Category: High Court

Archive for the ‘High Court’ Category


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DATE: February 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 201(3): The amendment to s. 201(3) by FA 2014 to extend the time limit for passing s. 201 orders is prospective and does not apply to cases which are already time-barred. A show-cause notice involving a pure point of law can be challenged in a Writ Petition

An accrued right to plead a time barred which is acquired after the lapse of the statutory period is in every sense a right even though it arises under an Act which is procedural. It is a right which is not to be taken away by conferring on the statute a retrospective operation unless such a construction is unavoidable. while amending section 201 by Finance Act, 2014, it has been specifically mentioned that the same shall be applicable w.e.f. 1/10/2014 and even considering the fact that proceedings for F.Y. 2007-08 and 2008-09 had become time barred and/or for the aforesaid financial years, limitation under section 201(3)(i) of the Act had already expired on 31/3/2011 and 31/3/2012, respectively, much prior to the amendment in section 201 as amended by Finance Act, 2014 and therefore, as such a right has been accrued in favour of the assessee

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DATE: February 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 23, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 271(1)(c): Penalty is not leviable on income declared during survey and offered in return. Law laid down in Mak Data 358 ITR 593 (SC) is distinguishable on facts and not universally applicable. A mere change of head of income does not attract penalty

The reliance by the Revenue upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mak Data P. Ltd 358 ITR 593 (SC) to contend that the justification of having deleted and accepted the amount of Rs.1.62 Crores as business income, to buy peace is not available. We find that the facts in that case are completely distinguishable and the observations made therein would not be universally applicable. In that case, a sum of Rs.40.74 lakhs had never been disclosed to the Revenue. During the course of survey, the assessee therein had surrendered that amount with a covering letter that this surrender has been made to avoid litigation and buy peace with the Revenue. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Apex Court held that the words like “to avoid litigation and buy peace” is not sufficient explanation of an assessee’s conduct. It held that the assessee had to offer an explanation for the concealment of income and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by leading cogent and reliable evidence. The Apex Court further records that in the facts of the case before it the surrender of income was not voluntary but was made only on the account of detection by the Assessing Officer during the course of survey. Further, the Apex Court also records the fact that the survey was conducted more than 10 months before the assessee filed its return of income

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DATE: February 10, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 147: Law laid down in DCIT vs. Zuari Estate Development and Investment Co 373 ITR 661 does not mean that in cases where no assessment order is passed and assessment is completed by Intimation u/s 143(1), the sine qua non to show that there is "reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment" is not required. It is open to the assessee to challenge a notice issued u/s 148 as being without jurisdiction for absence of reason to believe even in case where the assessment has been completed earlier by Intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act

It is settled position in law that the decision of the Court has to be read in the context of the facts involved therein and not on the basis of what logically flows therefrom as held by the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat, 1987(1) SCC 213. The Apex Court in Zuari Estate Development and Investment Co. Ltd. (Supra)not having dealt with the issue of reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment on the part of the Assessing Officer in cases where regular assessment was completed by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act, it would not be wise for us to infer that the Supreme Court in Zuari Estate Development and Investment Co. Ltd. (Supra) has held that the condition precedent for the issue of reopening notice namely, reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, has no application where the assessment has been completed by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act. The law on this point has been expressly laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (Supra) and the same would continue to apply and be binding upon us. Thus, even in cases where no assessment order is passed and assessment is completed by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act, the sine qua non to issue a reopening notice is reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In the above view, it is open for the petitioner to challenge a notice issued under Section 148 of the Act as being without jurisdiction for absence of reason to believe even in case where the Assessment has been completed earlier by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act

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DATE: January 29, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 69A: Law on taxability of large gifts received from abroad from donors who are total strangers to the assessee and not related by relationship, business or friendship explained

A question may, however, legitimately arise that such a large amount could not be given as a gift on the marriage of the assessee’s daughter but this question is speculative and cannot form the basis for raising an inference against an assessee. The Assessing Officer was apparently over-awed by the amount of the gift and, therefore, proceeded to base his opinion on his perception that no one would gift such a large amount. A deeming provision requires the Assessing Officer to collect relevant facts and then confront the assessee, who is thereafter, required to explain incriminating facts and in case he fails to proffer a credible information, the Assessing Officer may validly raise an inference of deemed income under section 69-A of the Act

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DATE: February 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2012-13
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S. 147: The reopening of the assessment is not valid if the reasons recorded are incoherent and do not indicate what the basis for reopening is

A plain reading of the reasons recorded for reopening reveals that the reasons are totally incoherent. In fact, a plain reading of it gives rise to doubts whether some lines have gone missing or some punctuation marks have been left out. Grammatically also the reasons recorded make little sense. However, this is the least of the problems. Essentially, the reasons recorded do not indicate what the basis for the reopening of the assessments is

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DATE: February 11, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 37(1): Expenditure in respect of a project which did not materialize has to be treated as revenue expenditure as not capital asset comes into existence

On the question was to whether if the project does not materialize and an asset is not created, expenditure on steps in that direction must be treated as capital expenditure or revenue expenditure, the Supreme Court in Commissioner of Income Tax vs. Madras Auto Service (P) Ltd., reported at (1998) 233 ITR 468 clinches the controversy. There while considering the issue, the Court finds that the assessee could not have claimed it as capital expenditure, as there was no capital asset generated by spending said amount. The expenditure has been held rightly classified as revenue expenditure

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DATE: December 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
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Pursuant to the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 all rights which were available to a Hindu male are now also available to a Hindu female. A daughter is now recognised as a co-parcener by birth in her own right and has the same rights in the co-parcenary property that are given to a son. Consequently, the eldest daughter is entitled to be the Karta of the HUF

The impediment which prevented a female member of a HUF from becoming its Karta was that she did not possess the necessary qualification of co-parcenership. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is a socially beneficial legislation; it gives equal rights of inheritance to Hindu males and females. Its objective is to recognise the rights of female Hindus as co-parceners and to enhance their right to equality apropos succession. Therefore, Courts would be extremely vigilant apropos any endeavour to curtail or fetter the statutory guarantee of enhancement of their rights. Now that this disqualification has been removed by the 2005 Amendment, there is no reason why Hindu women should be denied the position of a Karta. If a male member of an HUF, by virtue of his being the first born eldest, can be a Karta, so can a female member. The Court finds no restriction in the law preventing the eldest female co-parcener of an HUF, from being its Karta. The plaintiff’s father‟s right in the HUF did not dissipate but was inherited by her. Nor did her marriage alter the right to inherit the co-parcenary to which she succeeded after her father‟s demise in terms of Section 6

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DATE: September 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 13, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Transfer Pricing: Companies with large turnover like Infosys & Wipro are not comparable to companies with smaller turnover and should be excluded from the list of comparables

The said Companies are no doubt large and distinct companies where the area of development of subject services are different and as such the profit earned therefrom cannot be a bench-marked or equated with the assessee. The Tribunal whilst passing the impugned Order has considered the said principles whilst coming to the conclusion that the said three Companies cannot be treated to be comparable to the Assessee Company. The turn over is obviously a relevant factor to consider the comparability

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DATE: February 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 9(1)(vi) vs. Article 12 of DTAA: The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) so as to supersede the law laid down in Asia Satellite 332 ITR 340 (Del) and assess transmission fees as “royalty” has no impact on assessees covered by DTAA because a corresponding amendment has not been made to the definition of “royalty” therein. Amendments to domestic law do not affect the DTAA

This Court is of the view that no amendment to the Act, whether retrospective or prospective can be read in a manner so as to extend in operation to the terms of an international treaty. In other words, a clarificatory or declaratory amendment, much less one which may seek to overcome an unwelcome judicial interpretation of law, cannot be allowed to have the same retroactive effect on an international instrument effected between two sovereign states prior to such amendment. In the context of international law, while not every attempt to subvert the obligations under the treaty is a breach, it is nevertheless a failure to give effect to the intended trajectory of the treaty. Employing interpretive amendments in domestic law as a means to imply contoured effects in the enforcement of treaties is one such attempt, which falls just short of a breach, but is nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, indefensible

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DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 271(1)(c)/ 271(1-B): If the notice is issued without application of mind (by striking out the relevant part in the notice), the penalty proceedings are invalid

It is clear that the notice is issued proposing to levy penalty under Section 271(1)(b) of the Act whereas the order is passed by the Assessing Officer under Section 271(1)(c) of the Act which clearly indicates that there was no application of mind by the Assessing Officer while issuing the notice under Section 274 of the Act. As regards Section 271(1-B) of the Act, it clearly indicates that the assessment order should contain a direction for initiation of proceedings. Merely saying that the penalty proceedings have been initiated would not satisfy the requirement, a direction to initiate proceeding shall be clear and not be ambiguous