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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(1)/ Rule 34(5)(c): The Tribunal is mandated to pass orders within 90 days of the hearing. Delay is not justified on the ground that 'administrative clearance' was obtained. The aggrieved party is entitled to seek recall of such an order

The order of the Tribunal while rejecting the rectification application does not dispute the fact that the order dated 3rd February, 2016 passed under Section 254(1) of the Act was passed beyond the period of 90 days from the date of conclusion of its hearing on 22nd September, 2015. However, it records that administrative clearance had been taken to pass such an order beyond the period of 90 days. We are at a loss to understand what is meant by ‘administrative clearance’ and the basis for the same. Besides when, how and from whom the administrative clearance was received, are all questions still at large

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DATE: January 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 28, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11, 2011-12
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CITATION:
Entire law explained on whether gains from sale of shares held in a Portfolio Management Scheme (PMS) should be assessed as "capital gains" or as "business profits" in the context of CBDT Circular No. 4/7 dated 15.06.2007 and Circular No. 6 of 2016 dated 29.02.2016

While drafting the provisions the legislature did not make any water tight rule for determination of nature of income arising from purchase and sale of shares to be assessed under the head of capital gains or business income. It has been left upon the wisdom of the assessee and facts and circumstances of the case. Under these circumstances, if assessee has chosen a particular course after deciding all the pros and cons of both the options available to it and if the choice has been exercised in a bonafide manner, the Board has advised as discussed above that the AO does not have liberty under the law to thrust his opinion upon the assessee, so long as the assessee follows his choice on consistent basis

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DATE: January 24, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 45/48: The AO is not bound to accept the consideration stated in the sale deed. In a case where property is sold between arm’s length parties at a gross undervaluation, the onus is on the assessee to explain and if there is no explanation, the AO is entitled to draw an inference. The presumption against the value being understated (not undervalued) is greater where parties are connected or related. However, if the AO does not allege that the assessee received more consideration than is stated in the sale deed, he cannot made an addition to the stated consideration (George Henderson 66 ITR 622 (SC) & Gillanders Arbuthnot 87 ITR 407 (SC) explained)

The judgments in CIT v. George Henderson & Co. Ltd. (1967)66 ITR 622, Commissioner of Income Tax, Calcutta v. Gillanders Arbuthnot & Co. (1973) 87 ITR 407 undoubtedly hold that the expression “full value of the consideration” cannot be construed as the market value but as the price bargained for by the parties to the sale. It is necessary for the Assessing Officer to ascertain as to what was the price bargained for by the parties to the sale. The judgment, however, does not support the further submission of the assessee that the price stated in the sale-deed must irrespective of anything also be considered to be the sale price for the purpose of computing the capital gain. In our view this absolute proposition is not well founded. The Assessing Officer must determine whether the price stated in the agreement for sale is in fact the price bargained for by the parties thereto. In other words, the full value of the consideration is neither the market value nor necessarily the price stated in the document for sale but the price actually arrived at between the parties to the transaction. If therefore it is found that the price actually arrived upon between the parties is not the price reflected in the document, it is the price bargained for by the parties to sale that must be considered for determining the capital gain under section 48. The Supreme Court did not hold that inferences cannot be drawn by the Assessing Officer from the facts established. In fact in paragraph-5 the Supreme Court observed that there was no inferential finding that the shares were sold at the market price of ` 620/- per share. This read with the operative part of the order in paragraph-6 remanding the matter to record a finding as to the actual price received makes it clear that the finding can be based on inferences as well. In paragraph-6 the assessee is given an opportunity to explain the unusual nature of the transaction. It cannot be suggested that even if there was no explanation by the assessee, the Assessing Officer was bound not to draw an adverse inference

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 27, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 9(1)(vi) 'Royalty' on transfer of software rights: There is a difference between sale of a 'copyrighted article' and the 'copyright' itself. S. 9(1)(vi) applies only to the latter and not the former. Explanation 4 inserted by FA 2012 w.r.e.f. 01.06.1976 has to be read and understood only in that context and cannot be expanded to bring within its fold transactions beyond the realm of the provision

The provisions of section 9(1)(vi) as a whole, would stand attracted in the case of the latter and not the former. Explanations 4 and 7 relied by the authorities would thus have to be read and understood only in that context and cannot be expanded to bring within its fold transaction beyond the realm of the provision. The Tribunal has relied on the decision of the Division Bench of the Delhi High Court in the case of The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax V. M.Tech India Pvt Ltd, which supports our view as above. It is brought to our notice that the decision of the Delhi High Court has not been accepted by the Department and an SLP is pending. Be that as it may, in view of the facts and circumstances as observed above, we have no hesitation in dismissing the Departmental Appeal answering the questions of law in favour of the assessee and against the Revenue

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DATE: January 11, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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CITATION:
S. 147/ 151: The mere appending of the word "approved" by the CIT while granting approval u/s 151 to the reopening u/s 147 is not enough. While the CIT is not required to record elaborate reasons, he has to record satisfaction after application of mind. The approval is a safeguard and has to be meaningful and not merely ritualistic or formal

Section 151 of the Act clearly stipulates that the CIT (A), who is the competent authority to authorize the reassessment notice, has to apply his mind and form an opinion. The mere appending of the expression ‘approved’ says nothing. It is not as if the CIT (A) has to record elaborate reasons for agreeing with the noting put up. At the same time, satisfaction has to be recorded of the given case which can be reflected in the briefest possible manner. In the present case, the exercise appears to have been ritualistic and formal rather than meaningful, which is the rationale for the safeguard of an approval by a higher ranking officer

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DATE: January 12, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 23, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2002-03
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CITATION:
S. 254(2): Facts recorded by the ITAT have to be accepted as correct and conclusive and cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise. The mere placing of a case law in the paper book does not mean that it was cited before the ITAT and non-consideration thereof is not a mistake apparent from the record. A MA to rectify such alleged mistake of non-consideration of a judgement must be filed as quickly as possible

It is settled position in law that statement of fact recorded in the order of the Court/Tribunal has to be accepted as correct and conclusive. It cannot be contradicted by affidavit or otherwise as held by the Supreme Court in State of Maharashtra vs. Ramdas S. Nayak 1982 (2) SCC 463, Central Bank of India vs. Vrajlal K. Gandhi 2003(6) SCC 573 and Jagvir Singh & Others vs. State (Delhi Admn.) 2007 (5) SCC 359. Thus, mere filing of the paperbook is no indication of the fact that the case law referred to in paperbook was relied upon and submissions made on it during course of hearing of the appeal. Moreover, in cases such as this where it is contended by a party that particular case was not considered by the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority was cited during the course of hearing and is relevant to the issue, then a party would be expected to move the Tribunal as quickly as possible. This for the reason that the issues would be fresh in the mind of the Court/Tribunal/Adjudicating Authority

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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 92A Transfer Pricing: Important law explained on meaning of expression "associated enterprise". The mere fact that an enterprise has de facto participation in the capital, management or control over the other enterprise does not make the two enterprises "associated enterprises" so as to subject their transactions to the rigors of transfer pricing law

If a form of participation in management, capital or control is not recognized by Section 92A(2), even if it ends up in de facto or even de jure participation in management, capital or control by one of the enterprise in the other enterprise, it does not result in the related enterprises being treated as ‘associated enterprises’. Section 92A(1) and (2), in that sense, are required to be read together, even though Section 92A(2) does provide several deeming fictions which prima facie stretch the basic rule in Section 92A(1) quite considerably on the basis of, what appears to be, manner of participation in “control” of the other enterprise. What is thus clear that as long as the provisions of one of the clauses in Section 92A(2) are not satisfied, even if an enterprise has a de facto participation capital, management or control over the other enterprises, the two enterprises cannot be said to be associated enterprises

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DATE: January 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 20, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 206AA: In case where payments have been made to deductees on the strength of the beneficial provisions of s. 115A(1)(b) of the Act or as per DTAA rates r.w.s. 90(2) of the Act, the provisions of s. 206AA cannot be invoked by the AO insisting to deduct tax @ 20% for non-availability of PAN

It is only elementary that, under the scheme of the Income Tax Act 1961- as set out under section 90(2) of the Act, the provisions of the applicable tax treaties override the provisions of the Income Tax Act 1961- except when the provisions of the Act are more beneficial to the assessee. The provisions of the applicable tax treaty, in the present case, prescribe the tax rate @ 10%. This rate of 10% is applicable on the related income whether or not the assessee has obtained the permanent account number. In effect, therefore, even when a foreign entity does not obtain PAN in India, the applicable tax rate is 10% in this case. Section 206AA, which provides a higher tax burden- i.e. taxability @ 20% in the event of foreign entity not obtaining the permanent account number in India, therefore, cannot be pressed into service, as has been done in the course of processing of return under section 200A. To that extent, short deduction of tax at source demand, raised in the course of processing of TDS return under section 200A, is unsustainable in law

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DATE: January 3, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 18, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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CITATION:
S. 9(1): Important law explained as to the taxability of export sale commission payments received by non-resident agents and the obligation of the assessee to deduct TDS thereon in the context of s. 9(1)(i)/ 9(1)(vii) of the Act and relevant provisions of the DTAA

In the light of the above legal position, what we need to decide at the outset is whether the amounts paid by the assessee to the non-resident agents could be termed as “consideration for the rendering of any managerial, technical and consultancy services”. As we do so, it is useful to bear in mind the fact that even going by the stand of the Assessing Officer, at best services rendered by the nonresident to the agent included technical services but it is for this reason that the amounts paid to these agents, on account of commission on exports, should be treated as fees for technical services. Even proceeding on the assumption that these non-resident agents did render the technical services, which, as we will see a little later, an incorrect assumption anyway, what is important to appreciate is that the amounts paid by the assessee to these agents constituted consideration for the orders secured by the agents and not the services alleged rendered by the agents. The event triggering crystallization of liability of the assessee, under the commission agency agreement, is the event of securing orders and not the rendition of alleged technical services. In a situation in which the agent does not render any of the services but secures the business anyway, the agent is entitled to his commission which is computed in terms of a percentage of the value of the order

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