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COURT:
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DATE: February 23, 2017 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 18, 2017 (Date of publication)
AY: 2014-15
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CITATION:
S. 220(6) stay of demand: CBDT Circular dated 29.2.2016 does not supersede Instruction No.1914 but modifies it. Both have to be read together. The AO and CIT cannot straightaway demand payment of 15% of the dues but have to grant complete stay if the assessment is “unreasonably high pitched” or the demand for depositing 15% of the disputed demand leads to "genuine hardship" to the assessee”

It is true that Instruction No.4 (B)(b) of the Circular dated 29.2.2016, gives two instances where less than 15% can be asked to be deposited. However, it is equally true that the factors, which were directed to be kept in mind both by the Assessing Officer, and by the higher superior authority, contained in Instruction No.2-B(iii) of Circular No.1914, still continue to exist. For, as noted above, the said part of Circular No.1914 has been left untouched by the Circular dated 29.2.2016. Therefore, while dealing with an application filed by an assessee, both the Assessing Officer, and the Prl. CIT, are required to see if the assessee’s case would fall under Instruction No.2-B(iii) of Circular No.1914, or not? Both the Assessing Officer, and the Prl. CIT, are required to examine whether the assessment is “unreasonably high pitched”, or whether the demand for depositing 15% of the disputed demand amount “would lead to a genuine hardship being caused to the assessee” or not?

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DATE: April 25, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 27, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2006-07
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CITATION:
S. 245: Approach of the department of setting off / adjusting refund against demand without serving a prior s. 245 intimation to the assessee and without providing opportunity of hearing to assessee & without arriving at a satisfaction to the effect that such adjustment of refund can only be the mode of recovery of demand is bad in law. Dept directed to refund the amount set off / adjusted together with interest

In our view, the power under Section 245 of the Act, is a discretionary power given to each of the tax officers in the higher echelons to “set off the amount to be refunded or any part of that amount against the same, if any, remaining payable under this Act by the person to whom the refund is due.‟ That this power is discretionary and not mandatory is indicated by the word “may”. Secondly, the set off is in lieu of payment of refund. Thirdly, before invoking the power, the officer is expected to give an intimation in writing to the Assessee to whom the refund is due informing him of the action proposed to be taken under this Section

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DATE: March 16, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): An order disposing off a stay application has to objectively consider the prima facie case on merits, financial hardship and balance of convenience and give reasons for the rejection

We find that neither the Assessing Officer in the impugned orders dated 13th October, 2015 nor the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) in the order dated 25.2.2016 has dealt with the Petitioner’s primary contentions that the amounts received as lease premium and shown as deposits, cannot be taxed as income. This Court has time again set out parameters to be kept in mind while considering the stay application under Section 220(6) of the Act. the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) has completely misunderstood the scope of her powers and issues to be considered while disposing of the stay applications. In the above view, we set aside the orders dated 13th October, 2015 of the Assessing Officer and order dated 25th February, 2016… However, the Petitioner’s stay application is restored to the file of the Commissioner of Income Tax (Exemptions) for fresh disposal in accordance with law and after considering, prima facie, merits of the Petitioner’s case and in accordance with law

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Posted on by itatbar — No Comments ↓
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DATE: March 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: April 5, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
100% stay of demand has to be granted in high pitched assessments as per Instruction No. 96 of 1969

The Tribunal granted 100 percent stay of demand because (a) The assessed income was more than 10 times the returned income. (Instruction 96 of 1969 was relied upon) & (b) The stand taken by the AO was at variance with the stand taken by TPO

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DATE: March 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2012-13
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CITATION:
Strictures passed against high-handed and unfair approach of AO (IRS Officer) in refusing to give an acknowledgement of stay application. Chief CIT directed to ensure such behaviour is not repeated. Dept directed to nominate another AO to hear stay application

We find this conduct on the part of the Assessing Officer to accept a stay application and not immediately give acknowledgement of its receipt is unacceptable. The least that is expected of a civil servant is to be fair and civil. In the absence of the above, his conduct is not one becoming of an Officer belonging to the prestigious Indian Revenue Service. The least that is expected of an Officer is that when a person files an application / letter, which is accepted by him, an acknowledgement should be forthwith given to the party filing the application or letter. In case he refuses to accept the letter he should endorse on the letter / application the reason why it is not being accepted with a line or two for the refusal to accept. In case he does accept it and give an acknowledgment he can deal with the applications/ letters as is appropriate in accordance with law. We believe that what has happened in this case is an aberration. However, the Chief Commissioner of Income Tax would ensure that his Officers do not behave in such an high handed and unfair manner, not expected of civil servants

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COURT:
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DATE: March 17, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: March 28, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): Dept directed to redeposit moneys collected illegally by attachment of assessee’s bank account during pendency of stay application. A order passed on a stay application must give reasons for the refusal to stay the demand

Thus, any action to recover taxes adopting coercive means is not permissible till the petitioner’s application for stay under Section 220(6) of the Act is disposed of. Therefore, the action of the Assessing Officer in attaching the petitioners’ bank accounts under Section 226(3) of the Act as well as subsequent withdrawal of the attached amounts from the bank accounts is without jurisdiction and bad in law. The petitioners have a statutory right to its stay application being heard and disposed of before the Revenue can adopt any coercive proceedings on the basis of the Notice of demand under Section 156 of the Act issued to the assessee. This action on the part of the Assessing Officer, if permitted, would lead Section 220(6) of the Act becoming redundant. In the above view, the Notice under Section 226(3) of the Act issued by the Assessing Officer to the petitioners’ bankers are quashed and set aside. Further, the Assessing Officer is directed to deposit the amount of Rs.7,59,185 in HDFC Bank, Fort, Mumbai and Rs.34,265/in State Bank of India, Byculla, Mumbai within a period of one week from today

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Posted on by editor — 1 Comment ↓
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DATE: December 16, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 15, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10 to 2012-13
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): As the Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” has been struck down in Pepsi Foods 376 ITR 87 (Del) as being arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory, the law laid down in Narang Overseas 295 ITR 22 (Bom) & Ronuk Industries 333 ITR 99 (Bom) that the ITAT has power to grant stay beyond 365 days has to be followed

The ratio of the decision of this Court in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even to the substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act. The basis of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) was that the power to grant stay or interim relief has to be read as coextensive with the power to grant final relief. The object being that in the absence of the power to grant interim relief the final relief itself may be defeated. This Court thereafter followed the decision of the Apex Court in “CCE vs. Kumar Cotton Mills(P) Ltd., (2005(180) ELT 434 (SC)) and held that notwithstanding the pre-substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act the Tribunal continues to have powers to grant interim relief. In the above view, therefore, the ratio of the decision in “Narang Overseas (P) Ltd.” (supra) would apply even in case of substituted third proviso to Section 254(2A) of the Act

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DATE: June 12, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: June 27, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09, 2009-10
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A) third proviso cannot be interpreted to mean that extension of stay of demand should be denied beyond 365 days even when the assesseee is not at fault. ITAT should make efforts to decide stay granted appeals expeditiously

One cannot lost sight of the fact that there may be number of reasons due to which the learned Tribunal is not in a position to decide and dispose of the appeals within the maximum period of 365 days despite their best efforts. Some of the reasons due to which the learned Tribunal despite its best efforts is not in a position to dispose of the appeal/appeals at the earliest are stated herein above. There cannot be a legislative intent to punish a person/ assessee though there is no fault of the assessee and/or appellant

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COURT:
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COUNSEL: ,
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: May 19, 2015 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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CITATION:
S. 254(2A): The Third Proviso which restricts the power of the ITAT to grant stay beyond 365 days “even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee” is arbitrary, unreasonable and discriminatory. It is struck down as violative of Article 14. The ITAT has the power to extend stay even beyond 365 days

While it could be argued that the condition that the stay order could be extended beyond a period of 180 days only if the delay in disposing of the appeal was not attributable to the assessee was a reasonable condition on the power of the Tribunal to the grant an order of stay, it can, by no stretch of imagination, be argued that where the assessee is not responsible for the delay in the disposal of the appeal, yet the Tribunal has no power to extend the stay beyond the period of 365 days. The intention of the legislature, which has been made explicit by insertion of the words – ‘even if the delay in disposing of the appeal is not attributable to the assessee’– renders the right of appeal granted to the assessee by the statute to be illusory for no fault on the part of the assessee. The stay, which was available to him prior to the 365 days having passed, is snatched away simply because the Tribunal has, for whatever reason, not attributable to the assessee, been unable to dispose of the appeal

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COURT:
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DATE: October 29, 2014 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: December 4, 2014 (Date of publication)
AY: 2011-12
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CITATION:
S. 220(6): Law laid down on the guidelines that have to be followed while considering a stay application

(i) At the very outset, it must be pointed out that the manner in which the Assessing Officer has disposed of the application for stay by impugned order is in complete breach of the directions of this Court as set …

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