Search Results For: Gujarat High Court


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DATE: March 21, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: September 26, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 147/148: If the AO reopens the assessment on the incorrect premise that the assessee has not filed a return, the reopening is invalid. The fact that the AO may be justified in the view that income has escaped assessment owing to the capital gains not being computed u/s 50C cannot save the reopening is the reasons do not refer to s. 50C

The Assessing Officer may be correct in pointing out that when the sale consideration as per the sale deed is Rs.50 lakhs but the registering authority has valued the property on the date of sale at Rs.1,18,95,000/for stamp duty calculation, section 50C of the Act would apply, of course, subject to the riders contained therein. However, this is not the cited reason for reopening the assessment

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DATE: June 12, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 20, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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S. 68: Addition of undisclosed income cannot be made on the basis of (a) entries in dairy found during survey & (b) admission of director in s. 133A survey if assessee has filed a retraction and alleged that the entries/ statement were recorded under pressure. A s. 133A statement is merely information simplicitor and not evidence per se. Addition cannot be sustained if the Dept has not investigated the matter and find material to support the addition

The Tribunal in its detailed order noted that the directors during the course of survey, had retracted the statements by filing affidavits. They also claimed that the diaries were created under the pressure of the survey party. The Tribunal noted decision of the Supreme Court in case of Paul Mathews & Sons v Commissioner Of Income Tax reported in [2003] 263 ITR 101 (Ker) and of Supreme Court in case of The Commissioner Of Income Tax vs M/S.S.Khader Khan Son reported in (2012) 25 taxmann.com 413 (Supreme Court), in which, it was highlighted that the statement under section 133A of the Act was not on oath and would have at best a coroborative value

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DATE: May 7, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 29, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 147: Even a s. 143(1) assessment cannot be reopened without proper 'reason to believe'. If the reasons state that the information received from the VAT Dept that the assessee entered into bogus purchases "needed deep verification", it means the AO is reopening for doing a 'fishing or roving inquiry' without proper reason to believe, which is not permissible

It is equally well settled that the notice of reopening can be supported on the basis of reasons recorded by the Assessing Officer. He cannot supplement such reasons. The third principle of law which is equally well settled and which would apply in the present case is that reopening of the assessment would not be permitted for a fishing or a roving inquiry. This can as well be seen as part of the first requirement of the Assessing Officer having reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In other words, notice of reopening which is issued barely for making fishing inquiry, would not satisfy this requirement

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DATE: April 9, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 26, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9/ 40(a)(i)/ 195: Explanation 2 to s. 195(1) inserted by Finance Act 2012 with retrospective effect from 01.04.1962 has bearing while ascertaining payments made to non-residents is taxable under the Act or not. However, it does not change the fundamental principle that there is an obligation to deduct TDS only if the sum is chargeable to tax under the Act. If the conclusion is arrived that such payment does not entail tax liability of the payee under the Act, s. 195(1) does not apply

It is indisputably true that such explanation inserted with retrospective effect provides that obligation to comply with subsection [1] of Section 195 would extend to any person resident or non-resident, whether or not non-resident person has a residence or place of business or business connections in India or any other persons in any manner whatsoever in India. This expression which is added for removal of doubt is clear from the plain language thereof, may have a bearing while ascertaining whether certain payment made to a non-resident was taxable under the Act or not. However, once the conclusion is arrived that such payment did not entail tax liability of the payee under the Act, as held by the Supreme Court in the case of GE India Technology Centre P. Limited [Supra], sub-section [1] of Section 195 of the Act would not apply

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DATE: March 6, 2018 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 3, 2018 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 92CB Transfer Pricing Safe Harbour Rules: If the assessee has exercised the safe harbour option under Rule 10THD(1) & the AO has not passed any order under rule 10THD(4) declaring the exercising of option to be invalid, the option is treated as valid. Thereafter, the Transfer Pricing regime does not apply & the AO has no authority to make any reference to the TPO to ascertain the arm's length price of the assessee's specified domestic transactions. CBDT's circular dated 10.3.2006 could not have and does not lay down anything to the contrary

In the present case, admittedly, after the petitioner exercised such an option, the Assessing Officer passed no order under subrule (4) of rule 10THD declaring that the exercising of option was invalid. In terms of subrule (7) and subrule (8) of the said rule, therefore, the option exercised by the assessee would be treated as valid. Once this conclusion is reached, it follows as a natural and necessary corollary that the Transfer Pricing regime would not apply. That being the case, the Assessing Officer had no authority to make any reference to the TPO to ascertain the arm’s length price of the petitioner’s specified domestic transactions. Reference itself was therefore, invalid. CBDT’s circular dated 10.3.2006 could not have and does not lay down anything to the contrary. The circular merely prescribes the circumstances under which the Assessing Officer would make reference to the TPO. Nowhere does the circular provide that as soon as such circumstances exist, the Assessing Officer would make a reference to the TPO, irrespective of the fact that the assessee had opted for safe harbour and such option was treated or deemed to be treated as validly exercised. Legally speaking, CBDT could not have given any such directive. Eventually no such directive can be discerned from the circular.

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DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 16, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 115JA/ JB Book Profits: Clause (i) to the Explanation was inserted to supersede HCL Comnet 305 ITR 409 (SC). Accordingly, a mere provision for bad debts has to be added back for computation of book profit u/s 115JA/JB. However, in terms of Vijaya Bank 323 ITR 166 (SC), if there is a simultaneous reduction from the loans and advances on the asset side of the balance sheet, the provision amounts to a write-off of the debt which is not hit by clause (i) of the Explanation to section 115JB

By way of culmination of above judicial pronouncements and statutory provisions, the situation that arises is that prior to the introduction of clause(i) to the explanation to section 115JB, as held by the Supreme Court in case of HCL Comnet Systems and Services Ltd. (supra), the then existing clause (c) did not cover a case where the assessee made a provision for bad or doubtful debt. With insertion of clause (i) to the explanation with retrospective effect, any amount or amounts set aside for provision for diminution in the value of the asset made by the assessee, would be added back for computation of book profit under section 115JB of the Act. However, if this was not a mere provision made by the assessee by merely debiting the Profit and Loss Account and crediting the provision for bad and doubtful debt, but by simultaneously obliterating such provision from its accounts by reducing the corresponding amount from the loans and advances on the asset side of the balance sheet and consequently, at the end of the year showing the loans and advances on the asset aside of the balance sheet as net of the provision for bad debt, it would amount to a write off and such actual write off would not be hit by clause (i) of the explanation to section 115JB

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DATE: January 25, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: August 4, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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For purposes of filing a rectification application, the period of limitation of six months commences from the date of receipt of the order sought to be rectified by the assessee and not from the date of passing of the order

The second part of the Section requires that the Tribunal shall make such amendments if the mistake is brought to its notice by either party to the appeal before it. The party to the appeal can bring the fact of apparent mistake on record only after going through the order made by the tribunal. Therefore, to read that the period of limitation has to computed at any time within six months from the date of the order does not fit in either with legislative intent or the language employed by the provision.

15. There is another angle from which the matter can be approached. It is only the party to the appeal who finds that the order contains a mistake apparent from the record and is aggrieved by such mistake, would be in a position to move an application seeking rectification of the order. Therefore also, unless and until a party to the appeal is in a position to go through and study the order it would not be possible, nor can it be envisaged, that a party can claim to be aggrieved by the mistake apparent from the record. Hence, even on this count the period of limitation has to be read and understood so as to mean from the date of the receipt of the order

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DATE: August 5, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 19, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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Interest on NPAs: While determining the tax liability of an assessee, two factors come into play, namely, (i) the recognition of income in terms of the recognised accounting principles and (ii) the computation thereof in terms of the provisions of the Income-tax Act, 1961. While the computation of taxability is solely governed by the provisions of the Income-tax Act and the accounting principles have no role to play, the recognition of income stands on a different footing. Insofar as income recognition is concerned, the RBI Directions prevail in view of s. 45Q of the RBI Act and s. 145 has no role to play. The AO has to follow the RBI Directions

Section 45Q finds place in Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act. Thus, the provisions of Chapter IIIB of the RBI Act have an overriding effect qua other enactments to the extent the same are inconsistent with the provisions contained therein. In order to reflect a bank’s actual financial health in its balance sheet, the Reserve Bank has introduced prudential norms for income recognition, asset classification and provisioning for advances portfolio of the co-operative banks. The guidelines provided thereunder are mandatory and it is incumbent upon all cooperative banks to follow the same. Insofar as income recognition is concerned, clause 4.1.1 of the circular provides that the policy of income recognition has to be objective and based on the record of recovery. Income from non-performing assets (NPA) is not recognised on accrual basis but is booked as income only when it is actually received. Therefore, banks should not take to income account interest on non-performing assets on accrual basis. Thus, in view of the mandate of the RBI Guidelines the assessee cannot recognise income from non-performing assets on accrual basis but can book such income only when it is actually received. Thus, this is a case where at the threshold, the assessee, in view of the RBI Guidelines, cannot recognise income from NPA on accrual basis. This is, therefore, a case pertaining to recognition of income and not computation of the income of the assessee

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DATE: June 20, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 13, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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CITATION:
S. 92A Transfer Pricing: The mere fact that an enterprise has de facto participation in the capital, management or control over the other enterprise does not make the two enterprises "associated enterprises" so as to subject their transactions to the rigors of transfer pricing law

A plain reading of Section 92A makes the legal position quite clear. The basic rule for treating the enterprises as associated enterprises is set out in Section 92A(1). The illustrations in which basic rule finds application are set out in Section 92A(2). Section 92A(1) lays down the basic rule that in order to be treated as associated enterprise one enterprise, in relation to another enterprise, participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, “in the management or control or capital of the other enterprise” or when “one or more persons who participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in its management or control or capital, are the same persons who participate, directly or indirectly, or through one or more intermediaries, in the management or control or capital of the other enterprise” . Section 92(A)(2) only provides illustrations of the cases in which such an enterprise participates in management, capital or control of another enterprise. In other words, what Section 92A (1) decides is the principle on the basis of which one has to examine whether or not two or more enterprise are associated enterprise or not.

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DATE: June 14, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: July 6, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 147: If the subject matter of the reopening is also the subject matter of appeal, the principle of merger would apply. There cannot be two separate considerations to the same subject matter relatable to the income, one by the appellate authority and another by the AO in fresh assessment. Scope of third proviso to s. 147 explained

Section 147 of the Act as is well known, empowers the Assessing Officer to reopen the assessment, subject to certain conditions. 3rd proviso to section 147 however provides that the Assessing Officer may assess or reassess such income other than the income involving the matters which are the subject matters of any appeal, reference or revision, which is chargeable to tax and has escaped assessment. When the subject matter viz. the receipt of transfer of rights in land and the income relatable to such matter was the subject matter of appeal and thereafter second appeal, the principle of merger would apply. There cannot be two separate considerations to the same subject matter relatable to the income. One by the appellate authority or forum and another by the Assessing Officer in fresh assessment