated the income or (ii) has not computed excessive loss, or (iii) has not underpaid the tax in any manner. The AO is, therefore, not expected to issue a notice under Section 143 (2) (ii) in a routine or casual or mechanical manner

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DATE: May 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 263: Even if AO applies mind and decides not to assess expenditure as unexplained u/s 69C because the assessee withdrew the claim for deduction, the CIT is entitled to revise the assessment on the ground that the matter needed further investigation

There can be no doubt that so long as the view taken by the Assessing Officer is a possible view the same ought not to be interfered with by the Commissioner under Section 263 of the Act merely on the ground that there is another possible view of the matter. Permitting exercise of revisional power in a situation where two views are possible would really amount to conferring some kind of an appellate power in the revisional authority. This is a course of action that must be desisted from. However, the above is not the situation in the present case in view of the reasons stated by the learned C.I.T. on the basis of which the said authority felt that the matter needed further investigation, a view with which we wholly agree. Making a claim which would prima facie disclose that the expenses in respect of which deduction has been claimed has been incurred and thereafter abandoning/withdrawing the same gives rise to the necessity of further enquiry in the interest of the Revenue

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DATE: May 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Transfer Pricing: High Court irked at fact that Dept is unaware of which of its matters are admitted/ dismissed. Chief CIT directed to streamline the procedure for filing appeal before the High Court. Adjustment can be made only for transactions attributable to the International taxation

This appeal filed by the Revenue raises questions with regard to whether transfer pricing adjustment consequent to arriving at Arms Length Price (ALP) is required to be done only in respect of the international transactions or this adjustment is to be done in respect of all the business transactions of the assessee i.e. at the entity level. This Appeal was on board and detailed orders were passed indicating that the Revenue has not been bringing to the notice of the Court orders of admission in its favour in the subsequent Appeals filed by it an identical questions. This has resulted in the subsequent appeals filed by the Revenue raising identical questions being dismissed at the stage of admission after having heard the parties at some length

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DATE: May 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 40(a)(i): The law in s. 40(a)(i) that failure to deduct TDS on payment to a non-resident will result in a disallowance violates the non-discrimination clause in Article 26 of the India-USA DTAA because a similar disallowance is not made on payments to residents (pre s. 40(a)(ia))

The argument of the Revenue overlooks the fact that the condition under which deductibility is disallowed in respect of payments to non-residents, is plainly different from that when made to a resident. Under Section 40 (a) (i), as it then stood, the allowability of the deduction of the payment to a non-resident mandatorily required deduction of TDS at the time of payment. On the other hand, payments to residents were neither subject to the condition of deduction of TDS nor, naturally, to the further consequence of disallowance of the payment as deduction. The expression “under the same conditions” in Article 26 (3) of the DTAA clarifies the nature of the receipt and conditions of its deductibility. It is relatable not merely to the compliance requirement of deduction of TDS. The lack of parity in the allowing of the payment as deduction is what brings about the discrimination