Search Results For: Delhi High Court


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DATE: February 18, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 22, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08 to 2012-13
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S. 147: The reopening of the assessment is not valid if the reasons recorded are incoherent and do not indicate what the basis for reopening is

A plain reading of the reasons recorded for reopening reveals that the reasons are totally incoherent. In fact, a plain reading of it gives rise to doubts whether some lines have gone missing or some punctuation marks have been left out. Grammatically also the reasons recorded make little sense. However, this is the least of the problems. Essentially, the reasons recorded do not indicate what the basis for the reopening of the assessments is

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DATE: December 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 16, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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Pursuant to the amendment to the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 by the Hindu Succession (Amendment) Act, 2005 all rights which were available to a Hindu male are now also available to a Hindu female. A daughter is now recognised as a co-parcener by birth in her own right and has the same rights in the co-parcenary property that are given to a son. Consequently, the eldest daughter is entitled to be the Karta of the HUF

The impediment which prevented a female member of a HUF from becoming its Karta was that she did not possess the necessary qualification of co-parcenership. Section 6 of the Hindu Succession Act is a socially beneficial legislation; it gives equal rights of inheritance to Hindu males and females. Its objective is to recognise the rights of female Hindus as co-parceners and to enhance their right to equality apropos succession. Therefore, Courts would be extremely vigilant apropos any endeavour to curtail or fetter the statutory guarantee of enhancement of their rights. Now that this disqualification has been removed by the 2005 Amendment, there is no reason why Hindu women should be denied the position of a Karta. If a male member of an HUF, by virtue of his being the first born eldest, can be a Karta, so can a female member. The Court finds no restriction in the law preventing the eldest female co-parcener of an HUF, from being its Karta. The plaintiff’s father‟s right in the HUF did not dissipate but was inherited by her. Nor did her marriage alter the right to inherit the co-parcenary to which she succeeded after her father‟s demise in terms of Section 6

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DATE: February 8, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: February 12, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: -
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S. 9(1)(vi) vs. Article 12 of DTAA: The retrospective amendment to s. 9(1)(vi) so as to supersede the law laid down in Asia Satellite 332 ITR 340 (Del) and assess transmission fees as “royalty” has no impact on assessees covered by DTAA because a corresponding amendment has not been made to the definition of “royalty” therein. Amendments to domestic law do not affect the DTAA

This Court is of the view that no amendment to the Act, whether retrospective or prospective can be read in a manner so as to extend in operation to the terms of an international treaty. In other words, a clarificatory or declaratory amendment, much less one which may seek to overcome an unwelcome judicial interpretation of law, cannot be allowed to have the same retroactive effect on an international instrument effected between two sovereign states prior to such amendment. In the context of international law, while not every attempt to subvert the obligations under the treaty is a breach, it is nevertheless a failure to give effect to the intended trajectory of the treaty. Employing interpretive amendments in domestic law as a means to imply contoured effects in the enforcement of treaties is one such attempt, which falls just short of a breach, but is nevertheless, in the opinion of this Court, indefensible

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 29, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05 to 2011-12
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S. 245F: The Settlement Commission does not have the power to direct a special audit u/s 142(2A)

The exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement commission to exercise the powers and perform the functions of an income tax authority, in terms of section 245F(2) of the said Act, is to be exercised and performed for the purpose of settlement of the case under Chapter XIX-A and not for assessment under Chapter XIV. That being the case, the powers and functions which are in the exclusive jurisdiction of the settlement commission are circumscribed by the object and role which has been ascribed to the settlement commission, which is to settle the case in terms of the procedure stipulated in Chapter XIX-A. Since assessment of the type contemplated under section 143(3) is outside the purview of settlement proceedings, a special audit under section 142(2A), which is in aid of assessment, would also be beyond the scope of settlement proceedings

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DATE: January 14, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2004-05
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S. 147: Reopening of assessment to take remedial action pursuant to audit objections as per Instruction No. 9 of 2006 is not valid if AO disagrees with the objections. Instruction No. 9 cannot override the requirement in s. 147 that AO should form his own belief that income has escaped assessment

The Court holds instruction No. 9 of the CBDT dated 7th November, 2006 cannot possibly override the statutory powers to be exercised by an AO in terms of Section 147 of the Act. In other words the said instruction has to be read consistent with proviso (a) to Section 119 (1) of the Act and cannot, as was erroneously understood by the Respondent, compel the AO to issue the notice u/s 148. If the CBDT Instruction No. 9/2006 is read to the contrary, it would fall foul of Section 119 of the Act.

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DATE: January 19, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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S. 9(1)(vi): While consideration paid to acquire the right to use software is assessable as "royalty", payments made for purchase of software as a product is not for use or the right to use the software and is not assessable as "royalty"

In the cases where an Assessee acquires the right to use a software the payment so made would amount to royalty. However in cases where the payments are made for purchase of software as a product, the consideration paid cannot be considered to be for use or the right to use the software. It is well settled that where software is sold as a product it would amount to sale of goods. In the case of Tata Consultancy Services v. State of Andhra Pradesh (2004) 271 ITR 401 (SC), the Supreme Court examined the transactions relating to the purchase and sale of software recorded on a CD in the context of the Andhra Pradesh General Sales Tax Act. The court held the same to be goods within the meaning of Section 2(b) of the said Act and consequently exigible to sales tax under the said Act. Clearly, the consideration paid for purchase of goods cannot be considered as ‘royalty’. Thus, it is necessary to make a distinction between the cases where consideration is paid to acquire the right to use a patent or a copyright and cases where payment is made to acquire patented or a copyrighted product/ material. In cases where payments are made to acquire products which are patented or copyrighted, the consideration paid would have to be treated as a payment for purchase of the product rather than consideration for use of the patent or copyright

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DATE: January 6, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2001-02
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S. 50B/43(6)(c): In computing the net worth for computing capital gains from a slump sale, depreciation on assets have to be deducted even if not claimed by the assessee

Plainly, the purpose of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act is to provide a methodology to compute the written down value of the block of assets transferred by an Assessee as a part of the undertaking or division sold by way of a slump sale. The reference to Clause C is clearly not for the purposes of computing the block of assets remaining with the Assessee after the slump sale. It is apparent from the above that the intended object and scope of Clause C as used in Section 50B of the Act is totally different than the purpose of the said provision when read as a part of Section 43 of the Act. In the circumstances, clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act must be read in a manner to expressly include the computation provisions of Clause C without reference to other the import of the said provisions of Section 43 of the Act. In our view, the ITAT fell into error in importing the interpretation of Clause C read as a part of Section 43 of the Act, to interpret the scope of clause (a) of Explanation 2 to Section 50B of the Act

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DATE: January 13, 2016 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 25, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2009-10
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S. 79: The transfer of shares of an Indian company by a holding Co (Yum Asia) to another holding Co (Yum Singapore) results in change of “beneficial ownership” of shares and results in disallowance of b/fd losses even though the ultimate beneficial owner remains Yum USA. The corporate veil cannot be pierced to regard the ultimate holding Co as the beneficial owner

Having examined the facts as well as the concurrent orders of the AO and the ITAT, the Court finds that there was indeed a change of ownership of 100% shares of Yum India from Yum Asia to Yum Singapore, both of which were distinct entities. Although they might be AEs of Yum USA, there is nothing to show that there was any agreement or arrangement that the beneficial owner of such shares would be the holding company, Yum USA. The question of ‘piercing the veil’ at the instance of Yum India does not arise. In the circumstances, it was rightly concluded by the ITAT that in terms of Section 79 of the Act, Yum India cannot be permitted to set off the carry forward accumulated business losses of the earlier years

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DATE: December 10, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2007-08
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CUP method can be applied by a comparing a pricing formulae, rather than the pricing quantification in amount. Rule 10AB inserted w.e.f. 01.04.2012 is beneficial in nature and so retrospective w.e.f. 01.04.2002

Rule 10B(1)(f) inserted vide notification dated 23rd May 2012 is not a residual method in the sense that it is not a condition precedent for the application of this method that all other methods set out in s. 92C (1)(a) to 92C(1)(e) and as elaborated under rule 10B(1)(a) to (e), must fail and only then this method can be applied. This method is at par with all other methods of determining the arm’s length price as set out in sections 92C(1)(a) to (f), and, in terms of Section 92C(2), the most appropriate method, referred to in Section 92C(1), “shall be applied, for determination of arm’s length price, in the manner prescribed”. Therefore, as long as the method covered by rule 10AB, which is duly covered by Section 92C(1) satisfies the test of being the ‘most appropriate method’, it can be applied to a fact situation. The expression ‘ price which….would have been charged on paid” is used in rule 10BA, dealing with this method, in this method the place of “price charged or paid”, as is used in rule 10B(1)(a), dealing with CUP method, such an expression not only covers the actual price but also the price as would have been, hypothetically speaking, paid if the same transaction was entered into with an independent enterprise. This hypothetical price may not only cover bonafide quotations, but it also takes it beyond any doubt or controversy that where pricing mechanism for associated enterprise and independent enterprise is the same, the price charged to the associated enterprises will be treated as an arm’s length price. In this view of the matter, the business model said to have been adopted by the assessee, in principle, meets the test of arm’s length price determination under rule 10BA as well

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DATE: December 22, 2015 (Date of pronouncement)
DATE: January 1, 2016 (Date of publication)
AY: 2008-09
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Transfer pricing of AMP Expenditure: the onus is on the Revenue to demonstrate by tangible material that there is an international transaction involving AMP expenses between the Indian Co and the AE. In the absence of that first step, the question of determining the ALP of such a transaction does not arise. In the absence of a machinery provision it is hazardous for any TPO to proceed to determine the ALP of such a transaction since Bright Line Test has been negatived as a valid method of determining the existence of an international transaction and thereafter its ALP

The provisions under Chapter X do envisage a ‘separate entity concept’. In other words, there cannot be a presumption that in the present case since WOIL is a subsidiary of Whirlpool USA, all the activities of WOIL are in fact dictated by Whirlpool USA. Merely because Whirlpool USA has a financial interest, it cannot be presumed that AMP expense incurred by the WOIL are at the instance or on behalf of Whirlpool USA. There is merit in the contention of the Assessee that the initial onus is on the Revenue to demonstrate through some tangible material that the two parties acted in concert and further that there was an agreement to enter into an international transaction concerning AMP expenses