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DATE: February 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 14A/ Rule 8D: Severe strictures passed against the ITAT for taking the view that the presumption laid down in HDFC Bank 366 ITR 505 (Bom) and Reliance Utilities 313 ITR 340 (Bom) that investments in tax-free securities must be deemed to have come out of own funds and (ii) Law laid down in India Advantage (Bom) that s. 14A and Rule 8D does not apply to securities held as stock-in-trade cannot be applied as both propositions are contrary to Godrej & Boyce 328 ITR 81 (Bom). ITAT's order reversed on the ground that it is "Judicial Indiscipline" leading to complete chaos and anarchy in the administration of law

The impugned order of the Tribunal seems to question the decision of this Court in HDFC Bank Ltd. (supra) to the extent it relied upon the decision of this Court in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra). This is by observing that the decision in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd.(supra) it must be appreciated was rendered in the context of Section 36(1)(iii) of the Act and its parameters are different from that of Section 14A of the Act. This Court in its order in HDFC Bank Ltd.(supra) consciously applied the principle of presumption as laid down in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra) and in fact quoted the relevant paragraph to emphasize that the same principle / test of presumption would apply to decide whether or not interest expenditure could be disallowed under Section 14A of the Act in respect of the income arising out of tax free securities. It is not the office of Tribunal to disregard a binding decision of this court. This is particularly so when the decision in Reliance Utilities and Power Ltd. (supra) has been consciously applied by this Court while rendering a decision in the context of Section 14A of the Act

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DATE: January 27, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 3, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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S. 147/ 148: Providing the assessee with the recorded reasons towards the end of the limitation period and passing a reassessment order without dealing with the objections results in gross harassment to the assessee which the Pr. CIT should note & remedy

The Principal Commissioner of Income Tax would take serious note of the above and after examining the facts, if necessary, take appropriate remedial action to ensure that an assessee is not made to suffer for no fault on its part. This is particularly so as almost the entire period of two years from the end of the financial year in which the notice is issued was consumed by the Assessing Officer in failing to give reasons recorded in support of the impugned notice. Nevertheless, the Assessing Officer proceeds to pass a draft Assessment order without dealing with the objections filed by the Petitioner. We could have on that date or even earlier passed an order setting aside the draft assessment order dated 30th March 2015 as it was passed without disposing of the objections. Thus, clearly without jurisdiction. However, we were of the view that although this appears to be a gross case of harassing an Assessee, the Principal Commissioner would take note and adopt remedial action / proceedings

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DATE: February 9, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 23, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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S. 271(1)(c): Penalty is not leviable on income declared during survey and offered in return. Law laid down in Mak Data 358 ITR 593 (SC) is distinguishable on facts and not universally applicable. A mere change of head of income does not attract penalty

The reliance by the Revenue upon the decision of the Apex Court in Mak Data P. Ltd 358 ITR 593 (SC) to contend that the justification of having deleted and accepted the amount of Rs.1.62 Crores as business income, to buy peace is not available. We find that the facts in that case are completely distinguishable and the observations made therein would not be universally applicable. In that case, a sum of Rs.40.74 lakhs had never been disclosed to the Revenue. During the course of survey, the assessee therein had surrendered that amount with a covering letter that this surrender has been made to avoid litigation and buy peace with the Revenue. In the aforesaid circumstances, the Apex Court held that the words like “to avoid litigation and buy peace” is not sufficient explanation of an assessee’s conduct. It held that the assessee had to offer an explanation for the concealment of income and/or furnishing of inaccurate particulars of income by leading cogent and reliable evidence. The Apex Court further records that in the facts of the case before it the surrender of income was not voluntary but was made only on the account of detection by the Assessing Officer during the course of survey. Further, the Apex Court also records the fact that the survey was conducted more than 10 months before the assessee filed its return of income

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DATE: February 10, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2010-11
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S. 147: Law laid down in DCIT vs. Zuari Estate Development and Investment Co 373 ITR 661 does not mean that in cases where no assessment order is passed and assessment is completed by Intimation u/s 143(1), the sine qua non to show that there is "reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment" is not required. It is open to the assessee to challenge a notice issued u/s 148 as being without jurisdiction for absence of reason to believe even in case where the assessment has been completed earlier by Intimation u/s 143(1) of the Act

It is settled position in law that the decision of the Court has to be read in the context of the facts involved therein and not on the basis of what logically flows therefrom as held by the Supreme Court in Ambica Quarry Works Vs. State of Gujarat, 1987(1) SCC 213. The Apex Court in Zuari Estate Development and Investment Co. Ltd. (Supra)not having dealt with the issue of reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment on the part of the Assessing Officer in cases where regular assessment was completed by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act, it would not be wise for us to infer that the Supreme Court in Zuari Estate Development and Investment Co. Ltd. (Supra) has held that the condition precedent for the issue of reopening notice namely, reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment, has no application where the assessment has been completed by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act. The law on this point has been expressly laid down by the Apex Court in the case of Rajesh Jhaveri Stock Brokers P. Ltd. (Supra) and the same would continue to apply and be binding upon us. Thus, even in cases where no assessment order is passed and assessment is completed by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act, the sine qua non to issue a reopening notice is reason to believe that income chargeable to tax has escaped assessment. In the above view, it is open for the petitioner to challenge a notice issued under Section 148 of the Act as being without jurisdiction for absence of reason to believe even in case where the Assessment has been completed earlier by Intimation under Section 143(1) of the Act

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DATE: December 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10 to 2012-13
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S. 254(2A): As the Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” has been struck down in Pepsi Foods 376 ITR 87 (Del) as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, the law laid down in Narang Overseas 295 ITR 22 (Bom) & Ronuk Industries 333 ITR 99 (Bom) that the ITAT has power to grant stay beyond 365 days has to be followed

The ratio of the decision of this Court in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even to the substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act. The basis of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) was that the power to grant stay or interim relief has to be read as coextensive with the power to grant final relief. The object being that in the absence of the power to grant interim relief the final relief itself may be defeated. This Court thereafter followed the decision of the Apex Court in “CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills(P) Ltd., (2005(180) ELT 434 (SC)) and held that notwithstanding the pre-substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act the Tribunal continues to have powers to grant interim relief. In the above view, therefore, the ratio of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even in case of substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act

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DATE: January 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
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S. 268A: Though the low tax effect circular No. 21/2015 dated 10.12.2015 does not refer to references filed u/s 256(1), it has to be held to apply to references as well in view of the objective of the CBDT to focus only on large tax effect matters

One feature in support of the submission that the Circular be not applied to References could be that the References are opinions sought by the Tribunal on questions of law from this Court unlike statutory appeals filed by the parties, seeking the view of the Courts. However though these References are undoubtedly made by the Tribunal, they emanate from an application by one of the parties before it leading to the order giving rise to the question of law requiring the opinion of the Court. This in practice is similar to the statutory appeal under Section 260A of the Act being filed by a party to the High Court for the reason that, this appeal is not considered as a matter of right of the party but only if the court to which the appeal is preferred is satisfied that a substantial question of law arises and admits the appeal for further consideration. Therefore a pending appeal under Section 260A of the Act is no different from a pending Reference in as much as in the case of a Reference the Tribunal is of the view that a substantial question of law arises either on its own (Section 256(1) of the Act) or as directed by Court (Section 256(2) of the Act) which requires the opinion of the Court, while in a pending appeal under Section 260A of the Act which has been admitted, the Court is of the view that a substantial question of law arises which requires due consideration by the Court. Therefore we construe the Circular dated 10th December 2015 as applicable even to pending References in the same manner they apply to pending appeals

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DATE: December 2, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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Transfer Pricing: An adjustment with respect to transfer pricing has to be confined to transactions with Associated Enterprises and cannot be made with respect to transactions with unrelated third parties

In terms of Chapter X of the Act, re-determination of the consideration is to be done only with regard to income arising from International Transactions on determination of ALP. The adjustment which is mandated is only in respect of International Transaction and not transactions entered into by assessee with independent unrelated third parties. This is particularly so as there is no issue of avoidance of tax requiring adjustment in the valuation in respect of transactions entered into with independent third parties. The adjustment as proposed by the Revenue if allowed would result in increasing the profit in respect of transactions entered into with non-AE. This adjustment is beyond the scope and ambit of Chapter X of the Act

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DATE: December 8, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08, 2008-09
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Commission earned by a non-resident agent who carried on business of selling Indian goods outside India cannot be said have deemed to be income which has accrued and/or arisen in India. Circular No. 23 of 1969 & Circular No.786 of 2000 were withdrawn on 22.10.2009. The withdrawal of a Circular cannot have retrospective operation

in CIT v/s. Toshoku Ltd. 125 ITR 525 the Apex Court held that the commission earned by the non-resident agent who carried on the business of selling Indian goods outside India, cannot be said have deemed to be income which has accrued and/or arisen in India. Circular No. 23 of 1969 and its reiteration in Circular No.786 of 2000 were in force during the Assessment Years. It was only subsequently i.e. on 22nd October, 2009 that the earlier Circular of 1969 were withdrawn. However, such subsequent withdrawal of an earlier Circular cannot have retrospective operation as held in UTI v. P. K. Unny 249 ITR 612

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DATE: December 18, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 21, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 1998-89
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Thought there is a difference between leasehold right and ownership right as per the Transfer of Property Act, a leasehold land in the possession of the assessee for a term of 95 years is "belonging" to the assessee and is liable for wealth-tax

We find that the word ‘belonging to the company’ has advisedly been used by the Parliament in Section 40 (2) of the Act. In case the Parliament sought to equate the word ‘belonging to’ mean ownership then in such a case, there would be no reason to use the word ‘belonging to’ and in stead use the word ‘owner of”. The intent in using the word ‘belonging to’ is to include within the provisions of the Act, assets in possession of the Company without full ownership, but sufficient domain over it, to exercise the powers which would otherwise normally vest in the owner on the valuation date. Therefore, the concept of less than full ownership is sought to be introduced by the use of the word ‘belonging to’

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DATE: November 17, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: November 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2005-06
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S. 32/ 43(6): Even assets installed in a discontinued business are eligible for depreciation as part of 'block of assets'

Once the concept of block of assets was brought into effect from assessment year 1989-90 onwards then the aggregate of written down value of all the assets in the block at the beginning of the previous year along with additions made to the assets in the subject Assessment Year depreciation is allowable. The individual asset loses its identity for purposes of depreciation and the user test is to be satisfied at the time the purchased Machinery becomes a part of the block of assets for the first time

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