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DATE: January 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 1984-85
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CITATION:
S. 256: While findings of fact found by the Tribunal are final and the High Court cannot reappraise the same, the High Court can take note of facts on record which are lost sight of by the Tribunal and also construe certain facts to be of significance as against the different view of the Tribunal

It is well settled that issues of fact determined by the Tribunal are final and the High Court in exercise of its reference jurisdiction should not act as an appellate Court to review such findings of fact arrived at by the Tribunal by a process of reappreciation and reappraisal of the evidence on record. The aforesaid position in law has been consistently laid down by this Court in several of its pronouncements out of which, illustratively, reference may be made to Karnani Properties Ltd. Vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, West Bengal [82 ITR 547], Rameshwar Prasad Bagla vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax, U.P. [87 ITR 421], Commissioner of Income-Tax, Bombay City vs. Greaves Cotton and Co. Ltd. [68 ITR 200] and K. Ravindranathan Nair vs. Commissioner of Income-Tax [247 ITR 178]

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DATE: January 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 147: Reopening of assessment to take remedial action pursuant to audit objections as per Instruction No. 9 of 2006 is not valid if AO disagrees with the objections. Instruction No. 9 cannot override the requirement in s. 147 that AO should form his own belief that income has escaped assessment

The Court holds instruction No. 9 of the CBDT dated 7th November, 2006 cannot possibly override the statutory powers to be exercised by an AO in terms of Section 147 of the Act. In other words the said instruction has to be read consistent with proviso (a) to Section 119 (1) of the Act and cannot, as was erroneously understood by the Respondent, compel the AO to issue the notice u/s 148. If the CBDT Instruction No. 9/2006 is read to the contrary, it would fall foul of Section 119 of the Act.

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DATE: January 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi): While consideration paid to acquire the right to use software is assessable as "royalty", payments made for purchase of software as a product is not for use or the right to use the software and is not assessable as "royalty"

In the cases where an Assessee acquires the right to use a software the payment so made would amount to royalty. However in cases where the payments are made for purchase of software as a product, the consideration paid cannot be considered to be for use or the right to use the software. It is well settled that where software is sold as a product it would amount to sale of goods. In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 (SC), the Supreme Court examined the transactions relating to the purchase and sale of software recorded on a CD in the context of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The court held the same to be goods within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act and consequently exigible to sales tax under the said Act. Clearly, the consideration paid for purchase of goods cannot be considered as ‘royalty’. Thus, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where consideration is paid to acquire the right to use a patent or a copyright and cases where payment is made to acquire patented or a copyrighted product/ material. In cases where payments are made to acquire products which are patented or copyrighted, the consideration paid would have to be treated as a payment for purchase of the product rather than consideration for use of the patent or copyright

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 50B/43(6)(c): In computing the net worth for computing capital gains from a slump sale, depreciation on assets have to be deducted even if not claimed by the assessee

Plainly, the purpose of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act is to provide a methodology to compute the written down value of the block of assets transferred by an Assessee as a part of the undertaking or division sold by way of a slump sale. The reference to Clause C is clearly not for the purposes of computing the block of assets remaining with the Assessee after the slump sale. It is apparent from the above that the intended object and scope of Clause C as used in Section 50B of the Act is totally different than the purpose of the said provision when read as a part of Section 43 of the Act. In the circumstances, clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act must be read in a manner to expressly include the computation provisions of Clause C without reference to other the import of the said provisions of Section 43 of the Act. In our view, the ITAT fell into error in importing the interpretation of Clause C read as a part of Section 43 of the Act, to interpret the scope of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act

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DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 79: The transfer of shares of an Indian company by a holding Co (Yum Asia) to another holding Co (Yum Singapore) results in change of “beneficial ownership” of shares and results in disallowance of b/fd losses even though the ultimate beneficial owner remains Yum USA. The corporate veil cannot be pierced to regard the ultimate holding Co as the beneficial owner

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT, the Court finds that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be AEs of Yum USA, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India does not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of Section 79 of the Act, Yum India cannot be permitted to set off the carry forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years

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DATE: December 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10 to 2012-13
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S. 254(2A): As the Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” has been struck down in Pepsi Foods 376 ITR 87 (Del) as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, the law laid down in Narang Overseas 295 ITR 22 (Bom) & Ronuk Industries 333 ITR 99 (Bom) that the ITAT has power to grant stay beyond 365 days has to be followed

The ratio of the decision of this Court in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even to the substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act. The basis of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) was that the power to grant stay or interim relief has to be read as coextensive with the power to grant final relief. The object being that in the absence of the power to grant interim relief the final relief itself may be defeated. This Court thereafter followed the decision of the Apex Court in “CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills(P) Ltd., (2005(180) ELT 434 (SC)) and held that notwithstanding the pre-substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act the Tribunal continues to have powers to grant interim relief. In the above view, therefore, the ratio of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even in case of substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act

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DATE: January 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 268A: Though the low tax effect circular No. 21/2015 dated 10.12.2015 does not refer to references filed u/s 256(1), it has to be held to apply to references as well in view of the objective of the CBDT to focus only on large tax effect matters

One feature in support of the submission that the Circular be not applied to References could be that the References are opinions sought by the Tribunal on questions of law from this Court unlike statutory appeals filed by the parties, seeking the view of the Courts. However though these References are undoubtedly made by the Tribunal, they emanate from an application by one of the parties before it leading to the order giving rise to the question of law requiring the opinion of the Court. This in practice is similar to the statutory appeal under Section 260A of the Act being filed by a party to the High Court for the reason that, this appeal is not considered as a matter of right of the party but only if the court to which the appeal is preferred is satisfied that a substantial question of law arises and admits the appeal for further consideration. Therefore a pending appeal under Section 260A of the Act is no different from a pending Reference in as much as in the case of a Reference the Tribunal is of the view that a substantial question of law arises either on its own (Section 256(1) of the Act) or as directed by Court (Section 256(2) of the Act) which requires the opinion of the Court, while in a pending appeal under Section 260A of the Act which has been admitted, the Court is of the view that a substantial question of law arises which requires due consideration by the Court. Therefore we construe the Circular dated 10th December 2015 as applicable even to pending References in the same manner they apply to pending appeals

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DATE: November 30, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Entire law on accountability of public officials for acts of omission and commission explained. Customs officials directed to pay costs of Rs. 14 lakh + interest @ 9% p.a. from personal account & to face disciplinary action for “high-handedness”, arbitrariness” and seeking to “hoodwink” Court

Today the issue thus is not only of award of compensation but who should bear the brunt. The concept of authority and power exercised by public functionaries has many dimensions. It has undergone tremendous change with passage of time and change in socioeconomic outlook. The authority empowered to function under a statute while exercising power discharges public duty. It has to act to subserve general welfare and common good. In discharging this duty honestly and bona fide, loss may accrue to any person. And he may claim compensation which may in circumstances be payable. But where the duty is performed capriciously or the exercise of power results in harassment and agony then the responsibility to pay the loss determined should be whose? In a modem society no authority can arrogate to itself the power to act in a manner which is arbitrary. It is unfortunate that matters which require immediate attention linger on and the man in the street is made to run from one end to other with no result. The culture of window clearance appears to be totally dead. Even in ordinary matters a common man who has neither the political backing nor the financial strength to match the inaction in public oriented departments gets frustrated and it erodes the credibility in the system. Public administration, no doubt involves a vast amount of administrative discretion which shields the action of administrative authority. But where it is found that exercise of discretion was mala fide and the complainant is entitled to compensation for mental and physical harassment then the officer can no more claim to be under protective cover. When a citizen seeks to recover compensation from a public authority in respect of injuries suffered by him for capricious exercise of power and the National Commission finds it duly proved then it has a statutory obligation to award the same. It was never more necessary than today when even social obligations are regulated by grant of statutory powers. The test of permissive form of grant is over. It is now imperative and implicit in the exercise of power that it should be for the sake of society. When the court directs payment of damages or compensation against the State the ultimate sufferer is the common man. It is the tax payers’ money which is paid for inaction of those who are entrusted under the Act to discharge their duties in accordance with law. It is, therefore, necessary that the Commission when it is satisfied that a complainant is entitled to compensation for harassment or mental agony or oppression, which finding of course should be recorded carefully on material and convincing circumstances and not lightly, then it should further direct the department concerned to pay the amount to the complainant from the public fund immediately but to recover the same from those who are found responsible for such unpardonable behaviour by dividing it proportionately where there are more than one functionaries

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DATE: January 1, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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Bogus Sales/ Purchases: Addition solely on the basis of information received from the sales-tax department is not sustainable. Suspicion of the highest degree cannot take the place of evidence

AO had made the addition as one of the supplier was declared a hawala dealer by the VAT Department. We agree that it was a good starting point for making further investigation and take it to logical end. But, he left the job at initial point itself. Suspicion of highest degree cannot take place of evidence. He could have called for the details of the bank accounts of the suppliers to find out as whether there was any immediate cash withdrawal from their account. We find that no such exercise was done

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DATE: November 27, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 50C: The stamp duty value on the date of agreement & not date of sale deed has to be taken. The nature of the property on the date of agreement has to be considered. Q whether proviso to s. 56(2)(vii)(b) is curative and retrospective left open

The issue is as to whether the date of agreement or the date of execution of sale deed has to be considered for the purpose of adopting the SRO value under S.50C of the Act. We find that this issue is now settled in favour of the assessee by the decisions of the Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Sanjeev Lal and Smt. Shantilal Motilal V/s. CIT(365 ITR 389) as well as decisions of the coordinate bench of this Tribunal at Visakhapatnam in the cases of M/s. Lahiri Promoters Visakhapatnam V/s. ACIT, Circle 1(1), Visakhapatnam (ITA No.12/Vizag/2009 dated 22.6.2010) and Moole Rami Reddy V/s. ITO (ITA No.311/Vizag/2010 dated 10.12.2010). It is therefore, now settled that the SRO value as on the date of agreement of sale has to be considered for the purpose of computation of capital gains

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